

An Integral Theory of Cultural Evolution

Toward a New Synthesis of
Language, Interaction, Thought & Emotion

Working Draft - 8.1

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Abbreviations

aCC – anterior Cingulate Cortex

ACES – Adverse Childhood Experiences

ACT – Affect Control Theory

ANS – Autonomic Nervous System

AQAL – All Quadrants All Levels

AR – Authority Ranking

BAS – Behavioral Activation System

BIAS – Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes

BIS – Behavioral Inhibition System

CAD – Contempt (C), Anger (A), Disgust (D). See *CAD Hypothesis*.

CAM – Conceptual Act Model

CCR – Cultural Cognition of Risk

CEN – Central Executive Network

CP – Categorical Perception

CS – Communal Sharing

CTE – Constructed Theory of Emotion

DMN – Default Mode Network

DVC – Dorsal Vagal Complex

E/S – Expectations/Sanctions Model

ECT – Evolutionary-Coalitional Theory

EDD – Eye Direction Detector

EEA — Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness

EEG — Electroencephalographic

ELS — Early Life Stress

EM — Equality Matching

EMT — Error Management Theory

EPA — Evaluation (E), Potency (P), Activation (A). See *Semantic Differential*.

ESA — Emotional Self-Alienation.

HRV — Heart Rate Variability

HPA — Hypothalmo-Pituitary Adrenal

HVIC — Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism

IToCE — Integral Theory of Cultural Evolution

ITPRA — Imagination, Tension, Prediction, Reaction, Appraisal

MFT — Moral Foundations Theory

MNS — Mirror Network System

MP — Market Pricing

NGS — Neuronal Group Selection

PCC — Posterior Cingulate Cortex

PRT — Plural Rationality Theory

OCC — Ortony, Clore & Collins Emotion Model

OFC — Orbitofrontal Cortex

PFC — Prefrontal Cortex

PNS — Parasympathetic Nervous System

PP — Predictive Processing

PSToE — Power & Status Theory of Emotion

rAIC — right Anterior Insular Cortex

ROI — Representamen, Object, and Interpretant

RWA — Right Wing Authoritarianism

SAM — Shared Attention Mechanism

SCE — Self-Conscious Emotion

SCM — Social Content Model

SD — Semantic Differential

SDO — Social Dominance Orientation

SES — Social Engagement System

SNS — Sympathetic Nervous System

SI — Symbolic Interactionism

SIM — Social Intuitionist Model

SN — Salience Network

SPT — Self-Perception Theory

STS — Superior Temporal Sulcus

SVS — Schwartz Value Survey

SVT — Schwartz Value Theory

TCA — Theory of Communicative Action

TCE — Theory of Constructed Emotion

TMS — Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation

TPJ — Temporoparietal Junction

VVC — Ventral Vagal Complex

WMC – Working Memory Capacity

WEIRD – Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic

Abstract

In this paper I attempt to demonstrate that Affect Control Theory (ACT) provides a robust theoretical framework for a complete theory of Human Cultural Evolution. I posit that Affect Control Theory explains the actual mechanism of the human cultural engine when viewed from an Integral perspective; that is, when viewed from perspectives across biological and social scientific theories. By orienting analytic models from across many different disciplines, the functioning of human social interaction can be seen to interact from Subjective, Objective, Individual and Collective perspectives. Weaving together these four perspectives shows how human social interaction functions in the Psychological, Biological, Cultural and Social domains. This Integral perspective of human social interaction posits a plausible explanation for the emergence of culture, yields important insights into human personal and group evolution, provides a roadmap for human evolutionary growth and development, and diminishes the division between the emotional and the cognitive.

Integral Theory provides a methodological framework for organizing epistemological knowledge into a systematized framework by aligning disciplines across a cartesian graph created by the intersection of Individual-Collective and Interior-Exterior perspectives. Integral Theory's methodology can be modified to model the human evolutionary system by mapping the analytic models from a variety of social and biological sciences spanning different epistemological levels. Each discipline's analytic produces a pattern, which when compared with other analytics, reveals a deep underlying commonality. These can be transformed and aligned to reveal a patterning of patterns related to an underlying morphological structure at the intersection of language, interaction, thought, and emotion. These aligned patterns create a higher order of information which can help to envision a deeper understanding both across and between epistemological levels.

From the collected integration of Cultural, Social, Interpersonal, Psychological, and Neurophysiological perspectives and the development of integral theories, a new synthesis can be made to provide the following:

1. Compilation of a Social Self Model aligning analytics along universal dimensions across ontological levels.
2. Integration of micro macro theory of levels in the Social Self Model.

3. A synthesis of semiotic self theory and representational conscious states.
4. Hypothesizing Affect Control Theory's expansion to include aspects of the Social Self Model.
5. A Universal Theory of Emotion uniting constructionist and nativist theories of emotion across various disciplines related to fuzzy categorization of autonomic modes of control.
6. Decoding of an Emotion Taxonomy from the structural dimensions of Power and Status Theory of Emotion.
7. Integration of Relational Models Theory, the Big Three Ethics, and Moral Foundations Theory with Grid-Group Theory.
8. An explanation of why Moral Foundations pattern as they do and why different ideologies value moral foundations differently.
9. A new understanding of Spiral Dynamics' ^MEMEs differentiated by prototype Moral Motivations rather than person perspective.
10. An analytic framework for confirming the validity of Integral Theory's basic model.

Keywords: **Affect Control Theory, Cultural Evolution, Integral Theory, Emotion Theory, Power Status Theory, Salience Network, Morality, Interoception, Categorization, Semiotics, Pragmatism, Theory of Levels**

Preface

The basic premise of this study posits that a mathematized theory in sociological social psychology providing a framework for understanding, modeling and simulating social interaction and the production of emotion can be reframed to integrate emotion theories from many different disciplines. That theory can be used to verify claims made by this study of a new synthesis of social and biological theories, yielding a deeper understanding of the coordination between language, interaction, thought, and emotion across the Cultural, Social, Interpersonal, Psychological, and Neurophysiological domains.

Social interaction and engagement are foundational to human experience, as humans are a social species. This interaction is felt, interpreted, expressed, and coordinated symbolically between social actors, through which emerge psychological, interpersonal, social structural and cultural symbolic domains which are thought to have appeared all at once with the emergence of language (Wiley, 1995). Individuals attempt to interpret social others, deducing meaning of events through the melding of affective and semantic information which can be interpreted at these many different levels of a complex system. Similarly, from an external, objective perspective, the study of human behavior produces meaning across each of these domains, so theories from only one domain cannot produce a comprehensive theory of human experience alone. Only by taking a broader, systems-level approach will it be possible to understand the fuller picture the human social system, and perhaps, its relation in the overall larger living world system. Such a synthesis, if possible, must overcome academically silohed domains, a process now happening rapidly as science and other knowledge systems are being brought together in interdisciplinary study and systems level thinking. However, a new "knowledge synthesis" of biology and the social sciences is needed (Brewer, 2016).

This study seeks to provide a framework for a new synthesis by using out of the box thinking. By taking the liberty of relaxing certain methodological rules about mixing models or levels of analysis to grasp the larger picture from a generalists' point of view, this study takes as a basic premise that the similarities between patterns of difference noted across fields of study and knowledge domains can be compared, not necessarily exactly or analytically, but analogously, correlatively and generally, revealing hidden symmetries and alignments. Such analogous features may be more than simple examples of convergence, instead indicative of a deeper, underlying unity. A broad coherence of

theories, each generally pointing towards a similar patterning of pattern, even if any individual theory tells only part of the story, can yield collectively strong evidence in support of an ambitious systems theory, an example of Consilience (E.O. Wilson, 1998).

Such consilience within the Social Sciences has already been noticed and provides the underlying girding of this study. Consilience between the analytics of a great many social science models has been noted by Kemper & Collins (1990), who study the universal dimensions of microinteraction, namely Power and Status. They review many studies across domains having similar underlying analytical dimensions, which when plotted on cartesian graphs, yield similar patterning. The heterogenous patterns across an analytic reveal phenomena at that level can be “psychologically reducible to a more basic set of properties” (Guttman, 1957, quoted by Barrett, 2006a: 35). Similarly, the pattern of patterns across analytics, too, reveal a similarity which must relate to a hidden underlying unity relating social interaction to patterns of group dynamics, psychological phenomena, the automatic functioning of the nervous system, patterns in language processing, etc. This study seeks to explore general patterns between these domains, and then, to see how they can be interpreted to reveal a deeper understanding of humanity.

The methodology used by this study begins with the alignment of analytical models from studies across cultural, sociological, neurophysiological, behavioral and psychological scientific theories. Some analytics must be isomorphically reoriented so that universal dimensions align in the same direction while still preserving the features and integrity of those models. The accumulation of analytics from across theories in the social and biological sciences reveal a similar patterning across the four quadrants of the cartesian map, accumulated in a model this study names the Social Self Model. Their heterogenous pattern can be compared to the patterns of sister analytics, both within each and across quadrants, revealing an alignment of knowledge between and across levels. The similarity of patterns across analytics show that they share some commonality or underlying phenomena of which each has some unique perspective. Only by taking an integral perspective integrating the different knowledge perspective parts can a fuller picture of the whole emerge, if only generally.

From this integral perspective, the big picture involves a constellation of concepts which human thinkers have spent ages speculating and studying their deeper connection: Language, Interaction,

Thought, and Emotion. Surely they are deeply connected, and much of modern science and philosophy have focused on integrating them into an overall framework. And yet a framework for deeply integrating these have not yet emerged.

Throughout this study, special attention is paid to the growing narrative that language, interaction, thought, and emotion too have some commonality. It is said that our evolutionary history is embedded in the structure and function of the brain, which can aid in understanding how the brain has evolved and how it has changed function. So too, does the body have an evolutionary history tied to that same structure. The brain and body have evolved together in a deeply interconnected nested hierarchical system of systems which must be considered together when theorizing about their evolution. Together, brain and body, comprise a whole system, yet at some point they became separate parts, studied independently, with wholly separate sciences. This study posits their unity, as, they represent the hardware of the system, with much functionality built into the dense connections within and between them. Language serves as something shared across brains and bodies, providing a connecting piece which systematizes and coordinate interaction and thought via affect, the component of emotion that serves as the data of the system.

It is this data which provides a common theme across all levels, in the form of affect and emotion. While many different theories of emotion have been offered, no coherent universal model of emotion has yet to emerge. A truly integrative model of emotion must integrate neurophysiological, psychological, social, and cultural theories of emotion in a coherent framework. While searches for localized correlates of specified emotions continue, several theories point to emotions arising as a result of general processing systems with no dedicated emotion circuits.

Affect Control Theory offers a theoretical model and platform for decoding an integrated theory of emotion. It is the modeling of impression formation and emotion generation from social action where the various levels meet. ACT's symbolic action implemented by hierarchical control systems matches the overall evidence from across the accumulated evidence of the Social Self Model. ACT's simulation software could be expanded to confirm theoretic predictions of component theories included in the Social Self Model, specifically in a new theory of emotion, and ultimately in measuring the change and evolution of culture.

This study offers a synthesis of these theories, positing that emotions correlate to how humans integrate and exchange information at various levels, from the deeply felt internal subjective experience of embodied emotions to the exchange of affect in social interaction to cultural meaning systems grouped around cultural emotions. A universal theory of emotion is proposed, psycho-physiologically constrained by the psychological categorization of the functioning of the autonomic nervous system, as explained by category theory, to yield a model constrained by biology yet malleable at the cultural level. Further, a complete emotion taxonomy can be built from the combined Power and Status Theory of Emotion and the autonomic theory of emotion.

Then, theories of morality in agreement with this model of emotion are used to construct an analytic that expands upon Moral Foundations and shows its relation to regulatory strategies spanning multiple person perspectives. The moral model is then expanded to integrate other competing theories of morality and then expanded to include models at other ontological levels which build a nested set of analytics which expand morality to include social relational regulation, norms and sanctioning, and ideology. That moral model then serves put the patterning of culture into context and preview an Integral model of morality.

This evidence together can be synthesized to see development and evolution in a new light. Evolution operates not simply at the biological genetic level, but at various levels in a deeply connected hierarchy of systems. It is the evolution of the symbolic where group level evolutionary forces outpace biological evolution, coordinated by language and emotion. Systems of group emotion coordination provide the cultural-moral engines essential to the evolution of human culture which is distinguished from the evolved psychological mechanisms of “evoked” culture. A bigger picture of the pattern of those systems provides the general template for a new theory of Cultural Evolution.

Introduction

“It is a narrow mind which cannot look at a subject from various points of view.” George Eliot, Middlemarch

The parable of the Blind men and the Elephant, a story passed down across millennia from the ancient wisdom tradition of the Indian subcontinent, has often been used to explain how basic reality can be perceived or described in vastly different terms by people directly observing some common phenomenon. In that story, a group of blind men happen upon an elephant for the first time in their lives. Surrounding the elephant, they each reach out and feel the elephant, but their experience and descriptions wildly diverge from one another.

One man feels the elephant’s side, describing it as sturdy like a wall. A second man feels the elephant’s smoothly long and sharp tusk and describes it as like a spear. A third feels the elephant’s trunk, describing it as coiled and long like a snake. Another feel the elephant’s wrinkled knee, describing it as thick and round like a tree. A fifth feels the elephant’s large, floppy ear, describing it as like a fan. The last man feels the elephant’s tail, describing it as like a rope. Each argues with the others, and they come to blows with each insisting they are certain what they experienced represented the real truth of an elephant.




The Blind Men and the Elephant (Wikipedia)

This parable is oft cited within the sciences, serving as a metaphor for how subjective experience of the world, or perhaps methodologically different ways of measurement, may result in vastly different explanations or models of the same phenomena. Oftentimes, our direct subjective perception of the world differs from others, which triggers an instinct to defend our experiential reality as true, while casting others' as false. Even the great debates within academia between rival theories regarding the reality of some particular phenomenon, each producing supporting empirical evidence but oppositely drawn conclusions, can be fought tooth-and-nail over which framework best describes reality. However, many theoretical debates result from differences in perspective, seeing the world or measuring a phenomena from different ontological levels, of which the collective human mind has great capability as evidenced by the tremendous increase in interdisciplinary fields of study.

However, there are regularities in how we differently see the world. Curiously, these regularities often have a pattern of difference resembling other patterns of difference across different levels in which humans perceive, experience, feel, and name the world. That resemblance of pattern of differences appears in various analytic models produced to support scientific theories, showing the variance of humans according to some salient aspect of a phenomena. Quite usually, this pattern emerges from measuring the co-variance of two independent variables, which when compared together produce a pattern of four distinct types. The basic form of such an analytic is the simple Cartesian graph, which on one axis shows the spectrum of variance of one variable, while on a perpendicular axis, the variance of the other variable. This divides the analytic space into four quadrant regions, representing a taxonomy of four recognizable ways in which these two phenomena relate.

An early typology of the ancient western world having this pattern of four was which sought to explain the basic building blocks from which reality emerged through the interaction of Earth, Air, Water, and Fire. These primordial types served as symbolic archetypes, from which complex phenomena could be understood as constructions using simpler forms. The elements of Earth, Air, Water, and Fire were symbolically represented by transformations of some archetypal form or object, of which each element's symbol iconically matched an aspect of reality which set it apart, and in relation to, the other basic types.




The Ancient Elements (Wikipedia)

The ancient greek word stoicheion (στοιχεῖον) originally meaning the series of marks the shadow the gnomon (etymology: *the interpreter*) of a sundial traverses to measure the time of day, transformed meaning to generally describe a series, the component parts, or the elements from which some larger phenomena was composed (<https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CE%9C%CE%91%CE%95%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%91%CE%95>). The greeks used stoicheion as a general categorical term, not only to describe the ancient physical elements, but also to describe elements of knowledge across the important fields of their early sciences: the first sounds used in spoken language (Phonology); the elemental parts of speech (Grammar); the basic units of math (Arithmetic); the points and lines used to draw shapes (Geometry); the major premises of a syllogism (Logic and Reason).

Two millennia passed until the European middle ages, when the rediscovery of the Ancient Greek

sciences and philosophy brought about the Renaissance through reestablished trade and export of knowledge with Arabic cultures whom kept alive ancient Greek scholarship during the European dark ages. European and Arabic learned men vigorously attempted to understand their current reality through experimentation, which saw the development of laboratory techniques and the scientific method. However, the antiquarian stoicheion of elements was still used as the model of the basic building blocks of reality. Their pursuits in Alchemy (etymology: *to tear apart*) was an attempt to find ways to purify materials into the basic elements.

The European discovery of Aristotelian texts added the four basic qualities of the elements, which represented two equal and opposite, yet complementary, pairs of forces or characteristics which described the interaction and transformation of the ancient elements. Hot and Cold were seen as an active force which drive change, while Wet and Dry were seen as passive forces produced by the active force. Modern traditions have since connected the Chinese concepts of Yang to cross combinations of Hot and Dry, while Yin to Cold and Wet. Thus, the Ancient elements could be seen as Fire being composed of Hot + Dry, Air of Wet + Hot, Water of Cold + Wet, while Earth of Dry + Cold. These shared qualities brought the elements into relation, which influenced experimental alchemic methods.



The Systematized Elements of Alchemy (Wikipedia)

Several centuries later, after real successes in developing the early sciences of the Renaissance, the pursuit of Alchemy continued as esoteric, magical, and spiritual practices in hopes of resurrecting some ancient wisdom forgotten over the ages. These esoteric pursuits greatly affected both the arts and literature of the time, which included works containing cryptic mysticism and symbolism. Yet, the tradition occurred outside of the empirical sciences, which continued to methodically *tear apart* phenomena into theorized constituent parts and to use the scientific method to rule out failed hypothesis and reinforce supported hypothesis.

The study of the ancients continued to influence science, literature, and culture up through the early twentieth century. It was Freud who integrated the pre-Socratic Greek philosophy of Empedocles, who theorized the ancient elements changed through the action of only two forces that were seen as equal and opposite. These two forces were envisioned as to equal to Love, which bound together the basic elements; and Strife, which disintegrated the whole into its constituent parts, which Freud recast as Eros and Thantos (Kemper, 2007). Later in the mid-twentieth century, empirical techniques uncovered two forces resembling these two archetypes as the primary dimensions underlying the social world, which surprisingly appeared in the analytics of many other theories within the Social Sciences (Kemper, 2007).


The resounding success in the Physical Sciences to discover the ultimate building blocks of matter using reductionist methodologies, confirming very accurate predictions, such as the measure of the energy of the electron, greatly influenced the Social Sciences to adopt similar reductionist methodologies and soon dominated research. Yet other methodological perspectives within the Social Sciences persisted, and since the cognitive revolution, have come into conflict with those newer perspectives, causing great conflict between competing theories of reality within and between endeavors in the Physical Sciences, Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities, and Philosophy.

The analytics in the Social Sciences often measure the variation of different aspects human interaction from different levels over two co-varying dimensions, producing typologies which have similar family resemblances. But human interaction is different than atomic particle interaction, and “the map is not the territory” and “the word is not the thing” (Korzybski, 1933), and these typologies aren’t reality, but models of reality, or re-presentations of reality (Bateson, 1972). The parts they dissemble from the whole of some phenomena co-varying across two dimensions are difficult to

measure exactly, yet their distinct patterning intrigues. And the stoicheion used to describe the constituent parts of that phenomena becomes reified, and is taken as real. These typologies, then, become generalized and recurrent, generating whole folk logics in which to understand the world. And yet, the resemblances between these different typologies of parts of wholes signify something important. By aligning the knowledge from across many of these analytics, comparing the parts of wholes at one level to the parts of wholes at others, and linking fact-based theory across disciplines and levels, a common groundwork of explanation can made to show Consilience, or the unity within the Social and Biological Sciences.

What is now needed is an integration of the knowledge from across these different perspectives and levels to encompass both bottom up and top down methodologies into a new theoretical framework. One which can explain the commonalities across and between levels of study. One which can explain the relation among the parts and the wholes. One which can uncover a hidden unity.

This study is one such attempt.



Day o

CHAPTER ONE

Culture & Worldview

“Any theory that hopes to explain the behavior of contemporary humans must tell us what it is that causes humans to be so much more variable than any other species and why this peculiar capacity for variation was favored by natural selection.” Richerson & Boyd (2005: 57)

It is well known that human beings differ from the rest of the living world in our ability to coordinate living via a transmitted culture representing a vast storage of knowledge accumulated and transmitted over many generations. Such knowledge allows human groups to adapt and thrive in virtually every environment on earth over hundreds of thousands of years of cultural exchange. The general explanations of how humans evolved involve descriptions of the development of tools, speech, art, agriculture, and so on. However, theoretical accounts vary across multiple fields teasing apart the influences across mediums of cultural exchange in language, interaction, thought and emotion to enable humanity’s uniquely varied forms of cultural transmission, and ultimately, how we come to collectively understand the world through meaning.

Different ontological levels mixing fundamental universal perspectives —collective versus individual, internal versus external— have unique vantage points from which to observe, assess, and name these influences, presumably to asses causation and ultimately the constraints that guided human adaptations. From the time of Plato and Aristotle onward, thinkers have outlined a hierarchy of Ontological levels to describe the structure of reality, which this study will generally call the cultural, social, interpersonal, psychological and neurophysiological levels from which a uniquely human system has somehow emerged and differentiated itself from the rest of the living world. This study will examine evidence from selected theories across these levels to assess the possibility of a new synthesis embedded in human neurophysiology, beginning with the topmost (Wiley, 1996), the cultural.

The definition of culture varies across disciplines, but as noted by Mesoudi *et al.* (2006), Boyd & Richerson (2001) provide a succinct definition of culture as “information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission,” (Mesoudi *et al.*, 2006: 331). We recognize the information exchanged through language as that which sets humans apart from other animals, allowing the nuanced ability to express internal thoughts and states, coordinate interaction between of our selves and others. However, information can also be exchanged through non-verbal communication: through a wink and a nod, imitation, embrace, mimicry, and many other forms less precise but sometimes more insightful than simply verbal forms. Both verbal and non-verbal forms of communication represent attempts to share something internally thought and felt with another, which at it’s core is an effort to be understood (Habermas, 1990).

While much of our behavior is formed and guided by socially exchanged information, other behavior, especially that which keeps us from social connection, is in fact not learned (non-cultural), but innate. Evolutionary biologists Cosmides & Tooby (1992a) argue that what is often labeled as epidemiological (learned) cultural behavior is in fact behavior “evoked” by environmental cues and processed by innate psychological mechanisms evolved to solve common problems faced by humans over the vast history of human evolution common to humans of all cultures and groups (p. 211). Richerson & Boyd (2005) counter, however, that much behavior is not “evoked” but acquired through social transmission, and that it gradually accumulates via small variations over time (pp. 44, 49-51). Thus, a comprehensive theory of cultural evolution distinguish between cultural behavior learned via transmission versus innate mechanisms evoked by environmental cues, and also, must explain how epidemiological culture manifests out of our innate biology and changes over time.

Culture is transmitted through social relationships (Fiske & Fiske, 2006). Culture is acquired, to a large extent not directly from formal teaching, but rather to a large extent, indirectly through observation and imitation. Children are keen observers of others’ behaviors and glean much without proper instruction, guided by what others around them value in their environment. Starting at early ages and onwards through adolescence and beyond, children learn from each other and from adults by imitating valued behaviors through play, especially pursuing cultural knowledge held esteemed others.

Such information is not simply exchanged, but embodied by individuals, which across a population results in certain patterns emerging across many individuals as culture (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Such things as skills, beliefs, values, and emotions have culturally defined meaning and guide individuals to behave in certain culturally approved ways, or to evaluate others' behavior, according to a cultural logic, but always in a social context. The complex of such cultural skills, beliefs, values, and emotions coalesce into an ever encompassing, perceived collective reality or way of life, although imprecisely so since an individual can only approximate the vast collection of cultural information. However, there is an underlying logic which clumps together skills, beliefs, values, and emotions into several different recognizable patterns which guide individuals to coordinate thinking and acting collectively, a sort of simplification of the vast combination of ways individuals interiorize the world, which manifest in worldviews.

The search for a general set of patterns of worldviews was put forward by Plural rationality theory (PRT) (Douglas, 1978), originally referred to as Cultural Theory (CT) and later Grid Group Theory, but renamed to avoid conflation with other meanings of "Cultural Theory." PRT posits that people socially orient their world along two fundamental bipolar dimensions called Grid and Group. These dimensions map the degree to which social relations vary across a bipolar spectrum. The grid dimension measures the degree of social differentiation within society (stratification/regulation), varying from hierarchism to egalitarianism. High grid worldviews value hierarchical structure in society with stratified social roles defined by position in society according to broad categories such as race, gender and class, with rigidity in social movement (Kahan et al., 2011). Low grid worldviews tend toward egalitarianism, valuing equality and equal rights, where individuals have opportunities apart from their position in society. The group dimension, on the other hand, quantifies the degree to which people seek to organize themselves into communities (collectivity/integration), varying from communitarianism to individualism. High group biases feature communitarian mindsets orienting behavior towards membership in a group, while low group biases yield an individualistic mindset viewing life as a competition between individuals, with little solidarity among members of society.

Plural Rationality Theory (PRT) posits grid and group constrain cultural ideas of how to order society and subgroups within society. When grid and group dimensions are intersected, four general cultural patterns emerge representing general person-types orientated as extremes along grid and

group. Plural Rationality Theory names these cultural biases: Hierarchy (high grid, high group), Egalitarianism (low grid, high group), Individualism (low grid, low group), and Fatalism (high grid, low group). PRT posits cultural biases don't represent personality types or "distinct types of people, but instead to individuals or institutions following the principles of a given cultural bias in a given respect" (Favre & Sornette, 2016: 5). While an individual may adopt a worldview within or across a bias, at the collective level, they coalesce into general clusters representing culturally distinct sets of values, beliefs, behaviors, and social tendencies, with each cluster having its own rational system, general mode of social interaction, typical experienced emotions, metaphoric understanding and concepts used to describe the world, functioning as a kind of consensus reality.




Fig. 1.1 - Grid-Group Plural Rationality Theory Model - Source: Bruce (2013)

The study of cultural cognition explores how culture worldviews influence cognitive perception in the form of beliefs, morals, and values and how such worldviews contain values which cause their holders justify their own worldview. Such a dynamic often prevents holders of those worldviews from being able to "see" aspects of other worldviews, especially when worldviews come into direct contradiction. Worldviews may prevent the perception or comprehension information pertaining to

risk or strategies mitigating risk due to these biases (Kahan, *et al.*, 2011). What one worldview may perceive as risky or immoral might to another seem innocuous, or vice versa. And when holders of worldviews are presented with evidence which may challenge beliefs or some logic of the worldview, people will often subconsciously choose to believe or alter perception to maintain agreement with esteemed others holding their same worldview in order to “minimize the danger of community estrangement” (Kahan, *et al.*, 2011).

Plural Rationality Theory’s four cultural biases represent generalized systems for ordering interpersonal relations, explaining how people interact, not why. To answer why requires understanding the values which motivate behavior, the province of moral psychology. An attempt to understand the link between interpersonal relations of Plural Rationality Theory and the psychological dimensions of moral and ethical reasoning was made by Bruce (2013), who presents a unified theory attempting to unite PRT with two moral theories having strong empirical support: Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Haidt, 2012) and the Big “Three” Ethics of morality (Schweder *et al.*, 1997). The unified model shows the logical mapping of these cultural biases, complete with their own rational systems of thought, with Moral and Ethical dimensions divided modern general political ideologies. The structure of PRT provides a model of social organization, while MFT and the Big “Three” theories integrate predictions and explanations for behavior with this framework grounded in moral dimensions (Bruce, 2013). The resulting integration provides “an accurate account of both how and why people behave as they do” (Bruce, 2013: 44).

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), provides a framework for understanding the building blocks of moral psychology, positing a basic set of psychological foundations, or intuitions, provide the mechanism from which underlying the logics of moral judgment arise. However, rather than focusing on the content of morality, MFT defines morality functionally, in how it works to “suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible” (Haidt, 2012: 314). While earlier work in moral psychology focused on largely on fairness (Kohlberg, 1971) and care (Gilligan, 1982) as the core principles of morality, MFT sought to identify and quantify additional moral intuitions governing morality valued in non-western societies studied by anthropologists, largely focused with binding groups together and maintaining their purity. The foundations were measured through questionnaire based inventories of answers people gave to moral statements, testing the degree to which people agreed or disagreed with hypothetical moral issues.

Haidt and co-researchers specifically studied American political ideologies to find what each political worldview valued morally. Their findings indicated that while American Liberals most highly valued what they characterize as “individualizing” morals of fairness and care, American Conservatives valued group-binding morals such as loyalty/ingroup, authority and sanctity/purity, in addition to care and fairness, albeit to a lesser degree than Liberals. A sixth foundation having empirical evidence was offered to account for the moral intuition of Libertarians, who were found to highly value personal autonomy, represented by a foundation of liberty, while greatly devaluing the other five moral foundations compared to Conservatives and Liberals (Haidt, 2012; Iyer *et al.*, 2012).

Moral Foundation	Challenge	Virtues
Care/Harm	caring for vulnerable children	kindness, gentleness, nurturance
Fairness/Cheating	punishing free riders	justice, rights, autonomy
Authority/Subversion	forming relationships w/in hierarchy	leadership, deference to legitimate authority & respect for traditions
Loyalty/Betrayal	creating & sustaining cohesive coalitions	Patriotism & self-sacrifice for the group
Sanctity/Degradation	maintaining clean surroundings	noble, cleanliness, free from immorality & contaminants
Liberty/Oppression	resisting domination by the powerful	liberty from oppression, cerebral, & individualist

Fig. 1.2 - Moral Foundations - Source: Haidt (2012)

The six Moral Foundations in **Fig. 1.2**, are proposed as cognitive modules having evolved as adaptations for overcoming common challenges of social life. From these building blocks, cultures construct rules governing social life guided by signature emotions and leading to valued virtues. The importance and value of these foundations vary across groups, characterized as “moral tastebuds” which cultures or subcultures “shrink or expand” to meet challenges (Haidt, 2012).

In further research, Haidt and colleagues subsequently discovered four-cluster social groupings which emerge with distinct moral profiles when MFT was mapped to personality dimensions (Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009). The clusters map to labels of the original MFT division between Liberalism and Conservatism, plus two others labeled Libertarianism and the Religious Left (Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009), as can be seen in the **Fig. 1.3** below.




Fig. 1.3 - Four Cluster Moral Foundation Valuation - Source: Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009: 113)

The original five foundations in **Fig. 1.3** are Harm/Care (H), Fairness (F), Ingroup (I) now referred to as Loyalty, Authority (A) and Purity (P), now referred as Sanctity. Cluster 1 clearly values Harm and Fairness far above the other moral foundations, while scoring lowest on biding foundations of loyalty, authority and purity. Similarly, Cluster 2, a perspective also valuing individualistic over binding foundations, having lower scores for the standard five, but characterized by the later inclusion of the sixth foundation, liberty (not measured in this study). While Cluster 4 unmistakably corresponds to one valuing group binding foundations of loyalty, authority and purity, their lower scores on harm and fairness differentiate it from the third cluster. Cluster 3 values group binding similar to Cluster 4, yet also highly values harm and fairness similar to Cluster 1. MFT identifies these clusters as matching ideologies of Secular Liberals, Libertarians, the Religious Left and Conservatism respectively. MFT identifies points of agreement between the Religious Left and Social Conservative clusters high in binding foundations, while Religious Left and Secular Liberal clusters share high valuations of individualizing foundations. These help to provide a more nuanced view between political worldviews beyond a traditional bi-polar moral logic of Liberal versus Conservative.

Haidt (2012) may have included only Clusters 1, 2, and 4 in his analysis due to its similarity to another moral model having great influence on his research, and of which MFT seemed to provide a type of confirmation. This other moral model, the Big “Three” Ethics (Shweder *et al.*, 1997), may constrain the MFT model’s focus on three ideological clusters. Yet, as will later be shown, the four-cluster groupings of MFT valuation profiles provides a fuller picture of the diversity of moral logics within the single American political system, and Bruce (2013) uses each of the four to map to PRT’s Grid-Group biases.

The Big “Three” Ethics of morality represent culturally universal moral concepts that provide a social orientation for explaining causation. They cluster around three universal realms thought by people to be causative agents of moral suffering in their desire to make suffering understandable. Shweder *et al.* (1997) conducted cross cultural research to find universal dimensions defining the most common causes of suffering, with three categories emerging in what they termed as **Autonomy**, **Community** and **Divinity**, mapping roughly to interpersonal, environmental/biomedical and moral explanations. These categories refer to general ethical frames for the moral orientation toward protection from risk. The ethic of autonomy focuses on morals protecting the autonomous individual, such as rights, prevention of harm and justice (Haidt, 2001). The ethic of community focuses on morals protecting collectives such as loyalty, duty, honor, respect. The ethic of divinity focuses on morals protecting spirituality, with morals of purity, sanctity, protection against degradation and the sacred. While different cultures vary in their focus and weight on one or more of these dimensions, all cultures to some degree recognize each of these domains in what may be termed folk theories, reflecting how societies order reality to protect from risk (Shweder *et al.*, 1997).

Autonomy	Community	Divinity
Code 1	Code 2	Code 3
Harm, Rights, Justice	Duty, Hierarchy, Interdependence	Sacred Order, Natural Order, Sanctity, Tradition
Individual as a Practice	Actor In a Play	Way of Life
Structure	Role-Based Social Status	Practice
	Family	World Soul
Obligations come from being a person	Obligations come from being part of a community	displaying dignity by showing ultimate concerns
free agent	social, not selfish	human, not beast
agency	Community	heroic enchantment
appetites	holism	soul memory
free contact	sacrifice	angelic side of human nature
marketplace	membership	hermit-yogi
Beast	Communitas	Angel

Fig. 1.4 - The Big “Three” Ethics - Source: Shweder (1997)

Some cultures might attribute most suffering to be caused by a personal interaction (Autonomy), from superstitious causes like sorcery or black magic to modern conceptions such as harassment, abuse or “toxic relationships” (Shweder *et al.*, 1997). Cultures may also be oriented towards blaming community or biomedical causes ranging from disease from exposure to out-groups or the unclean, to stress, genetically modified food, environmental contaminants, or even cultural ideologies. Cultures too can be oriented towards very general divine or religious explanations including karma, sin, psyche, spirit, astrology, etc. These causative dimensions are accompanied by therapeutic systems for managing or eliminating suffering, ranging anywhere from exorcism, cleanses, or interventions depending on the cultural orientation and what was thought to be the source of suffering.

Bruce’s unification of PRT and MFT involves seeing the similarity in the high Grid-high Group Hierarchical cultural view mapping to the morals of Social Conservatives, whose values of Authority and Loyalty reinforce and maintain stratification and the collective. Bruce maps the low grid-high group Egalitarian cultural view to the Religious Liberal morals of care and reciprocity, which favors individual morality while maintaining the collective. The low Grid-low Group Individualism worldview maps to Libertarianism’s moral of liberty, while the high grid-low group Fatalists map to Secular Liberalism (tenuously), seemingly most concerned with protection from harm and cheating. However, Bruce points out that Fatalists seem to be who “Secular Liberals are worried about, rather than describing the lived experiences of Secular Liberals themselves” (Bruce, 2013: 44).




Fig. 1.5 - Cultural Unified Model - Source: Bruce (2013)

Similarly, the Big “Three” Ethics can be mapped to the PRT model, as the Autonomy ethic aligns with the individuality aspect of grid, while the community ethic aligns with the communitarian aspect of group. The grid-group dimensions describe the structure of social organization while the Autonomy/Community ethics describe how morals ought to be centered. The mapping of the two systems yields dimensions of Group/Community and Grid/Autonomy, although for Grid/Autonomy the mapping is reciprocal, in that hierarchy and stratification of high Grid restricts low Autonomy, while low Grid eases the restriction on and allows for high Autonomy. Bruce speculates the Divinity ethic to be tentatively related to another aspect in PRT called Grip, essentially the degree to which people incorporate, digest and affirm their cultural worldview bias (Bruce, 2013).

The mapping of these three domains together yields a Unified Model combining MFT, the Big “Three” and the PRT structure defining a coherent model encompassing PRT’s interpersonal relations with Political worldview’s moralities and ethical dimensions. Most importantly, Bruce states the unified theory provides a framework for empirically testing PRT by using moral narratives

of MFT against observable accounts of how and why people behave the way they do according to their political worldview and cultural biases. A deficit of PRT has been its lack of an analytic measure of cross-cultural data (Caulkins, 1999). While Bruce states more work is left to fully integrate the theory (like ferreting out the liberty dimension from MFT and integrating Divinity from the Big “Three” more fully), it provides a solid base for a testable theory of cultural morality (Bruce, 2013).

What makes Bruce’s effort noteworthy is his attempt to uncover a deeper structure underlining the differences between cultural worldviews. As will be demonstrated later, the patterning at the cultural level reflects deep structure connected to human behavior, psychology, emotions and neurophysiology, rooted in how humans process and reason about social perception.

CHAPTER TWO

Cultural Cognition of Risk

“The high degree of rationality individuals display in forming risk perceptions that express their cultural values can itself inhibit collective welfare rationality by blocking citizens from converging on the best available scientific evidence on how to secure their common interests in health, safety, and prosperity.” Kahan et al. (2011: 89)

Cultural worldviews place constraints on individual reasoning, biasing perception of the world, especially the perception of risk (Kahan *et al.*, 2007). The theory of Cultural Cognition of Risk (CCR) studies how worldviews unconsciously shape perception of environmental and technological risk, as group affiliations and psychological pressures towards affiliate group attitudes alter individual perception of consequential facts to agree with cultural bias (Kahan *et al.*, 2007). CCR posits that cultural worldviews bias one’s perception towards rationally choosing a belief which reinforces one’s identity within a worldview, while protecting against evidence which challenges those beliefs and threatens cultural identities (Kahan *et al.*, 2007).

Cultural Cognition of Risk measures the effect of cultural cognition across contentious issues, such as Climate Change. CCR posits that while scientific evidence of climate change might convince one of its validity, holding the belief that it is real doesn’t help in one’s life if climate change doesn’t directly affect them. Rather, for individuals identifying with a cultural worldview skeptical of climate change, agreeing with one’s worldview provides a subconscious rational reason to hold the belief against climate change evidence and instead in support of counter-evidence. CCR terms this bias cultural-identity-protective cognition (Kahan *et al.*, 2007).

CCR offers that many types of issues involving attitudes about how society should assess risk differentiate following the pattern of PRT’s cultural biases. CCR uses the same grid-group framework as Plural Rationality Theory, comparing how the PRT worldviews differ in risk perception and provide a logic for which adherents are influenced by cultural cognition. That logic represents

psychological frameworks for selecting and dismissing information which can either confirm or conflict with cultural worldview specifically towards perception of risk to cultural identity. CCR uses different terminology for the CT dimensions, using instead Individualism/Communitarianism and Hierarchist/Egalitarian labels for the group and grid dimensions, as below in **Fig. 2.1**.




Fig. 2.1 - Cultural Cognition of Risk Dimensions - Source: Kahan *et al.* (2011)

The cultural theory of risk perception (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) upon which it is based, offers that ideals of how society should be organized strongly influence whether risk is taken seriously or dismissed according to the norms of particular grid-group biases. These biases then come into conflict, as “hierarchical and individualistic worldviews showed disagreement with egalitarian and communitarian worldviews about expert consensus on these issues” (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). The data support the conclusion that knowing cultural worldview could be predictive on one’s likelihood of seeing these issues as high or low risk, regardless of other person characteristics (age, gender, race, etc). However, it doesn’t affect one worldview or the other, but that “Hierarchical Individualists and Egalitarian Communitarians were equally likely to hold mistaken beliefs about “scientific

consensus” (as reflected in National Academy of Sciences “expert consensus” reports) on culturally charged risk issues” (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011).

Besides climate change, Kahan et al. (2011) also studied risks from nuclear waste disposal, as well as more socially oriented issues with divided opinion, like the risk presented by abortion and by guns. For issues in which perception of risk affect cultural-identity, such as the risk from some activity threatening the livelihood of an esteemed profession of the cultural group, they show an extraordinarily high skepticism towards expert opinion which asserts it as risk. For example, managers and executives in corporations in the coal industry accused of adversely contributing to environmental climate effects, for whom there is a negative assessment of their activity, may lead them to dismiss strong empirical evidence of their work as increasing risk of climate change (Kahan, 2007). Cultural-identity-protective cognition helps discount conflicting evidence and embolden skepticism of risk precisely because of a subconscious motivation to protect culturally derived identity.




Fig. 2.2 - Cultural Cognition of Risk Issue Dynamics - Source: Kahan *et al.* (2011: Fig 5, p. 20)

This dynamic helps to explain the phenomenon of hierarchical white males' skepticism about gun violence, which is attributable to the many hierarchical cultural-identities in which guns hold particular salience (policing, military, hunting, etc.), the perception of risk from guns threatens (Kahan *et al.*, 2007). Insensitivity to risk and extreme skepticism by hierarchical white males is a defensive response to cultural identity threat, yet they "are by no means uniquely vulnerable to this condition," as other segments of the population including Egalitarians and Communitarians exhibit "distinctive patterns of risk perception" (Kahan *et al.*, 2007: 3). For women, the issue of abortion threatens the domestic cultural-identity of motherhood, which for hierarchically oriented women are challenged by newer individualistic and egalitarian professional female identities in which choice is salient (Kahan *et al.*, 2007). Similarly, Egalitarian concerns about technological and environmental risks which they assess as "producing social inequality or legitimizing unconstrained self-interest" (Kahan *et al.*, 2007). New technologies such as nanotechnology and its applications to human health are seen by Egalitarians negatively. Exposure further scientific evidence supporting that technology increases Egalitarians' skepticism, while Hierarchists are oppositely influenced towards increasing agreement with expert analysis (Kahan *et al.*, 2009).

Previous theories about why this division, especially in context to political polarization across technical issues, are challenged by CCR. It provides empirical evidence that despite much thinking to the contrary, differences in attitudes towards risk conform towards one's worldview and not necessarily due to an individual's lack of scientific or rational understanding. CCR challenges an amalgam of several different theories called the "public irrationality thesis" (PIT) which attempt to explain the irrationality of public consensus versus the individual attitudes towards climate change or other issues of risk related to technology. PIT uses several theoretical components to explain irrationality. "Scientific illiteracy" theory posits irrationality stems from a deficit of scientific understanding. "Bounded rationality" theory posits two separate forms of information-processing exist: System 1, which relies on quick, innate decision-making "heuristics" while the other, System 2, involves slower, conscious inferential processing, with the later yielding far higher degree of rationality (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). PIT also integrates Cultural Cognition, which posits that conforming to group attitude is simply one of the System 1 heuristics.

PIT predicts that the public's concern with these risks should diminish with an increase in scientific literacy and numeracy and agreement with scientific consensus. However, CCR challenges PIT with counterintuitive empirical evidence showing increases in scientific literacy or individual rationality can actually enhance one's tendency to choose a belief consistent with one's the cultural worldview (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). While this may benefit individuals by improving their group standing by taking up a rational belief congruent with their cultural worldview, it can promote the support of irrational cultural beliefs. "The high degree of rationality individuals display in forming risk perceptions that express their cultural values can itself inhibit collective welfare rationality by blocking citizens from converging on the best available scientific evidence on how to secure their common interests in health, safety, and prosperity" (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). In fact, CCR finds that increased scientific literacy and numeracy actually widens the gap between worldviews, fostering disagreement and polarization (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). This tendency threatens arriving at societal consensus on important issues and explains a great deal of why the current public discourse is experiencing such discord.

CCR in effect shows that there are "rational" modes of cognition. One is individualist, where knowledge and reasoning capacities are marshaled to "maximize correspondence between their own perceptions of societal risks and the perceptions which predominate within the cultural groups to which they belong" (Kahan *et al.*, 2011: 4). The other orients toward the collective, sort of a social mode of cognition, where agreement with cultural peers provides a rational objective for having a particular view or belief, no matter the truth value of the belief. Holding the group-centric belief is rational in that it confirms a congruence between the belief and "individuals' cultural commitments" (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). That rationality is confirmed, when holding that belief improves social standing within the group by confirming one's cultural-identity. Thus, cognition oriented towards confirming one's identity, whether as an individual or member of a group, can have profound effects in cognitive style and subjective/objective truth statements. Problems arise when groups become so polarized that their group-confirming biases outweigh individual rationality.

"This conflict between individual and collective rationality is not inevitable. It occurs only because of contingent, mutable, and fortunately rare conditions that make one set of beliefs about risk congenial to one cultural group and an opposing set congenial to another. Neutralize these conditions, we will argue, and the conflict between the individual and

collective levels of rationality is resolved. Perfecting our knowledge of how to achieve this state should be a primary aim of the science of science communication.” Kahan et al. (2011: 2)

While CCR frames cultural worldview only in PRT's terms, Bruce's Unified Cultural Model maps political ideology to PRT's worldviews. This sheds light on the particular dynamics of identity conflicts between conservative and liberal political ideologies. The Hierarchist worldview's orientation towards assigning status based on stratified cultural identities makes challenges to traditional identities threatening, activating culturally protective cognition and perception. Thus, identity politics themselves evoke much of the discord via cultural-identity protective cognition, as the great expansion & fragmentation of identity in the modern world challenges tradition and hierarchy.




Fig. 2.3 - Unified Cultural Model adding Cultural Cognition of Risk

This has important consequences for debates in the political arena, where discourse has diminished because of a clash of cultures, or rather of cultural cognitively protective cognition. This cognitive mechanism demonstrates people reject information threatening beliefs central to their identity. It also demonstrates exposure to information threatening one's cultural views drives one further towards culturally-protective cognition, increasing polarization. As mainstream and social media continually focus on a core set of social issues of great contention, CCR provides an explanation of the increased division, as cultural-identity-protective cognition provides a set of culturally tuned rationale for argumentation that feels totally correct and protects against counter-evidence directly challenging one's core beliefs and identities. In today's increasingly risk focused society (Beck, 1992), the polarization of cultural worldviews and political conflict has increased as people are forced to increasingly shoulder the burden of risk that was previously borne by government (Martin, 2007).

Cultural Cognition of Risk's empirically based methods can serve as an important cross-test of the MFT's moral logic and Big "Three" ethics and their orientation with worldviews. CCR's empirical evidence provides a predictive model of how people will answer questions about risk if their location on the Grid/Group map is known (Kahan *et al.*, 2007). This pattern provides some hope for coming to some kind of consensus for those issues which have so divided the public, for we can become aware of how information can be presented that doesn't challenge one's identity, but instead finds a common moral and ethical frame that all worldviews may understand.

Triggering of identity-protective-cognition contributes to greater division and reliance upon social stereotype in assessment of those not sharing similar cultural group beliefs and values, which then increases further polarization and affects social perception.

CHAPTER THREE

Social Cognition & Group Perception

“Stereotypes can legitimize antipathy towards out-groups. However, the social structure creates these relationships of antipathy and stereotyping” Fiske et al. (2006: 81)

Our social perception reflects how we form impressions both of individuals and of groups, gauging their intentions and their ability to act on those intentions, in an effort to determine whether one is friend or foe (Fiske et al., 2007). Social Cognition, taking the form of social judgment, has been shown to vary along two analytic dimensions, which cross cultural research has found to be universal dimensions of **warmth** and **competence**, experiencing these two dimensions as liking and respecting, respectively (Fiske et al., 2007). The warmth/liking dimension measures the degree to which we expect another's intention to cooperate rather than compete in interpersonal competition (Fiske, 2012). The competence/respecting dimension measures the capability of another to enact those intentions (Fiske, 2012). However, social perception isn't judging individual personality; but rather “correlates to the structural relationships between groups, the outcome of interpersonal relationships” (Fiske, 2012).

Social cognitive research has inventoried group stereotypes measured across Warmth and Competence using the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), finding that their variance produces four general clusters of group types that emerge from intergroup relations. A **BIAS** map, standing for Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes, shows how patterns of behavior from social perceivers towards groups according to perceived group warmth and competence judgments. These dimensions of warmth and competence affect the behavioral outcomes of group interactions, with perceived warmth eliciting active behaviors, while secondarily perceived competence elicits passive behaviors (Cuddy et al., 2008). These patterns in social perception result in behavior promoting “active facilitation (e.g., helping), active harm (e.g., harassing), passive facilitation (e.g., convenient cooperation), and passive harm (e.g., neglecting)” (Cuddy et al., 2008: 70).




Fig. 3.1 - Stereotype Content Model (SCM) & BIAS - Source: Fiske et al. (2007)

The **BIAS** map (**Fig. 3.1**) offers outward emotions which pair with these behaviors, where “admired (i.e., competent and warm) groups elicit both active and passive facilitation, that is, both helping and associating. Resented, envied (i.e., incompetent and cold) groups elicit both kinds of harm: active attack and passive neglect” (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008: 71). In-groups and reference groups, both typically judged to be high in both warmth and competence, are seen with Admiration while receiving active help, protection, and association (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). Societal out-groups, judged to be cold and incompetent, are viewed with Contempt while being subject to attack, neglect, and demeaning. Groups judged as warm but incompetent are seen with Pity, receiving active help while being subjected to passive harm and neglect. Groups judged as competent yet cold are be viewed with mixed emotions of Envy and Resentment, subject to stereotypes of exploitative and receiving active

attack (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). BIAS emotions in which both dimensions agree in valence are said to be univalent, either both positive or both negative. Groups having mixed hi/low ratings of Warmth/Competence, are viewed with mixed emotions and said to be ambivalent.

Stereotyped social perception of general groups, graphed on Warmth & Competence scale as seen in **Fig. 3.1** above, represent both pan cultural aspects, as well as culturally specific aspects (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). Some general groups are stereotyped in roughly the same places across all cultures, particularly low status groups judged with contempt (i.e., the poor, uneducated) and high status groups seen with admiration (i.e., educated, professional, middle class), tending to be univalent groups, either viewed uniformly negatively or positively (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). The elderly, on the other hand, suffer ambivalent stereotyped perceptions as more warm than other groups, yet less competent (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). While the elderly are venerated in some East Asian cultures, they too harbor the same stereotyped perceptions of the elderly as warm and noncompetitive, a finding that is supported by other research showing ageism to be pancultural (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008).

Fiske *et al.* (2006) posits that the stereotypes we have of groups and individuals are the result of certain biases which balance information about them from *impoverished* information or culturally held general impressions. “Stereotypes can legitimize antipathy towards out-groups. However, the social structure creates these relationships of antipathy and stereotyping” (Fiske *et al.*, 2006: 81). Stereotypes are greatly influenced by balancing our negativity bias, which may produce strong negative reactions to foreign or unfamiliar groups or individuals with low status in the social hierarchy, although much of these attitudes are based on “accidents of history” (Fiske, 2012).

Groups perceived ambivalently receive a mix of active and passive prejudice, ambivalent behaviors & emotions. Ambivalent stereotype envy and paternalistic behavior has been theorized to maintain women deemed traditional (homemakers, mothers, wives) and subjected to paternalism (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). Paternalist sexism has the effect of positive stereotypes as long as women mind their place, which is a form of social control and undermines equality (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). However, non-traditional women (professionals, feminists, etc) suffer from stereotyped envious hostility from prejudiced men who view them as competitors (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008).

Envious prejudice (low warmth, high competence) is often directed at “model” ethnic minority

groups whose competition with in-groups “can motivate the most extreme forms of discrimination, ethnic cleansing and genocide” (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008: 124). In the US, it is presumed competence and competition from such ethnic groups which threatens prejudiced White in-groups, where positive stereotypes of high competence are accompanied by negative behaviors and emotions towards them, leading to fear and discrimination against them (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). Ambivalent emotions of envy, produced from the perception of negative Warmth and positive Competence, may turn to anger, hostility and active harm when societies are under stress and out-groups blamed (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008: 112).

The SCM also makes an important contribution to understanding the differing pattern of ambivalent prejudice, with its theory called Stereotype-Confirming Attribution Bias (SCAB). SCAB resolves the inconsistency of the “Ultimate Attribution Bias (UAB)” which states stereotypes make negative dispositional attributions towards out groups and positive dispositional attributions towards in- and reference-groups (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008). However, the SCAB theory is able to more accurately differentiate prejudice effects on dispositional versus situational attributions when stereotypes aren’t wholly bad or good. Summed up succinctly, when “behaviors or outcomes match stereotypical expectations, perceivers are likely to make dispositional attributions... (while) behaviors and outcomes that are stereotype-inconsistent should be excused away” (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008: 130).

An additional attributional bias contributing to stereotype is the Group Serving bias in which in-group members tend to attribute positive in-group and negative out-group behavior to internal, dispositional causes. Conversely, in-group members tend to attribute negative in-group and positive out-group behavior to situational causes. Regardless, people tend to underestimate situational factors to behavior in general, related to the Fundamental Attribution Error (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Thus, we may be biased toward attributing negative behavior of out-groups (e.g. unexpected or against role-type behavior) as causally related to negative dispositions, while attributing in-group negative behavior to situational causes.

Another relevant evaluative bias in social cognition affecting attributions is the actor-observer bias in which evaluations of self tend towards considering situational factors, while the evaluation of others’ behavior tends to be dispositional (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). One reason this bias differs between self-focus and other-focus seems to be the tendency to overestimate the causal factors of behavior. The

observation of others includes being able to see another's behavior visually, where context must be inferred and causal behavior is attributed to the actor. However, we (normally) do not have the visual perspective of the self behavior, instead looking outward at the situation, over-weighting the perspective of the situation. Thus, disposition is highlighted when looking outward at others, while situation appears more salient when subjectively assessing our own behavior.

The difference between these two perspectives have direct connections to two competing theories which provide accounts of how generalized Social Cognition may work, one called Theory Theory (TT) and the other Simulation Theory (ST). Both offer a framework for how we try to grasp how others think. The former, TT, posits that social cognition functions via a mentalizing process, where inferences are made about the social actions of others against a stored background of "folk" knowledge from a third-person perspective to glean the mind of another. The latter, ST, posits that social cognition originates from a mirror resonance system (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013), where mirror neurons activate when we think about another's social action and mentally "simulate" the intentions, thoughts and feelings one would have in that situation, which allows for understanding another's social action through the first person perspective. The TT is thought to operate via the large-scale neurophysiological Mentalizing Network (MENT), while the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) represents a separate large-scale network which supports ST (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). TT and ST posit social information is gleaned through either observing or subjectively thinking about social action, representing third-person and first-person points of view, respectively. Both TT and ST can be considered "spectator theories" (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013).

A challenger to TT and ST, termed Interaction Theory (IT) (Gallagher, 2009), represents a genuine alternative to the standard social cognition theories emphasizing the importance of a second-person perspective on social cognition. Interaction Theory (IT) posits that human social nature results from an embodied perception that does not require mindreading or mirroring others, but rather is felt through primary motor-sensory processes and primary intersubjectivity (Gallagher, 2009).

Intersubjectivity allows for joint attention and joint action in highly contextualized situations (Gallagher, 2009). Intersubjectivity is fueled through the direct exchange of affect laden, non-verbal means (e.g. posture, gesture, vocal intonation), allowing for the direct experience of another's emotions, intentions and dispositions (Gallagher, 2009), making IT a 'participant theory' (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). A primary intersubjectivity is established from the very earliest stages in ontogeny in

which infants share affective laden interactions with caregivers in expressive, person-to-person communication events (cf Trevarthen, 1979), and provides strong support for pluralist approaches to social cognition (Fiebich *et al.*, 2016).

Attempts at finding neural correlates of social cognition have primarily measured first-person and third-person cognition through subjects' detached observation of others' behavior (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). The primary way people come to know each other is through "a social knowing based on interaction and emotional engagement" rather than simply from observation (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 395). Engaged interaction involves affective responses which are absent detached observation, and these responses have important effects on cognition (Laird, 2012). Engaged intersubjectivity amplifies affect, as well as enable unconscious or implicit processes be made explicit as conscious emotional states through (Schore, 2009). A second-person neuroscience measuring an actor while engaged in dyadic social interaction is necessary to uncover differences in neurological processing of social stimuli (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013).




Figure 1. A–D:

Center: Schematic depiction of interaction contingencies for situations of (A) no (or little) social interaction and no (or little) emotional engagement, (B) no (or little) social interaction, but emotional engagement of person A with person B, (C) social interaction, but no (or little) emotional engagement, and (D) social interaction and emotional engagement. Dotted lines indicate the absence or relatively decreased influence of actions on oneself (vertical arrows) or the other (oblique arrows), temporal sequence is shown from top to bottom. (Schematic of interaction contingencies adapted from Jones & Gerard 1967.) Despite the suggestion of linearity in the interaction sequence, our account also stresses the importance of interaction dynamics, which may be seen as emergent properties of an interaction, and possible inter-brain effects of social interaction (see sects. 2.3 & 3.2.2 for details).

Left & right: Schematic depiction of putative differences in the recruitment of brain regions during situations A–D and their functional connectivity (see sect. 3 for details). Brain regions on the medial surface or deep structures of the brain are shown in italics, brain regions on the lateral surface of the brain are shown in normal font.

Fig. 3.2 - Neural Recruitment in Perspective Differences of Social & Emotional Engagement -

Source: Schilbach *et al.* (2013: Fig. 1, 396)

The above **Fig. 3.2** shows a schematic representation of differences in neural recruitment for different perspectives of social and emotional engagement. The four cells depict different neural networks activated when interaction is experienced from (A) a detached observer position, (B) a detached observer position with emotional engagement, (C) an interactively engaged position *without* emotional engagement, and (D) an interactive engaged position with emotional engagement. Brain imaging studies use different methodologies when studying social cognition, and those measuring subjects from (A) detached observational position will detect a different set of neural components and networks than if the subject were sharing intersubjectively in interaction (C). Similarly, engaging emotionally recruits still other neural networks, making brain imaging study results dependent on methodological design and subject perspective.

“advanced levels of social cognition may have arisen as an emergent property of powerful executive functioning assisted by the representational properties of language. However, these higher levels operate on previous levels of organization, and should not be seen as independent of, or conflicting with one another. Evolution has constructed layers of increasing complexity, from non- representational (e.g., emotion contagion) to representational and meta- representational mechanisms (e.g., sympathy), which need to be taken into account for a full understanding of human empathy.” Decety & Lamm (2004: 9)

Second-person engagement, however, “demands that emotion be taken as central to an awareness of minds and focuses on emotional responses rather than reflections or constructs” (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). Such engaged interaction can activate natural empathic feeling through social and emotional engagement. However, human empathy refers not to a simple phenomenon, but to a construct involving social and emotional aspects in “the interaction between emotional awareness, empathic concern and affective arousal...which depend on a number of interacting and partially dissociable neurobiological systems” (Decety & Svetlova, 2011: 3). The intersubjective emotional awareness of empathy comes from the experience of another’s emotional states triggering similar states in the observer, thought to involve a mirror neuron system (MNS) analogous to that found in the sensorimotor system in which the observer’s corresponding neurological sensorimotor system activates as if they are pantomiming the action, giving the system Self-Other sharing properties

(Decety, 2011). However, the MNS is also found to be heavily recruited in preparing complementary actions to another's social signaling, rather than simply mimicry (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013).

Second-person engagement also results in joint attention often involving gaze-following, either in a "responder" or "initiator" role, depending on whether one responds to another's gaze or directs the other's gaze. These two roles recruit the mentalizing system (MENT) "overlapping with the Default Mode Network (DMN)" where social actors are "simply and naturally coordinating their gaze with that of the other without any explicit instruction" (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 403). Activity in the MENT is shown in very young children engaged intersubjectively "long before" the age in which they exhibit explicit, reflective social understanding of other minds, hinting the mentalizing network is engaged in implicit social processes which may later be reused by explicit processes (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013).

Later differences between implicit and explicit social cognitive processes may result from "differences in the functional or effective connectivity between individual brain regions, rather than functionally segregated effects" (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 403). However, there are important neurological differences between the role of responder or initiator, where the latter seems to recruit the reward center producing positive feeling , implying "that social interaction may involve collaborative and affiliative *motives*, the realization of which is experienced as rewarding" (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 403).

The person perspective, however, from which one is either subjectively imagining, objectively observing or interactively engaged, then may have important effects upon the processing of social cognition, for each recruit different neural circuitry (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). Observational perspectives tends to rely more on situational-*independent* social cognition, where "psychological traits or dispositions influence evaluation of others," while interpersonal perspectives tend to rely on situational social cognition, such as the reaction of others with which one is engaged (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 407), which the actor-observer bias reflects.

Differences of person perspective in social interaction, utilizing different patterns of neuronal networks in information processing, may suffer from different types of biases. A relevant theory from Evolutionary Psychology posits such biases are not necessarily design flaws, but may in fact be design features resulting from social adaptations that can better be understood from an evolutionary perspective (Haselton *et al.*, 2016). Natural selection may have provided an advantage for certain types of biases from inferences of social action that favored greater reproductive success, lower error

costs, or for problem sets for which current bias no longer applies (Haselton *et al.*, 2016). These types of cognitive biases can be sorted into three broad categories representing protection from threat, interpersonal perception, and self-perception (Haselton *et al.*, 2016) which seem to be directly relating to third-, second-, and first-person perspectives, respectively. The SCM enumerates social cognitive stereotypes, which may be due to detached observational biases lacking the context that intersubjective social and emotional engagement could provide. Comparison of these detached observational perspectives to second-person perception engaged in interaction could lead to finding the sources of bias in observational perspectives.

Error Management Theory (EMT) (Haselton & Buss, 2000) posits that given differential success in certain types of biases in social judgments made under uncertainty, natural selection could act on those biases which minimize cost. Two types of errors are produced from such judgments, false positives (Type I errors) and false negatives (Type II errors), in which costs between them are normally orthogonal and asymmetrical, where one or the other can be minimized, but not both (Haselton & Buss, 2000: 81). Some biases may increase errors by introducing false positives, such as triggering an alarm (e.g., ill feeling, emotion, vocalization) when danger is perceived but not present, which results in a low cost even if the error rate is high, since danger could significantly affect the cost of not perceiving it. The failure to detect alarms in the presence of danger, as in false negatives, can have a very high cost even if the error rate is low, since failing to avoid serious dangers can be very costly, as in deadly.

Error Management Theory helps to explain how natural selection can tend to favor mental decision making processes which produce bias, favoring false positives or false negatives, driven not by the rate of error but cost asymmetries between them (Haselton & Buss, 2000). In their study, EMT is recruited by to explain differences in decision making in judging sexual interest, which helps to explain why the biases men exhibit differ from those which women exhibit, producing differing error rates of false identifying interest, as well as having differing costs, with the latter being the driver of asymmetry between the two types of bias (Haselton & Buss, 2000). The EMT paradigm applied to biases of social cognition, such as general dispositional versus situational judgments, seems an understudied, fertile theoretical area, especially were person perspective to be additionally factored. It might show that deficits of knowledge based upon neurocoritical regional information processing lead directly to the differences in biases and error rates in social judgment.

These results have important implications for research of impairment of different aspects of social cognition. Schilbach *et al.* (2013) suggest that while it is assumed that High Functioning Autism (HFA) includes deficits in implicit social cognition, a number of studies have shown neither “impaired explicit social cognition” nor “capacity of implicit learning in general” (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 411). Rather, impairment seems to stem from difficulties of “automatic integration of social information” from implicit processes which transmit affective information, giving situational context (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). Other clues pointing to contextual integration of social cues are found in characteristic language abnormalities in semantics and pragmatics deficits, where language processing of dialogue includes monitoring of “paralinguistic cues” and interpersonal synchronization (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 413). Also important would be to investigate the role of reward signals upon situational context, as second-person initiator roles recruit neurological reward centers, while third-person observational perspective do not (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013).

Mirror Neuron System (MNS) dysfunction has been offered as the source of the social cognitive difficulties of autism (Iacoboni & DaPretto, 2006). Several studies have shown “temporal progression of activation in the core circuit for imitation is delayed,” reflecting “a deficit in functional connectivity of brain regions involved in MNS” (Iacoboni & DaPretto, 2006: 949). Bilateral EEG measurements show that mu rhythms, occurring at similar frequency as alpha rhythms (8-12 Hz) although perpendicular to, are suppressed when executing or observing goal-directed action, generally taken to indicate the activity of motor activation or MNS activation, respectively (Iacoboni & DaPretto, 2006). While action observation/imitation mu rhythms show bilateral similarity, TMS studies show lateralized differences with left hemispheric responses to auditory stimuli from action, suggesting human multimodal (visual, auditory) MNS existing only in the left hemisphere, while the right hemisphere is visual MNS only (Iacoboni & DaPretto, 2006). This tends to support that conceptions of human evolution in which multimodal processing instead of purely visual drove the left lateralization of language (Iacoboni & DaPretto, 2006: 947). Additionally, gestural communication underlies semantics and the “processing of linguistic material activates motor areas” as well (Iacoboni & DaPretto, 2006: 945). However, the particular deficit of the MNS affecting HFA seems to be not in mirroring *per se*, but in the motor preparation for “complementary or incongruent actions rather than imitative or congruent ones” typical for many “actions performed jointly” (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 401), such as preparation of the next thing to say in a conversation.

While much research has focused upon autism's impairments of social cognition, it must be recognized these are compared to the normative view of social cognition. Schilbach *et al.* observe anecdotally that individuals with HFA diagnosis self report "not having any significant impairments of social interaction and communication when they interact with other persons diagnosed with HFA." They offer that greater public awareness of autism's unique mode of social cognition would provide for "flexibility and openness for a diversity in styles of social interaction" (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013: 413). While social cognitive deficits are characterized as impairments clinically, these may in fact represent variance across the spectrum of functional divergence between high level brain systems, for which extreme modes provide evolutionarily selected abilities that benefit groups at a cost to individuals (Sober & Wilson, 1998).

While Autism and Asperger Syndrome are often characterized as deficits from "typical" brain functioning, they include a broad range of differences from so-called "neurotypical" minds across general domains showing both some difficulties in social communications while usually paired with some degree of repetitive behavior and narrow interests (Baron-Cohen, 2008). The difference between Autism and Asperger Syndrome stems from the delay of language and varying IQ in the former, while the latter exhibits normal language development and higher to well above average IQ (Baron- Cohen, 2008). When the behavioral traits cause problems in life, Autism and Asperger Syndrome are diagnosed by the DSM as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), although Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) is sometimes a more accurate term (Baron-Cohen, 2008). While the ASD diagnostic only identifies outliers, Autism Spectrum Condition includes not simply people with extreme "deficits" of "normal" brain functioning, but also people with exceptional functioning in other domains as compared to "neurotypicals" (Baron-Cohen, 2008: 14). ASC can be screened by an Autistic Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire coming in several different versions to measure child, adolescent, and adult behavioral traits commonly associated with these conditions, although disorders must be diagnosed by clinicians. Diagnoses don't apply over all of life, but represent "snapshots" of a particular time in life when the symptoms make life difficult, which can be lessened over a lifetime through improving core social skills (Baron-Cohen, 2008).

Autism Spectrum Condition expresses itself across a wide variety of behavioral traits, which can occur in various combinations since it is a spectrum disorder. A unique set of behavioral,

sensational, and cognitive differences from “typical” brain function reveal the neural dynamics of neural developmental differentiation, with regards to social perception and person perspective taking (Baron- Cohen, 2008). These arise in domains that make up parts of motor functioning, social communication and cognitive thinking styles, including specific “**motor traits** (e.g. non-right-handedness, dyspraxia, tip-toe walking), **repetitiveness traits** (e.g. repeated watching same movie/eating the same food/wearing the same clothes, routines & rituals, obsession with systems), **language** (e.g. delay, echoalia, syntactic talent, literalness, poor pragmatics), **social traits** (e.g. frequent faux pas, no pretend play, unusual eye contact, turn taking difficulties, lack of reciprocity), and **cognitive traits** (e.g. truth-seeking, difficulties in big picture planning/generalizing/multitasking, high penchant for lists/cataloguing/memory for facts/musical talent/collecting/, Sensory hypersensitivity)” (cf table 5.4 in Baron- Cohen, 2008: 77-83).

Baron-Cohen (2008) compares and critiques five other psychological theories with his own, each of which attempt to explain Autism by finding the causal factors for different sets of these behavioral traits (pp. 51-84). The executive dysfunction theory (EF) posits that behaviors stuck in repetition are due to deficits in prefrontal development and inability to shift attention, but EF suffers from not being able to explain differentiation on the ASC spectrum, as some with ASC perform well on tests and their specialized hyper focused narrow interests in subjects are what develop into expertise (Baron-Cohen, 2008). Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory posits that Autism is due to the inability to take coherent, globalized views, getting “stuck” in the details in which people with ASC have high ability to attend to small details and may take longer to connect these to larger contexts, although it suffers “by implying” that people with ASCs “cannot see the whole, which cannot be true” (Baron-Cohen, 2008: 55). Mind blindness theory describes autism as resulting from a delay in forming a theory of mind (ToM), “sometimes called mind reading or mentalizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2008: 57). ToM makes sense of social communication problems experienced by those with ASC, but suffers from perhaps not being specific to ASC, as other clinical conditions show mind blindness (i.e., narcissistic or borderline disorders). Finally, Baron-Cohen (2008) offers Magnocellular theory, which posits Autism is caused by a specific visual pathway in the brain which doesn’t allow for accurate prediction of visual movement for those with ASC. However, Magnocellular theory again suffers from not characterizing the spectrum and only focusing on visual modality, while the other senses are clearly affected in ASC.

While Baron-Cohen offers suggestions of how these theories can be improved by integrating aspects of others such as Hypersensitivity to Sensation and Monotropism theory, his own theory incorporates a wide breadth to account for all of them, to show that ASC can be shown to emanate from two underlying causal factors: **Empathizing** and **Systematizing** (Baron-Cohen, 2008). Baron-Cohen pairs Empathizing/Systematizing with a “Male brain” theory, which posits ASC brain types resemble extreme male brain types, characterized by larger Amygdala and smaller ACC among other male-female differences (Baron-Cohen, 2008). This extreme “male” brain type has a particular signature in degrees of Empathy and Systematizing abilities, and the overall E-S/EMB theory characterizes a full spectrum theory that includes ASC, as well as the ‘normal’ part of the spectrum.

According to E-S/EMB, Empathy has two aspects, a cognitive empathy that includes ToM and mind reading, as well as an affective empathy, which relates to having the appropriate emotional response, for which ASC is characterized by challenges with that latter (Baron-Cohen, 2008). The Systematizing dimension is related to the ability to analyze or construct systems which are defined by rules which govern the system in order to predict how the system will behave (Baron-Cohen, 2008). These vary across a diverse set of major kinds of systems: collectible, mechanical, numerical, abstract, natural, social, and motoric, for which ASC is characterized by high levels of systematizing (Baron-Cohen, 2008). The intersection of Empathizing and Systematizing give a spectrum across which different “brain types” emerge.




Fig. 3.3 - Empathizing & Systematizing & the Five 'brain types' – Source: Baron-Cohen (2008: 73)

The variance in **Fig. 3.3** across these two E/S dimensions pattern into five mind types of various capabilities of empathizing and systematizing. The axis tics (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2) represent standards of deviation, meaning type areas are not to scale as the zero deviation would have the largest area and the extreme types the smallest. Type E are those people whom have higher empathy than systematizing ($E > S$) while Type S higher systematizing than empathy ($S > E$). Type B are those who have a balance (high or low) between empathy and systematizing. Extreme Type E represents people who have above average empathy, but some challenges with systematizing ($E \gg S$), while Extreme Type S represents people who have above average systematizing, but some challenges with empathy ($S \gg E$). 44% of Women and 17% of men and only 1% with ASC have the 'female brain' ($E > S$) type. 54% of Men and 17% of women with 27% having Aspergers have the 'male brain' ($S > E$) type. 6% of Men and 0% of women with 65% having Aspergers have the 'extreme male brain' ($S \gg E$) type. Thus, virtually all with ASC and ASD fall under 'male brain' types, the bottom right corner (Baron-Cohen,

2008).

Deficits in empathy for individuals with ASD have often been ascribed to difficulties with perception of one's own body states (interoception). However, interceptive deficits have been found to be caused by a separate condition known as Alexithymia, having high co-occurrence with autism (Shah *et al.*, 2016). Individuals with Alexithymia experience difficulties in describing and identifying emotional feelings, despite having awareness of internal bodily sensations, producing the diagnostic feature of socioemotional deficits (Shah *et al.*, 2016).

Empathizing, in the context of **Fig. 3.3**, refers to the largely automatic, affective form of emphatic feeling. The Empathy construct can be characterized as the “sense of similarity in feelings experienced by the self and the other, without confusion between the two individuals,” which when “confused” can lead to two different types of behavioral responses (Decety & Lamm, 2009: 941). Sympathy describes “(empathic) concern for another based on the apprehension or comprehension of the other’s emotional state or condition,” while personal distress describes, typically, an emphatic “aversive self-focused emotional reaction to the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition” (Decety & Lamm, 2009: 941). Both empathic concern and personal distress are aspects of emotional empathic reactions to the misfortune of others, both of which tend to be automatic and unconscious (Goldman, 2011). These lead to two very specific response patterns in that sympathetic concern is associated with prosociality (helping) from an underlying “other-oriented, altruistic motivation,” while personal distress “leads to a self-oriented, egoistic reaction” (Decety & Lamm, 2009: 942).

The ability to flexibly adapt to and deal with stressful interaction defines Ego-Resiliency, a heritable constitutional trait “associated with differential reactivity in specific affective regions in the brain” (Alessandri *et al.*, 2014: 3). Ego-resiliency’s relations to prosociality has been studied in conjunction with Effortful Control, a “supra ordinary construct” defining the deliberate control functions (eg, attention, planning) required for voluntary and goal-directed behavior (Alessandri *et al.*, 2014). It has been found that individuals high in effortful control are generally predisposed to experience sympathy (i.e., an other-oriented response to another’s emotion or condition) rather than personal distress (i.e., a self-focused, aversive response to another’s emotional state or condition) when exposed to cues regarding another’s emotion or negative state (Alessandri *et al.*, 2014).

However, effortful control mediates this pattern of sympathetic or personal distress empathetic reaction indirectly through ego-resiliency, such that failures of effortful control lessens ego-resiliency and lead more frequently to self-focused dispersal of personal stress (Alessandri *et al.*, 2014).

These psychological constructs, as well as the clues above regarding the neurological differences in functional connectivity of MENT and MNS in HFA, could point to a neurological locus for the social cognitive effects (Uddin & Menon, 2009). HFA has been correlated with the hypoactivation of the neural circuit identified as the locus of emotion awareness of self and others (cf Craig, 2009), “integrating internal states with external sensory stimuli” specifically located in the right hemisphere (Uddin & Menon, 2009). The lower activation of the affective integration center, when actively engaged in an affect rich second-person engagement, could overwhelm and cause delay or disruption of integration of social information from external sources.

As reviewed by (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013), different neurological circuits and large scale systems are recruited depending upon perspective, in the level of engagement or interaction ranging from observational to intersubjective. As will be covered later below, controls of large scale brain systems focus in on this same neural circuit, dubbed the Salience Network (Uddin & Menon, 2009), central to switching between an internally focused mentalizing mode and externally focused socializing mode. The differences in focus between these modes would then reflect different information processing styles, manifesting in differences in social cognition and related cognitive biases affecting cognitive, affective, social and sensory domains.

One study of young children with ASD involving three types of motor imitation with objects, while not explicitly stating their deliberate exploration of perspectival differences, have found that different foundational predictors of motor imitation are salient depending upon the perspective in which an imitation task is presented (McDuffie *et al.*, 2007). These mirror three of the four cells of **Fig. 3.2**, in which brain network recruitment contingencies depend upon on different fundamental aspects of both interaction and engagement (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). Study design compared motor imitation tasks from an detached observational perspective from an observed a video record of object manipulations (**a**), an interactional perspective engaged with a tester manipulating object (**b** or **d** unclear), and a directed elicitation observational perspective in response to a tester (**c**). Directly elicited imitation was significantly correlated with attention-following, while interactive play was

significantly correlated with social reciprocity and observational play significantly with correlated with both attention-following and non-imitative fine motor ability (McDuffie *et al.*, 2007: 401).

These three differences can be attributed to differential neural recruitment of brain networks, not only in which are activated, but also the pattern of ordering between network switching during the phases of elicitation, interaction, and observational imitation.

The study of the extremes of spectrums can help to reveal clues about the underlying dynamics of systems, as well as the dynamics of top-down and bottom-up processes. The E-S/EMB helps not only to understand the etiology of ASC, but also its relations to differences between genders in Empathizing and Systematizing. Importantly, ASC demonstrates that spectrum disorders resulting in differential deficits and abilities across a spectrum of neurological differences from the ‘neurotypical brain type,’ may be overcome through early recognition of deficits of early predictors and therapeutic techniques to build foundational building blocks of social and emotional interaction (Baron-Cohen, 2008).

While, the two dimensions of Empathizing and Systematizing show the familiar quadrant pattern when graphed, they cannot yet be directly matched to the Warmth and Competence dimensions of the SCM. There is similarity in the vertical dimension Empathy, although the E-S/EMB characterizes only emotional expression empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2008) while the SCM contains both cognitive and emotional empathy, perceived not expressed. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear in which direction Systematizing would align with SCM’s competence dimension. However, as will be covered by this study below, feelings, empathy and uncertainty have a common neurophysiological locus (Singer *et al.*, 2009).

The Warmth & Competence dimensions of the SCM can be mapped directly to the dimensions at the cultural level, which measure Group/Community and Grid/Autonomy respectively, since warmth measures the degree to which we like another group in regards to social interaction, while competence measures the degree to which we respect their ability to act. However, the Unified Cultural model is oriented with Grid running vertically and Group running horizontally, while the SCM dimensions of warmth and competence orient warmth/coldness (Sociability) vertically and competence (Status) horizontally. To match these two models, the Cultural model can be rotated by **90°** counter-clockwise, so that high Group and Warmth (Sociability) are atop the Y-axis, bringing the

two models into alignment for high level comparison.




Fig. 3.4 - Unified Cultural Model rotated 90° counter-clockwise

Re-orienting Group/Community/Sociability vertically along the y-axis will make alignment with subsequent Social, Physiological and Psychological analytical models congruent. Additionally, the two dimensions differ in their focus, with the Group/Community/Warmth dimension really relating to the **Social**. The Grid/Autonomy/Competence dimension focuses on the agentic **Self**. As we shall see, these two terms represent generally the basic disposition of the two universal dimensions. Thus, we'll refer to this growing IToCE model as the **Social Self Model**, shown below as **Fig. 3.5**.




Fig. 3.5 - Social Self Model adding Stereotype Content Model & BIAS

Social Cognition's SCM & BIAS maps add another analytical domain with empirical evidence to correlate with the PRT, MFT, Big Three and CG domains, integrating perception of stereotypes, biased behavior & emotion with worldview & cognitive bias. Each analytic are oriented along same social relational dimensions.

CHAPTER FOUR

Social Relational Models

*“Relational Models Theory is simple: People relate to each other in just four ways. Interaction can be structured with respect to (1) what people have in common, (2) ordered differences, (3) additive imbalances, or (4) ratios. When people focus on what they have in common, we call that **Communal Sharing**. When people characterize some aspect of an interaction in terms of ordered differences, the model is **Authority Ranking**. When people attend to additive imbalances, they are framing the interaction in terms of the **Equality Matching** model. When they coordinate their actions according to proportions or rates, the model is **Market Pricing**. Everyone uses this repertoire of relational capacities to plan and to generate their own action; to understand, remember, and anticipate others; to coordinate the joint production of collective action and institutions; and to evaluate their own and others’ actions. In different cultures, people use these four relational models in different ways, in different contexts, and in different degrees. In short, four innate, open-ended relational structures, completed by congruent socially transmitted complements, structure most social action, thought, and motivation. That’s the theory.” Fiske (2004a: 3)*

A theoretical framework which influenced Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory comes from cultural anthropology, Alan Fiske's Relational Models theory (RMT) which posits that “people are fundamentally sociable” and organize their social relations according to “abstract templates” or “models.” RMT posits four fundamental models underlie the elemental psychological foundations of social exchange from which all social interactions are composed: **Communal, Ranking, Matching, and Pricing** (Fiske, 1992). They don't simply model dyadic interaction, but serve to plan, coordinate, anticipate and make understandable behavior in a set of common “languages” which can be used in combination or interchangeably. They help to make sense of complex social relations “in the process of seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, adjusting, judging, construing, and sanctioning relationships” (Fiske, 1992: 689). They are distinct structures which manifest social structure and represent “mutually exclusive alternatives in the orientation of any person at any given

moment with regard to any one aspect of any particular level of interaction in any given domain” (Fiske, 1992: 710).

Communal Sharing (CS) is a social relational pattern where group members treat each other as undifferentiated equals. CS relationships emerge from a shared common identity and produces high social unity, conformity to ritual, consensus decision making, and distribution according to need. The prototype CS relationship is between close kin or friends, but also is found in groups in which an aspect of identity is particularly salient and shared in common, such as ancestry, ethnicity, nationality or race. CS uses a categorical measurement type, in that the group membership and “relationships ordinarily involve kindness, in both senses of the word: people are kind to people of their own kind, prototypically their own kin” (Fiske, 1992: 699). The conformity of individuals towards group consensus and collective identity occurs through “social proof and imitation to describe this tendency to change one's attitude to correspond to the attitudes of similar others” (Fiske, 1992: 697). A malformed version of CS occurs during an attack on a shared identity, which results in a polarization between the subjective “we” and objectified “they”, which can spiral towards evaluating in-group members as good or chosen, while outsider “others” are labeled bad, defiled, or worse (Fiske, 1992). Kin selection according to inclusive fitness is hypothesized to be the natural selection mechanism of CS (Fiske, 1992).

Authority Ranking (AR) is a social relational pattern where group members are differentiated and ranked according to a hierarchy. AR relationships produce a distribution of people over a rank system that requires deference, subordination, and respect from low-rank for those of higher-rank, while those of higher-rank have an obligation to be generous towards and protect those of lower-rank. A linear-ordering emerges in such social structures as chain of command, redistribution networks sendings goods “upwards” towards a central authority, or dominance hierarchies. The AR measurement scale is ordinal (counting), providing a different logical type (Bateson, 1982) than CS’s categorical measurement, integrating the lower level of categorization into an ordered lineal rank. AR provides a strong group structure binding people through multiple levels of hierarchy and stratification, although some AR cultures display a flatter hierarchy limited to the extended family unit where rank is based on gender and age (Fiske, 1992: 701). AR emerges from “hierarchical social relations in the medium of a social physics where space, mass, time and force function iconically to represent and create rank” (Fiske, 2004b: 94). The AR natural selection mechanism relies on the

“adaptive value of submission and dominance behaviors in a linear hierarchy” (Fiske, 1992: 696).

Equality Matching (EM) is a social relational pattern where group members are co-equal peers according to an egalitarian model. EM produces egalitarian relationships through balanced reciprocal exchange, where contributions towards others are tallied and imbalances are tracked. The EM measurement scale is an interval (ordered Abelian field), where differences are enumerated to determine a quantitative amount of imbalance, “which can lead to AR structures when initial distributions are unequal” (Fiske, 1992: 705). EM social relations organize around turn taking, balanced in-kind reciprocity, equality and trust as a way of establishing socially balanced relationships with strangers or reestablishing relationships with enemies. Social exchange, work, material goods and distribution are all centered around like for like and equality, while decision making resembles one-person, one-vote. The EM natural selection mechanism operates as ‘tit-for-tat’ in-kind reciprocity (Fiske, 1992).

Market Pricing (MP) is a social relational pattern particularly oriented towards organizing work and occupational identities. MP produces proportional exchange standards for contributions and distributions based on the logic of the market extended across society, where rewards are offered in proportion to productivity. The MP measurement scale is a ratio (Archimedian ordered field), where differences are compared through distributional and ratio of input and output. Such measurements are conducted using abstract symbolic representation of figures, prices, and common ratios to determine cost-benefit, profit-expenditure, and risk-return. MP can be seen as a “social influence device” producing heuristic errors when people are manipulated to believe there exist a “scarcity of goods, limited time for choice, or competition” (Fiske 1992: 707). MP also provides the rationalization for such pathological forms of exchange such as “prostitution, capture and sale of people into slavery, the killing of indigenous inhabitants to open land up for economic exploitation, child labor, and colonial systems of forced labor” as well as “Mercantile wars fought for markets and sources of raw materials...drug dealing, loansharking, and extortion” (Fiske, 1992: 708). The MP natural selection mechanism emerges from abstract symbolic representation, a distinctly human domain (Fiske, 1992).

The RMT Mods are the source of social intuition from the externalization of “innate cognitive models (which) manifest themselves as part of normal maturation” (Haidt, 2001: 19). Moreover, the first

three of these models are shared with some other species, having been observed in primate research and several other social species (Haidt, 2001: 18). The fourth model (MP), however, represents the only truly uniquely human form and provides “a moral Rubicon that only Homo Sapiens appear to have crossed: widespread third party norm enforcement” (Haidt, 2001: 18). The four Mods are thought to be learned in the “same sequence in which the models appear to have emerged phylogenetically in the mammalian and primate lineages” (Haidt, 2001: 19).

Four Social Relational Models Manifestations & Features

	Communal Sharing (CS)	Authority Ranking (AR)	Equality Matching (EM)	Market Pricing (MP)
Decision Making	Group Consensus	Chief Decides & Delegates	Voting	Market Mechanism
Group Organization	all pitch in without assignments	orders down a chain of command	everyone do an equal share	compensation depending on proportion
Social Influence	Conformity	Obedience	Compliance	Cost & Benefit Incentives
Social Identity	Membership in a Natural Kind	Social Rank	Co-Equal Peer	Occupation or Economic Role
Natural Selection Mechanism	Kin Selection	Dominance / Submission Adaptiveness	“Tit-for-Tat” In-Kind Reciprocity	Specialization & Commodity Exchange
Relational Structure	Equivalence Relation	Linear Ordering	Ordered Abelian Group	Archimedean Ordered Field
Measurement Scale Type	Categorical or Nominal	Ordinal	Interval	Ratio
Significance of Time	Relationships idealized as Eternal Perpetuation of Tradition	Sequential Ordering by Rank Temporal Priority to Superiors	Oscillation of Reciprocation Synchrony of Action	Calculus of Rates of Interest/Return/Pay Efficient use of Time
Relationship Marking Mode	Enactive, Kinesthetic, Sensorimotor Rituals	Spatiotemporal Ordering	Concrete Operations	Abstract Symbolic Representation
Constitutive Media	Consubstantial Assimilation Birthing, Nursing, Food Sharing, Ritual Synchronization, Movement, Shared Pain	Social Physics Above, In Front, Earlier, Larger, More Numerous, Greater Force	Concrete Operations Turn taking, In-kind Reciprocation, 1:1 Correspondence, Balance, Alignment	Arbitrary Signs Money, Propositional Language, Writing, Numbers & Math, Digital Accounts

Fig. 4.1 - Four Social Relational Model Manifestations & Features -

Source: Fiske (1992: 694-696)

RMT provides a condensed summary of the manifestations and features which summarize the extensive cross-cultural research of each relational Mod (**Fig. 4.1**), allowing for comparisons across different modalities and analytics (cf Fiske, 1992: 694-696). Rai & Fiske (2011) offer that “literature in social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology suggests moral psychology may be inseparable from its social-relational context” (p. 59) and propose a theory of moral psychology based on **relationship regulation**. The four relational Mods (**Fig. 4.1**) represent fundamentally different logics for managing social relationships (Fiske, 1991).

One particularly interesting note is the similarity of the RMs to the four classical scale types of measurement (Stevens, 1946) that were discovered in the attempt to find the fundamental laws governing the formal measurement of sensation. These scale types represent four distinct, isomorphic numerical transformations which serve as a model for ways of sorting or ordering equal objects within a set, with each scale type building upon and reordering the previous type in increasing complexity: nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. The Measurement Scale Type logic

provides a hierarchical ordering of the Mods underlying many of these manifestations and features in **Fig. 4.1**. The scale type like logic appears to differentiate across many different Psychological domains, including concepts of time, decision making, relation to the self, moral judgment and ideology, moral interpretations of misfortune, and perhaps most tellingly with respect to social development, characteristic mode of marking relationships.

Applied to the Social, the scale types represent different orderings of people, with each successive scale type re-ordering the previous according to some additional property of the set. The scale type for Communal Sharing (CS), **nominal**, represents a set where members are equivalent according to some categorization of a natural kind. Examples would be people in the same kin group or whom share the same ethnicity, where all members are treated as part of the group entitled to community. The scale type for Authority Ranking (AR), the **ordinal** scale would represent the linear ordering or ranking of people according to some category. Socially, this would look like the hierarchies we see tied to power according to wealth, social rank, beauty, occupation, education, etc. The scale type for Equality Matching (EM), the **interval**, represents a logic in which differences between members of the group are compared for equivalence enumerating differences of an ordinal set. Socially, this would manifest in the attention we pay to the evening of social debts, where social accounting of favors exchanged are compared and influence relationships. The scale type for Market Pricing (MP), the **ratio**, would provide a proportional contribution to differences between members an interval set. Socially, this manifests most simply in the wage rates different professions command according to many factors. It would also manifest in commodity exchange, where valuations of products are ratios of some common standard (money). The difference in scale types makes comparison between Mods ambiguous, as there is no common currency between Mods, (e.g., authority & rank (AR) are not convertible to money (MP), while love (CS) cannot be bought (MP)) (Fiske, 1991).

The developmental details of RMT remains speculative, although they are hypothesized to emerge during development in the sequence CS -> AR -> EM -> MP (Fiske, 1994). According to the scale logic, these represent successive reorderings of the Mod to the left. This progression also resembles the temporal progression of childhood cognitive developmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg which will be reviewed later (i.e., Sensorimotor => Spatiotemporal ordering => Concrete Operations => Abstract Symbolic representation).

“People generate, interpret, and judge social relationships with reference to the models, enforce them on others, sanction transgressors, and adjust their relationships with others to take account of whether these third parties conform to the models. The motivational and directive quality of the models can be seen as the human proclivity to relate to people in these modes, also reflected in the emergence of the models and the people’s facility at recognizing them and learning their implementation rules. People are ‘prepared’ and attuned to find and participate in these forms of social relations, to create them, and to insist on them.”

Fiske (1991: 195)

The Mods represents the elemental relational building blocks upon which all social relations are built, as “these four and only these four,” have been discovered to be operating across many different societies studied (Fiske, 1992), although other forms cannot be theoretically ruled out (Haslam, 1994). However, abstract models of dyadic relationships show “the RMs constitute an exhaustive set of coordinated dyadic social relationships” (Favre & Sornette, 2015: 2). Additionally, two cases exist which represent exceptions in social relations to RMT’s Mods as “people sometimes act without regard to any social relationship...acting towards others as if they were (Fiske, 1992: 19).

Termed **Asocial** and **Null** interactions, these are non-coordinated and non-relational interactions, respectively. Asocial interactions occur as people “pursue their own goals without regard to their own social models or those of the others around them” (Fiske, 1992: 19). Null interactions represent non-relational situations where people simply ignore each other and do not interact, such as people passing each other on busy streets. These two exceptions represent limiting cases which provide exceptions to the RM Mods of cooperative, social relations.

Favre & Sornette (2015) offer a proof that the basic set of abstract realizations of social interaction within dyadic relational actions provide a finite and definite set. These are a set of six mutually exclusive, idealized interactions in which actors engage in the same action, different actions, or doing nothing at all. These are termed action fluxes, which refers to a pattern of behavior where roles may be simultaneous enacted by both actors, be exchangeable and non-exchangeable, or the actions can be null (no response). It creates the following list of categories which match Relational Models Theory.

Table 3. Six categories of action fluxes

Category	Fluxes characteristics	Representative relationship	Alternative notations	RMT	
	Identical actions				
1	Non-null actions	$A \xrightleftharpoons[X]{Y} B$	$A \xrightleftharpoons[Y]{X} B$	EM	
2	Null actions	$A \xrightleftharpoons[\emptyset]{\emptyset} B$		Null	
	Different actions				
3	Non-null actions, exchangeable roles	$[A \xrightleftharpoons[X]{Y} B \text{ and } A \xrightleftharpoons[X]{Y} B]$		MP	
4	Non-null actions, non-exchangeable roles	$A \xrightleftharpoons[X]{Y} B$	$A \xrightleftharpoons[X]{Y} B$	AR	
5	One null action, exchangeable roles	$[A \xrightarrow{X} B \text{ and } A \xleftarrow{X} B]$	$[A \xrightarrow{Y} B \text{ and } A \xleftarrow{Y} B]$	CS	
6	One null action, non-exchangeable roles	$A \xrightarrow{X} B$	$A \xrightarrow{Y} B, \text{ or } A \xleftarrow{X} B, \text{ or } A \xleftarrow{Y} B$	Asocial	

Exhaustive categorization of relationships in the model of two agents A and B that can each do X, Y or nothing (\emptyset). In elementary interactions, agents can do the same thing or not (i.e. actions can be identical or different) and actions can be null (\emptyset) or not (X or Y). Within the relationship, agents can be able to exchange roles or not.

Fig. 4.2 - Six Categories of Action Fluxes - Source: Favre & Sornette (2015: Table 3, 7)

The action fluxes in **Fig 4.2** are represented by the arrows connecting actors A and B in a dyad, where X and Y represent different actions. The two actors may engage in any combination of action fluxes, such as identical actions (a form of reciprocal action such as a greeting), followed by different actions such as one questioning while the other answers. The actors may exchange roles, reversing the questioning and answering during rounds of turn-taking, while simultaneously sharing reciprocally, such as in sharing a meal. Later, they may take turns arguing a point, while later one may begin being silent and allow the other to continue to make points, settling on null actions. A series of actions may include many variations, but all of them can be related to these six elemental relational categories. Importantly, these fluxes act as guides for different aspects of the relationship. Favre & Sornette's proof of that these six fluxes compose the definite set of six interaction styles lend proof to RMT's claims that there are only four Mods which are used to construct and order all social relations.

RMT's four Mods appear, at first glance, to match Plural Rationality Theory's cultural biases, and several attempts to justify a mapping have been made (cf Favre & Sornette, 2016). Some pairings between PRT's biases and RM's Mods have a high degree of resemblance: Hierarchy with Authority Ranking (AR), Egalitarianism and Equality Matching (EM), Fatalism with Communal Sharing (CS) and Individualism with Market Pricing (MP). However, assigning one particular social relational pattern per PRT's biases has been shown to be **non-plausible** (Favre & Sornette, 2016). Favre & Sornette make a case that each of the PRT biases implement all of the RM Mods, with examples for each, including the Asocial and Null interactions.

	Fatalism	Hierarchy
High grid	CS: unreliable ; extreme initiations (e.g. blood rituals) AR: unreliable mentor-protégé relationship; EM: strict reciprocity; tit-for-tat MP: evil, amoral Asocial: default state Null: prevents changes	CS: abiding by collective rules (e.g. food rituals in caste system; intolerance of same-sex relationships) AR: legitimate authority (based on prescribed roles) EM: cooperation MP: top-down allocation Asocial: violation of rules; punished Null: exclusion
	Individualism	Egalitarianism
Low grid	CS: whatever involved parties want for themselves; merging companies AR: expertise-based; prestige ranking EM: equal opportunity; one-person-one-vote; alliance MP: contract, bargain (individual optimization) Asocial: expected; triggers self-defense Null: voluntary withdrawal	CS: consensus decision-making; abiding by collective rules emphasizing absence of discrimination AR: charisma-based; rotating chair(wo)manship EM: equal opportunity <i>and</i> outcome; hinders discrimination MP: such that everyone benefits (e.g. barter, microcredit) Asocial: pathological; helped toward reintegration Null: exclusion
	Low group	High group

Fig. 4.3 - RMT Mod Implementations per PRT Bias - Sources: Favre & Sornette (2013: Table 1, 13)

Like Plural Rationality Theory (PRT), Relational Models Theory presents a typology from which the complexities at a level of analysis (i.e. the Cultural Realm), can be divided and categorized to reveal a

more fundamental and simple structure emanating from hidden causes. Verweij (2007) proposes calling an integration of these theories a “Theory of Constrained Relativism,” that is, one which takes evidence from social theories from disciplines such as Anthropology, Sociology, Economics, or Political Science, yet which recognizes evidence of biological constraints from Brain Research and Evolutionary theory. Such constraints offer realities that must be taken into account and which shape the actual typologies towards models of human social behavior, emotion and brain functioning. This embeds them in an evolutionary lineage connecting them with other species and models of brain functioning free from traditional assumptions which have been shown to be no longer valid (Verweij *et al.*, 2015). By taking into account not simply the latest in Cognition, but also evidence from Affective and Social Neuroscience, dimensions of brain functioning and structure long ignored by the Cognitive revolution, a Theory of Constrained Relativism can offer empirical models driving neuroscience research and further shape social theories (Verweij *et al.*, 2015).

The progress made in the Brain Sciences and Evolutionary theory over the past several decades has shown that previous notions of human behavior weren’t supported by evidence revealed by modern Neuroscience, nor that human evolution was limited to strictly Neo-Darwinian models. Older models of human behavior had been used as the basis for many dominant Social Theories, yet the many recent advances in understanding the brain and how it evolved has led to important critiques of these theories. This is especially relevant since they have been used as a basis of Policy that has mischaracterized human behavior and decision making, mischaracterizing how humans actually behave and think.

For instance, a social theory dominant in Political Science and Economics, and to a lesser extent in Sociology and Anthropology, **Rational Choice Theory**, posits that generalizations of human political and economic decision making can be made based on a model of human rationality using only cognition to exercise cost-benefit analysis of options available. Rational Choice Theory’s predictions of human behavior have been shown to be inaccurate by studies showing that decisions are in actuality affected by affect and upon social structure in unforeseen ways, squaring with the latest evidence from Affective and Social Neuroscience (Verweij *et al.*, 2015). However, the revolution of emotion studies has come to inform such human models that rationality is deeply affected by and integrated with affect and emotion. Further, the new field of **Behavioral Economics**, which tries to reconcile the effect of affect with rationality, has grown in stature as it

posits two systems are used to make decisions, labeled System 1 and System 2 to represent a quick reacting emotional system and a slower reflective cognitive system, respectively. Yet, it too relies on a model of the human brain in which Emotion and Cognition are processed by separate neuronal systems, when in fact, Neuroscience has shown they are deeply intertwined (Verweij *et al.*, 2015).

On the opposite side of the spectrum, another influential Social Theory, **Post-Structuralism**, posits that no generalizations can be made “on how people can organize, perceive, justify, and emotionally experience their social relations” (Verweij *et al.*, 2015: 5). It maintains that humans only come to knowledge of things through Language, which is socially constructed and subject to arbitrariness that cannot be reduced to universals. What’s more, it leads to a situation where Post-Structuralism declares there can be no truths that exist outside of each and everyone’s personal truth, pushing the valid concept of Pluralism outside the boundary of its proper scope. It however, falls prey to its own theory, as it declares itself a universal theory and ignores the deep pattern of universals across cultures, languages, neurology, etc.

Plural Rational Theory (Grid/Group) (PRT) presents a middle ground theory between these two extremes which squares with the latest evidence from affect and social neuroscience that emotion and feeling and the effects of others constrain how humans behave and decide (Verweij, 2007). PRT’s Biases encompass perception, emotion, and cognition as a “rational” system in which all function to influence human behavior and decision making. PRT allows that regularities in human social life can be explained by the interplay between social interaction and cultural influences, leading to very noticeable generalized patterns that can be identified across cultures in PRT’s four pattern typology. It recognizes the vast complexity and diversity of human patterning emerges from the combinatorial mixing of a small number of these elemental patterns which are constrained by Neurological and Biological systems (Verweij *et al.*, 2015: 6). Biological constraints the brain and nervous system placed upon twin processes of evaluating stratification (Grid) and collectivity (Group), have distinct signatures of hormonal, emotional, neural, and autonomic patterning.

PRT describes social structural patterns of how society should order social relations, crossing the degree they are controlled by Groups running from the Individualism to Collectivism (Group), with the degree of freedom they have in the social structure running from high Stratification to leveled Egalitarian equality (Grid). The Group dimension of Individualism and Collectivism is used in

another similar theory offered by Triandis (1999), which produces a similar quadrant typology crossing Individualism-Collectivism with a concept of Vertical-Horizontal, very similar to the Grid construct where the vertical emphasizes Hierarchy, while Horizontal emphasizes equality. Dubbed Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism (HVIC) (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), the Individual and Collective can be emphasized in the definition of the social self, a social psychological construct where the self has both individual and collective identities, as well as orders goals towards independence or interdependence, rationality or relatedness, and attitudes or norms (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Cross-cultural empirical evidence demonstrates that societies are found in both western and non-western countries which have dominant social constructs of horizontal individualism (HI), vertical individualism (VI), horizontal collectivism (HC), or vertical collectivism (VC) (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). These constructs are “distinct and incommensurable”, in that “no transcendent value encompasses all four types of social motive” and align with other empirical measures of Individualism and Collectivism across attitudes, values, and goal orientation (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

The HVIC construct seems to align tightly with PRT worldview biases, although they represent constructs at different levels of analysis, and from different directions. Where as Grid/Group focus upon macro social structural external constraints upon individuals, HVIC describes how micro psychological phenomena affect social striving, which vary from individual attitudes to the expectations and sanctions of collective social norms. The two typologies of PRT and HVIC align closely in logic, as Horizontal Individualism (HI) aligns with PRT’s low Grid/low Group Individualism, while Horizontal Collectivism (HC) aligns with PRT’s low Grid/high Group Egalitarianism. Similarly, Vertical Individualism (VI) aligns with PRT’s high Grid/low Group Fatalism, while Vertical Collectivism (VC) with high Grid/high Group Hierarchy.

And while social norms for behavior are central in HVIC, the Individualist or Collectivist dimensions vary culturally to the degree to which these norms are imposed and enforced (Gelfand *et al.*, 2006). The construct of the strength of social norms a culture imposes upon its members, as well as the degree to which those social norms are enforced, is termed Tightness-Looseness (Gelfand *et al.*, 2006). Cultural tightness refers to stronger social norms more strictly enforced via

sanctions (rewards and punishments), while cultural looseness refers to fewer social norms, less enforcement and a certain tolerance for deviation from the norm.

Tightness-Looseness is a separate construct from HVIC and covaries with Individualism and Collectivism such that a Collectivist oriented culture can be tight, such as Japan and Singapore, or loose such as Brazil. Similarly, national cultures can display a looseness or tightness in Individualist cultures, where many of the most Individualistic such as the USA or New Zealand skew loose, although others like Germany skew tight (Gelfand *et al.*, 2006). And while whole cultures such as Nation-states may skew Tight or Loose generally, that bias can filter down to organizations, families, groups and individuals, although it is context-dependent. Constituent subcultures, such as those at the level of states or national organizations, may have a completely different level of tightness-looseness than the national character, as well as a different valuing of Individualism or Collectivism.

Tightness can be correlated with groups having experienced higher degrees of threat. Societies having historically experienced more instances of natural disasters, lack of natural resources, or threats from other societies are found to be tighter (Roos *et al.*, 2015). Use of Evolutionary Game Theoretic modeling has shown in conditions of increased threat, stricter norm enforcement and higher levels of punishment prove adaptive. Cross-cultural research reinforces this, as many societies having experienced high levels of national threat tend to be tighter. At the level of individual psychology, studies have shown that under experimental conditions, artificial induction of threat cause individuals to exhibit temporary preference for tighter norms until the threat subsides (Roos *et al.*, 2015). Additional evidence shows that people from lower social strata prefer stronger social norms and tightness while those more affluent, especially those whom exhibit power socially, experience and prefer looseness of social norms (), reflecting, class differences of threat experience, which are partially explainable by the Tightness-Looseness construct ()�.

Adding both RMT's and HVCI's taxonomies to the Social Self Model results in the following:




Fig. 4.4 - Social Self Model adding RMT Mods - Sources: Favre & Sornette (2013: Table 1, 13)

Group regulation via social norm enforcement is central to human cultural evolution. Culture influences the organization and context of behavioral patterns, and those which are successful and adaptive are copied and spread across the population. This provides a rich system which allows for wide variation in the social structural and behavior logics of groups, with discernible patterns emerging from the effects of constraints imposed by universal dimensions. This variation allows for Cooperation within groups with Competition between groups, both key dynamics of cultural evolution (Sober & Wilson, 1998). And these two dynamics emerge from a deeper underlying social relational dynamic, two analytic dimensions which scale from the micro to the macro, namely Power and Status.

CHAPTER FIVE

Social Dynamics of Power & Status

“Our conviction is that while power and status are the important analytic dimensions of social relations and in a sense represent phylogenetic continuity, culture and social organization, not genes, determine overwhelmingly what particular mix of power and status relations will prevail in any human group. The most important route between the sociological, psychological and physiological levels proceeds, so to speak, from the outside in.” Kemper & Collins (1990)

The evolution of human social cognition provided a first line of generalized information about the competitiveness of individuals and groups. As humans evolved, the capacity to cooperate grew to a scale unseen in the rest of the living world. Social cognition became important for quickly assessing both **competitiveness** and **cooperativeness** of individuals and groups. At the level of microinteraction, competition and cooperation are generalized terms for the conflict and consensus in human face to face social interaction occurring over two universal dimensions, that of Power & Status (Kemper & Collins, 1990).

Power and Status theory, as conceived by Kemper (1978), is a sociological approach to define the dynamics of human interaction, which “generally occur in a context of interdependence and the division of labor” (p. 27). Purely technical behavior that is functionally differentiated and done by specialists is considered to be non-relational and part of the division of labor. However, when work or relations are interdependent, social interaction is dependent on two dimensions over which actors either are coerced or voluntarily comply with one another. **Power** is defined as the active ability of a social actor to compel or coerce another towards something they don’t want to do, against their will. Examples can be “force, threat, withdrawal of benefits, manipulation, deception and other negative sanctions are tools of power relations” (Kemper & Collins, 1990). **Status** (Prestige) is defined as the passive ability to have others voluntarily comply to one’s will, accomplished by “deference, acceptance and liking. It involves the voluntary provision of rewards, benefits, and gratifications

without threat or coercion. The ultimate form of status accord is **love**" (Kemper & Collins, 1990).

People have multiple status ranks for each social relationship and group membership during which interaction offers opportunities to make claims of Status. Often during interaction, actors vie for status claims through such behaviors as seeking attention and recognition, offering their credentials or making statements about personal tastes or values (Kemper, 1979). Additional status claims are made in various domains which advertise one's status, such as ownership of material goods, such as an expensive automobile or home. Similarly, membership in exclusive groups provide additional sources of status, such as sororities or country clubs.

Power and Status Theory posits the structural relations between these two dimensions produces structured emotion as the result of one's either losing or gaining power, or losing or gaining status. Emotion is defined as "relatively short-term evaluative response essentially positive or negative in nature involving distinct somatic (and often cognitive) components" (Kemper, 1978: 47). Somatic markers (Damasio, 1995) include physiological changes which are directly observable including face flush, heart rate variability, pulse, etc., while cognitive components include verbal markers describing how one feels. "A very large class of emotions results from real, imagined, or anticipated outcomes of social relations" (Kemper, 1978: 48).

The emotions produced by social relations can be sorted into three general types: Structural, Anticipatory and Consequent. Structural emotions describe the degree to which actors are satisfied or unsatisfied with their own level of status and power. Anticipatory emotions are described as relating to how actors view the state of a social relationship. Consequent emotions are described as occurring from the outcomes of interaction, which chain together structural and anticipatory into a final consequent set of emotions. Much more will be said about Power and Status theory of emotion, but essentially the Power and Status Theory models a systematized socio-emotional structure guiding human social behavior and resulting in clear patterns of social structure.

Power and status are found to correspond to similar basic dimensions found in many different analytic domains, from studies of small group interaction, neurophysiology, autonomic response, personality psychology and semantics (Kemper & Collins, 1990). Power and status are found to underlie micro-, meso- and macro- levels, concluding that "the structural features underlying the

two-dimensional model can be usefully applied not only to cross-cultural comparisons among whole societies, but also to the comparison of cultures among classes and occupational and professional groups" (Kemper & Collins, 1990:48). At micro- levels, Power and Status correspond directly with psychological models of personality, the Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC) and Five-Factor Model (FFM), whose orthogonal dimensions of Dominance-Submissiveness and Friendly-Hostile (IPC) map to FFM's Agreeableness and Extraversion (Pincus *et al.*, 1998)(De Young *et al.*, 2012), both of which match Power (reciprocally) and Status (Kemper, 2007).

Power and status also scale upward to macro conditions, correlating with Plural Rationality Theory's Grid and Group dimensions, where Grid represents "the power dimension of society," while Group represents an aspect of Status as the "acceptance or rejection of self and others based on the single criteria of membership" (Kemper & Collins, 1990: 47). Evidence of power and status is even found underlying primate "agonic" and "hedonic" behavior (Kemper & Collins, 1990:44), which provides a physiological basis for human study of power and status (Kemper, 2007). So too the Sociological theory of Weber's (1946) Class, Status, Party triad includes Parties in which Political Interest groups compete using power to gain control over the polity and Status Groups which coalesce around the affective commitments between members which binds them together, while Class reflects the non-relational technical sphere (Kemper & Collins, 1990: 51-52).

Some fields use different terms, while other use similar terms with slightly different meanings. Conflicting definitions can be disambiguated to show how Power and Status dimensions converge on behavior resembling either coercion and competition, or voluntary cooperation and liking, respectively (Kemper & Collins, 1990).

Paradoxically, evidence from social cognition studies and the SCM find that structural features of interpersonal relationships determine stereotypes having the opposite relationship with Power and Status dimensions. The perception of intergroup competition and status relations result in warmth and competence stereotypes, respectively (Russell & Fiske, 2008). Fiske *et al.* (2007) shows a very high cross-cultural analytic correlation between Status and Competence (0.94 for Groups and 0.77 for individuals). The SCM pairs Status with Competence/low Grid/Autonomy, while low status aligns with high Grid. From a social perception standpoint, the status-competence correlation implies that **demographic** status (gender, race, etc) depends on the character trait of competence, a

pancultural stereotype since the SCM has been cross culturally verified (Fiske *et al.*, 2007). Similarly, Competition (power) causes stereotypes of Coldness while inversely related to interpersonal Warmth, corresponding to the high Group/Communion dimension (Fiske *et al.*, 2007).

This presents a dilemma, since Kemper's definition of Status seems to be orthogonal to the SCM's definition of perceived Status. Power and Status theory clearly aligns Status with the Group/Community/Warmth dimension due to its role in liking (aligning with Warmth) and group membership, while Power in the form of coercion or coldness used in social competition aligns with low Grid/Autonomy/Competence.

The paradox between these two different conceptions of Status can be resolved by considering the invisibility of some amount of Status being paid through coercion. While Status accord is theorized to be purely due to liking, deference is given in some combination of both status accord and coercion (Kemper 1978). Oftentimes this coercion can be hidden in institutional forms of social structure, which obscures the source of Status paid. This skews perception of Status to such a degree that we associate it with Competence, along which Power is structurally aligned, while institutional coercive sources are invisible. Thus, our perception of Status and Power through social perception is skewed by our threat defenses of guarding against harm.

This bias is confirmed by the findings of the SCM, which indicate that evaluations of Coldness from use or potential use of power are weighted more heavily in evaluations of others, guarding against active harm, while passive harm from incompetence is less heavily weighted. We estimate other's Power and Activation level and evaluate their level of status from those two attributions, while we can sense or own activation and status implicitly and use power strategically to get what we need from others. Thus, we grant deference out of self-protection from harm, yet attribute it as Status and now Power, while we pursue Status through a combination of both interpersonal warmth and instrumental and strategic competence. Also, Social Cognition does not seem to differentiate between technical and purely relational interaction, which Power and Status theory clearly separates (Kemper, 1978). These two opposing views of Status have a clear solution, which lies in the evaluative process, along which Status is congruent.

Status can be said to lie between Competence and Warmth along the diagonal representing

Evaluation, which lies orthogonal to Power, running diagonally between Competence and Coldness, along the BIAS axis. SCM's social perception locating Status directly in line with Competence conflates some amount of Status due to coercion and the use of power, in varying combination of deference due to accord (liking-warmth). Pure Status accord would be free of coercion, directly opposite Coldness. We shall later see evidence supporting this hypothesis, placing Status along the diagonal running between Warmth and Competence, while Power would be situated orthogonally running between Competence and Coldness, aligning with SCM's BIAS dimensions. Thus, SCM's dimension of Coldness-Warmth would correspond to a range running from high Power/low Status to low Power/high Status, while the Incompetence-Competence dimension corresponds to a range running from low Power/low Status to high Power/high Status.

Abelle & Wojciszke (2007) further support the correlation of SCM's terms with two broad categories called Agency and Communion. Rather than being opposite ends of a single bipolar dimension, Agency and Communion have been found to be orthogonal (Wiggins, 1991). They represent basic dimensions of judging persons and groups related to the basic self-focused and other-focused perspectives in social interaction. Agency represents goal pursuit benefitting a **self-perspective**, while Communion represents consideration of an **other-perspective**. These two concepts provide broad dimensions recognized by many models in Social Psychology, Social Cognition, Personality Psychology, etc.; and correspond to dimensions from those fields which correlate cross-culturally (Abelle & Wojciszke, 2007). A list of person trait types for both dimensions (**Fig. 5.1**) align with the Social Self Model's two Universal Dimensions.

AGENCY - interests of the self

- POWER - social structure
- STATUS - social perception
(corresponds with COMPETENCE)
- AUTONOMOUS
- INDEPENDENT
- intellectual desirability
- competence
- initiating structure
- egoistic bias - the “superhero” bias
- independent self-construal
- dominance / ambition
- self in terms of unique qualities
- instrumental functions
- self-profitable / self-harmful
- masculinity stereotype

COMMUNION - interests of others

- STATUS - social structure
- POWER (inverse) - social perception
(corresponds with WARMTH)
- COMMUNIATIVE
- SOCIABILE
- social desirability
- morality
- consideration
- moralistic bias - the “saint” bias
- interdependent self-construal
- nurturance / warmth
- relationship with others
- expressive functions
- other-profitable / other-harmful
- femininity stereotype

Fig. 5.1 - Universal Dimensions of Social Person Traits Agency & Communion -

Source: from Abele & Wojciszke (2007, 2013)

As we shall see later, Self and Other perspectives are essential in social relations as well as at lower levels of this analysis in Neurophysiology, Behavior and Psychology. Many of the details and corresponding evidence will become apparent when we look at three sets of examples matching Autonomic Nervous System activation, Emotion generation and Self/Other orientations of the Social Engagement System. The SCM measuring people's social perception of others is based on real perceptual biases related to our physiology, while at the same time having certain psychological & cultural influences.

Adding to our previous model (**Fig. 4.4**), high Power maps to low Grid/high Autonomy/high Competence dimensions, while high Status maps to high Group/high Community/high Warmth. The integration of Power & Status into the Social Self Model adds a social interactional framework yielding the following:




Fig. 5.2 - Social Self Model adding Power & Status - Source: Kemper (1978)

While Power & Status form a unique dynamic in social relations, repetitive microinteraction across these two dimensions not only form social structure at macro levels, but also provide the basis for the production of emotion in individuals. In fact it is the extension of Kemper's Power & Status theory to include the generation of emotion categories which ties it to the macro levels above and micro levels below.

CHAPTER SIX

Emotion & Social Structure

“Emotional expressions help individuals know others’ emotions, beliefs, and intentions, thus rapidly co-ordinating social interactions...emotional communication evokes complementary and reciprocal emotions in others that help individuals respond to significant social events... and emotions serve as incentives or deterrents for other individuals’ social behaviour.”

Keltner & Haidt (1999: 511)

At its most essential level, social interaction is defined by the **social dyad**, between two individuals. Familiar and common patterns of repetitive behavior result in social structure when aggregated and scaled to macro levels. Emotion represents a response to environmental events, largely social, such as reactions to changes in social relationships. Emotions produced during the process of microinteraction operate both at the conscious and subconscious levels guiding social interaction (Plutchik, 2001). They help to define social situations and provide stimuli drawing people towards affiliation or repelling them away from each other (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Emotions can be experienced as feeling states informing about interaction with others, whether from direct interaction or mere contemplation of such. These tend to be brief and may serve as direct initiators to automatic behavioral changes (Baumeister *et al.*, 2007). Emotions can also serve as feedback from automatic affective responses which serve adaptively to not directly change behavior, but rather provide emotional information that stimulate conscious reflection, where insights can be made to understand why things happened and to learn from mistakes and social misdeeds (Baumeister *et al.*, 2007). Anticipated emotions arise out of feedback emotions which have been encoded (learned), which serve then as motivators towards more adaptive behaviors via approach and avoidance, regulating choice and goal pursuit (Baumeister *et al.*, 2007).

Emotions also function as a signaling mechanism in social interaction. Physiological manifestations of emotions act as signals about internal states displayed through verbal and non-verbal social cues,

giving others clues about behavioral probability. Moreover, they can be alerts through proprioceptive feeling or noticing outward emotional displays as to subconscious emotional states out of awareness. It was Darwin's notice of these displays in both humans and primates, along with other more distantly related mammals, which led him to speculate that emotions had a common evolutionary origin and were shared widely across species. However, human's have the extraordinary ability to distinguish between many different emotions and use them as guides towards adaptive behavior.

While emotions make up a significant portion of conscious (and subconscious) life, their expression and differentiation is sometimes difficult to express through language because they are largely experienced internally outside the realm of verbal description. Their labeling and association with characteristic behavioral situations are culturally learned. So too are certain social norms and cultural taboos which guard against emotional displays or emotion talk, further limiting our conscious comprehension of them. Emotions can co-occur as mixed feelings which complicates the ability to recognize what one is feeling. Longer term emotional states are called moods, while temperament describes the long term emotional disposition of an individual related to personality. Most emotions are transient (short-lived) and often follow in a line of successive emotions, particularly when they are negative such as in rumination. They may also vary over the degree to which they are cognitively controlled. Many emotions are automatic, meaning they are instinctually displayed, difficult to fake and even more difficult to suppress, most of which we would recognize through universal facial displays (Ekman, 2003).

Emotions can be classified along several different scales or properties which help in classifying "families" of emotion. Valence, also called hedonic valence or hedonic tone, is evaluative and denotes a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Activation measures the strength of the felt intensity of emotion above neutral from the normal baseline or in comparison with a previous emotion state. Valence and Activation together make up Core Affect, the psychological component of emotion, in which people feel good or bad, energized or enervated (Russell, 2003). Emotions are generally short lived, can occur in successive or overlapping fashion, and can vary widely in their anticipation or dissipation. Moods are longer term emotional states, which can influence behavior and motivational states. Temperament characterizes a base emotional disposition connected to personality which also effect behavior. All of these can influence the salience and meaning of emotion.

There are thought to be a small set of innate, primary emotions, although the set of primary emotions is hardly agreed upon, nor for that matter are primary emotions accepted by all theories (cf Barrett, 2015). However, innate primary emotions are generated by limbic system circuitry, namely by the amygdala, anterior cingulate and hypothalamus, activating the body via the endocrine system (via the bloodstream) (Deacon, 1997). These core emotions represent automated biophysical reactions to external stimuli oriented towards threat defense, occurring nearly instantaneous, with inflexible & recognizable patterns of response, i.e. the Fear response. These also precede cognitive awareness (Deacon, 1997).

Secondary emotions involve conscious and unconscious processing mediated by the prefrontal cortex and somatosensory system overlaying connections to the primary emotional circuitry (Damasio, 1995). These emotions are produced by conscious mental representations of social events, both verbal and non-verbal, activating a number of neural sensory cortices (e.g. visual, aural) to model situations involving the self and others (Damasio, 1995). Unconsciously, the prefrontal cortex processes the images from the sensory cortices and activates the body according to culturally acquired information about how this dispositional information is associated with emotional responses experienced previously (Damasio, 1995). This in turn leads to a cascade of unconscious, innate changes by the limbic circuitry, resulting in the activation of primary emotion response network (Damasio, 1995). All these steps together result in the feeling of an emotional body state. It is the additional processing by other neural circuitry which results in the conscious awareness of feeling that emotion state (Damasio, 1995).

Secondary emotions act as markers which flavor social concepts reconstructed or presently experienced, producing a gut feelings which can be particular advantageous for when applied to our personal and immediate social domain. These emotions are associated with aspects of social situations, events, people, etc previously learned which guide in predicting the best course of action in future interaction. According to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1995), the gut feelings of secondary emotions guide decision making and the estimation of probable outcome. These somatic (body) feelings mark “real, imagined, or anticipated outcomes of social relations” (Kemper, 1978: 48). Negative feelings help to winnow out possible social actions that may cause social harm or damage personal status, while positive emotions act as beacons for social actions which perform social good and increase personal status.

The Somatic Marker Hypothesis helps to explain how emotions assist reasoning and decisions making. Cold rationality without such markers yields behavior which resembles sociopathy or psychopathology, as in the case of patients with damaged emotion centers, i.e. Phineas Gage (Damasio, 1995). The presence of such markers assists cold rationality in narrowing social responses from the diverse universe of possible responses to improve accuracy and efficiency of social decisions. It also helps to explain how the possibility of future positive payoffs despite a current negative assessment of a present scenario, such as in the case of delayed gratification, where an initial negative payoffs is endured for the chance of some future benefit which far outweighs the endurance of immediate negativity.

Somatic Markers are continuously learned, acquired during socialization and experience, but continuing throughout life. They include internally generated individual preferences or dispositions oriented towards survival, reduction of unpleasant body states, and the exploitation of pleasure seeking. They also include externally imposed social norms enforced by parents and adults when young, through punishment and reward, as well as those followed personally when internalized as social conventions and personal ethics (Damasio, 1995: 179). Thus, feeling rules of a particular culture will shape social rules guided by which emotions are valued. We shall see that some cultures pay particularly close attention to some emotions which other cultures either ignore or avoid as taboo.

While Emotion has been the subject of study across many fields for a century and a half, no general agreed upon theory of emotion, nor general definition nor even consensus on which are universal or primary, exists in which to explain emotions fully (Plutchik, 2001). The diversity of Sociological, Cultural, Psychological, and Neurophysiological theories of emotion have yet to settle upon a universal framework. Nor for that matter have a set of primary emotions been identified, although a small few appear across many lists of universal emotions. Those most often identified in cross-cultural and primate studies yield the following: Fear, Anger, Sadness, Joy, Surprise and Disgust (see table in Kemper, 1987: 266).

Plutchik's (2001) circumplex model of psychological emotion (**Fig. 6.1** below) provides one of the best candidates for describing primary emotions. It includes a multidimensional graphical

representation of the relationship between eight primary emotion categories, their relationships, as well as a set of blended emotions. According to Plutchik's model, emotions can be blended from primaries, similar to theories of color, producing recognizable mixtures called primary dyads. Plutchik's circumplex model also incorporates emotional intensity in which each of the eight primary emotion categories have mild, normal, and intense versions, producing a systematized set of blended emotions of varying intensities.




Fig. 6.1 - Primary & Blended Psychological Emotions - Source: Plutchik (2001)

The eight primary emotions defined by Plutchik's model (the second inner band of emotions in **Fig. 6.1**) are theorized to have evolved out of four existential problems of adaptation which all organisms must negotiate. Such problems are thought to have produced evolutionary changes to emotion subsystems that produced bipolar emotion pairs to help organisms evaluate whether a situation was good or bad, eventually guiding the organism towards (approach) or away (avoidance) from behaviors in order to aid survival and reproduction. The four problems of life - **Hierarchy, Territoriality, Identity, and Temporality** - have resulted in evolutionarily honed affective signals: Fear-Anger, Surprise-Anticipation, Disgust-Acceptance, and Sadness-Joy, respectively (Plutchik, 1980: 146-158). Plutchik's psychoevolutionary theory of emotion connects the environmental and social challenges shared generally, providing a theory connecting the human emotions on a continuum with other species.

Critiques of the psychoevolutionary model include its lack of explaining the origin of social emotions, as well as lacking the connection of emotion with the dynamics of social interaction, instead focusing on the psychological and behavioral aspects of emotions (Kemper, 1978). Its model includes only four dimensions of interaction, considered to be problems of life, which limit its ability to be universal across all behaviors, "as if to suggest that other dimensions are unnecessary or incidental for a comprehensive classification system" (Thamm, 2007:13). However, Plutchik's psychoevolutionary model has contributed "the dimensions of polarity, valences, mixed emotion categories, compounded emotions, intensity, analogy, and the possibility of a dictionary of emotions" (Thamm, 2007). It provides a concise yet comprehensive model which can serve as a good start for the exploration of basic emotion, especially for the primaries in particular.

Primary emotions are often triggered by environmental or behavioral triggers, said to be evoked, which elicit psychologically instinctual behaviors, some having signature social gestures, especially facial expressions recognized across the world as human universals (Ekman, 2003). Instinctual behaviors can be said to be intrinsic, without having conscious choice and the emotions they produce are principally unconscious emotions. Our instincts towards protecting ourselves physically and socially produce the most negative emotions, and which guide social behavior, thus the emotions producing that behavior and signaling information about the situation are important to decode.

“Fear results from interaction outcomes where actors are subject to the power of others because that power is greater than their own. Anger results from interaction outcomes in which expected, customary, or deserved status has been denied or withdrawn by another actor who is seen to be responsible for the reduced status. Depression results from interaction outcomes in which status has been lost or denied, but where the actor deems him- or herself irremediably responsible for the loss or incapable of retrieving the desired benefit. Satisfaction results from interactions in which the power outcome is nonthreatening and the status outcome is according to what was desired or expected.” Kemper (1987: 275)

Power and Status theory posits that social structural outcomes are linked to physiological outcomes via emotions (Kemper, 1978, 1987). Kemper extends the Funkenstein hypothesis (1955) by proposing that differential autonomic activation and inhibition via neurochemical modulators match a basic set of social behavioral outcomes. That hypothesis posits that epinephrine (E) is associated with Fear states, while norepinephrine (NE) with Anger states, both governed by the sympathetic component of the autonomic nervous system (ANS). Kemper extends that hypothesis by offering that acetylcholine (ACh) modulates parasympathetic activity of the autonomic system, modulating Satisfaction and Depression. These four functional autonomic modes very generally produce primary emotions, and that the Power and Status dimensions are theoretically linked to (E), (NE) and (ACh) (Kemper, 1987: 271-276).

A simple model of Power and Status relations shows that interaction can produce a wide variety of emotions based on the increase, decrease or no-change of a person’s power or status (Kemper, 2006). When individuals exercise or gain power, they experience positive emotions like satisfaction, confidence and security. When they lose power they experience emotions like anxiety and fear. Gains and losses in Status (prestige) similarly result in the elicitation of positive and negative emotions. “When individuals experience gains in prestige (or the receipt of deference), satisfaction and well-being are aroused, and they express positive sentiments to others, thereby increasing the flow of positive emotions and bonds of solidarity between givers and receivers of deference” (Turner & Stets, 2007: 11). Individuals blaming others for the loss in status cause feelings of Anger, Shame and Embarrassment (*ibid*).

Power and Status measure rank, where actors stand in relation to each other. The interplay between

trying to elevate one's rank status by using power or by denigrating another provide the context of the different combinations of interactions that Power and Status describes. Kemper's theory posits the set of different combinations of potential Power and Status interactions between two actors produce a set of unique emotion categories, as well as describe the range of common patterns of atomic behavior which accumulate as social structure. While the situations that produce these Power and Status interactions can vary across cultures, the emotion categories and social structure from these interactions are universal (Kemper, 2006). The system of power and status relations producing universal emotions can be systematically studied to understand the production of social structure (Kemper, 2006).

Power & Status Theory of Emotion attempts to integrate constructionist emotion theory with this positivist account of primary emotions, by positing that secondary emotions are constructed from these primaries via "social definitions, labels and meanings to differentiated conditions of interaction and social organization" through the process of socialization (Kemper, 1987: 276). It offers that microinteraction across two universal dimensions of social interaction produces a "large class of emotions results from real, imagined or anticipated outcomes in social relationships" (Kemper, 1978: 43). The Power & Status Theory of Emotion represents a "potentially testable theory" combining a small set of "physiological grounded primary emotions" with "secondary emotions" constructed from "primary emotional experiences" paired with "the secondary labels attached to specific circumstances eliciting the primary feeling or feelings" (Thoits, 1989: 321).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Emotion & Expectation

“To the extent that situations are structured and recurrent over evolutionary time, their statistical properties can be used as the basis for a special kind of psychological adaptation: an emotion.” Tooby & Cosmides (2011: 410)

Expectations play an essential role in social interaction because they prepare the actor for behavior. We generally have expectations for ourselves and others when we interact. These expectations come from socialization learning about behavior norms and from experience with others generally and also with specific others. When we engage in interaction and our expectations are met, it provides us with satisfactory emotions. However, when our expectations are not met, we may experience negative emotions, which can vary in intensity depending on how strongly we felt towards those expectations and to what degree they were not met. The expectations function as a way of managing our emotional selves, preparing for certain expected emotions generated by social interaction.

There are two basic ways in which the subjective experience of emotion influences behavior (Fessler, 1999: 19). In the first, following some event, an emotion is produced which causes one to act. The intensity indicates the significance of the event stimulus and contributes to the level of response, while the hedonic affect determines which direction (toward or away) the responsive act should be. The first style reacts to an emotion and can be thought to be a defensive mode. This style is **reactionary** and can be modeled as:

EVENT -> EMOTION -> ACTION

The second style is affected by learning, which seeks to act in order to produce certain feelings, acting in order to shape events, with emotion influencing action before it is experienced. The hedonic affect determines whether the emotion is a goal or anti-goal while the intensity matches the significance of the emotion. This style is **responsive** and can be modeled as:

ACTION -> EVENT -> EMOTION

The learned responsive mode is a more evolutionarily advanced model guided by learning, which allows one to be predictive rather than reactive. This style contributes towards emotions as motivational and goal/anti-goal states (Fessler, 1999).

Goals can be thought of as motivations for the avoidance of a negative outcome (anti-goal) or approaching a positive outcome. Over time, these become regulatory mechanisms in which we engage in one or the other style, although they differ in outcome (Heimpel *et al.*, 2006). Avoidance goals tend to be less optimal regulatory structures, tending towards negative outcomes and more often evoking “threat appraisals, anxiety, controlled volition, and other negative processes”, resulting in the absence of any positive outcome (Heimpel *et al.*, 2006). Additionally, “avoidance goals in achievement have been linked to low enjoyment and fulfillment, perceptions of low goal progress, low job satisfaction, and low subjective well-being,” as well as high fear of failure and insecure attachment (Heimpel *et al.*, 2006:1296). Approach goals, on the other hand, provide a positive goal to work toward and generally have the opposite effects on achievement and avoidance. These two styles are correlated with self-esteem, a predictor of which emotion management paradigms people use, with approach goals used more often by those with higher self-esteem and avoidance goals more often by those with lower (Heimpel *et al.*, 2006).

Interestingly, the study of emotion in music provides an empirical model of expectation and emotion, revealing a deep structure used to anticipate events and limit surprise (Huron, 2006). Huron offers a theory using the acronym **ITPRA** to model five steps of emotion generation in music, where pre- and post- stages include steps to model, prepare for, predict, react to, and assess aural events in order to be more adaptive in our environment. Each of the steps represent expectation-response systems serving different adaptive functions (Huron, 2006).

The ITPRA model includes a pre-outcome stage preceding an event representing responsive behaviors. It begins with the **Imagination (I)** response, which involves thinking about possible future events to help guide behavior towards desirable and away from undesirable outcomes. This is possible because thinking about future behavior produces muted versions of emotions which act as

positive or negative motivators of behavior. These emotions are felt and provide motivation to change behavior toward adaptive outcomes, including delayed gratification, which delays reward now for greater reward later. Imagining occurs over a long period of time preceding events.

The **Tension (T)** response occurs shortly before an event, where the body prepares for anticipated events by adjusting arousal based on the uncertainty of the situation, such gearing up defensively in fight/flight/freeze. The tension stage also involves the focusing of attention as the mind prepares for the anticipated event. Both arousal and attention are accompanied by physiological changes that are timed to meet the moment of an event. The physiological arousal from tension results in stress, even in the case of tension from positively expectations. The degree of stress can be exacerbated by the uncertainty of the timing and details of the outcome of the event. The tension stage occurs typically just before the event to conserve energy which can be costly for high expenditures of arousal.




Fig. 7.1 - ITPRA Model of Musical Expectation - Source: Huron (2011)

The Post-outcome stage begins immediately after an event. The **Prediction (P)** response occurs at the onset of an event, representing some reward or punishment for accurate expectation, which likely manifests at the neurophysiological level as a release neurotransmitters triggering the nervous system (Huron, 2006). It is at this stage which emotions are experienced, either positively or negatively valenced depending on the expectation and outcome. If the stimulus is expected, the emotion is likely positively valenced, while if unexpected, the emotion generally negative. This stage

is transient, lasting a brief amount of time.

The **Reaction (R)** response co-occurs with prediction responses directly and rapidly after an event (~120ms), generating a specific somatic bodily response lasting several seconds. A reaction generally results in an unconscious defensive or protectively oriented response. It is instinctually evoked by the event, although it too can be learned. Some automatic reaction responses act like reflexes reflecting automatic motor responses, while others are more complex and evoke the activation of learned behavioral schemas that have become second nature.

Appraisal (A) responses follow prediction and reaction responses far more slowly, evolving consciously over time. Appraisals represent a contemplative and reflective response of the previous four responses, remaining independent of reactions and subject to revision. Thus, negative responses can be revised by positive appraisals, such as when someone reacts to a surprise event negatively but then realizes with contemplation that it was a false alarm, appraising it in another context. Appraisals represent learning through reinforcement.

Extensive analytical evidence from cross-cultural musicology supports the ITPRA paradigm, and this emotional musical emotional system is universal regardless of the tonal or cultural system (Huron, 2006). Importantly, it can be generalized to represent the psychological system used to model expectation to prepare the body for future adaptive behavior (Huron, 2006).

While the expectation and expression of emotions are universal across all cultures, the situations which generate them and their particular meanings and value are culturally determined. Culture provides the context and connotation in which emotions serve to achieve certain cultural goals, representing collective intentionality. Cultures display differing patterns of emotional expression, valuing some patterns and not others, resulting in certain behaviors being favored over others. Thus, emotion tends to result in the differential patterning of social behavior across cultures. However, because of the universality of our primary and at least some secondary emotions, great similarity across cultures can also be found, which suggests a universal structure to emotion underling human behavior.

CHAPTER EIGHT

An Emotion Classification System

“Thamm is able to create a periodic table of emotional responses that predicts which particular emotions emerge depending on appraisals of self and/or other with respect to expectations and/or rewards and the degree of power and status (and powerlessness and statuslessness). Of all the theories reviewed in this essay, Thamm offers the most predictions about the specific emotions that will be aroused under varying social structural conditions of power/status and appraisal.” Turner & Stets (2006: 36)

Thamm (1992; 2004) extends Kemper’s Power & Status Theory of Emotion by proposing universal structures of human groups emerge from the social causes of emotion and by providing a “condensed symbolic notation” to summarize “complex structural configurations that predict each emotion” (Thamm, 2007: 19). He presents a framework for integrating different emotion classification systems from psychological, cognitive, symbolic, interactional, evolutionary and social perspectives. Rather than a “prototypical approach” which explains emotions through resemblances characterized by Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary model, Thamm uses a “dimensional approach” which takes the classical view that emotions can be differentiated by mutually exclusive conditions, although it is suggested that the two approaches are “more complimentary than irreconcilable” (Thamm, 2007: 12). Thamm’s model originates from the sociological tradition, where emotions are responses to social events which “arise out of behavioral and environmental preconditions” (Thamm, 2007: 16). A recent survey comparing the main theoretical approaches in sociological emotion theories states, “of all the theories reviewed in this essay, Thamm offers the most predictions about the specific emotions” (Turner & Stets, 2006: 36).

Thamm’s model integrates non-classical appraisal theories of emotion, presenting a classification system which “includes both the appraisal and social dimensions and is defined as the process of actors appraising and responding to real or imagined focused social situations” (Thamm, 2006: 16). One appraisal theory highlighted by Thamm is the OCC model (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988), an

early psychological model positing that emotions arise from evaluations of “significant psychological situations,” where evaluations are “implicit, automatic, and subcortical, as well as those that are explicit, conscious, and deliberative” (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988).




Fig. 8.1 - The OCC Model of Emotion Categories - Source: Ortony & Clore (2006)

The OCC model demarcates the directionality of emotion, whether felt by Ego or by Alter, as well as postulating that meaning emerges for emotion labels and helps to differentiate different orders of emotion categories and emotion hierarchy (Thamm, 2007). The OCC model in **Fig. 8.1** shows emotion categories arising out of appraisals focusing on the outcomes of three different aspects of social action: an **event**, the **action** by an actor in an event, or upon an **object**. These different aspects result in differing dimensions of emotion categories arising from both initial implicit automatic evaluations, as well as further refined, controlled cognitive processes.

The OCC offers a model of emotional appraisals of social situations by borrowing from Balance Theory (Heider, 1958), a theory normally applied to cognitive attitudes and the general psychological motivation to seek interpsychic balance and consistency between actors and their attitudes.

However, the OCC offers a balance model for socially shared emotions in which two nodes of the Balance triangle are Ego (P) and Alter (O), while the other node is an event (X) appraised by both (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988: 98-99). The OCC balance model posits that the segment between Ego and Alter (P->O) is one of either like (+) or dislike (-). The other two segments are Ego's appraisal of the event (P->X) and Alter's appraisal (O->X). Thus, using their example (p.98), if John likes Mary (+), Mary dislikes an outcome of an event (-), and John feels sorry for Mary (-), the resulting emotion triad is balanced. If John were to gloat at Mary's dislike of the outcome of the event (+), the resulting in an imbalance would exist, since that would contradict John's like for Mary.

The OCC's "seminal model for predicting emotions" stems from two types of evaluations, not meeting **Expectations** and receiving **Sanctions** for both Ego and Alter (Thamm, 2004: 193). Thamm's model conjectures that expectations and sanction underly the universal forms for constraining social interaction, aligning with Kemper's (1978) model of social structure, by creating substructures from normative constraints on behavior and prescriptions are distributed. These dimensions answer the following basic questions of a dyadic interaction— did each of the actors meet or not meet expectations?" and second, "did each of the actors receive rewards or not?" (Thamm, 2004). These two questions define two basic components of interaction, expectations towards compliance/noncompliance of behavior and sanctions representing reward or punishment for compliance/noncompliance to norms. Each set of questions produce specific emotions in each social actor during microinteraction, although they may not necessarily be aware of Alter's or even their own. The E-S paradigm postulates expectations and sanctions as the basic dimensions used to differentiate, categorize, "constrain and circumscribe the valence and amplitude of emotion" (Thamm, 2007: 14-15).

	SELF	OTHER
EXPECTATIONS	CONDITION 1 SELF EXPECTATIONS I am about to meet (-+) or about to not meet (+-) my expectations?	CONDITION 3 OTHER(S) EXPECTATIONS Other(s) is about to meet (-+) or about to not meet (+-) my expectations?
SANCTIONS	CONDITION 2 SELF SANCTION I am about to receive (-+) or about to not receive (+-) rewards?	CONDITION 4 OTHER(S) SANCTION Other(s) is about to receive (-+) or about to not receive (+-) rewards?

Fig. 8.2 - Expectations & Sanctions (E-S) of Ego and Alter - *Source: Thamm (2004)*

Thamm (1992) integrates the Expectations-Sanctions (E-S) paradigm with Power and Status dimensions by mapping typical Power and Status type behaviors as either actions taken by an actor (expectations) or prescriptions placed upon an actor (sanctions). Expectations for using Power would include actions which force another to submit to one's will, using either direct or indirect means, from assault & manipulation to deception and lying. Conversely, powerlessness would include submission, restraint and passivity. Status expectations would include conformity, deference, acceptance, cordiality, while statuslessness includes unfriendliness, unsociability and negativity. As for sanctions, Power sanctions include gaining rewards, punishing others, withholding rewards and winning. Powerless sanctions result in no rewards, punishment, and losing. Status sanctions include receiving approval, respect and acceptance where conformity is rewarded. Statusless sanctions include disrespect, low esteem, punishment and group rejection.

	POWER	POWERLESS		
ACTOR'S ACTIONS	Controlling, Commanding, Coercive, Authoritative, Imposing, Withholding, Strong, Potent, Forceful, Constraining, Excluding, Hurting, Punishing, Lying, Manipulating, Deceiving, Assertive, Achieving, Aggressive, Leading, Threatening, Assaulting, Dominating	Controlled, Submissive, Order-taking, Coerced, Complying, Weak, Involuntary compliance, Down, Passive, Subordinate, Restrained		
ACTOR'S SANCTIONS	Gaining rewards, Withholding rewards, Punishing others, Winning	In-effective, Deprived of rewards, Impotent, Weak, Fear of rewards Being withdrawn, Hurt, Punished, Rewards withheld, Un-achieving, Losing, Un-rewarded, lost rewards		
	STATUS	STATUSLESS		
ACTOR'S ACTIONS	Induced, Integrated, Providing services, Making contributions, Good, Admirable, Voluntary compliance, Supportive, Beneficial, Conferring rewards, Deferring, Conforming, Accepting, Friendly, Pleasant, Sociable, adaptable, Agreeable, Helpful, Genial, Cordial, Giving, Contributing, Positive	Un-likeable, Unfriendly, Unpleasant, Unsociable, Un-adaptable, Un-agreeable, Unhelpful, Uncongenial, Un-cordial, Voluntary non-compliance, Not giving, Failure to make contributions, Negative		
ACTOR'S SANCTIONS	Receiving approval, Rewarded for contributions, Admired, Deference, Respect, Conformity rewarded, Group acceptance, Accorded positive sanctions, Rewards given	Low esteem, Disapproval, Punished for not contributing, Disrespected, Receiving punishment, Lack of deference, non-Conformity punished, Group rejection, Accorded negative sanctions, Punishment given		
	POWER	POWERLESS	STATUS	STATUSLESS
ACTOR'S ACTIONS	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative
ACTOR'S SANCTIONS	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative

Fig. 8.3 - Power & Status - Actions & Sanctions - Source: Thamm (2004)

Power and Status actions and sanctions can be characterized as either positively or negatively valenced behaviors. Valence provides the most easily distinguishable and most fundamental

dimension in emotion grouping (Thamm, 2007: 21). By simplifying the E-S behaviors as simply positive or negative yields a generalized model for comparisons of power, powerlessness, status and statuslessness providing a mutually exclusive set of 16 generic Power versus Status combinations. Each combination includes expectations and sanctions for Ego and for Alter. An actor can appraise any one of these four conditions, which when left unappeased results in a “affective neutrality” (Thamm, 2004). Emotions result from the appraisals, so emotions can range from simple one condition appraisals, say of Ego’s expectations, to compound multiple appraisals of both Ego and Alter.

The integration of Power/Status with E-S dimensions produces a universal structure for **predicting** distinct emotions independent of social content, describing the universal production of emotions from social interaction (Thamm, 2004). Social actors assess each other’s Power & Status attributes, form expectations of behavior for Ego and Alter, and react according to whether behavior met expectations and was properly sanctioned during interaction. Good feelings arise when each confirm each other’s expectations, while conflict can arise when expectations are not met. Interestingly, even if met expectations are unfavorable or negative, it would result in some satisfaction, the result of confirmation bias demonstrating that correct prediction is rewarded (Thamm, 2004). Different combinations can be charted out based on different relational aspects to reveal the many different social emotions emerging from power and status relations, which can be and has been empirically tested (Thamm, 2004).




Fig. 8.4 - The Emotion Social-action System - Source: Thamm (1992: Fig. 2, 655)

The E-S paradigm in **Fig. 8.4** shows the social structural relations between actors in a social dyad. Each relation represents a different comparison between aspects of Social action. Certain relations may be more salient for a particular interaction, which if attended to inferentially, produces the effect of a structural emotion category. Attending to multiple aspects produces hierarchically blended emotions, which are composed of combinations of emotion categories.

Elementary emotion structures are simply those for either meeting expectations or sanctions, either of Self or Other. They are the primary components of structural emotions and can be combined to produce two-category comparisons. The comparative emotion structures may combine elemental emotion categories with differing valences, leading to compound mixed emotions. The comparative structures come in three interaction “families” comparing different social relational dimensions.

Attributional emotion structures compare an actor’s performance with sanctions. They reflect the power and status dimensions of the social substructure. They are the most basic comparison dimension assessed by a social actor in any situation. They result in emotions, in the case of Power, such as feeling manipulative, powerless, disgusted or compassionate. In the case of Status, they consist of feelings of honor, disgrace, admiration or disillusionment. In both cases, attribution emotions are sensed by self or read in others, independent of interaction, representing trait like attributions of persons. Thamm ties these attribution structures to similar emotion theories related to identity, power and status valences, and EPA potency and evaluation dimensions (Thamm, 2007: 26-28).


Distributional emotion structures compare performance or sanctions between the actors of the dyad. When they agree and distribution is equal such as both meeting expectations, they result in consensus, and when not equal such as unequal distribution of rewards, they are characterized as conflict-producing. They result in a class of emotion categories involved in all hierarchical or ranking systems (Thamm, 1992). In the case of expectation performance distributions, consensus emotion categories can be both positively and negatively valenced. They produce conflict emotion categories as inferior, superior, jealous, and selfish while consensus emotions categories produced are proud, ashamed, joy and sorry.

Interactional emotion structures compare balanced or imbalanced social exchange. Interactions can be either contributional in which one’s performance results in sanction, or retributional, in which sanction is given for the other’s performance. These are considered consistent if the sanction shares the same valence with the performance, or inconsistent if not. These structures produce emotion categories like anger, regret, gratitude and generous. These can be used to define both specific and general interaction identities, such as “good father” or “abusive person” respectively (Thamm, 2007:

29).

Thamm created a condensed symbolic notation (combining **Fig. 8.2** and **Fig. 8.3**) to chart all the combinations of Power and Status interactions over the basic E-S paradigm using simple (+) and (-) symbols to represent the valence (evaluation) of meeting or not meeting expectations or rewarding or punishing in the case of sanctions. The notation represents emotion appraisals, not of social content, but of the structure of content. These appraisals are always from the perspective of Ego, although the possible conditions from Alter's point of view can be seen by simply reversing the diagram columns. The total possible emotion structures that can be represented yield a total of 81 (3^4), each of which it could be possible to identify with emotion labels (Thamm, 1992: 653). The actual count should be 80 ($3^4 - 1$) emotion structures, arrived at from 8 one-condition elemental structures, 24 two condition comparison structures, 32 possible three condition subtle structures, and 16 possible four condition structures termed Syndromes.

The model in **Fig. 8.5** below shows one of the 16 Syndromes, a Power Advantage identity conflict, where Ego has higher Power than Alter in a comparison between high Power and low Power types. Following the E-S paradigm, Thamm's notation places expectations and sanctions as the top and bottom rows respectively, of the matrix, while Ego and Alter are represented by the two columns. The different substructures of the diagrams (in **Fig. 8.4**) represent structural content from which emotion appraisals define an emotion (Thamm, 2007: 17). These substructures begin with the elemental emotion categories representing a single expectation or sanction of either Ego or Alter.

**Fig. 8.5 - Power & Status Theory of Emotion Categories of Power Advantage -**

Source: Thamm (2004, 2007)


Each Syndrome is comprised of **15** total ($4^2 \cdot 1$) emotion structures, many of which will be repeated across the other permutations of Power & Status. Two category emotion structures are comparative in nature, between Ego and Alter, producing the most commonly recognizable social emotions. The three-category emotions, termed **Subtle** emotions, are composed of one attribution, distribution and interaction relation. Subtle emotions have “virtually no literature” available for their analysis and their overlapping and undifferentiated structure make classification especially difficult (Thamm, 2007: 31). Their emotional components can be built up from the two-category triad of emotions which make up each three-category combination composed of an Attribution, Distribution and Interactional structure. Thamm suggests that for these subtle emotions, “only the complexity and subtleties in natural language can offer meaning for these emotion categories” (2007: 31).

However, the decipherment of a syndrome’s four subtle emotions could be aided by incorporating balance theory (Heider, 1958), as affective relations tend towards a balanced state (Ortony, Clore &

Collins, 1988). While balance theory was conceived of the psychological drive to balance emotion valence between three actors, the OCC posits the principle could apply to emotion between two actors and a target object, action or event creating a similar triadic relationship. When Ego has some like or dislike for Alter, it influences the emotions generated by Ego's emotional outcome to the target in relation to the emotion generated by Alter's outcome with the target, and a similar psychological desire to achieve emotional balance would exist (cf Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990: 98-99).

Thamm characterizes each Subtle emotion structure as composed of an Attributional relation (vertical), a Distributional relation (horizontal), and an Interactional relation (diagonal), each of which contribute to the overall blended Subtle emotion. Each of these component relational structures can produce an emotion category through inference of that relation, but few of them would elicit the psychological need for balance without a liking dimension involved. The liking dimension of the E-S paradigm is in Sanction of Other (right bottom corner), of which only three of the four Subtle emotions contain a like/dislike value. Those three Subtle forms' other signed dimensions produce a unique comparison structure (Attribution, Distributional, Interactional) which are absent in the others. It may be that a drive for psychological balance exists as one of the three relational comparisons for each of the Subtle forms for every Power and Status paradigm.

Thus, each Subtle emotion form describes one structural aspect of the relationship which could be attended to and could be cause for seeking emotional balance with alter. Thamm's system leaves it unclear as to which structural relationships of the Subtle triad make up the balance equations, so this must later be determined during the decipherment of the Subtle emotions. A tentative form could look like the following:

**Fig. 8.6 - Emotion Balance Model of Subtle Emotions -**

Sources: Thamm (2004), Ortony, Clore & Collins (1990)

Only the left most Subtle form in **Fig. 8.6**, termed by this study as the Self-Evaluative subtle form, does not contain a tic mark in the Other like/dislike cell, which makes that form independent of like or dislike of Other. Speculatively, it may be that a Self-Evaluative form ignores alter and represents an Ego-centric evaluative form whose imbalance produces some form of psychological discomfort. However, it is not clear that a psychological drive for balance without an Other like/dislike dimension would exist, and the Subtle form would simply be the composite of the three comparison relations.

The other three Subtle forms do contain an Other like/dislike elemental structure, with each having a different complementary Comparison structure to be balanced. The third Subtle form, termed the Other Evaluative form, is an other-evaluative emotion form, producing emotion based on the distribution between them. This corresponds to the BIAS map (**Fig. 3.1**) emotions directed towards others. Liking Alter will affect the emotion type in differentials of distribution, with liking muting differences, and disliking enhancing the negative valence, or oppositely when distribution is positive, liking would produce a stronger positive valence with an even distribution or produce mixed feelings

when the feeling towards Alter is dislike. The like or dislike structure would influence the emotion blend increasing the intensity towards Alter when the valences are univalent while muting intensity in ambivalent mixes. This may explain the mixed emotion dynamics of the BIAS map in Stereotyped perception (Cuddy et al., 2008).

For the second and fourth Subtle forms in **Fig. 8.6**, these include the like/dislike structure with an Attributional or Interactional complementary structure, respectively. A similar dynamic may occur in that similarly valenced elemental Like/Dislike and comparison emotion produce a univalent blended emotion, affecting the intensity of feeling, or muting intensity in differences in valence. However, the comparison structures are not similar to distributional comparisons, which compare the meeting of expectations (social norms). In the case of the Attributional comparison (2), it is an evaluation of Ego's Power-Status, of which Alter's evaluation is only structural. For the Interactional comparison (4), it is an assessment of Alter's retribution capacity. Both of these assessments provide important information with regards to threat from Alter, which may make the balance between emotions psychologically salient, and provide an added emotion dimension for these Subtle forms.

Several iterations of this study have attempted to apply balance to Subtle forms where the three comparison structures represent the triad to be balanced. However, this ignores the literature regarding the basic disposition towards Alter as the defining structure which motivates psychological balance. The Subtle balance equations using the comparison triad run into problems in trying to define balance between Attributional and Interactional forms. It would seem balance between those two comparisons require all four E/S categories, which Thamm terms Syndromes, and which would require comparing both actor's Power & Status attributions together, or both actor's Contributions and Retributions together to trigger psychological desire for balance.

Thamm posits, "the formal mapping of these emotion structures and labels into a comprehensive classification system is possible...perhaps the taxonomy could resemble the periodic chart of elements, using E-S states instead of protons, neutrons and electrons" (Thamm, 2004: 220). Thamm's model for differentiating emotion categories produced according to psychologically important social structural relations provides a testable of systematically creating a hierarchy of emotion categories correlated with structural social behavior, which he likens analogously to the taxonomic structure of living things (cf Thamm, 2007). The mapping of all the combinations of

Power and Status interactions could provide an empirical framework for testing universal emotion categories generated from universal social structures.

Much time has been spent within emotion studies across many fields, arguing over whether emotions represent ontogenetically specific things, directly produced and mapped to specific brain structures, and/or having unique neurophysiological autonomic fingerprints. There is "much evidence and agreement" among researchers that emotions represent "autonomic-motoric-cognitive states" and that the number of recognized emotional states are constrained by the number of functional autonomic states (Kemper, 1987) . Thus, emotions tie the Social interactional and psychological to the physiological via the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and that **fear, anger, depression** and **satisfaction** are *primary* physiological emotion states directly tied to the most basic functional ANS states (Kemper, 1987).

CHAPTER NINE

Autonomic Underpinnings of Emotion

*“The polyvagal theory forces us to interpret compromised social behavior from a different perspective. The theory emphasizes that the **range of social behavior is limited by physiological state**. The theory also emphasizes that mobilization and immobilization behaviors may be adaptive strategies to a challenged (i.e. frightened) individual. Thus, it may be possible that creating states of calmness and exercising the neural regulation of brainstem structures may potentiate **positive social behavior** by stimulating and exercising the neural regulation of the social engagement system.” Porges (2001: 142)*

Mammalian evolution was accompanied by a suite of biological & neurophysiological changes which co-evolved to produce a control system that could override the innate behaviors of the sympathetic (SNS) and older parasympathetic (PNS) nervous systems fueling our innate defensive “instincts,” to one featuring a higher order defense through emotion auto regulation and social connection. The autonomic nervous system (ANS), also referred to as the limbic system, features dual component systems, the SNS and PNS, which control involuntary processes such as cardiovascular, renal, digestive, etc. The Somatic Nervous System, which provides voluntary control over joints, muscles, limbs, and appendages, can be differentiated from the ANS, not simply by the difference between voluntary versus involuntary, but also things like localizability (somatosensory pain has a specific location) and specificity (you cannot feel your liver).

Polyvagal theory (Porges, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003) provides a paradigm for understanding the evolution of this limbic neurophysiological complex to inhibit threat defense and manage security, the opposite of the functioning of the old system which was threat defense only. Polyvagal theory describes the divergence between two branches of the tenth cranial nerve (the vagus), with each branch evolving to provide a different adaptive behavioral strategy. Polyvagal theory asserts that the evolution of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) in mammals “provides the neurophysiological substrates for the emotional experiences and affective processes that are major components of social

communication,” via “structural and functional changes in the cranial nerves, especially in the regulation of cardiac function and of the striatal muscles of the face, larynx, and pharynx” (Porges, 1997: 838). This system then again evolved which “prepared the human infant for social behavior” (Porges & Furman, 2011: 108).

The two branches of the **vagus nerve** serve different subsystems of the parasympathetic nervous system (PNS): the ventral vagal complex (VVC) and the dorsal vagal complex (DVC), both of which are differentiated from the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) subsystem, which controls fight/flight activation. The VVC evolved to assert inhibitory control over the SNS, centered around the ventral (upper) part of the vagus nerve connecting heart as well as other organs to the brainstem, onto higher cortical integration areas and to peripheral systems important for human social communication. Those include somatosensory systems involved in monitoring the environment (looking, listening, ingesting) and sensorimotor systems for engaging in connection (head gesture, facial expression, vocalization & intonation) (Porges, 2001). The DVC represents the evolutionarily older system involved in the “neural regulation of subdiaphragmatic organs such as the digestive tract” (Porges, 1997: 840). The two branches are controlled by two neuronal clusters in the medulla, with the ventral vagus controlled by the right-lateralized nucleus ambiguus (NA) while the dorsal vagus is controlled by the dorsal motor nucleus (DMX).




Fig. 9.1 - The Vagus Nerve - Source: Wikipedia

In humans, the ventral (upper) vagus nerve is myelinated, which is a conductive sheath surrounding the nerve and greatly speeds signal transmission. The vagus nerve develops myelination during infancy and early childhood until it is fully myelinated, which differentiates the ventral and dorsal parts of the vagus nerve. The myelinated vagus nerve serves as a bi-directional connection from the heart, transmitting information from heart up to the brainstem and onto the peripheral system, serving as a quick conduit of affective body state information to the social communication system for expression.

The vagus nerve carries a constant signal down to the heart, termed the Vagal Tone, which applies disinhibitory control over the heart's pacemaker, allowing the quickening of the heart rate by decreasing of vagal tone. The baseline vagal tone is associated with positive, prosocial feelings while a high tone is highly correlated with positive affect, resiliency, and social connection. High vagal tone has been found to be correlated with higher behavioral activation scores (BAS) in both men and women, although vagal tone was found to have no correlation with behavioral inhibition scores (BIS) (Movius & Allen, 2005). The vagus nerve delivers cortical control over the activation/inhibition of

the cardiovascular system, as well as dampening the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis (HPA) regulating neuroendocrine stress reactivity (Porges, 2001). In times of SNS activation, VVC can apply the vagal brake, increasing the vagal tone and dampening the pacemaker to quickly decelerate the heart rate, returning to a sense of calm.

The co-evolution of the VVC with higher brain functions yielded an executive control system which could inhibit the older sympathetic nervous system (SNS) controlling flight/flight response (mobilization) and the dorsal vagal complex (DVC) controlling the freeze response (immobilization). Visceral information is relayed to the the right hemispheric orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), equivalent to the ventral medial parental frontal cortex (vmPFC) that serves as senior executive controls over the predominantly right-hemispheric social-emotional brain, connecting to subcortical areas and the limbic system to integrate information from the internal and external milieus (Schore, 2000). The executive controls process affective information from self and others and adjust the approach/avoid limbic response accordingly via the VVC (Schore, 2007).

The OFC provides a circuit which can override older automatic emotional controls of the brain, which include the cingulate and especially the amygdala, which processes direct emotional content of raw perceptual information. The OFC can take control of these lower instinctual emotional controls, giving one cognitive control over response, since it is able to regulate arousal via the VVC control of cardiovascular innervation (Schore, 2007). It is able to do this outside of awareness, at a subconscious level, where it adjusts and corrects emotional responses to both internal and external stimuli, giving it regulatory control over emotional modulation and regulation. It also is able to "integrate and assign emotional-motivational significance to cognitive impressions; the association of emotion with ideas and thoughts" and in "the processing of affect-related meanings" (Schore, 2007, p. 39).

The OFC asserts fine control over the limbic system via the myelinated bi-directional ventral vagal connection, allowing it to receive detailed information about the nervous system from the heart, integrate that with external information and send back adjustments in autonomic activation. The VVC connections to the sensory motor peripheral regions allow the OFC to translate and regulate inward and outward **social signaling** via facial expression, gesture, posture, gaze, listening, vocalization & intonation. The OFC processes detection of signal cues of others' inner emotions and

provides a source for guiding behavior adaptively. This system provides social perception, actively monitoring and integrating behavioral, non-verbal communicational cues, attention, gaze, and other aspects of other's behavior (Schore, 2007). The OFC is able to engage the VVC to control the nervous system, getting ready for possible engagement, avoidance, fight or flight, or calming self when secure. When the SNS is activated hormonally, the OFC is able to assert executive control of the fight/flight response by applying the vagal brake, which inhibits SNS cardiovascular activation (slowing the heart rate).




Fig. 9.2 - ANS 2-D Co-Activation Space - Source: Berntson *et al.* (1991: Fig. 9, 477)

The ANS is able to function in a dual state of both sympathetic and parasympathetic (vagal) covariance, yielding a 2-dimensional space allowing finely detailed biophysical control over organs and peripheral sensorimotor systems (Berntson *et al.*, 1991). Once thought to only be related through tightly coupled reciprocal (opposing) variance, the dichotomous Sympathetic and

Parasympathetic halves of the ANS, have been found to operate separably through advances in measurement of the ANS, which have outpaced conceptual theory of ANS functionality (Berntson *et al.*, 1991). The 2-D Autonomic Space in **Fig. 9.2** models Sympathetic and Parasympathetic systems which co-vary, where both may be co-Activated, co-Inhibited, Reciprocally related or uncoupled, producing a functional surface over which the complex interplay of sympathetic and vagal regulation and response can be better understood (Brenton *et al.*, 1991). “The three levels do not function in an all-or-none fashion; rather they exhibit gradations of control determined by both visceral feedback and higher brain structures” (Porges, 1997).

Polyvagal theory posits the three subsystems (VVC, SNS, DVC) of the ANS represent different phylogenetic stages of development that can be co-activated at different levels together, meaning it yields a very large range of physiological states (Porges, 2001). These three emotion subsystems manifest different “adaptive functions: to immobilize and conserve metabolic resources, to mobilize in order to obtain metabolic resources, or to signal with minimal energy expense” (Porges, 1997). These match three types of emotion regulation: contentment, soothing, and affiliative focused systems; drive-seeking and acquisition focused systems; threat and self-protection focused systems (Gilbert, 2015).




Fig. 9.3—Hierarchical Organization of Endocrine & Autonomic Processes -

Source: Porges & Carter (2012: Fig. 2, 16)

Polyvagal theory posits the three emotion subsystems are functionally arranged hierarchically, as in **Fig. 9.3**, to deal with threatening environmental stimuli. When the VVC safety level is triggered by an environmental cue, the next lower system, the SNS can be activated by the release of the vagal brake, quickly sending the cardiovascular system into activation, as the myelinated signal reaches the heart quickly. If the Fight/Flight system becomes overwhelmed, the DVC can be activated, shifting into Freeze mode, a more ancient self-protective mode.

Conversely, recovering from threat responses requires going up the hierarchy, which can be controlled consciously through voluntary engagement with the environment. Recovering from DVC immobilization requires activation of the SNS shaking the SNS “awake” in a drive-seeking mode, which inhibits the VVC and social engagement system (Porges, 2001). Similarly, tempering SNS fight/flight activation can be overridden by applying the vagal brake; the disinhibition of the vagal tone; decreasing SNS activation; dampening the heart rate and cardiovascular system; and triggering contentment and affiliative behavior (Porges, 2001). The vagal brake can be applied consciously through diaphragmatic breathing which involves taking deep long breaths of the abdomen (Hanson, 2013).

The process of moving from threat reactivity to calm state is **affect regulation**, mediated by the parasympathetic nervous system via the vagal tone (Porges, 1997). This design evolved, with each higher level evolving an inhibitory control over the next lower emotion subsystem (the SNS) (Porges, 2001), making the ANS system sensitive to environmental changes due to its control by neural mechanisms, far more flexible than earlier stages of development (Porges, 2001).

“The lower subcortical levels of the right brain (the deep unconscious) contain all the major motivational systems (including attachment, fear, sexuality, aggression, disgust, etc.) and generate the somatic autonomic expressions and arousal intensities of all emotional states. When optimally functioning, higher orbito-frontal limbic levels of the right hemisphere generate a conscious emotional state that expresses the affective output of these motivational systems. This right lateralized hierarchical pre-frontal system performs an essential adaptive motivational function: the relatively fluid switching of internal bodily based states

in response to changes in the external environment that are non-consciously appraised to be personally meaningful.” Schore (2009: 124-125)

Shore (2009) offers much evidence that the senior executive controls are dominant in the right-hemisphere of the brain. The right brain is in fact “the biological substrate of the human unconscious mind and is intimately involved in the processing of bodily based affective information associated with various motivational states” (Schore, 2009: 114) and that “the implicit self, the human unconscious mind, is located in the right brain” (Schore, 2009: 124). Schore posits the right-hemispheric emotional brain’s central role in survival functions is driven by emotions, with a suite of operational controls for rapid responses to danger of avoidance and escape (Schore, 2009). The right brain is central not only in emotion processing, but also in unconscious empathic communication, responses to danger, self-image processing, regulation of autonomic function, infant-mother attachment, and affect regulation (Schore, 2003). In fact, Schore states that “unconscious affect regulation is more essential than conscious emotion regulation in human survival functions” and that the sense of self “depends on how well the capacity for affect regulation and affective competency has been achieved” (Schore, 2009: 116).

Additionally, considerable evidence shows that relational trauma experienced early in childhood, where experiences of separation, neglect, distress, fear and rage affect development of precisely this right hemispheric neurobiological substrate (Schore, 2009: 123). Schore offers a theory that SNS and PNS responses, integrated in the right hemispheric subcortical areas to regulate emotional homeostasis and motivational processing, become uncoupled by traumatic states of pathological dissociation. SNS responses are oriented towards external stimuli and high energy expenditure, while PNS responses drive internal disengagement from the external stimuli and conserve energy, which when injured by trauma become dissociated and unable to co-function optimally to handle new stressors (Schore, 2009). Early-onset traumatization results in disintegration of “sensorimotor experiences, reactions, and functions of the individual and his or her self-representation” (Schore 2009: 124).

The evolution of the vagal system for safety and trust was accompanied by hormonal changes that allowed for the management of feelings of security, motivation of social approach and connection, and development of pair-bonding. Oxytocin, which ancient neural systems shared with reptiles used

for hormonal control over lactation and birth, was commandeered by the VVC for use in the social engagement system (Porges, 2001). Oxytocin is crucial in maternal motivation, maternal/infant care, emotional co-regulation, stress resistance, orgasm, pair bonding, and crucially, allowing for extended periods of nurture (Carter, 2014). In times of security, corresponding transmission of affect by the visceral peripheral system signals **prosocial emotions** to others, encouraging social engagement. Moreover, oxytocin operates in the DVC to immobilize the infant for bonding, suckling and other behaviors crucial for early development (Schore, 2007).

“Each of these three neural constructs is linked with a specific emotion subsystem observable in humans. Each emotion subsystem is manifested via differentiated motor output from the central nervous system to perform specific adaptive functions: to immobilize and conserve metabolic resources (DVC), to mobilize in order to obtain metabolic resources (SNS), or to signal with minimal energy expense (VVC).” Porges (2001: 130)

Emotions function as homeostatic information used by this system to produce specific stereotyped reactions without being guided by higher reason (Damasio, 1998). Emotions also function as bioregulatory mechanisms of internal states, so that the organism can be ready for defensive reactions (Damasio, 1998). They produce particular configurations of the ANS, generating sensory patterns of activation across the body, which can be experienced subjectively as feelings. Thus, feelings are sensed emotions and are available to consciousness, allowing even greater regulatory control. However, emotion and feeling are distinctly different, in that emotions are external while feelings internal which are processed in “the sequential, unidirectional enchainment of the process — from inducer, to automated emotion, to representation of emotional changes, to feeling” (Damasio, 1999: 291). Kemper (1987) provides evidence that the ANS is the source of the primary emotions of Anger, Fear, Depression and Satisfaction, corresponding directly to each of the major modes of the Polyvagal emotion subsystems.

		<u>Polyvagal / ANS Threat Responses</u>	
		Self-Regard (thoughts about Self)	
		Negative	Positive
Sociability (thoughts about Other)	Positive	DEPRESSION Dorsal Vagal Complex (DVC) Acetylcholine (ACh) Immobilization Freeze (dissociative)	SATISFACTION Ventral Vagal Complex (VVC) Acetylcholine (ACh) / Oxytocin Social Signaling Fawn (codependent)
	Negative	FEAR Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS) Epinephrine (E) "adrenaline" Mobilization Flight (obsessive/compulsive)	ANGER Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS) Norepinephrine (NE) "noradrenaline" Mobilization Fight (narcissistic)

Fig. 9.4— Polyvagal / ANS Threat Response Matrix -

Sources: Kemper (1987), Porges (2007), Walker (2016)

Evidence can be combined from Polyvagal Theory, Kemper's primary emotions, and PTSD threat responses by Walker (2016) results in a clear picture that the Polyvagal /ANS system functions in **a physiological analogue to the same dimensions** traced “down” from the cultural level in **Fig. 9.4.** The Sociability (thoughts about Other) dimension corresponds to the Group/Community dimension (y-axis) of the Social Self Model, where positive Sociability would be high Group/Community/Warmth, while negative Sociability would be low Group/Community/Cold. Likewise, the self-regard dimension corresponds to Grid/Competence>Status, where negative maps to high Grid/Incompetence/low Status while positive maps to low Grid/Competence/high Status. Also note the four quadrants of **Fig. 9.4** are orientated precisely the same way across the same two universal dimensions as the Social Self Model, allowing the IToCE to integrate this data to the corresponding quadrant.

The Social Engagement system activates the VVC for social signaling when Sociability of Other is high and the Self model is positive. When threat is detected, either the SNS is activated hormonally or by the lifting of the vagal brake, initiated by the OFC's cognitive appraisal of threat and activation

of the Fight/Flight system. Those two defenses are chosen given the Self model's estimate of self versus other, with high power Other's causing flight, with fight chosen when the cortico-limbic estimation of confrontation is in Self's favor. The activation of the DVC in times of life threatening situations can hardly be classified as a positive Sociability of Other. However, the activation of the DVC during attachment processes (covered in the next section) provides evidence that Immobilization strategies are used prosocially during infancy during infant nursing, mutual gazing, ANS co-regulation and other care activities (Schore, 2007). Additional evidence provided by Walker (2016) characterizes four basic psychological defense modes corresponding to protecting against the four primary emotions, established by Kemper (1987) corresponding to the major ANS modes. The Self/Other dimensions of **Fig. 9.4** are also physiological analogues to the basic Universal dimensions of our growing Unified mapping, in the figure below.




Fig. 9.5 - Social Self Model adding Polyvagal/ANS Defenses

The Social Self Model in **Fig. 9.5** adds the threat defense behaviors and Polyvagal/ANS evidence. Walker's (2016) elaboration of four basic psychological defense structures map directly to the generalized physiological threat responses of the ANS. The description of the 4F Responses (Fight, Flight, Freeze and Fawn) along with their corresponding dysfunctional behaviors match psychological dysregulation of the corresponding ANS subsystems described by Polyvagal theory. Additional matching occurs when Kemper's primary emotions provide a link to the 4F & ANS responses. While the mapping of the exact SNS & PNS activations and differential activation/inhibition of many other organs & sensorimotor systems connected may be quite complicated, this simplified model provides a base paradigm for understanding how the ANS is rooted at the heart of human social interaction.

CHAPTER TEN

Training the Social Engagement System

“Affect-regulating attachment experiences specifically impact cortical and limbic-autonomic circuits of the developing right cerebral hemisphere. For the rest of the lifespan, internal working models of the attachment relationship with the primary caregiver, stored in the right brain, encode strategies of affect regulation that nonconsciously guide the individual through interpersonal contexts.” Schore (2009: 118)

Problems with emotion regulation and social engagement can be shown to have corresponding neurophysiological traces, according to Polyvagal Theory, specifically the inability of the VVC to inhibit Fight/Flight/Freeze and progressively calm threat defenses (Porges, 2003). The ability to override these defenses and engage the Social Engagement System (SES), the neurophysiological regulatory system of the Orbitofrontal system, can be impeded during infant development, when the OFC, VVC and other components of the system are “coming online” (Schore, 2009). The period of early infancy is a crucial time for the development of several aspects of the SES. Disruptions during this time can affect one’s social and emotional selves into adolescence and adulthood. These particularly important first years are when the child experiences the most influential socio-emotional development, during the process of infant-caregiver attachment (Schore, 2009).

Schore states Attachment Theory (Bowlby, 1973) has shifted from a behavioral theory to an emotional theory of development (Schore, 2009). Attachment represents “the regulation of biological synchronicity *between* and *within* organisms” (Schore, 2009:117). Attachment theory posits a primary caregiver provides co-regulation of infant’s developing autonomic nervous system and social communication system through synchronized affect-laden facial signaling and bodily contact. Facial and body movements represent the first means of communication between infant and mother (Schore, 2003). Co-regulation includes tuning of affective social communication through the process of cooing, suckling, baby talk, face-to-face mutual gazing, facial mirroring and vocalization, as well as establishing in the infant the ability to self-regulate emotion change and recover from

negative emotions, providing body contact, co-generating positive feelings and creating a social bond (Schore, 2000).

ROOTS OF EMPATHY

Dr. Allan Schore
Modern Attachment Theory:
The enduring impact of early right brain
development on affect regulation.
2012

Fig. 10.1 - Dr. Allan N. Schore - Roots Of Empathy Talk <https://youtu.be/cosKY86Qmzo> -

Source: Schore (2016)

Schore (2003) characterizes the process of attachment as the synchronization of right brain regulation between caregiver and infant. It is during this time the infant develops “the capacity to experience, communicate, and regulate emotions” (Schore, 2003: 72). The right-brain “acts as a unique response system preparing the organism to deal efficiently with external challenges, and so its adaptive functions mediate the stress coping mechanisms” (Schore, 2003: 74). The right-brain is dominant during the first three years of infancy (Schore, 2003: 74), when maturation is “experience dependent” acquired through affect-regulating transactions between the mother’s right brain and the infant’s right brain (Schore, 2003: 82). Thus, the emotional regulatory system is not innately shaped, but responsive to the environment in which it grows and responds.




FIGURE 4.1. Hemispheric brain growth cycles continue asymmetrically throughout childhood, showing early growth spurt of the right hemisphere. (Trevorthen 1996, adapted from Thatcher, 1994)

Fig. 10.2 - Hemispheric Brain Growth Cycles - Sources: Schore (2003: 74)

The emotion regulatory system is encoded in the right hemisphere's implicit procedural memory, serving as strategies to regulate severe stress (Schore, 2003). Difficulties during attachment produce deficits to these implicit regulation scripts, impairing individuals' abilities to regulate stress and self resiliency (Schore, 2003). That this has been found to be largely dominated by the right hemisphere is a paradigm shift in neurobiology and developmental studies for these fields have long been dominated by left brain studies of the development of speech (Schore, 2003). However, the recognition of affect in cognition and discovery of asymmetric hemispheric development cycles during the first years of life have highlighted the critical importance of right hemisphere studies.

"The right hemisphere contains an affective-configurational representational system, one that encodes self-and-object images unique from the lexical-semantic mode of the left. It stores an internal working model of the attachment relationship that determines the individual's characteristic approach to affect regulation. In the securely attached individual, this representation encodes an expectation that homeostatic disruptions will be set right, allowing the child to self-regulate functions which previously required the caregiver's external regulation. For the rest of the life span these unconscious internal working models

are used as guides for future action.” Schore (2003: 83)

This provides a template for emotional security and trust having important long-term consequences for the infant’s future ability to self-regulate. During this time the child learns both to be in dyadic relationship and also to self-regulate alone (Keller, Yovsi, *et al.*, 2004). A stream of verbal interaction with the child “center around the inner world of intentions, wishes, feelings, thoughts, and preferences of the child,” considered to be more important than the infant’s own signaling (*ibid*). “The attachment system is readily activated until the end of the third year, when the child’s capacity to cope with maternal separation ‘abruptly’ improves, due to the fact that ‘some maturational threshold is passed” (Schore, 2000:29).

Schore’s Attachment model differs from traditional Attachment Theory (Bowlby, 1973), which measured the behavior of infants during exploratory forays and reunions with caregivers, creating a typology of different categories of the attachment style of the child. Theoretically, AT posits that the caregiver serves as a secure base from which the child uses and returns for exploring objects and other people. Traditional Attachment Theory classified three different categories of behaviors, labeling when children warmly engage with strangers and well as with their caregiver upon reunion as exhibiting secure attachment. Other infant behaviors such as being scared of strangers were labeled as Ambivalent-resistant, while other behavior was labeled Anxious-avoidant when the child ignores or avoids the caregiver, while a fourth category, Disorganized/disoriented, was offered for the strange situation of a mix of non-secure behaviors.

In light of cross-cultural research, Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973) has been critiqued as being biased towards western cultural practices and conceptions of normative child behavior, which does not signify a universality for “healthy” attachment (Rothbaum *et al.*, 2000). Critique include the characterization of the return to secure base behavior as providing the early behavior pattern which will best lead to later social competence in adulthood (Rothbaum *et al.*, 2000). Cross-cultural research has shown that other cultures place different values upon infant autonomy and individuation, leading to differences in normative assessments of healthy infant attachment styles (Rothbaum *et al.*, 2000). However, thees notions of caregiver-infant attachment are different than Schore’s, whom is focused upon emotion generating face-to-face interaction, rather than on child behaviors of autonomy and reunion.

Keller (2016) critiques the mother-infant dyadic model of Attachment, characterized by face-to-face co-regulation by the mother, as a largely a western cultural phenomenon, where a much higher standard of living affords mothers the material and social resources for intense and exclusive mother-infant caregiving, which is “adaptive only in particular socioecological conditions” (p. 60). For the vast majority of families around the world, Attachment Theory’s model for ideal maternal-infant interaction does not match real life conditions, because so many lack the material resources to devote to exclusive caregiving (Keller, 2016). The lack of universality for “attachment theory’s claim of its evolutionary basis, must be seriously questioned” (Keller, 2016).

Keller (2013) points out that different attachment styles “do not represent one healthy strategy and different aberrations but different adaptive strategies in different environments responding to different adaptational challenges. Therefore, secure attachment is not “better” than insecure attachment but a different way to maximize reproductive success” (2013:1 80). Caretakers follow a culturally favored set of ”beliefs about parenting and follow different parenting strategies and behavioral scripts while interacting with their infants. These parenting beliefs and strategies lead to different developmental outcomes, which have an adaptive value within the specific sociocultural context” (Keller et al., 2010). In prototypical independent sociocultural contexts, distal parenting styles engaging in face-to-face synchrony and object stimulation interaction are adaptive, leading to development of a more autonomous self (Keller et al., 2010). Contrarily, non-western proximal parenting styles high in body contact & stimulation, interactional warmth and alloparenting lead to earlier development of compliance and obedience, focusing development more towards hierarchy and community, favored in interdependent sociocultural contexts (Keller et al., 2010).

Keller’s cross-cultural work makes clear that empirical evidence shows differences in culturally specific parenting styles produce different attachment styles, although the theory fails to account for all cultural differences (Keller, 2013). Keller asserts that no style is better than another, that they simply reflect adaptations to particular sociocultural environments. However, the Autonomous vs. Community dimensions appear to be related to distributed parenting styles, whether distal or proximal, which could be ferreted out by more cross-cultural studies of infant care, which are lacking (Keller, 2013). In most other societies, infant rearing falls to a group of people besides the mother, largely siblings and female adult relatives, who engage in allo-parenting. Differing socioeconomic

factors may cause infant caregiving to be spread out across multiple people instead of a single primary maternal caregiver, lessening the predictive power of attachment theory as it pertains to the child's future attachment style (Keller, 2013). Education does however influence how much face-to-face interaction mothers have with children in non-western studies (Keller, Yovsi *et al.*, 2004).

So too can economic issues contribute to the increase in risk to the attachment process. It has been shown that poverty impedes cognitive function, consuming valuable cognitive resources, leaving less for other tasks, especially maternal care (Mani *et al.*, 2013). Also, trauma experienced early in life from adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) affects the ability to regulate stress & social behavior (AAP, 2013). ACEs include emotional, physical, or sexual abuse; emotional or physical neglect; spousal violence; household substance abuse or mental illness; parental separation or divorce; and incarceration of a family member (AAP, 2013). "ACEs may become toxic when there is 'strong, frequent, or prolonged activation of the body's stress response systems in the absence of the buffering protection of a supportive, adult relationship'" (AAP, 2013). It has been estimated that a majority of people have experienced some form of childhood trauma, which gets locked into our bodies subconsciously and can affect behavior later in life (Levine, 2010). Additionally, this kind of early life stress (ELS) can lead to serious health problems in adulthood and be passed on to successive generations epigenetically (Lemche *et al.*, 2016). Epigenetic pathology include problems targeting Endocrinological, HPA and Vagal systems affecting stress reactivity via Autonomic Imbalance and HPA Dysfunction in the Metabolic Syndrome (Lemche *et al.*, 2016).

This last point is particularly important. Epigenetic inheritance, the effect on genetic expression caused by chemicals attached to DNA via methylation or similar compounds that are able to be passed on through the germ line in pregnancy, can be caused by experiential trauma and stress that is passed on to successive generations (Hurley, 2015). The effects are pronounced for the handling of stress, but also many other health related issues such as ADHD, diabetes, obesity, heart disease. Prolonged exposure to negative environmental situations can affect behavior into adulthood and future generations via epigenetic inheritance (AAP, 2013). Toxic social situations such as chronic poverty, homelessness, food scarcity, violence against women and children, incarceration, etc, have amplifying effects on families that are felt for years to come in succeeding generation, contributing to the endurance of chronic social problems despite many good hearted attempts at solutions.

Cross-species research reveals the key factor in negating these stressors is **maternal-infant interaction** (Szyf *et al.*, 2004). Studies of various mammalian species reveal maternal care of young interrupted by stressors (environmental, economic, social, behavioral), lead to varying deleterious and sometimes delayed future effects in the young. In rats, the absence of grooming and licking of young during infancy directly affect the levels of stress hormones expressed in adulthood. Converging evidence from primate and rodent studies support the hypothesis that maternal environment has a profound influence on offspring phenotype (Szyf *et al.*, 2004). These include not simply the enhancement of stress reaction, but also longer term effects, such as the timing of the onset of sexual behavior, the degrading of adult maternal behavior, enhancing defensive responses, and diminishment of social interaction (Szyf *et al.*, 2008). Particularly problematic are those effects passed on to female offspring, affecting the rearing of the next generation and forming a vicious downward cycle (Szyf *et al.*, 2008).

The “infant’s psychobiological reaction to traumatic stress is comprised of two separate response patterns: hyperarousal and dissociation” (Schore, 120). Hyperarousal triggers the right-hemisphere fear motivational system, activating the HPA stress axis and ANS sympathetic mobilization response producing “dysregulated hypermetabolic psychobiological state of fear/ terror” (Schore, 2009:120) which is “driven by the subcortical right amygdala involved in fear conditioning.” (Schore, 2009: 142). Dissociation involves the withdrawal from environmental stimuli, the activation of the ANS parasympathetic immobilization response via the activation of the Dorsal Vagal Complex (DVC) to “conserve energy” and “foster survival” leading to a “passive hyper metabolic state” mimicking death (Schore, 2009:120).




Fig. 10.3—Autonomic Nervous System Arousal — Source: Schore (2009: 121)

During infant-caregiver attachment, the caregiver helps to co-regulate the infant out of hyperarousal fear states by using soothing techniques to calm and guide the child through the negative state. However, should the fear state lead to immobilized dissociation, the trauma can be encoded in the body (Levine, 2010). Trauma endured during childhood can be embodied only to be reactivated by later events in adulthood, when an environmental trigger, say a similar state from one's own child, triggers the same dissociation in the parent, enactivating a childhood mental state with low emotional self-regulation ability and resulting in the parent losing control with an extreme negative outward reaction, such as enrage (Siegel & Hartzell, 2003: 161-162).

The body's ability to lock in trauma during dissociation and immobilization appears as the freezing of hyperarousal to a fast and high energy, causing a shutdown of frontal lobe executive control and overloading the homeostatic management of the ANS, triggering the DVC withdrawal (Levine, 2010).

The cycle of experiencing high Arousal of such excess can lead to feelings of fear and helplessness, producing immobilization, especially at very young ages, literally trapping the negative energetic state into an impulse towards avoiding fear and helplessness through aggressive autonomous action (Levine, 2010). Later, environmental cues may trigger a similar high arousal state which leads to adult dissociation, feelings of terror & helplessness, triggering impulsive violent aggression (Levine, 2010). Thus, trauma endured early, or at any time during life, can embed that trauma in the body, which alters normal self-regulation and increases the tendency of violent aggression.

Attachment Theory's typology of infant attachment styles has been shown to be plastic and not indicative of later adult attachment styles (), as well as having been shown to be culturally dependent. Attachment theories of adult relationships share a similar typology, although focus upon the models of self and other as producing variations in relationship regulation. People are conceptualized as having two theoretical or ideal images of self and two of others, each having a positive and negative variant, which serve as prototypes in underlying models of relationships with others (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Individuals, however, use no one set strategy with any one person or across different relationships and vary over time and situation in strategy used and intensity of use (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).

		Security-based Strategy of Affect Regulation	
		Model of Self (Dependence)	
Model of Other (Avoidance)	Positive (low)	Negative (high)	Positive (low)
Positive (low)	Anxious – preoccupied		Secure
Negative (high)	Fearful – avoidant		Dismissive – avoidant


Fig. 10.4—Adult Attachment Theory Strategies —

Source: adapted from Bartholomew & Horowitz (1991: Fig. 1, 227)

The Adult Attachment Theory strategies (AATS) in **Fig. 10.4**, while similar in typology to Attachment Theory's infant attachment styles, are recruited in relationship regulation, which emerge in different situations with different others. The studies of adult attachment styles use self-report and friend/family-reports on Self-Concept, Sociability, and Relationships to measure the propensity of adults to seek social bonds with others in patterns which align with these basic attachment

strategies (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Roughly just under half of subjects were reported to use predominantly Secure relationship strategies, while the other three roughly split the other half at rates just under 20% (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Self-Concept as measured by reports of self-esteem, self- acceptance, and subjective distress positively correlated with Secure and Dismissive types, while Preoccupied and Fearful were negatively correlated. Sociability was found to be positively correlated with Preoccupied and Secure types, while negatively correlated with Fearful and Dismissive types (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).

The Adult Attachment theory is included by this study because of that theory's focus upon the model of Self and Other in establishing secure social bonds. Adult attachment patterns are envisioned as models of the basic dyad, self and other, in which models of each are generalized in the contemplation and enactment of social relationships. However, it is the insight that universal dimensions regulating the model of self is related to the amount of anxiety felt in relationship with another, with higher levels of anxiety producing negative models of self and greater dependence on the other in the dyad. The sociability dimensions is governed by an avoidance dimension, which generally motivates . These dimensions can be oriented upon the Social Self Model, as well as the AATS typology fitting into the quadrants in the figure below:

**Fig. 10.5 – Social Self Model adding Attachment Styles –**

Source: Bartholomew & Horowitz (2009: 121)

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Interoception & the Opponent Control System

“the limbic sensory representation of subjective “feelings” (in the anterior insula) and the limbic motor representation of volitional agency (in the anterior cingulate) together form the fundamental neuroanatomical basis for all human emotions.” Craig (2008: 272)

While Polyvagal theory and the Ventral Vagal Complex (VVC) describes the neurophysiological underpinnings of the Social Engagement system, the VVC represents the parasympathetic afferent pathway of the ANS carrying information from the viscera up to the brainstem and cortex. The information carried by the VVC represents only one of the afferent pathways of sensory information to the cortex. The other half of the ANS, the sympathetic nervous system (SNS), also has an afferent (bottom up) pathway for transmitting internal visceral sensory information to the brain, dubbed interoceptive information, which provides the brain physiological information about the state of the internal milieu of the body. This sympathetic afferent pathway answers the question, “how could ANS control so many crucial homeostatic functions without well-organized, modality-specific sensory feedback?” (Craig, 2015: 33).

Recent advances in micro electrode recording, neuroimaging resolution and careful tracing of pathways have revealed the functional organization and neuroanatomical structure which enables homeostatic regulation of the viscera, interoceptive feeling and emotional control (Craig, 2015). The recent discovery (1990’s) of this sympathetic sensory pathway and its neural circuitry represents a major conceptual shift in how sensory information is transmitted (Craig, 2015). Previous textbook understanding of pain and temperature were thought to be carried and processed by the somatosensory network, a high speed large fibre network connecting to musculature and transmitting exteroceptive information very quickly. However, cutaneous (e.g., touch on skin) and visceral (e.g., liver activity) sensation differ, as the cutaneous kind can be localized and attended to, while the visceral is non-localizable. This newly discovered afferent pathway is a low speed, small fibre “well-organized modality-specific sensory feedback pathway” for homeostatic functioning

controlled by the ANS (Craig, 2015: 33) and “fundamentally distinct from the large-diameter mechanoreceptive pathway that supports discriminative touch and the sense of limb position” (Craig, 2015: 38).

The interoceptive afferent pathway carries information like pain, temperature (cool, heat, cold), pinch, pin prick, itch, sensual touch, muscle ache, burn, toothache, cardiac pain, full bladder, and vasomotor flush (Craig, 2015). These different types of visceral sensations are transmitted via a neural network extending along the length of the spinal column, branching out to the internal viscera along the lamina I layer of the dorsal horn of the grey column (Craig, 2015). “The lamina I is the only portion of spinal grey matter that receives direct monosynaptic input from all subtypes of inner sensory fibers from all tissues and organs of the body,” including the heart, organs, bone, muscle and skin (Craig, 2015: 39).




Fig. 11.1 - The Interoceptive Network of the Lamina I spino-thalamic pathway -
Source: Craig (2008: Fig 16.1, 275)

Lamina I neurons on either side of the spinal column receive input from tissues and organs on their side of the body. These neurons then project axons to connect internally within the grey column to the autonomic cell column located laterally and diagonally across the opposite “hemisphere” of the grey column in the spino-thalamic tract. There, sympathetic pre-ganglionic output neurons project axons upward all the way through the spinal column to the brainstem and onward to higher cortical

areas. At the Medulla, in addition to meeting with afferent information from the parasympathetic network, these axons are met and integrated with similar sensory input via the NTS from neurons in the tongue and pharynx, transmitting sensation like taste (sweet, sour, salty, bitter, umami), hunger, thirst, nausea, and “air” hunger (Craig, 2015).

In primates, spino-thalamic projections continue up through the medulla and mid-brain to the thalamus, then onto the thalamo-cortical relay nucleus (VMpo), and eventually projecting into the interoceptive cortex, the dorsal part of the posterior **insular cortex**. Additionally, primates also have a similar thalamo-cortical relay of afferent sensory information to the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) processing motor control. Both of these relays provide a hierarchical tier of processing above the brainstem of homeostatic sensory information unique to primates. “A parallel pathway, also unique to primates, conveys afferent input from the **vagal** and glossopharyngeal nerves to the adjacent thalamo-cortical relay nucleus (VMb), which in turn projects to a rostrally adjacent region of dorsal insular cortex. Together these pathways through **VMpo** and **VMb** provide a direct cortical image of all homeostatic afferent activity that mirrors the sympathetic and the parasympathetic halves of the efferent autonomic nervous system” Craig (2008: 278).

Thus, the parasympathetic (vagal) and sympathetic (spino-thalamic) afferent pathways are joined at the thalamo-coritcal relays and mapped onto the insular cortex, located deep within the Sylvan fissure at the junction of the three major lobes of the brain. The insular cortex directly connects to the amygdala, hypothalamus, cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex. It is this central part of the brain which develops first, and which in humans **most recently evolved** (Craig, 2015).

In most species, the afferent sensory information from the body is integrated at the automatic life-support homeostatic regions in the brainstem (Medulla, PAG, A1, PB), then relayed up to the motor controls directly from the brainstem. However, in primates this information is further projected and again re-represented in connections to the thalamus and onward into cortical areas. At the insula, these re-representations are topographically organized in a map of the body. Each type of feeling is represented, similar to the somatosensory map of the body, only mapping feeling and not mechano-muscular information (Craig, 2015). However, in humans this information is yet again re-represented, in the right anterior insula (rAI), which receives input from the mid-insula and the interoceptive cortex, along with inputs from the ACC motor controls. The rAI provides an anatomical

basis for the subjective experience of emotional awareness and the embodiment of emotional feelings, which “underly the James-Lange theory of emotion, the somatic marker hypothesis, and self-perception theory” (2015: 209).




Fig. 11.2 - Primate Homeostatic Afferent System -

Source: Craig (2003: Fig. 1, 501)

*“An organizational map of the homeostatic afferent system and its extension into the forebrain of primates. The afferent limb is shown in the top row and the efferent limb in the bottom row. The hierarchy consists of input-output loops at several levels, all of which are modulated by the hypothalamus (black lines) as well as the limbic sensory (insula) and limbic motor (cingulate) cortices (not shown). The red lines indicate the phylogenetically new pathways in primates that provide a direct thalamo-cortical input reflecting the physiological condition of the body. In humans, re-representations of the interoceptive cortex lead to a meta-representation of the state of the body in the right anterior insula that is associated with the **subjective awareness** of the ‘feeling self.’” Craig (2003: Fig. 1, pg. 501)*

The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), located far to the front of the brain and involved in the motor control of emotion, is co-activated with the Anterior Insula (AI) during all fMRI imaging studies of

emotion, with both the rAI and ACC active during conscious thought (Craig, 2015). In addition, both the AI and ACC are directly connected to interoceptive information, both receiving representations of this information, making them higher processing centers of emotions (Craig, 2015). The AI can be regarded as limbic sensory cortex, while the ACC can be considered the limbic motor cortex (Craig, 2015: 242). The integration of the “feeling” AI with the “behavioral agent” motivational centers (ACC, Orbitofrontal Cortices, ventral striatum) provides an “anatomical basis for the representation in awareness of the ‘I’ postulated by Damasio” (Craig, 2008: 281).

In humans, hemispheric differences create functional differences between the bilateral halves of the AI + ACC circuit, processing emotional sensory and motor states across modalities with slight hemispheric differences noted throughout. The left anterior insula (lAI) aligns with parasympathetic limbic system activity, involved in energy nourishment and conservation. It is predominately involved with positive affect and calm behavior described by the term “approach-plus-parasympathetic” and linked with positive reward (Craig, 2015: 273). The right AI functions mostly with sympathetic limbic system activity involving energy expenditure, threat anticipation and vigilance. The right AI is also predominately involved with negative affect and challenging behavior, described by the term “avoid-plus-sympathetic” (Craig, 2015: 273). Balanced integration of the left and right AI-ACC controls lead to balanced and resilient emotional control (Craig, 2015).

“The evidence indicates that this bidirectional control system integrates autonomic, homeostatic, emotional, and behavioral motor control. It functions as an opponent system with crossed regulatory inhibition, yet it provides flexible, adaptive control with coordinated coactivation.” Craig (2015: 273)

Additionally, the AI+ACC circuit differs bilaterally in its connection to Von Economo Neurons (VENs), spindle-like neurons that are unique in several ways. First, VENs’ spindle-like shapes includes only a single long dendrite, providing a single fast input connection and a narrow apical axon for outbound transmission. Secondly, these unique spindle neurons are found in only several restricted areas of the brain: the anterior insula; the ACC; and the Dorsal Prefrontal Cortex, the site of planning, inhibition, abstract reasoning and high level motor control. Most interestingly, spindle neurons are found most prevalently in aged humans, and progressively less in children, cetaceans, elephants, gorillas, chimps, bonobos and sparingly in macaques. VENs connect both the anterior

insula and the ACC, which are physically located far apart, both ipsilaterally and contralaterally, thought to enable fast, complex integration of emotion and motivation (Decety & Lamm, 2009). Particularly in humans are bilateral differences pronounced, with a 30-50% higher density in right hemisphere than in the left (Craig, 2015).

In humans, VENs begin growing rapidly during the first 8 months and reach an adult levels around 4 years of age, although critically they can vary in concentration across individuals. Craig posits the VENs' locations and existence in only the most highly social mammals point to VENs being critically involved in social decision-making (2015: 219). Conversely, abnormal development of spindle-neurons has been found to correlate with psychological dysfunction involving the social, where the rAI+ACC is dysfunctional in every type of mental illness (Craig, 2015). The full development of the rAI+ACC core control network and its connections to the prefrontal cortex grows more dense during development, only reaching maturity around a mean brain age of 22 years (Craig 2015: 253).

These core components of the limbic circuitry, the AI and ACC, connected by VEN's for fast, long distance coordination of emotion and motivation, have also been identified as involved in processing sensation (pain) differently when experienced versus when observed in others (Decety & Lamm, 2009). Pain perception experienced by the self and observed in others provides an exemplar for studying Empathy, which is thought to be an embodied, automatic 'mirroring' or resonance of another's autonomic state that allows for a linking of perception, affect, and action that leads to emotion relatedness (Decety & Lamm, 2009). Aspects of empathy is shared with non-human apes as well as other highly social mammals (de Waal, 1996). Human empathy then is not one thing, but a psychological construct that combines an affective "ability to share the emotional experience of the other person" with a cognitive "understanding of the other person's experience," along with a regulatory mechanism to "keep track of the origins of self- and other-feelings" (Decety & Jackson, 2004: 73).

However, the feelings of Self and the feelings for Other can be confused and undifferentiated (Decety & Jackson, 2004). The empathetic feeling from observing others and having an emotional reaction to it, when the feelings between Self and Other can be distinguished, may lead to Sympathetic concern, characterized by an Other-focused, prosocial altruistic motivation to help (Decety & Lamm, 2009). However, when empathic feelings are confused with the Self's own emotion reaction and Self

and Other feelings cannot be distinguished, may lead to an aversive state of Personal Distress, characterized by a Self-focused, egoistic reaction to reduce the stressor, often in social withdrawal and a decrease in prosociality (Decety & Lamm, 2009).

In studies of empathic and experienced pain, the Somatosensory network is activated only in experienced pain, while the affective network is activated by the emotional content of pain perception for both experienced and emphatic pain through observing another's pain, namely the anterior insula, ACC and OFC, as seen in **Fig. 11. 3** below. Observed pain in others triggers the dorsal ACC, the thalamus and the anterior insula, while the audial perception of an infant crying by breast-feeding, first-time mothers triggers those same circuits, in addition to the medial prefrontal and right orbitofrontal cortices, while the somatosensory system remains unactivated (Decety & Lamm, 2009).




Fig. 11.3 - Somatosensory-Affective Pain Neurophysiology -

Source: Decety & Lamm (2009: Figure 48.1, 946)

Brain imaging (fMRI) during pain perception shows hemispheric differences in the insular cortex

and ACC activation during experienced and observed pain. The AI+ACC core is more left-lateralized in emphatic pain, while right-lateralized in experienced pain. Observing increasing levels of pain in others triggers the bilateral anterior insula, left anterior cingulate cortex, and left inferior parietal lobe, with self-reports of emphatic concern that increased with increases in observed pain levels (Decety & Lamm, 2009). A similar differential of feeling gradients are found within the insula, where observed pain showed more activation in the anterior insula, while experienced pain activated “a rostro-caudal activation gradient” that “indicate the involvement of distinct cognitive and affective processes” (Decety & Lamm, 2009: 948).

“Analyses identified areas whose activity covaried with ACC and AI activity during self or other pain either across time (intra-individual connectivity) or across participants (inter-individual connectivity). Both connectivity analyses identified clusters in the midbrain and periaqueductal gray with greater connectivity to the AI during self pain as opposed to other pain. The opposite pattern was found in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, which showed greater connectivity to the ACC and AI during other pain than during self pain using both types of analysis. Intra-individual connectivity analyses also revealed regions in the superior temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate, and precuneus that became more connected to ACC during other pain as compared to self pain. The results of this experiment document distinct neural networks associated with ACC and anterior insula in response to first-hand experience of pain and response to seeing other people in pain.” Decety & Lamm (2009: 947-948)

Thus, there are neurophysiological differences in experiential versus observational perspectives. Previous studies measured only the difference in activity between first-person and third-person pain perception, but these more finely detailed analysis studied connectivity differences in experienced versus observed sensation. While the spatial resolution of fMRI brain imaging is limited and cannot be definitive, the evidence of the neurophysiological studies of experienced and observed pain points not simply “distinct but overlapping” neural networks involving the AI and ACC which process experienced versus observed pain differently (Decety & Lamm, 2009). These results support the neural encoding of emotion for both Self and Other (Decety & Lamm, 2009) in the conscious “feeling center” of the brain highly connected to the motivational controls of the ACC & OFC (Craig, 2007). However, in some subjects, there is no offset and both observed pain and experienced pain show

considerable neurological overlap, which provide a neurophysiological correlate for the situation in which empathic feeling is not distinguished from self feeling and may lead to personal distress instead of sympathetic, prosocial empathic concern (Decety & Lamm, 2009).

The rAI+ACC control network is central to the Salience Network (SN), a large scale brain network involved in detecting salient sensory (external) and limbic (internal) inputs, and in selecting and monitoring behavioral response crucial in “communication, social behavior, and self-awareness through the integration of sensory, emotional, and cognitive information” (Menon, 2015: 597). The Salience Network’s rAI+ dACC core is connected to 3 key subcortical structures: the amygdala, the ventral striatum, and the substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (Menon, 2015). The Salience Network helps to identify what internal and external stimuli are important and towards what to devote behavioral and energy resources.

The rAI+ACC circuit is hypothesized to be the homeostatic system evolved in mammals, and again in primates and humans, for advanced homeostatic energy regulation, essentially regulating the two salience detection systems of the SN (Craig, 2015). This homeostatic regulatory circuit in the SN provides dynamic mediation between other energy intensive large-scale brain networks: the Default Mode Network (DMN) and the Central-executive Network (CEN) (Menon, 2015), as seen above **Fig. 11.4**. The right AI, identified by Craig (2003) as generating the subjective awareness of salient “feeling” events, has been shown to be the causal component in switching between the DMN and the CEN, temporarily preceding each when activating the CEN and deactivating the DMN (Menon & Uddin, 2010). The VENs are speculated to be the high speed controls signals from the AI+ACC controlling this switching.




Fig. 11.4 - Salience Network Dynamic Mediation Between Networks -

Source: Menon (2015: Figure 11, 605)

The Default Mode Network (DMN) is an expensive, energy consuming large-scale network centrally involved in “internally directed, interpretive, and reflective thought, for example, when remembering past experiences, imagining hypothetical or future scenarios, or deliberating on inferred, abstract, or morally relevant information” (Immordino-Yang, 2016: 4). Its component brain regions become “highly active and functionally connected when people daydream or wakefully rest in the fMRI scanner, compared with when they perform demanding cognitive tasks” (Immordino-Yang, 2016: 3). The DMN is active during moral contemplation, ethical contemplation, thinking about the future, inferring about “their own or other’s psychological and moral qualities and values,” as well as when they “experience complex emotions of others about others’ psychological qualities and inferred internal emotional experiences” (Immordino-Yang, 2016: 4). The inward focused DMN becomes deactivated when the Salience Network directs attention outward, “towards physical action and instrumental task orientation” (Immordino-Yang, 2016: 4).

The large-scale Central-Executive Network (CEN) also consumes large amounts of energy oriented towards externally driven action-execution and action perception. The CEN is centrally involved in “mediating attentional, working memory, and higher order cognitive processes” and is functionally inactive during DMN activation, and vice versa (Menon & Uddin, 2010).

The Salience Network (SN) core components, the rAI + ACC, act as a switch when activated by some feeling event, directing conscious attention to from the inward focused DMN to the outward task oriented focused CEN. Craig posits the rAI+ACC circuit evolved for homeostatic efficiency “by integrating all of the physiological information of the body with other conditions which are salient in the moment: first with all of the current conditions outside of the body, and second with all of the current conditions *represented in the brain* - the greatest consumer of energy” (Craig, 2015: 222). The integration of the rAI+ACC with the CEN and the DMN mirrors integrating the “conditions outside of the body” and “the current conditions *represented in the brain*,” producing “the active feeling state of homeostatic sentience and the feeling of being alive” (Craig, 2015: 221).

Differential connection strengths of the rAI and ACC to subcomponents of the DMN or CEN result in particular deficits in externalized perception-action or internalized thought and planning (Menon, 2015). Too little signal from the dorsal ACC leads to deficits in psychomotor control and goal directed action, both CEN functions (Menon, 2015). Too little signal from the insular cortex is correlated with excessive rumination and poor autobiographical memory (Menon, 2015). Too little signal from the rAI+ACC to the dorsal lateral Prefrontal Cortex (dlPFC) and Posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in the Central Executive Network (CEN) affects working memory and sequential chaining (cf Menon, 2015: Figure 14, pg. 608).

“Signaling deficits can arise from aberrant filtering and mapping of salient stimulus cues into the SN and weak signaling mechanisms from the SN to other networks such as the lateral frontoparietal central executive network. These signaling mechanisms together with poor integrity of network nodes and their anatomical connectivity (e.g., the posterior cingulate cortex and medial temporal lobe nodes of the default-mode network in Alzheimer’s disease or the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in depression) can compromise interactions between these core networks. Diminished outflow from the cingulate cortex results in

psychomotor poverty and impoverished goal-directed action. Weak interactions along the anterior-posterior axis of the insular cortex contribute to altered introspective awareness and physiological monitoring of the internal milieu. The consequence of abnormalities at any of these levels is deficient, context-dependent engagement and disengagement of cognitive systems important for attending to salient external stimuli or internal mental events.” Menon (2015: 608)

Thus, the Salience Network core circuitry produces two overriding dynamics along a hemispherically lateralized axis and a dorsal-frontal to ventral-medial axis, which Craig characterizes as the autonomic opponent control system governed by the integration of the motor and affective systems to prepare for and act on motivation and feeling. Additionally, the DMN and CEN systems each display a neurophysiological gradient in which control over that domain’s functioning varies along a continua with oppositely valenced controls.

Hemispheric bilateral differences appear to emerge out of the basic asymmetry between Sympathetic and Parasympathetic autonomic systems (Craig, 2015). The bilateral differential in hemispheric processing of feeling is significant (Craig, 2015), providing to the basis of a logic circuit at the heart of the opponent control system described by Craig (2015). Left lateralized AI activation produces positive affect and “approach-plus-parasympathetic” activation of the Ventral Vagal Complex, while the right lateralized AI produces negative affect and “avoid-plus-sympathetic” activation (Craig, 2015: 273), yielding a motivational action potential.

While fMRI studies do not typically test for lateralization of functionality, EEG tests do and show alpha waves display a high degree of lateralization in the Prefrontal cortex (Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014). The source of this alpha lateralization has been traced down to differences in dorsal lateral Prefrontal Cortex functioning (dlPFC) (Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014). The dlPFC is posited to be the seat of inhibitory motivational control as measured inversely by EEG alpha power in the Central Executive Network (CEN). High left dlPFC activity inhibits negative emotion distractors, while high right hemispheric dlPFC activity inhibits positive emotion distractors (Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014). These executive controls allow the focus of attention away from emotional reactivity to maintain and achieve goal pursuit (Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014).

Individuals differ in the ability to exert top-down effortful control of attention over automatic bottom-up processes is dependent upon working memory capacity (WMC) (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). WMC is utilized to activate needed goal-relevant information from long term memory, such as situational representations and action plans that may or not be subjectively available to conscious awareness (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). Information retrieval speed and stability of representation are important differences in WMC, which lead to differences in ability to behaviorally inhibit interference of emotions or suppression effects to keep certain information out of mind (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). Failure to inhibit automatic processes in favor of controlled processes is generally viewed as a deficit, although metrics such as reaction slowing or discrimination biases may in fact be enhanced by controlled processes (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004).

“our consideration of WMC has led us to depart from the standard dual-process theories in two ways. First, controlled processing allows people to flexibly interface with their environment, and the source of this flexibility is the ability to control attention in a goal-directed manner, whether or not those goals are represented in conscious awareness. Thus, we have defined controlled processing not by the phenomenology of control, but by the extent to which goal-directed attention is at play. Second, our brief discussion about the dynamics of attention makes clear that goal-directed attention is often the precondition that allows more automatic forms of attention deployment to occur. The interplay between these two types of attention allocation, especially when considered at the neuroanatomical level, may obfuscate the need for the distinction between automatic and controlled processing whatsoever, thereby drastically revising the dual-process story as we now know it.”

Barrett, Tugade & Engle (2004: 23)

Importantly, both the automatic and controlled processes are non-conscious, with only highly activated representations actually elevating to conscious awareness (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). The inhibitory, effortful controls described are non-conscious, but effortful control can also be exercised consciously and deliberately, with direct correlations to the ability to consciously monitor internal salient sensations (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Interoceptive monitoring abilities can vary across individuals, with some people able to distinguish between three dimensions that comprise Interoception: accuracy, sensibility and awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Interoceptive accuracy involves the behavioral accuracy of heartbeat tracking or other measures which compare one's

internal estimation of the heartbeat to an actual measure, directly corresponding to rAI activation (Craig, 2008). Interoceptive sensibility is the personal account of how people sense and are engaged with their internal milieu, which some are oriented towards while others largely unaware.

Interoceptive awareness is a measure that compares accuracy and sensibility, contrasting the objective and subjective feelings of interoception into a measure of awareness. Together, these three measures provide distinctly dissociable dimensions of interoceptive ability, which in most people are dissociated, although, in a small subgroup of the population, all three measures have high correspondence (Garfinkel et al., 2009).

In all people, these measures can be disrupted and distorted by stress and anxiety (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Experiencing greater anxiety has been found to produce greater discrepancy between observed and expected body states. This has been put into theoretical terms using the “Bayesian principles of predictive processing” in which prediction error signals may arise from the difference between “representational precision and accuracy of the expected internal state of the body” (Garfinkel et al., 2009: 72). Bayesian prediction, quite generally, is associated with estimating probability based on prior probabilities. As will be covered later, the neurophysiology of anticipation seems to use Bayesian logic, which is a type of pattern recognition as a natural way of preparing the body for an expected state and reducing prediction error as part of homeostatic regulation. Importantly, greater prediction error signals represent distressed subjective feeling states (emotions) arising from the inability to accurately predict feeling state from external stimuli (behavior and events) (Garfinkel et al., 2009). This gives a clue at a neurophysiological level, how stress and anxiety may impair the ability to prepare the body for behavior in anticipation of an event.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Core Affect, Categorization & Interoceptive Prediction

*“As an animal’s integrated physiological state changes constantly throughout the day, its immediate past determines the aspects of the sensory world that concern the animal in the present, which in turn influences what its niche will contain in the immediate future. This observation prompts an important insight: neurons **do not** lie dormant until stimulated by the outside world” Barrett (2017: 6)*

Neuroscientist Lisa Feldman Barrett deepens the understanding of interoception by postulating it arises from allostasis, the brain’s metabolic regulatory process of provisioning the body with physiological resources for maintenance, growth and reproduction (Barrett, 2017). The brain does this by anticipating the body’s needs before they’re required and predictively provisions those needs via autonomic, immune and endocrine systems. The spino-thalamic pathways provides the channel transmitting sympathetic interoceptive information for fine-control of the internal viscera (Craig, 2015) which is processed by the visceromotor regions (e.g., insula, OFC, amygdala, ACC, etc). These regions are among the most densely connected hubs of the brain, connecting to the brainstem, spinal cord, and midbrain. And while these regions are typified as the emotion circuits of the brain, its their highly integrated sensory and motor processing and regulatory control that allow them to serve as multipurpose circuitry for internal cognitive simulation of the world. Barrett offers a formalized theoretical framework grounded in neuroscience which fundamentally advances the understanding of not simply of emotion, but of overall brain functioning by providing a paradigm shift that may very well lead to a revolutionary rethinking of not simply emotion, but of cognition as well (Barrett, 2017).

Cognition and affect have been thought of as separate processes, although cognitive neuroscience has accumulated enough evidence which counters that affect is a form of cognition (Duncan & Barrett, 2007). The detailed network of limbic and higher cortical areas which instantiate and process affect also share in cognitive functioning, while “cognitive” areas of the brain (anterior prefrontal) both process and instantiate affect. Instead of looking for specific brain circuits that situate different

functional modules, Barrett and colleagues offer a theory that posits that highly connected neuronal hubs participate in multiple types of processing networks that cannot be distinguished as exclusively processing cognition, emotion or perception; nor for that matter, can particular brain circuits be said to process primary emotions like anger or fear (Barrett, 2011). Rather, the brain and its various regions all participate in highly distributed forms of processing using several primitive types which participate in the processing of all types of brain functions.

Barrett and colleagues present a modern constructionist view of emotion embedded in modern social neuroscience, which challenges not only classical views of emotion originating from discreet circuits in the brain, but also appraisal theories positing a core set of emotion primitives having ontological existence. This new theory, first conceived of as the Conceptual Act Model (CAM) and most recently enveloped into an ever wider take on emotion called the Theory of Constructed Emotion (TCE), is fully grounded in the latest neurological structural and functional understanding, offering a complex yet elegant rethinking of how emotion is generated. It posits that emotions should be modeled holistically, as whole brain-body phenomena in context, not as functional responses to stimuli, or as stimuli themselves, but as ad-hoc categorizations (Barsalou, 1983) of mental contents of perception and cognition. Instead of being generated by an “anger” circuit or a “fear” module, emotions are categorizations of various mental states which are grouped together and perceived as emotions by humans. “Emotions are constructions of the world, not reactions to it” (Barrett, 2017: 16).

The key to understanding Barrett’s theory begins with identifying several “psychological primitives” not reducible to more basic phenomena which are engaged in all mental processes that “create mental life” (Barrett, 2011: 363). **Core Affect** is conceived of as a system for integrating sensory information from both the external world and the internal interoceptive milieu to produce a mental state which serves in predicting the goodness or badness of external events, agents, actions and objects, aiding toward adaptive behavior. Core Affect is composed of two components, both of which are universal, pancultural dimensions of feelings which can vary independently of each other. The first is an evaluative dimension of feeling called **valence**, a spectrum which runs from pleasure to displeasure. The second dimension of feeling is termed **arousal**, which runs from activation to deactivation. These two dimensions are directly felt through experience and represent the basic building blocks of emotional feelings.




Fig. 12.1 - Core Affect Circumplex - Source: Barrett (2011: 363)

Core Affect can be conceived of as a heterogenous set of feeling states across the two dimensions of valence (x-axis) and arousal (y-axis), which can be mapped in a circumplex arrangement, as in **Fig. 12.1**. The conscious experience of these two dimensions of feeling emerge from events and situations, representing the internalization of external events translated into an internal representation felt and reportable across these two component dimensions (Barrett, 2011). Affect registers not as a specific point but in a probabilistic field within this graph, with feelings constantly streaming and influencing the simultaneous processing of cognitive, perception and sensory events.

"Core affect has been characterized as the constant stream of transient alterations in an organism's neurophysiological state that represent its immediate relation to the flow of changing events...in a sense, a neurophysiological barometer of the individual's relation to an environment at a given point in time, present at birth and homologous in all mammalian species." Barrett (2011: 364)

However,

“it is often not clear whether a valence judgment (pleasant or unpleasant) concerns the appraisal of the nature of the stimulus object or event or rather the feeling induced by it. Similarly, arousal or activation ratings may refer to perceived activation in a situation (or image) or to the proprioceptive feeling of physiological arousal induced by the stimulus event.” Scherer (2005: 719)

Core Affect, then, represents a certain type of meaning that guides behavior towards things that feel good (approach) and away from those that feel bad (avoidance). It is hardwired at birth and also homologous in mammals (Barrett, 2006b). In humans it is a pancultural human universal to communicate affect in the meaning of words for objects, actions and concepts (Barrett, 2006b), as every language communicates affective dimensions in their languages (Heise, 2010).

In addition to core affect, a second psychological primitive is the ability to categorize or conceptualize the stream of external and internal information of the current situation into concepts, guided by feeling from core affect, and relating it to previous experiential knowledge (Barrett, 2011). The categorization process can be characterized as a moment by moment ongoing process of the brain’s prediction system for preparing the body for the current and upcoming situation (Barrett, 2011). Social perception can be thought of as categorization, with all the bits of information from a social situation being associated knowledge from stored memory as concepts. The process of categorization happens effortlessly and automatically, and is “necessary for every mental state that is not pure sensation...If you are awake, you are categorizing” (Barrett, 2013: 383).

The products of categorization are categories, which for millennia since Plato, were thought to be a set of objects sharing a central trait. However, Rosch (1978) redefined categorization as being subject to human experience, where categories represent families of related structures having a best fit prototype. Similarly, Barrett relies on this redefinition of Category to redefine emotions as constructed categories which no member may even share a common trait (like a distinct neural fingerprint), but rather, be defined loosely according to relatedness to situated prototypes. These emotion categories are conceptualized at the psychological level from experience, with language playing a large part in shaping the categorization of emotion.

Barrett's (2011) Conceptual Act Model (CAM) conceives of **Concepts** in a very precise and defined way. They are considered to be the building blocks of categorized information, combining many different experienced examples of categories across repeated situations into aggregates having a particular structure.

“Once concepts become established in memory, they play central roles throughout cognition, supporting perception, categorization, inference, and many other processes. As people experience a situation, they categorize the agents, objects, setting, behaviors, events, properties, relations, bodily states, mental states, and so forth that are present. As some aspect of experience is perceived, it projects onto all concepts in parallel, with concepts competing to categorize the aspect, with the best-fitting concept winning. Once an entity has been categorized, categorical inferences follow, including inferences about how the entity is likely to behave, how one can best interact with the entity, the likely value to be obtained from interacting with the entity, and so forth. Such inferences result from accessing category knowledge associated with the concept used to categorize the current instance, and then generalizing this knowledge to the instance.” Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2001: 1106)

The Conceptual Act Model names the overall concept the **Situated Conceptualization** (Barsalou, 2015), defined as the representation of a concept that includes all the many components of a situation including a setting, actors, actions, objects, behaviors, events and internal states. The situated conceptualization is equivalent to Goffman's (1975) Social Frame, although Barrett does not make this distinction. These components of the situation are themselves concepts associated with knowledge stored in memory. The construction of the situated conceptualization instantiates an object, allowing for inferences to be made about any of the information within the conceptualization. **Simulation** is the term used to define the process of locating the situated conceptualization in the collection of past situated conceptualizations, which iterates through matching components of the conceptualization to find a best fit to the current instance with past situated experiences. It is analogous to using knowledge from previously learned material to guide decision making, only it is an automated subconscious process to ready the body for the next instance, predictively (Barrett, 2011).

According to the Conceptual Act Model, the current feeling in Core Affective space having some combination of valence and arousal, becomes associated with the situated conceptual instance, recognizable as an emotional feeling, highlighting and giving meaning to some aspect of experience. Categorization uses our shared semantic knowledge to categorize similar feeling states together as the same kind of emotion, where the emotion label serves as a loose ad-hoc categorization (Barsalou, 1983) of a set of situated conceptualizations. Barrett characterizes these kinds of emotions not as natural kinds with specific body state signatures originating from dedicated neural mechanisms, but as nominal kinds created by humans constraining perception of emotion (Barrett *et al.*, 2007). The labeling of emotion states and the sharing of internal experience via emotion labels produces “emotions that are not static entities, but rather context-sensitive emergent phenomena” (Barrett, 2011: 374). Emotions categories, then, emerge as loosely organized concepts that “refer to entire situations, and thereby represent settings, agents, objects, actions, events, interceptions, and mentalizing...**relational structures** that integrate multiple parts of experienced situation.” (Wilson-Mendenhall *et al.*, 2011: 1107). These are the “dialogic cognitive representations” identified by Tomasello *et al.* (2005) that allow for shared intentionality, for we share these interpretations of situations through language and shared experiences.




Fig. 12.2 - Depicting the Conceptualization of Core Affect - Source: Barrett (2011: 365)

“when encoding a category instance of emotion, say anger for example, we hypothesize that the brain captures the elements of the setting in which the anger occurs (i.e., other agents and objects), internal sensory (i.e., somatovisceral) cues from the body, as well as actions, instructions from others (in the form of rules), and words (e.g., the phonological form for ‘anger’ or ‘angry’). Over time, these situated conceptualizations create a heterogeneous

population of information that is available to represent new instances of the category ‘anger.’ Later, when the brain requires conceptual knowledge to construct an instance of emotion, it samples from the populations of situated conceptualizations, associated with relevant concepts, to create a novel situated conceptualization, which integrates current sensory input and retrieved conceptual knowledge.” Barrett (2013: 381)

The CAM conceptualizes emotions as fluctuating instances of attempts to make meaning of feeling states using the context of situated events. There are no set of characteristics that define an emotion from a physical perspective, since the body and face can show very different expressions for emotions classified as the same type (Barrett, 2013). For example, the emotion of “anger” may include a variety of different facial expressions, as one may laugh, cry or exhibit the classical angry face depending on the context. This contradicts classical emotion theories which posit primary emotions have core neurophysiological signatures, such as Ekman’s work on facial emotional expression (Barrett, 2013). Ekman’s emotion work on facial cues claims to show a core set of emotions are universally identifiable across all cultures (Ekman, 2003). However, according to Barrett, Ekman’s methodology and its use of emotion words to be matched to actors’ portrayals of facial emotions only showed the priming effects of language and its ability to shape perception of categories, while the same experiment run without emotion words show very different results and no universality (Barrett, 2013). This hypothesis will be challenged later by this study in which a common ground can be found.

In addition to Core Affect and Categorization, several other “psychological primitives” are involved in this process. The CAM also identifies a Controlled Attention mechanism as another primitive which “resolves conflict between competing representations or inhibiting pre-potent responses when necessary” (Barrett, 2011: 367). It is related to the executive functions which discriminate between exteroceptive features of the situation while managing attention on interoceptive feelings. In effect, the attention mechanism keeps an ever watchful eye on each of the core systems and creates an emotion when it predicts a change in core affect is causally related to surrounding events. Language processes are another psychological primitive, which CAM identifies as crucially involved in the labeling of emotion categories, as emotion categories semantically provide a top-down context for perception of emotion, as perception is a form of nominal categorization (Barrett, 2011). However, this latter hypothesis extended to assertions that emotions cannot be culturally universal or discrete

will be challenged later by this study, as will the assertion that emotion categories cannot “be elevated to a common ethological framework for comparing humans with other animals” (Barrett, 2017: 16).

However, aligning with the PStoE, the CAM offers that each emotion category is generated from the **“relational structures** that integrate multiple parts of experienced situation” (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011: 1107), as “highly variable set of instances that are tied to the situation you are in” (Campbell & Barrett, 2017). While this control process is automatic, running implicitly, it is discoverable consciously, as “emotion is constructed as sensory information flows through a series of evaluative processes that are hierarchically organized from automatic to reflective” (Barrett, 2013: 383).

“The brain constructs meaning by correctly anticipating (predicting and adjusting to) incoming sensations. Sensations are categorized so that they are (i) actionable in a situated way and therefore (ii) meaningful, based on past experience. When past experiences of emotion (e.g. happiness) are used to categorize the predicted sensory array and guide action, then one experiences or perceives that emotion (happiness).” Barrett (2017: 9)

The Theory of Constructed Emotion (TCE) extends CAM by specifying in great detail the neural mechanisms involved in the general processes of creating situated conceptualizations and generating emotion categories. TCE builds upon the work of emotion researchers in discovering the components of classical emotion circuits, yet re-conceiving how they function systematically from both bottom up and top down paradigms. Five distinct neural systems were identified early by Ochsner & Barrett (2001) as being involved in the automatic and controlled processing of emotions. The automatic processes (1) detect potential threat (regulated by the Amygdala), (2) detect possible rewards (regulated by the Basil Ganglia) which together describes a system which manages avoidance and approach behaviors. Controlled processes kick in to control (3) activation of semantic knowledge that contextualizes the stimuli and helps to form strategies for dealing with it. The fourth and fifth systems (4) discriminate between possible responses and (5) evaluate the meaning of the response and select the best choice.

Straying from the positivist theories of emotion which seek to locate specific emotion circuits in the brain, these five neural systems are instead envisioned to be able to process all emotions generally,

through general purpose neural components which process not simply emotional content, but are integrally involved in cognition and all other processing (Barrett, 2013). The proposed neural assemblies involved in each one of these systems are identified as (1) the amygdala, central to early detection of important stimuli from the environment and determining certainty of threat. The (2) Basil Ganglia are involved in encoding implicit behaviors which in the past have lead to reward and avoided punishment. The (3) left lateral prefrontal cortex generally is involved in storing and retrieval of semantic information and episodic memory, both integral in schematized knowledge, connecting valence with stimuli and forms explicit judgments independent of the implicit judgments of (1) the amygdala. The (4) Anterior Cingulate Cortex is central in executive control of mobilizing behavior and regulating pain and emotional conflict while the (5) Orbital & Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex guide controlled judgment and decision making.




Fig. 12.3 – Neural Components of Emotion Processing – Source: Ochsner & Barrett (2001: 66)

Barrett reconceptualizes emotion as generated not from specific emotion circuits but as the natural processing of generalized cognitive modules, evolved to integrate feedback information from the body with motor control and executive functions. Integral to this reconceptualization was understanding the role of categorization, conceptualization, and prediction and locating it in

neurophysiology through advances in neurological structural and functional analysis. These advances have come from the interoception research covered above, enhanced understanding of the predictive wiring of the sub cortex, as well as from studies focusing upon neural allostasis and the homeostatic regulation of the body according costs and benefits. This is accomplished through the internal representation of the world internally (embodiment) and the use of simulation to predictively find best fits for action based on previous experience using internal sensation as the internal language for representation. This hypothesis, called predictive coding (Friston & Kiebel, 2009) or active inference, integrates concepts of Bayesian filtering to explain the **continual anticipation of information** from the environment (Barrett, 2017: 6-7).

Predictive coding is implemented through a neural computational architecture embedded in the wiring of exteroceptive and interoceptive processing deep within the sub cortex, in highly connected hubs of the visceromotor system, the same system also engaged in homeostatic control of autonomic, immune and endocrine systems (Craig, 2010). On a moment by moment basis, autonomic feedback via the vagal and spino-thalmic afferent pathways inform visceromotor components of the precise state of the internal viscera. Sensory information from both internal and external sources are processed to compose the next moment's predictions using unanticipated information from the environment as prediction error to be compared to anticipated. A new set of predictions for both sensory and motor control is computed through the coordination between the limbic sensory cortex (AIC) and the limbic motor cortex (ACC), creating new efferent signals readying the senses to anticipate new sensation both internally and externally, as well as readying the body for the next action. "Their consequence for allostasis is made available in consciousness as affect" (Barrett, 2017: 7).

Prediction is conjectured to be the actual firing of a neuronal cascade across sensory areas representing the conceptual aspects of a stimuli in anticipation of the experience of that stimuli. Thus, imagining eating an apple triggers the visual, gustatory, auditory, as well as tactile motor cortices so that when actually taking a bite, the body is prepared and activated for experiencing the apple, with very little prediction error. The expected crunch of the apple would produce error, say if the apple was overly ripe and full of worms, which would register as prediction error since it deviates from the expected, triggering the salience network to notice the unexpected event of biting into a rotten apple. That might trigger the feeling of disgust accompanied by a reaction of spitting out the

bite and the encoding of the entire assembly into memory. Thus, the brain only encodes those unanticipated events which create prediction error and generate emotions which become salient. Apples that taste as expected are a ho-hum and forgettable affair, whereas the mushy one picked from a tree might remind one of the highly memorable time of finding a half eaten worm and be discarded.

The Theory of Constructed Emotion locates this functionality in the complex wiring of the primary sensory cortices, which are layered in laminar sheets containing three types of neuronal assemblies. The structure reveals that feedback and feedforward channels are built into the layering of signal processing, with layers having different types of neurons having different functional processes.




Fig. 12.4 - Intra-cortical Architecture & Inter-cortical Connectivity for Predictive Coding -

Source: Barrett & Simmons (2015: Fig. 1, 2)

Above the laminar processing structure of the sub cortex, the TCE describes the domain-general networks functioning as higher level control systems participating in the basic functioning of this predictive system. The Default Mode Network (DMN), so called default because it represents the base state of the conscious brain when it's not occupied with immediate conscious task focus, is thought to be critical in social-emotional effects on learning, "supporting social-emotional aspects of personal memory, future-oriented thinking, and conceptual understanding" (Immordino-Yang, 2016: 1). The TCE posits the DMN engages in the categorization and guidance of sensory and motor movements through the re-presentation of concepts *semantically* (Barrett, 2017: 12), initiating a cascade of predictions from multimodal summaries that eventually route to sensory and motor cortices (2017, 14).

The Salience Network (Menon, 2015) is involved in the control of attention, discriminating which signals and sources of prediction error are relevant to the situation and thus worthy of updating the internal model. Precision signals targeted by what's deemed salient are amplified, adjusting the resources of the body towards their stimulus source. Signals which produce unanticipated error are especially salient and are chosen by attention for encoding (learning) and transmission via efferent (bottom down) channels to update the internal milieu via autonomic, immune and endocrine systems. Barrett also notes that the neurons of the salience system can also modify incoming sensory information, indirectly affecting and limiting perception in ways analogous to inhibition of non-salient information (2017: 12).

The preemptive style of prediction with correction yields a model for managing energy resources at the time they're needed when encountering unanticipated stimuli from the environment. The body is kept in a state of relative energy conservation (homeostasis), while at the same time, the brain is continually activated in patterns closely matching the expected next moment from which it can quickly adjust and revise predictions. Being at rest where stimuli may require the vast recall of energy reserves would take both precious time and require huge swings in energy which may or may not be available on command. Yet, the sensations of the functioning autonomic system are experienced without the conscious knowledge that the brain is predicting what it will next see, hear, taste and feel emotionally, and the conscious register of an emotion doesn't precede action, but rather follows from action.

Huron's (2006) ITPRA model (**Fig. 7.1**) of expectation provides a well studied model of emotion generation in music, a modality thought to be an ancient cultural form in hominid symbolic development (Mithen, 2005). Thus, this emotion model of expectation (prediction) could serve as a high level framework for reconceptualizing the ordering of neural processing systems interactions. Recall, ITPRA was a model of the expectation systems active during auditory processing of music. ITPRA stands for the temporal ordering of Imagination, Tension, Prediction, Reaction, and Appraisal expectation-response systems divided into pre-outcome and post-outcome responses to some event.

From a general level, it is possible to pair **ITPRA**'s steps with the large scale neural systems responsible for each response. **Imagination** begins an expectation cycle, which involves imagining and evaluating possible outcomes, which is clearly the domain of the Default Mode Network (DMN). The **Tension** response focuses attention and arousal dependent on the salience of the anticipated outcomes, clearly the domain of the Salience Network (SN) with its rAI+ACC functional core modulating the ANS. Both of these steps are pre-outcome to an event. Then the stimulus occurs and immediately (within 120 ms), the **Prediction** response evaluates the expectation producing positive valence for correct predictions or negative valence for incorrect, clearly involving the Intra-cortical Architecture & Inter-cortical Connectivity for Predictive Coding and error computation Barrett (2017). The **Reaction** response is fast and automatic, weighted towards self-protection, involving the implicit Somatic bodily response threat reactions controlled by the Central Executive Network (CEN) rapid control or release of the VVC's vagal brake. Finally, the **Appraisal** response is a slower assessment process producing positive and negative reinforcement (learning) weighted towards failures of anticipation, involving the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis for threat reactivity and the Neuroendocrine system using neurotransmitters to encode prediction error to update the internal model via learning.

A possible correspondence generally of the ITPRA steps with large scale system functioning would be:

1. Imagination :: Default Mode Network (DMN) / Mentalizing Network (MENT) / VMPFC - PCC
2. Tension :: Salience Network (SN) / rAI+ACC & OFPFC
3. Prediction :: right anterior insular pattern matching with previous emotional moments
4. Reaction :: Central Executive Network (CEN) / Mirror Neuronal System (MNS) / DLPFC - PPC

5. Appraisal :: HPA axis and neuroendocrinal system using neurotransmitters (acetylcholine)

Since music, often producing strong emotional and attentional motivations, does not require processing semantics and focuses emotion generation and expectation responses without involving another party, it makes for an ideal test model in brain imaging studies to confirm the TCE, the interaction of the large-scale brain networks (SN, DMN, CEN) and the Polyvagal emotion subsystem interactions in the production of emotion. Individuals with ASD show strong preferences for music, while also showing normal acquisition of the affective qualities of music, and for some, greatly enhanced musical abilities such as pitch discrimination (Molnar-Szakacs *et al.*, 2009). Additionally, there is evidence that individuals with ASD show functional connectivity and switching differences of SN, DMN, and CEN (Uddin & Menon, 2009). Brain imaging studies of individuals with ASD both in engaged production of and “observational” listening to music in both isolated and interpersonal settings would provide fertile grounds for a second-person neuroscience (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013).

Thus, according to the Theory of Constructed Emotion, humans are wired for anticipating external events, whether to avoid potentially dangerous stimuli or approach beneficial stimuli. The brain reacts not to events in the world, but rather constructs and predicts, agreeing with the Response->Event -> Emotion pattern, turning the stimulus->response paradigm on its head, as the TCE describes a paradigm where “perception follows (and is dependent on) action...calling into question classic models of emotion” (Barrett, 2017: 7). The TCE also, in essence, dissolves the distinction between the central and peripheral nervous systems, as from the brainbody’s perspective, it is one big integrated system. The Theory of Constructed Emotion takes a big leap in mapping the neurophysiological systems engaged in prediction to metallization, tying together the two halves of classic dualism.

How did this system arise and how does it wire up during development? The answer, according to Nobel Laureate Gerald Edelman, lies in the neural competition between neuronal groups which occurs after birth, during the critical attachment period during infancy and thereafter especially over the course of language acquisition. Predictive wiring of the central and peripheral nervous system ratchets up with experience from the external world. The end result of this wiring is a system that can engage in a natural, hierarchical process called Learning.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Neural Darwinism & Learning

“Whether events are considered novel or repeated is not just a property of events, but of the system used to categorize them. Every event and circumstance in the world can be considered as unique or as a repetition of an earlier event, depending on the system of categorization used. A system of categorization that experiences each event in the world as unique is useless for making decisions. Natural selection, therefore, will act on the organism’s systems of categorization, so that each encounter with the world is perceived and processed in terms of instances of recurring categories. What makes a particular partitioning of events into classes useful to the organism is whether a decision rule based on that categorization leads to adaptive outcomes. For example, deciding between fleeing or not fleeing requires categorizing situations by the cue ‘predator present’/‘predator absent.’”

Tooby & Cosmides (1990: 408)

Neuronal Group Selection (NGS) provides an evolutionary neurological theory to explain the innate program for wiring of the brain, which prepares for and allows a global mapping of the external world internally (Edelman, 1985). In great detail, NGS describes a neural darwinian selective process that explains the dynamic plasticity of the brain through the training and competition between groups of neuronal networks. These networks process information from the environment and are selected through group selection of adaptive behavior. While the details of the theory are complex, NGS in effect outlines a neurological theory of how the acquisition of information through perceptual categorization modifies brain structure and functionality, allowing the brain to be wired dynamically and adaptively to the particular environment outside of a strict genetic code.

The ability to categorize, which in humans is most evidently expressed through language, as envisioned by the Conceptual Act Model, is the basic act of perception, occurring automatically on a moment by moment basis. Neuronal Group Selection posits categorization is an essential automatic process of perception that must be explained at the neurological level, since those theories lacking a

direct neural substrate in their explanation represent simply "a phenomenological description at the functional level" and leave open "an infinite variety of possible neural explanations" (Edelman, 1985: 294). However, rich categorization alone is insufficient to explain adaptation, which requires sophisticated primary and secondary repertoires of behavior selected for during evolution (p. 292).

The NGS theory outlines a theory of learning which matches generally the evidence presented of emotion emerging from situated conceptualization, as well as connecting indirectly to semantic meaning and symbolic interactionism. The NGS learning theory provides not only important explanation of the connections between emotion and behavior, but also provides a key insight into the process of development. NGS outlines a theory of learning that combines both classical and operant conditioning, utilizing the existing neurophysiological regions (limbic system, hypothalamus, etc.) able to internally represent outside stimuli and provide a representation of the world.

NGS posits learning requires two-steps. First, the training and populating of the innate neurophysiological system with information from the environment (categorization via the conditioned stimulus (CS)), then secondly, adding a step which associates these categories with behaviors that in the past have provided adaptive advantage (learning). Classical conditioning provides the mechanism to create an internal representation "when the conditioned stimulus (CS) predicts the unconditioned stimulus (US) in a context related to **VALUE**" (Edelman, 1985: 296). This value is represented by evaluating outcomes of events as positive or negative which are non-consciously, dynamically categorized, essentially the definition of Core Affect's valence and the process of emotion construction.

A second step of learning via operant conditioning, or of remembering which categorized behaviors provided advantage based on signals from the environment, is conducted via inferences against the internalized representation (Edelman, 1985). The operant mode involves not only selecting the categorization from the stimuli, but selecting the appropriate behavior from a remembered repertoire based on environmental stimuli (situations). The learning step involves associating adaptive actions as part of higher level of categorization (Edelman, 1985: 298). However, the means for categorization must exist before learning can take place, and NGS posits a theory of neural substrate which provides the capability of the brain to categorize everything from the environment innately, so that it can be organized for inference and learning, the latter which makes categorization adaptive

(Edelman, 1985: 296).

The (repeating) stages of learning outlined by Edelman (via Staddon 1983), resembles a responsive style of emotion: “(1) novelty or surprise → (2) “inference” → (3) action → (4) new environmental situation → surprise” (Edelman, 1985: 299). Novelty or surprise from the environment creates a salient stimulus which causes an innate inference (appraisal). The appraisal motivates an action to be taken which feeds into the next situation, resulting in another novel salient feature that generates another surprise, beginning the cycle over. Set in the context of social behavior and emotion, the operant learning process described by NGS fits the Theory of Constructed Emotion, which models the cycle of expectation (prediction), inference (simulation of situated conceptualization), action (new error prediction) and the memorization of adaptive behaviors (encoding of prediction error). Essentially, then, NGS provides not only details of how the neurological system evolves during development, but also offers a theoretical model of how learning can be driven by the categorization of behavioral responses to emotion (prediction error encoding) which result in value changes.

Thus, learning is embedded in perceptual experience in which the computation of prediction error is greater, producing surprise. Emotion constructed during the encoding of situated concepts into memory provides a salient affective cue for memory retrieval and symbolic categorization of the event with other like-events. Novel experience then becomes our greatest teacher, in that direct experience can contextualize and help to redefine what has been previously learned generally (culturally) via transmission of knowledge from others, ie being told what others know. This cultural form of learned content comprises the majority of our knowledge about the world. However, experience corrects cultural knowledge, which may be too general for all situations, representing error correction to culturally naive or folk wisdom which may not fit contextually, or may simply be wrong.

Edelman’s neural characterization of categorization perception and higher orders of categorizing as learning resembles a theory of different logical levels of learning put forward by Bateson (1982), who adapted Whitehead and Russel’s Theory of Logical Types, from their *Principia Mathematica*, which sought to solve the paradoxes arising from certain conditions of mathematical logic. Similar to the age old paradoxes of the Cretan Liar or the Barber whom shaves all whom do not shave

themselves, problems arise when a class and members of a class are compared. However, in formal logic, a class cannot be a member of itself, nor can a member be that of a class because they represent different levels of abstraction, or different logical types.

Bateson (1980: 190) recognized the very process of perception is an act of logical typing , creating potential for paradox often encountered in human and animal communication, when the semantic meaning at one level is conflated with the contextual meaning at another, or vice versa. The difference between the two result from the context referring to the message, not part of it, representing a higher order of information about information. Logical levels are essential to both categorizing communication and behavior. Even no message is communication, with a contextual meaning (Watzlawick et al., 2011).

Behavior, too, can be contextualized separate from its stated or apparent meaning, as gesture or other non-verbal social cues can be about the behavior. Animals exhibit a similar dichotomy when engaged in play. Dogs employ a front leg bow signaling to another that the actions taken in biting, wrestling and roughhousing, nearly identical to actual aggression, are actually only simulated play. Many researches have characterized play as important for learning to control aggression (Bateson, 1982). Bateson famously noted that many miscommunications occur because of mismatches of logical type, resulting in not simply misunderstandings, but comprising the heart of mental psychopathology as his double-bind theory of schizophrenia famously posited (1982). Bateson's model encompasses basic logical levels shared by all species (zeroth & first Orders) up through higher order levels which only humans achieve, establishing an evolutionary model for the construction of higher order representations.

Different logical types also apply to learning, nested hierarchies of categorization, the effect of learning by integrating, and reorganizing previously learned categorized information into a new higher order pattern. Categorizing a category provides a second order difference that encompasses and integrates the previous order of organization into a different configuration of ordered sets. Bateson offered not a formal theory, but a framework for modeling different reorganization of categories via learning. Bateson's model represents a nested hierarchy of learning that advances from initial automatic perception and reaction to stimuli (zeroth order), learned behaviors in relation to stimuli (first Order), and adaptive behaviors from a repertoire of behavior (second

order). The first two orders represent classical (perception/reaction) and operant conditioning (learning) while the next higher represents learning how to learn, which Bateson envisioned as a human trait.

Bateson studied communication across human cultures, within families, and even across species such as dolphins, dogs, and primates, observing that communication contains both digital and analogue components. The former serves as the (literal) denotive meaning, with the latter as the meta-communication about the message. These two channels produce different orders of information, the former being the message itself while the latter putting the message into context.

The abstraction of logical typing is built into the working of a brain able to create higher order **representations** of representations, leading to new categorizations of categorized content. The structure of learned content such as mathematics, emotion categories, social relations, and many other categorical forms produce structured categories, particularly in language and communication. While other species may have the ability to learn through this method, humans have a symbolic language system which makes sharing of categorization essential to higher level development.

With regards to emotion, the emotion categories produced from the structure of social relations in **Fig. 8.5** (one category, two category, three category, etc) clearly exhibit differing logical levels. This study posits as a hypothesis that the structural relations identified by Thamm (2004) represent distinct logical levels related to social categorization, and that attending to aspects of each level allows for awareness of emotion categories at that level. Blending Edelman's categorization perception with Bateson's levels of learning applied to Thamm's structural relations yields a hierarchical relation of structural relationship dimensions, in which each level represents a re-categorization of the previous level according to some new dimension, which then blends previous emotion categories into a different higher order emotion category.

Thus, according to Thamm's (1992; 2004; 2007) E-S model of Power and Status theory of emotion, the relational dimensions producing structurally different categories of emotion come out of comparisons between different aspects of expectations and sanctions for behavior, which incorporates social structural dimensions according to power and status. Thus, the different

relational processes in **Fig. 8.4** would appear to be different types of categorization, which create a hierarchy of re-categorizations of perception and upward.

Thus, a hypothesis of this study is that the construction of emotion come from hierarchic re-categorizations of Elemental emotions (one category) are recognized through perception and differentiation of natural categories. Attributional emotions (two category) are discerned through typology of perception leading to classification of objects (persons) according to power and status. Distributional emotions (two category) are discerned through differentiation of behavior of persons. Interactional emotions (two category) are discerned through classification of types of interaction between types of behavior. Subtle emotions (three category) are discerned though the combination of Attributional, Distributional and Interactional dimensions together. These emotion categories are discerned through semantic labeling of emotion, but are tied to the Situated Conceptualization involving all the concepts associated with the situation.

In essence, human learning is driven through language, through a building up of situated concepts representing the shared meaning of social behavior, while also accompanied by motor/vestibular integration mentioned in NGS theory (Edelman, 1985), as well as wiring emotion with motor control as part of the visceromotor system (Craig, 2015). This allows for valued action to be selected and culturally transmitted, leading to behavioral complexes which can be modified, improved upon, and spread socially. And this process is subtly part of the process of socialization over the period of extended childhood development, where culturally valued social behaviors and relations are first learned internally, then externalized behaviorally across different contexts. It wires in adaptive behavior while children are protected and growing, driving **neoteny** of the species, which has been called the most important determinant of human evolution (Gould, 1985).

The process of taking in and attending to reality, both internally and externally, through direct perception, is not without its peculiarities, in which not all that is represented is perceived and not all that perceived is real, due to the influence of the internal on the external, and vice versa.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Self-Perception, Feelings & Identity

“The essence of the self-perception insight is not that all feelings are about overt behavior but simply that they are constituted from and are about some underlying process. That is, they are based on and provide information about the relationship between some activity of the person and its context. Often that activity is some sort of cognitive processing or act.” Laird (2012: 12)

While feelings transmitted along the spino-thalamic pathway provide a functional and structural mechanism for mind-body homeostasis, their relation to emotion and interaction require a deeper explanation grounded in psychophysiological research, regulated by perception. Integrating evidence from across many different studies of affect, cognition and interaction, **Self-Perception Theory** (SPT) presents compelling evidence that feelings operate as feedback from subconscious processes readying the self for action, and this feedback guides and helps to contextualize subsequent action (Laird, 2012). SPT posits that feelings are not the cause of behavior, but information “about” behavior gleaned through the process of self-observation and interpretation (Laird, 2012: 9). Yet, the feelings felt from introspection are imperfect and suffer the same problems of social perception of others, in that we are prone to self-deception and suffer from “inattention, distraction, prejudice, and self-serving misrepresentation” (Laird, 2012: 7).

Self-Perception Theory descends from William James’ (1890) original conception of emotion as a psychological recognition of feelings following action. The widely held common sense view of emotions being the cause of behavior has prevailed since James’ time until mounting evidence from Cognitive disciplines has shown that automatic processes largely guide behavior while associated feelings follow (Laird, 2012). However, rather than reversing the equation, that behavior causes emotion, SPT instead offers a cybernetic theory in which feedback from both serve to adjust behavior across many embedded control systems.

Self-Perception Theory defines feelings to include not simply emotional feelings, but also feelings of motivation, knowing, intuition - signals from the body giving feedback about the relationship between behavior and context. SPT posits cognitive appraisals of feeling give rise to emotions, which guide behavior, although not to the degree we'd expect—feelings have only partial influence with a wide spectrum variance over how closely attuned people are to both internal and external cues arising from events (Laird, 2012). These cues can subtly influence cognition subconsciously, making one prone to misperception and biases of cognition.

Many different sources of natural processes of the body can affect feeling states, and thus mental states. These include the rhythmic hormonal endocrine processes following circadian schedules. Starting with the early morning hours of the day when the pineal gland is active through awakening and the rise of cortisol affecting arousal, through the habitual rhythms which elicit behavior including the hunger, thirst and excretion schedules affecting feelings and surprisingly, affecting cognition. Bodily manipulate through facial expression or posture can produce feelings that align with behavior, such as smiling increasing satisfactory feelings or slouching producing feelings of lethargy or depression. Feelings can also be cognitive, such as the feelings of familiarity, tip-of-the tongue, and knowing often reflect the ease and speed in which a cue or a question comes to mind (Laird, 2012).

Feelings may subconsciously bias cognitive judgment, congruent with the feelings-as-information hypothesis (Schwartz, 1990). One example of a study of rulings made by judges show some judgmental biases occur according to the time of day, with outcomes of judgment affected by the time they are made, such as just before lunch when hunger is high and energy is low compared with just after breakfast. It was found judges ruled more leniently just after breakfast than those times before lunch, when rulings against defendants were more punitive (Laird, 2012). The idea that hunger pangs could be misinterpreted and misattributed as negative impressions towards defendants provide an example of how such feeling biases affect judgment, and reciprocally, other people's lives. Such evidence also challenges cherished beliefs about rationality, which has been shown to be strongly influenced by affect via interoceptive bias (Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002).

Tversky & Kahneman's (1974) study of judgment and decision making made under uncertainty demonstrate that a variety heuristics and biases arise out of cognitive operations susceptible to

influence from feelings, not simply from high valence affects, but even in an unemotional state. Their very first experiments to test intuitive judgment of probability were conducted against mathematicians at a national convention of statisticians, many of whom demonstrated a bias in predicting probability when primed with the wrong answer. Different signature errors have been discovered in intuitive judgment when assessing probability and predicting values, which show both automatic (System 1) and consciously reflected (System 2) judgment can be subject to subtle influences which create illusions of certainty, yet produce incorrect results. The analysis in their studies posited that biases in judgments from heuristic shortcuts were due to “processing limitations” between fast System 1 and slower System 2 processing,

However, two of the heuristics studied by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) seem to not simply showing processing limitations between System 1 and System 2, but actually being heuristics involved in either bottom-up (System 1) or top-down (System 2) information processing.

Availability names the heuristic used when an instance of a category provides enough of a fit that it can be considered an exemplar of the category, causing it to be selected in a misjudgment. It arises when the ease by which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind, the ease of stereotypical recall, makes a category salient and available for selection or influence. While it may not be the ideal example of that category, its exemplary instance gives surety to a close fit. This seems to be an example of bottom-up processing, such as in pattern recognition where global pattern is synthesized from unexpected stimuli.

Oftentimes the recency in memory (availability) of information or resemblance to some problem set under consideration results in effects on quick judgment when additional mental resources would be needed to find a correct answer (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It is as if easy access gives emotional surety and overconfidence to a cognitive judgment which ends further search for a better fit, settling on the quick, first plausible fit. Quick and easy information processing of non-affective judgments has been found by psychophysiological studies to elicit “a genuine affective reaction” that is hedonically positive (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001: 990). The Hedonic Fluency model posits that fluent processing (quick evaluative information processes) produces affective feedback used by “rudimentary processes of stimulus recognition” (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), available at a conscious level in the form of positive affect or liking. This affective feeling seems to provide an

affective signal accompanying a propositional judgment that acts as the contextual analogue signal to the digital semantic one, indicating how strongly to take the propositional validity of the judgment (Watzlawick et al., 2011).

Representativeness names the heuristic used when an instance of something from perception closely resembles the possible outcomes of judgment and is selected as a fit for some category. It arises when perceptions of categories affect the judged outcome regardless of the predictive accuracy, essentially choosing it as a prototype or sort of stereotype for the category. This is an example of top-down processing, in which differentiating between stimuli latches onto a recurrent, salient detail.

A famous example test problem, called the Linda problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974), offered a short description of a woman and her activist involvement for social justice and against discrimination and participation in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Then a question asked which was more probable with four possible answers, that her occupation was Bank Teller, while another answer offered that she was Bank Teller and a feminist. More than 80% of respondents chose the latter description, which has a lower actual probability since not all bank tellers are feminists. Similar tests unearthed a logical fallacy triggered when some priming information causes one to choose a more concrete example when estimating probability, called the disjunction fallacy. The explanation of this finding was the disjunctive choice (Bank teller and activist) was more representative of the description, causing one to disregard its less likely probability.

Evidence that combinations of core affect's valence (positive and negative evaluations) and arousal can have differential effects on cognition and reasoning shed new light on cognitive processes previously thought to be separate from emotion. One study found high arousal with positively valenced stimuli enhances semantic processing, while high arousal with negatively valenced stimuli decreases semantic processing (Orlić et al., 2014). Valence seems to effect the style of cognitive processing (semantic versus stimulus driven), while arousal seems to have effects on salience, with high arousal increasing the importance or urgency of the information (Orlic et al., 2014). Other studies have found that high valence affects judgments through automatic heuristics which add bias to normal cognitive processes. Affective evaluations have been found to be the main determinants in intuitive judgments, with high valanced feeling sometimes overriding the attributions of a category under judgment (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Thus, evaluations of

stimuli (valence) can influence our perception of the thing, whether that stimuli is externally (extero-) or internally generated.

Barrett offers, as part of the Conceptual Act Model, two components of experiencing Core Affect (see **Fig. 12.1**) which introduce a bias towards internal or external cues. **Arousal focus** is described as the “extent of incorporating subjective experiences of arousal into conscious affective experience,” while **valence focus** as the “extent of incorporating subjective experiences of valence, pleasantness or unpleasantness, of stimuli into conscious affective experience” (Barrett, 1998: 580). These two focuses produce a general bias towards internal or external cues, respectively, in how people label their own experienced feelings or those from the past (Barrett, 1998). This bias, Barrett concludes, produces effects in emotion processing, where those using valence focus pay attention to the social cues of others in guiding one’s behavior, “resulting in emotional sensitivity to the social environment” (*ibid*, p. 595). According to Power and Status theory, the corresponding valence produced by an external stimuli comes from an evaluation of the two fundamental properties of the stimuli, its potency and activation (Kemper, 1978). Alternatively, those using arousal focus cues are oriented inward towards feelings, reflecting heightened self-awareness. Those whose focus applies equally to both valence and arousal are best able to discern discreet emotions (*ibid*, p. 595), giving them better ability to cope with events causing the emotion (*ibid*, p. 597).

Self-Perception studies identify personal and situational cues which are analogous to internal and external cues, respectively. Sensitivity to internal cues, in studies focused on eating and obesity, show that recognizing satiety or fullness led to eating less, while external or situation cues such as noticing dinner time or advertisements for food, influence overeating (Laird, 2012: 136). However, “externality doesn’t cause obesity” (*ibid*, p. 132), showing much of the original obesity research has been found to be explainable in that many non-overeaters also tend to pay attention to external cues, which can be chalked up to the fact many “normal eaters” consciously abstain from overeating due to concerns about weight, dieting, etc, while still paying attention to external cues. Studies conducted over the course of a number decades have shown that those whom are overweight or consciously restricting their eating tend to be overly responsive to external, situational cues while being under responsive to internal, emotional cues. Similarly, “repeated attempts at restraint may actually cause a reduction of response to internal cues,” which may lead to “unresponsiveness to internal cues, and hence an over response to external cues” (Laird, 2012: 134).

This internal-external cue dynamic appears in other studies, such as the determination of the source of certain experiences, termed source monitoring. Classic studies of witness testimony show that experiences witnessed can be altered over time by new information or changes to memory, which can lead to different estimations of what caused an event (Laird, 2012: 151). Manipulation of information has been shown to effectively alter the details remembered about an event, leading to mistakes in memory, especially for external sourcing. Similarly, getting someone to distinguish what someone said versus what they themselves said can be altered by having the person imagine what was said in that person's voice, distorting their internal sourcing and introducing reality distortions. What these findings show is that thoughts and memories about past events are not simply influenceable through external inducement, but are in fact "inferences from a wide variety of cues that reflect only indirectly the events that are being remembered" (*ibid*, p. 151). Thus, what we judge or remember reflects more about what we are currently experiencing than the experience of the original event, influenced by Self-Perception biases.

Particularly informative are biases which affect our beliefs and attitudes through the phenomena of Cognitive Dissonance, an older theoretical rival to Self-Perception Theory. Cognitive Dissonance describes the unpleasant motivational state occurring when emotions reveal behavior inconsistency with beliefs. A counterintuitive dynamic occurs when feelings produced by behavior differ from attitudes and beliefs, resulting in changes of belief and attitudes to align with behavior. This produces a sort of self-protective psychological mechanism "designed" to avoid uneasy feelings of cognitive dissonance (Laird, 2012). When previous attitudes and beliefs are inaccessible, the change in attitude is not even questioned and the previous attitude forgotten. However, for those whom remember their previous attitude, the uneasy feeling of cognitive dissonance produces a motivation to resolve it somehow.

In classic Cognitive Dissonance experiments, those whom were forced to comply with behavior going against their attitudes, such as giving a speech on a topic which they have a strong opinion against, allowed participants to subconsciously ease the conflict of expressing a counter attitudinal speech via blaming the "rules" of the experiment and resulting in no cognitive dissonance. When other participants were told they may refuse to give the speech based on their opinions but who decided to participate and performed the speech freely, their resultant attitudes had changed to match the

speech. This surprising finding shows the subtle power of induced-compliance through social influence and status protection, especially true when one's self-concept is threatened by compliance. On the other hand, the forced-compliance served as a reason for the counter attitudinal expression, which relieved one of the need to change attitude, all happening subconsciously.

"one of the hallmarks of this kind of procedure has been the arrangement of conditions and the experimenter's behavior so that participants do exactly as asked, without recognizing the degree of social influence that has in fact guided their behavior, hence the origin of the label for this procedure, induced compliance." Laird (2007: 161)

In either case, the inaccessibility of previous attitudes and the protection from the feeling of dissonance can help explain the runaway process of behavior which diverges from an original attitude. Take for instance making a decision to cheat or some other act of coercion, perhaps a small one at first. That behavior would produce a dissonance for someone who doesn't see themselves as a cheater, creating a justification of why it was ok in that instance to cheat. That exception then becomes the basis to cheat again, which again may produce dissonance and again more justification for the behavior, since it is protecting against feelings challenging the self-concept of an honest or ethical person. While cognitive dissonance helps to explain the mechanism, Self-Perception Theory expands on Cognitive Dissonance Theory to explain a curious exception for those whom are more sensitive to personal cues. When one is more sensitive to arousal feelings produced by dissonance and more prone towards changing attitudes, the recognition of internal feelings by those sensitive to internal/personal cues are misperceived as confirmation of an implicit attitude. When those people are reminded of their previous attitudes, their subsequent justifications for their behavior act as post-hoc arguments supporting their feelings (Laird, 2012). This counterintuitive claim shows how effects of subconscious feelings arising from internal control processes can influence and bias rational cognition.

Self-Perception Theory includes an explanation of and integration with Control Theory (Laird, 2012: 194-201; cf Powers, 1973). Control Theory applied to Self-Perception explains why feelings generating emotions seem to be causes of behavior, when in fact they more closely resemble information from the system fed back into a comparator making adjustments to the system before taking another "reading" through feeling. Control Theory (cf Powers, 1973) defines the dynamics of

negative-feedback systems which maintain control of automatic processes in biological systems. These systems take in information from the environment, monitor for some tiny fluctuation and make some kind of adjustment before again making another reading. A control system achieves control by monitoring a property of the world and performing some action when it changes, like that of a thermostat monitoring temperature by turning heat on and off when the temperature crosses some threshold. The behavior of the system is not a property of the thermostat, nor is the effect of the system's behavior truly 'perception' of the system. The thermostat simply reacts to the tiny fluctuations of a local variable (internal measure), not of the overall system.

Control systems arrange hierarchically, so that feedback from lower controls systems feed forward or backward in nested hierarchies to achieve complex behaviors. Living systems are composed of fantastically complex hierarchically nested control systems, e.g. the workings within the cell, brain or any complex system. Human behavior, and that of all living creatures, results from control systems, which explain many complex behaviors. Importantly, "emotions exhibit the same kind of hierarchical structures," such as the autonomic "fight" attack response system, which is composed of separate subsystems controlling "autonomic response, expressive behavior, and overt action" (Laird, 2012: 199). The feelings that feedback in such a system serve as information to tweak any of the subsystems needing adjustment in order to achieve "goals" of the topmost control system. Thus, the feeling of confidence might lead to increases in overt action, while feelings of sympathy might lead to a sudden inhibition of autonomic activation halting an "attack."

Self-Perception Theory's control systems represent multiple aspects of feedback from hierarchical systems monitoring different variables in the social and self environments, from aspects of relations with others, to attributional cues or contexts of the situation, to internal cues reflecting ones reaction or readiness to the situation. Ability to monitor one's own Self-Perception of these complex feeling states relies on a balance of Core Affect's valence and arousal biases, composed of internal and external monitoring processes modeling outside and inside of self environments.

Identity Theory, from the Sociological Social Psychological tradition of Symbolic Interactionism, posits a core human control process runs as a semi-subconscious continuous loop producing a flow of meaning towards which people seek to reinforce their identity. The process takes as **input** a categorical perception felt or expressed as meaning, then **compares** that meaning to similar past

meanings in memory. Their difference produces some error calculation, providing some target intensity of corrective adjustments **output** as behavior and speech towards reinforcing some shared identity standard as the **feedback function**. This sense making provides the central loop of the intersubjective experience.




Fig. 14.1 – Perceptual Control Model – Source: Powers *et al.* (2011)

The loop begins when Categorical Perception (CP) from a stimulus produces and names the feeling of meaning from the current situation. It then compares that meaning to previously encountered *like* meanings from memory, with exemplar or prototypical meanings holding emotional sway towards some set of meanings having resonance with an identity standard. A neural computation produces an error measure of difference from such a standard, providing a scale to amplify or dampen auto-corrective self-expressive behaviors to bring one's situational self-meaning to be consistent with one's self-meaning standard. Such behaviors provide stimuli for meaning making in both ourself and others in the form of affective signals, via communicative non-verbal and verbal messages. Disturbances, such as the reactions of others or feelings within oneself, influence the situation and serve as stimuli for the next loop and subsequent categorical perception.

Identity Theory defines stimuli in two different ways. Those which arise from the environment are termed natural signs or simply signs, while stimuli originating from other persons are termed as conventional signs or symbols, sometimes referred to as a significant symbol (Burke & Stets, 2009). The difference are that signs from the environment are indexically linked to a stimuli, while the latter produce a common response (same meaning) and are symbolically shared between persons, such as in the shared meaning of language. Additionally, conventional signs can arise not simply from spoken language as stimuli, but through the various modalities through which affective information can be transmitted, e.g. through gesture, intonation, posture. The common response may be either external through action or internal through thinking, or even perhaps internally through subconscious self-perceptive biases influencing control processes.

This process happens in continuous time, as thought and attention scan across features of the performance invisible to all but the micro-inquisitive eye (cf Goffman, 1967), but registered by semi-conscious external affective perception. Control of perception determines toward what is attended, while self-consciousness provides ability to self-determine attention. This ability provides distinct advantages in human group living, as it helps regulate individual behavior toward both improving individual success & group success. Emotion provides a culturally shaped system defining categorization rules of what stimuli from the environment are salient and must be attended to, especially in the case stimuli provoking negative evaluations.

Self-Perception theory shows emotions aren't the cause of behavior. Rather, they represent feedback

information used by control systems to adjust behavior. But what of emotions that emerge from other's emotions? Do hierarchical control systems generating emotions from the emotions of others represent more than coupled control systems, something akin to an interpersonal social control system?

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Symbolic Reference, the Semiotic & Three Tenses

*“(Speaking of Mead) Imitation...is possible when one observes another’s reaction or response to some situational stimulus and that reaction has already been learned by the individual. That is, the observer already has the behavior or response as part of his or her behavioral repertoire—something he or she already has done and can do. When that stimulus, which calls forth the reaction in the other, also calls forth the same reaction in the observer, the observer sees this commonality and “**understands**” the other’s reaction, since the observer is already familiar with the response. Because the reaction has already been learned by the individual, the meaning is understood. Moreover, because the response of the observer is also seen in the other, the observer understands that **the response is shared**. In this shared understanding of the commonality of responses to the stimulus lies the beginning of the symbol. In this case, we have what is known as a natural sign or simply a **sign**: a common **reaction to some stimulus** in the environment.” Burke & Stets (2009: 21-22)*

Infant humans seem wired to be ready to immediately communicate (Tomasello, 2008), as multi-modal faculties are available at birth (Kuhl, 1997). Only several hours after birth, newborns display a preference for faces, spending far more time looking at a visual image with two circles above a third centered circle (resembling eyes and a mouth) rather than the image turned upside down (Otsuka, 2014). Similarly, newborns soon are able to engage in “acts of meaning” through facial imitation in little ritualized exchanges (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2008). A few weeks after birth, infants take part in “protoconversations” with the caregiver showing “control of breath and vocal projection” along with coordinating the rhythm of interaction using both vocal and whole body actions, as well as turn taking “reflecting norms of verbal communication” and exchange of affect (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2008: 129).

Infant multi-modal perception comes prepared by innate perceptual boundaries which are “tailor made for language process,” such as the auditory attunement to the human vocal range (Kuhl &

Meltzoff, 1997), with particular attunement to “motherese” (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2008). The infant auditory system busily sorts out the consistencies in the ambient language around them through auditory categorical perception. By two months, infants are “able to distinguish perceptual constancy across acoustic examples (high pitch, low register, nasally, etc)” and by six months, simple “exposure to language has already altered infants’ perception of speech” (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997: 15). Through Categorical Perception (CP), categorical prototypes are formed for infant vowel categorization, in that across all the different voices, pitches, register and accents to which the infant has been exposed, perceptual boundaries of the vowel sounds particular the infant’s language environment will have been drawn (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997). These become stored representations reflecting the distributional properties of language which act recursively to alter the innate perceptual boundaries (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997). Prototypical vowel sounds become “culture bound” and represent the accent the child will have for these sounds for the rest of their life (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997).

The wiring of the infant representational speech system is polymodal and entails “a rather special interaction that occurs with conspecifics gained through experience... a tape recorder presenting the sounds of language would not trigger it” (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997: 8-9). The direct engagement with caregivers involves exchange beyond simply the verbal, as communication involves the “non-verbal semiosis of mimetic expression and sympathetic action” (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2008: 122). The sequencing of gesture, body movement, and facial express help to shape narrative non-verbally, providing a multi-modal display which helps to engage with another in reciprocal motivated ‘enactment’ (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2008: 125).

Categorical Perception seemingly operates in infant facial recognition, where young infants up to 3 months show various preferences for faces over other images of inverted, top-heavy, or scrambled faces (Otsuka, 2014). However, at 3 months and later, after experience with different faces, inversion and other manipulations of images of face-like stimuli no longer induce preferences, which instead shift to more general categorical properties such as gender or ethnicity consistent with that of caregivers (Otsuka, 2014). Habituation and familiarization effects show infants, with far less experience, develop similar biases shared with adults, not simply in perception but also in attentional biases around 3-4 months (Otsuka, 2014). This may be due to the crystallization of categorical prototypes built through engagement with the world similar to vowel prototypes

through exposure to various speakers.

So too, must other modalities of an infants' perceptual world build categorical prototypes through experience with the world, especially with social engagement with the world. Beyond simply the sensory, the social perception of infants must too be built up through categorical perception and the construction of categorical prototypes. The recognition of the mother's face and preference for social familiars over others give some clue (Otsuka, 2014). However, perhaps each of the necessary psychological foundations for human sociality are built using this same neural processes and architecture.

Consider self-other discrimination () and joint attention (Tomasello, 1999), marked by developmental psychologists as requisite for human differentiation from our close primate relatives. Reddy (2008) offers these psychological traits are based upon "Cartesian" theories which separate cognitive and affective domains as somehow separate, based on metaphysical ideas of internal mental representation appearing suddenly, while any processes occurring earlier in development or in other species as resembling "zombie-like" processing (Reddy, 2008). Much empirical evidence supports that repeated exposure to social engagement with caregivers and familiars provide the infant with experiential affective moments which "may not only be developmentally primary, but developmentally necessary" for the scaffolding of these later psychological milestones (Reddy, 2008: 136). In infancy, second-person social engagement involves exchange of affect which stimulates responses producing affect and subsequent responses in a back and forth between caregivers and infant. Reddy (2003) argues that second-person mutual engagement occurring early in infancy slowly builds a bridge between first-person subjective and the third-person objective "categories" of social perception, as well as the differentiation of self-other knowledge.

Particularly, the experience of attention felt by the infant, initially from the gaze of the caregiver but later from all types of mutual attention in social interaction, are requisite, temporally prior, and not simply similar but primordially concordant with latter representation of attention (Reddy, 2003). Reddy (2008: 135-136) outlines the variety of different social situations and contexts in engaged mutual attention that expands the infant's emotion awareness. The experience of attention paid by caregivers help the infant experience attention to itself first to the infant's own

Self, then to the self's body, to the self's actions, to distal objects in space, to objects in time such as past events detached from immediate stimuli. Direct social engagement of the infant with familiars provide a rich social context in which the infant learns to both manipulate attention from other people through clowning and teasing (Reddy & Mireault, 2015), while also recognizing attention others pay to objects from an observational point of view (Reddy, 2008).

The social actions of infants in reaction to affective stimuli, and the subsequent reaction of caregivers to the infant's actions, produce countless opportunities to build categories of mental representations throughout the first year. These must surely be taking shape categorical prototypes, analogous to the vowel prototypes from experiential social listening constrain vowel vocalization (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997), wiring the constraints of social competencies for facial recognition, social signaling, etc enabling social identity and signal reading later in life. The experience of this affective back and forth provokes affective reactions, in addition to the observed affect shown by others which too is felt proprioceptively, both internal to the infant (Reddy, 2008). The infant experiences its own reactions from the social stimuli, which also draw attention from the caregiver, eventually coupling the directive with those actions eliciting reactions. The building of competencies in the infant for initiating and eliciting affective interchanges, thought to involve the neurological reward centers (), must too produce new categorical prototypes and higher orders of categorization (Edelman, 1987), ones that are plastic and can be modified, as opposed to the vowel prototypes.

There comes a crucial point around the first year, when the infant grasps its actions, reactions and subsequent internal feelings, however those are represented in the prelingual infant, are shared in symmetrical and complementary forms of affect exchanged with the caregiver across modalities. The infant becomes able to represent other's representations, the re-presentation of another's representation, providing the first leap to a second-order type of social perception. The account by Hellen Keller of her recognition of the pouring of water and simultaneous hand-sign of the term water, may have been such a moment moment, only one occurring at an age in which explicit long-term memory has developed and allowed access built atop , whereas the young infant has yet not. Yet, because it is occurring in the infant before language, some other communicative medium or protolanguage, spanning the spectrum from feeling to thought, must be underlying language.

“The question we must ask is not whether language is a good vehicle for conveying and inducing emotions in others, but rather whether the ability to produce a symbolic interpretation of signs of another's emotional state provides empathic capabilities that are inaccessible without it.” Deacon (1997: 428)

Deacon (1997) lays out an evolutionary path for the emergence of the capacity for language and culture, averring that human language must have arisen for want and desire to exchange emotional states with others. Deacon posits humans made that great leap by developing higher level abilities to interpret social information via new learning processes, where a symbolic interpretive competence represented a higher ordering of iconic and indexical interpretations (de Villiers, 2006). Similar to Bateson’s (1974) Logical Typing, these represent different logical types which emerge from different forms of learning and represent the inner language of the mind. Similar to Edelman, Deacon insists that understanding how different types of learning could span from innate to cultural requires embedding it in neurological realities so it doesn’t simply guess at the actual neural implementation (Deacon, 1997). He offers a model in which a hierarchical system of signs provides a continuity from simple perception and learned association (shared with other species), to cultural learning and ultimately higher order logic, the latter which seems to be sole province of humans (Deacon, 1997).

Animals have simple referential abilities, and our closest living relatives, bonobo primates, have shown extraordinary ability to use iconic and indexical referential systems (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996). Kanzi, a young bonobo who observed as his mother was taught sign language and a simple indexical reference system, eventually learned hundreds of indexical “words” through simple observation rather than direct instruction (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996). Kanzi’s early observational exposure to indexical training likely provided a huge advantage, since similar to humans, there is a window in early development which allows for the acquisition of language, after which, acquisition of language fluency becomes very difficult, as any adult trying to learn a foreign language would attest. Kanzi and several other chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin, have arguably been able to approach the symbolic threshold in acquiring new vocabulary and relating it to abstract categories with little effort, which other chimps similarly trained in indexical communication have been unable to do quickly (Deacon, 1997).

Mimesis defines the supra-modal motor-modeling capacity which enables the whole body to be used as an indexical representational device (Donald, 1993). This early adaptation of humans was able to be voluntarily retrieved from stored memory via “Autocueing,” which rather than requiring an environmental cue to trigger a memory, represented a new type of control over the environment (Donald, 1993). Mimesis allowed for the rehearsal and refinement of voluntary fine motor control necessary for transmission of instrumental skills (e.g. toolmaking), in culture making. Memetic routines could be brought to mind and referred to through enactment or pantomime with others. This ability is hypothesized to be the step between cognition and language that separated human communication from environmental reactivity (Donald, 1993). However, apes do not have the ability of autocueing (Donald, 1993) and are tied to iconic and indexical environmental cues, which places their language capabilities below the symbolic threshold in a hierachic model of representation (Deacon, 1997).

Iconic reference serves as the base of these tiers, which refers to things in the world in a one-to-one mapping directly emerging from perception. A mental image of an iconic reference will directly refer to that thing without any other reference necessary to recognize it (Deacon, 1997). The icon is not a property of the thing itself, but arises from a resemblance to the thing. Computer icons are perfect examples, where the icon calls to mind the program which it represents in a one-to-one match. Vervet alarm calls are another example, allowing vervets to communicate when an eagle predator is hovering overhead with one call, while another alerts that land predator is lurking in the brush. Iconic references are related directly and immediately through **recognition**.

Indexical references are related to things **represented** spatially and over time learned through association. They refer to a set of iconic references that refer to things from past memories or experience, which then can represent something through an association created by a conditioned response (Deacon, 1997). They are like something pointing to something else, such as the smell of smoke associated with fire. The smell of smoke itself would be an iconic reference, which could bring to memory a previous time smelling smoke, iconically referring to the memory of a fire. The correlation between the two then become indexical, in that they’re paired in memory, so that the smell of smoke could become an indexical reference to fire. Animals are able to use indexical reference, which can be taught via conditioned response (salivating to the sound of a bell), or even learned via simple observation in the case of Kanzi’s extraordinary language abilities (Deacon,

1997).

Symbolic reference emerges from social learning of the relationship between indices, where language provides a system of words defined by and related to other words (Deacon, 1997). It creates a formal system of higher-order relationships which do not necessarily refer to something real, giving words their abstract nature and our ability to think and communicate in abstraction. The effort to build indexical relationships can be reduced by linking symbolically, which thereupon requires simply adding another symbol and relating it to other symbols. Deacon refers to this step as offloading the burden of remembering the many indexical relationships to an external memory aid, the symbol, which reduces the amount of information required to sort through symbolic relationships to recall a reference and relate to others. This also releases reference from having a basis in reality and perception, freeing it to a purely symbolic level and allowing the contemplation of symbols referring to imaginary things like future events. The finite set of symbols greatly reduces the mental resources necessary to add new information and integrate with older knowledge (Deacon, 1997).

Deacon's hierarchy is embedded in C.S. Peirce's theory of signs and the Semiotic (cf Deacon, 2012). While a full review of Peirce's Semiotic theory is beyond the scope of this study, a review of the basic components of the theory will help to demonstrate how interpretation has a structure related to different logical levels and how this must be related to a basic neurological process which in humans lead to higher symbolic consciousness. Differences in logical type between iconic, indexical, and symbolic "modes of representation can be understood in terms of *levels of interpretation*" (Deacon, 1997: 73). Peirce envisioned a fundamental set of Universal Categories (UCs) for experiencing and knowing about the world that are "necessary and sufficient to account for all of human experience...designated firstness, secondness, and thirdness" (Everaert-Desmedt: 2011).

Firstness is a quality of being encapsulated by wholeness or oneness, in which there are no boundaries, no parts, no cause and effect, no sense of time. Firstness is related to sensation, feeling, the body and emotion. Firstness can be thought of a "quality experienced, not conceptualized" (Short, 2007), a simple subjective experiencing in the moment of the feeling of a quality which can be reduced to nothing else. Secondness is the category of individuality in relation

with something else, where cause and effect produce a difference in time between past and now. Secondness is related to practical experience. Thirdness brings firstness and secondness into relation through rules and laws in the effort of prediction. Thirdness is characterized as intellectual thought.

The Universal Categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness are each components of the Semiotic triad, of which Peirce's terms of Representamen, Object and Interpretant are held in relation to each other to describe the semiotic process. "Peirce's view of semiosis integrates all the components of semiotics: Pragmatics (the domain of the interpretant) is inseparable from semantics (the domain of the object) and from syntax (the domain of the representamen)" (Everaert-Desmedt, 2011: 2.3).

Peirce's 9-part Sign Taxonomy

	(Representamen) Sign Vehicle Itself	(Object) Sign to Object	(Interpretant) Sign to Interpretant	Category Type
1	Qualsign	Icon	Rheme	Quality
2	Sinsign	Index	Dicent	Association
3	Legisign	Symbol	Argument	Proposition
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	

Fig. 15.1 - Peirce's 9-part Sign Taxonomy - Source: Deacon (2012)

In Peirce's taxonomy (**Fig. 15.1**), the semiotic is envisioned as a triadic relationship between a Representamen, an Object, and an Interpretant (ROI). The Representamen is something which represents an Object and which requires interpretation via the Interpretant. "Upon being interpreted, the representamen has the ability to trigger an interpretant, which in turn becomes a representamen by triggering another interpretant referring to the same object as the first representamen, and thereby allowing the first one to refer to the object. And so on, *ad infinitum*" (Everaert-Desmedt, 2011: 3). This process continues until a final interpretant is reached by settling on a certain signification of the sign in a particular familiar context, through which consensus of interpretation of a sign enables social communication. This final interpretant is characterized by the term "**habit**," be it a habit of convention enforced by social or cultural rules, or a habit of thought developed through previous experience.

Confusingly, each of the three general categories of the triad can themselves be distinguished by trichotomies relating to firstness, secondness, and thirdness. The sign taxonomy in **Fig. 15.1** shows the three categories (columns) of Representamen, Object, and Interpretant (ROI) each having forms relating to firstness, secondness, or thirdness. Thus Representamen can manifest as a Qualsign (quality), Sinsign (thing or event), or Legisign (conventional sign). Objects are what the sign represents: Icon, Index and Symbol. Interpretants can be interpreted at the level of firstness (Rhematic), secondness (Dicent), or thirdness (Argument). The triadic is then composed of a combination of Representamen, Object, and Interpretant by adhering to one rule: “no property from a column to the right is at a higher level than that to its left. Thus there can be “a rhematic indexical sinsign (2 2 1) or a decent symbolic legisign (3 3 2) but not a dicent indexical qualsign (1 2 2) or a dicent iconic legisign (3 1 2)“ (Deacon, 2012: 16). This taxonomy of sign types yields a combinatorial system of logical typing, producing ten mechanisms of signification (Everaert-Desmedt, 2011).

Distribution of Categories in Semiosis

ROI	Classes of Sign Triad Type	Phenomena
1	1 1 1	rhemetic iconic qualsign a general vague of hurt
2	2 1 1	rhemetic iconic sinsign a model
3	2 2 1	rhemetic indexical sinsign an involuntary shout
4	2 2 2	dicent indexical sinsign a weathervane (pointing in direction of the wind)
5	3 1 1	rhemetic iconic legisign onomatopoeia: "cock-a-doodle-doo"
6	3 2 1	rhemetic indexical legisign an indexical word: "that"
7	3 2 2	dicent indexical legisign a red light in context
8	3 3 1	rhemetic symbolic legisign a common noun: "apple"
9	3 3 2	dicent symbolic legisign a proposition: "it's cold in here" abduction: "It's cold in here" Interpreted as a request to close the window.
10	3 3 3	argument symbolic legisign induction: "Where there is smoke there is fire" deduction: the red light of the traffic code in the abstract.

Fig. 15.2 – Distribution of Categories in Semiosis - *Source:* Everaert-Desmedt (2011)

The distribution of categories of Semiosis in **Fig. 15.2** describe a hierachic stack sign triads composed of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Each level of the stack represents a different logical type which can be defined by a particular set of relations between firstness, secondness, and thirdness. A stimuli (eg a feeling, a sound, any object of interest) may have some quality (a

firstness) which may be related to a previously encountered quality from memory (a secondness) that brings to mind a propositional statement about them (a thirdness), which in turn brings to mind other experiences that were similar, and so on. The thinking process can speed through a series of connections evoked by some stimuli, traversing up and down the list of categories, although most verbal content are various categories of legisigns. So, Semiosis seems to work downward in **Fig. 15.2** towards some psychological resolution in the form of a propositional statement that satisfies the semiotic chain. A sign (stimulus) may be encountered for which one has no ability to evaluate at a particular level, but which can be evaluated at a lower level, as there may be no propositional content to a meaning because of the ambiguity of a situation. However, should a sign be not understood at the Symbolic level, one may evaluate it at the Indexical or even Iconic, as these categories are embedded in higher level categories.

The semiotic process is analogous to the Conceptualized Act Model's Conceptualizations (Barrett, 2017), which is the process by which previously encountered representations stored in memory are compared to Core Affect to contextualize the situation and give meaning to feeling. The collection of concepts associated with a situated conceptualization contains aspects of the situation held in memory at every level of the Semiotic Category distribution, representing different aspects of the situation encoded in memory which can be used to interpret the meaning of the current feeling state. The concepts themselves are semiotic representations symbolically related to all other content. Conceptualization relies on categorization matching Core Affect's Evaluation and Activation affective dimensions to the Evaluation of a stimuli's Potency & Activation, for which all semantic terms have some culturally coordinated location in EPA space. Thus it is the embodiment process from which we gain meaning from the world.

Peirce's semiotic comprises the core of a process from which human volitional and moral capacities arise (Wiley, 2006b). These manifest through inner speech, a concept offered by the classical American Pragmatists William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead in addition to Peirce (Wiley, 2006b). Peirce envisioned inner speech composed by a dialogue between a subjective "I" brought into relation with an objective "you." A generation later, Mead envisioned the inner speech dialogue between the subjective "I" and the objective "me." Wiley's *Semiotic Self* (1995) provides a synthesis of Peirce's "sparse comments" on the I-you and Mead's I-me, creating an I-you-me triologue that manifests as the Semiotic process. It is consciously available as the inner

speech of thought, which is the conscious awareness of the semiotic process engaged in managing the overall global Self-Concept.

Vygotsky's (1986) Private Speech theory provides a high level answer to how the internal semiotic self emerges. Vygotsky's theory challenged Piaget's studies of early child development, which negatively characterized children's egocentric speech (self-talk) as a deficit of perspective taking and reciprocity in communication before the development of the social externalized social behavior. Alternatively, Vygotsky's careful study of the emergence and gradual disappearance of egocentric speech characterized it as externalized thought which eventually becomes internal thought. Children often engage in self-talk when consumed in a task or play that poses some difficulty, providing guidance and direction towards accomplishing a goal. Self-talk can be seen as self-guidance towards integrating social role behavior learned via speech with the actual implementation of action. "Egocentric speech emerges when the child transfers social, collaborative forms of behavior to the sphere of inner-personal psychic functions" (Vygotsky, 1986: 35). Vygotsky's insight was that the social role had already been learned through speech and gradually internalized, but that behavioral externalization was guided by objectively observable self-talk, giving a glimpse into the role of internal semiotic thought process at the time of speech leading to action.

Wiley's theory posits the internal conversation of thought is a semiotic triadic between **I** (subjective self-awareness) with the reflexive **me** (objective static self-representation) engaged with **you** (changing self). The three person perspectives of language—subject, object and predicate—also signify temporality representing present, past and future. Wiley's synthesis provides a reconceptualization of the I-you-me conversation as a Semiotic process containing a firstness, secondness, and thirdness of Self. Such a synthesis resolves the difference between subject-object reflexivity, on which Mead and Peirce differed.

The **I** is the spontaneous, creative innovator that can "construct cognitive reality, to redefine situations" in the present (Wiley, 1995: 51). As the agent of action, the **I** has the freedom of choice and ability to cognitively choose definitions. The act of choice and moment of decision is the cognitive blind spot "by virtue of the structure of reflexivity," as the **I** is "blind to itself" because the **I** is always stuck in the experiential subjective present, so **I** cannot be the object of its own thought.

The I's rule breaking is mired in ignorance and error, yet has cognitive freedom "of redefining situations and dissent from old definitions" (Wiley, 1995: 48).

However, that moment of decision crystalizes the me in the past, and those decisions are "repeated and hardened into relatively settle orientations and habit" (Wiley, 1995: 47). Mead's me can then provide an objective view of the Self as it was a moment ago (or longer), which when observed objectively by I in the present, can reveal an outside view of the I and a "quasi-penetration of the blind spot...via a position of otherness" (Wiley, 1995: 46). This provides a second order of logical information that acts as self-awareness, although it is only a snap-shot of the self at a time captured by the psychological present. The I-me relation is often a second order thought about thought, such as thinking through a past event, where the me of the past occupies a second order I, which allows examination of the me from angles which the experiential I is blind. The objective me is associated with normative morality in which it is judged by others externally (reward/punishment) and from within emotionally (guilt).

By contrast, Peirce's you is the "second" person in the conversation grammatically, either as the projection of the Self in the future or a generalized other you, both a non-reflexive objects to the I. Whereas the me is stuck in the same first person as the I, the you can function in both the nominative or accusative cases, simultaneously both subjective and objective. However, when you is the object to I, it is also a subject as another speaker, facing the I. Thus, the I-you relationship lacks the blind spot of the I-me, in that the you can see the I better than the I can see itself. The you can be projected onto with hypothetical situations and examined by the I, allowing for an intra- and interpersonal you in the future permitting "internal reflexivity" and serving as a "cognitive looking glass" (Wiley, 1995: 51). This internal relation provides an internal model of the external interpersonal experience, from which a concrete you can be engaged and also provides information that informs the I about itself.

*"(In an actual interpersonal) "we experience"...the I is not a blindspot for the other person, even though it is blind to itself. In a sense **you get closer to your own I** through the other person than you do in your own self-awareness. You see yourself in the other by way of two acts: that person's perception of you and your perception of that person, neither of which entails the blindspot of reflexivity. The I-you relationship has some of the same features as*

the “we experience.” Wiley (1995: 50)

Wiley's Semiotic Self structure helps to organize the integration of various components from other theories involved in the various aspects of Self and the Self process in relation to temporality and the representational. Peirce's categories (firstness, secondness and thirdness) provide the basic dimensions in which the symbolic self operates and the basic logic for the three columns in **Fig.**

15.3.

Semiotic Self Structure

Label	Present	Past	Future	Sources
Identity	I	Me / It	You / Thou	Wiley - Peirce/Mead
Triadic	firstness	secondness	thirdness	Peirce
Semiotic	Representamen	Object	Interpretant	Everaert-Desmedt
Perspective	1 st Person	2 nd Person	3 rd Person	Wiley, Habermas
Self	Proto	Core	Autobiographical	Damasio
Self-Representation	non-conceptual	conceptual	propositional	Schlicht <i>et al</i>
Emotion Category	structural	consequent	anticipatory	Kemper
Knowledge Realm	subjective	normative	objective	Habermas

Fig. 15.3 – Semiotic Self Structure - Source:

Habermas (1979); Wiley (1995); Schlicht *et al.* (2009); Damasio (2010); Everaert-Desmedt (2011)

The firstness Subjective realm is the default experiential and knowledge perspective that experiences sensation and emotion in the now. Damasio (2010) characterizes a Protoself as the primordial part of the brain (upper brainstem) that lays the foundation of consciousness through its representation of the body, which allows for experiences the spontaneous feeling of the living body through primordial feelings and constructs “images” of the stable self. Kemper's (1978) structural emotions are those which arise from the stable structure of a power-status relationship by one's current power and status, producing elemental emotion categories analogous to primordial feelings which are usually stable and define the emotional self.

The secondness Normative state of being is the Self in relation with some(thing/one) else relating cause and effect to generate a discontinuity in the sense time and the feeling of the past. This corresponds to Damasio's Core-self defined by part of the brain which monitors changes to the protoself during interaction with an object, in which their relationship is constructed in a sequence of images, some of which are feelings, producing the sense of time and of the past. Kemper's consequent emotions are those which have arisen as the result of interaction, which change the

relationship between the self and an interactant, and with the emotion categories generated reflecting that change, which is consequent of the interaction creating the sense of cause and effect.

The thirdness Objective realm represents a detached Self produced from the relation of the stable self of now and the self actualized through interaction with an object, representing a propositional logic or interpretation of Self used hypothetically or predictively. Damasio's Autobiographical self is defined by multiple instances of the Core-self narrative, either from the experienced past or anticipated future, linked to a coherent large-scale pattern. Kemper's anticipated emotions are those "positive or negative feeling tones" (Kemper, 1978) related to past emotional experience or future success/failure given the current setting, relating the consequent with the structural in anticipation of a future feeling state.

The Semiotic process is involved in building meaning between the interrelation of these three categories, not simply linguistically, but representationally. The Self, then, is a constructed representation of these three different perspectives, which are embodied cognitive processes that become articulated by the acquisition of language and the grammatical speaker perspectives. In a seeming fit with **Fig. 15.3**, Schlicht and colleagues (2009) distinguish between three distinct levels of mental representations of the Self—the non-conceptual, conceptual, and propositional—which seem to resonate with Peirce's Universal Categories (UCs) of firstness, secondness and thirdness categories.

Non-conceptual and conceptual representations are normally ignored by traditional philosophical conceptions of Self-representation, which instead are traditionally focused upon a propositional self emanating from social-narrative practices defining a propositional Self, matching Damasio's autobiographic self (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009), and a sense of thirdness. The non-conceptual self-representation, on the other hand, is a non-attributive representation manifesting from subjective experience lacking an object, where the self is implicitly felt (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009). Non-conceptual representations form the basis of self-consciousness, yet are paired with Damasio's (2010) Core Self (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009) which does not match the Core Self's relation to an object. Instead, Damasio's Proto Self more closely matches non-conceptual representation and a sense of firstness. Instead, the Core Self pairs better with Conceptual representations relating to the Self as object and a sense of secondness. Conceptual representations are tied to direct perceptions of self-

attributions, which can be prone to misidentification and invalidated by others' independent perception, making them subject to some cultural influence (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009).

Whereas the non-conceptual representation (firstness) is posited to be culturally invariant, the conceptual (secondness) may be shaped by culture but only in the sense of culturally defined rules for perception-based concepts (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009). However, Propositional Self-representations (thirdness) *are* subject to cultural variation, shaped by culturally-defined processes which affect individual human cognition not simply in content, but using distinct cognitive mechanisms (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009). These cultural influences come in two distinct variants corresponding to **individualist** and **collectivist** cultural orientations producing either Independent or Interdependent self-construal processes. Culturally-defined normative systems of expectations and sanctions influence self-construal both implicitly and explicitly, as these norms become internalized and guide not simply behavior but also conceptualizations (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009). Self-construal itself is shown to shape both perception and the content of representation, of which Independent and Interdependent self-construal differ (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009).

Independent self-construal is shaped by Individualist cultures placing value upon individual, autonomous achievement and personal uniqueness, which influences people to see themselves as separate from others (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009). Individualist orientated cultures focus the self-construal process upon individual self-representations directed by unique characteristics of "internal features like traits, attitudes, and abilities" (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009: 691). Interdependent self-construal is shaped by Collectivist cultures placing value upon "elements of the social world, such as relationships to others, contexts for behaviors, group memberships, and social roles" which direct behavior towards social norms, shared beliefs, and the desire to "fit in" (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009: 691). Studies of priming techniques toward either an independence mindset or an interdependence mindset has been shown to have differential effects on memory and direct perception, as well as conceptual representations which ultimately use different "basic cognitive processes for the perception and interpretation of stimuli" (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009: 692-3).

Specifically, independent self-representation has been shown to use context-independent processing to "focus selective attention on task relevant stimuli features, active inhibition of task irrelevant cues, and shifting between different cognitive tasks" (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009: 693).

However, interdependent self-representation uses context-dependent processing that takes the social context into account. What really differentiates these two is how the information is stored and accessed, as independent self-representation involves “aggregating and integrating information about the self across situations while ignoring situational variance in one’s own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors” so that self-representation is trait-focused (Schlicht *et al.*, 2009: 693).

Edelman (1987) characterizes all perception as categorization, which infants display from the very earliest of ages in the stored vowel categorizations which serve as vowel prototypes for the rest of life (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997). However, Categorical Perception (CP) causes perception of physical continua to be perceived in non-linear chunks, a process which does not require lexical categories (Sauter *et al.*, 2011). This type of categorization differs from the categorization of Situated Conceptualizations, where the chunked content are termed concepts which “represent diverse categories of settings, agents, objects, actions, mental states, properties, relations” and “enable categorization, making it possible to identify the objects, agents, actions, and so on currently present in a situation” (Barsalou, 2017: 12). This categorization is made possible by a symbolic referential system of higher-order relationships detached from physical stimuli able to model all the various components of any and every Social Frame (Goffman, 1974).

However, while enabled by language, the symbolic referential system’s lexical component is a mere subset in all the various representations of meaning possible. The combinatoric channels of symbolic meaning span the spectrum from the phenomenological subjective qualities of experience such as feelings or qualia (firstness); to the intersubjective medium of non-verbal exchange of gestures, intonation, etc that give context to communication (secondness); to the “habits of feeling, action, and thought” that extend far beyond the “narrowly defined concepts of symbol and conventionality” (thirdness) (Mittelberg, 2019: 195). Examples of any of these can be part and parcel of information adding to the richness of the Social frame, and used to glean meaning from social actions, which contributes to the construction of symbolic meaning of ourselves and others.

The context of different levels flavor the interpretation of stimuli differently, at both micro levels (psychological & interpersonal) and macro levels (social & cultural). The self making process occurs at the psychological level via the internal I-me-you dialogue, representing the conscious

tracker of the process, which occurs internally in each individual and provides the most basic universal uniting all humans (Wiley, 1995). Self making and meaning making also occurs in relation to others, at the interpersonal level where we enact roles which reinforce self-identities as well as shared identities with others (Heise). Self making can also be viewed from the structural perspective, where social structure offers or restricts opportunities for self making. Cultural levels are those shared meanings of selves toward which we use as standards, which are largely embedded in semantic meanings. All of these levels have symbolic realizations of the semiotic structure, both experientially in the construction of self and externally in the decipherment and study of human systems.

Wiley's Semiotic Self theory similarly posits the Self is interpreted differently from different perspectives, where rather than a purely psychological phenomenon, the Self is reduced to "some other kind of reality" at different ontological levels. Different knowledge pursuits within the Social Sciences, Humanities, and Biological Sciences naturally sort themselves into particular levels, which are recognized generally as being at the Cultural, Social, Interpersonal, Psychological, Biological levels, and present different "kinds" of social reality focused at different levels spanning from the physical to higher symbolic levels (Wiley, 1988). While a theory of levels dates back to Plato and Aristotle, it has never been formalized and would require far more detailed analysis to demarcate levels (cf Wiley, 1988). However, Wiley offers a simple six level model offered in **Fig. 15.4** below.

Semiotic Self - Ontological Levels											
Reduction	Level	Semiotic Structure Object				Point of View	Reflexivity	Solidarity	Materiality	Reduction	
		Sign	Interpretant	Structure	Content						
Idealism: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • omits material conditions • explanation solely on Meaning • drops genus maintains differentia • lacks sign • corporate not individual ~ Structuralism ~ Interactionism 	Cultural	Sign	Interpretant	Meaning	Concrete referent	Extra-Subjective	Virtual	Ritual Symbols	Virtual As centers	Positivism:: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • omits normative properties • explanation solely on Cause • maintains genus drops differentia • lacks interpretant • lacks personhood ~ Neurophysiology ~ Artificial Intelligence 	
	Social	Collective Agent	Collective Patient	Organization	Concrete referent	Generically Subjective	Collective Consciousness	Social Solidarity	Time-space Elasticity		
	Interpersonal	Ego	Alter	We	Concrete referent	Inter-Subjective	Role-taking	Interactive Solidarity	Time-space Indexicality		
	Psychological	I	You	Me	Concrete referent	Intra-Subjective	Internal Conversation	Inner Solidarity	Embodiment In Organism		
	Biological										
	Physico-Chemical										

Fig. 15.4 – Ontological Symbolic Levels & the Semiotic Self –

Source: Wiley (1995: Table 7.1 & 7.2, 158-159)

At each level, different knowledge perspectives recast the Self, for example in the case of the Interpersonal, in intersubjective relation to a particular other Self (Alter). From that perspective, the Self is an actor seen from the Self's perspective as Ego, while Alter too has its own self and together their joint attentional interaction produces a higher ordered conception of self in which both share in "We." The conception of the self at the Interpersonal level represents an expansion of Subjectivity that is shared, and that combined shared sense of "We" encompasses each actors' Self role while also providing a second order shared Self. The structure of Ego - Alter - We at that level has a Semiotic structure, and the Self engages in intersubjective role taking. Similarly, at other perspective levels, such as the Social third person observer perspective, or the Cultural third person interactant perspective, the Self is reconciled in more generalized terms, as in the collective Roles that produce Social Structure, or in the symbolic ways in which Cultures interpret the Self.

Wiley argues that scientific endeavors to explain reality within the Social Sciences, Humanities and Biology reduce knowledge from other ontological levels, and in the process, negate one of the semiotic perspectives, leaving that knowledge perspective with an incomplete conception of reality. Reductions occur not only upward, but also downward, such as when Psychological or Social phenomena are reduced to simply a Biological or Neurological explanations. While the Sign, Interpretant, and Object of the Semiotic are all necessary for a complete picture of human reality, "the two reductions lose one of these elements in their reduction of one level into another, reducing the triad into a dyad, losing either the sign or the interpretant, while Cartesianism loses the object (Wiley, 1995). These two reductions can be generally identified as an Idealism abstracting upward or Positivism reducing downward.

The upward reduction has been resurgent in the past half century, as "a wave from structuralism to post-structuralism to postmodernism to deconstruction...took over the literary criticism, language studies, and the humanities" and could be "interactional (e.g. Wittgenstein), structural (e.g. Foucault and Althusser), cultural (e.g. Derrida)" (Wiley 1995: 195-196). Upward reductions, in which the Self is rolled up into a higher level categorization alters the reality at that level as too generalized or abstracted, missing perspective of the Self as an individual. Thus, endeavors such as Post-Structuralist or Post-Modernist analysis to explain reality fail to take into account different aspects of the Semiotic that leave their analysis lacking some component of the Self.

Downward reductions, on the other hand, which include Psychological Behaviorism, Philosophical Empiricism, AI, Cybernetics, and the various Biologisms, differentiate reality to a level below the human experience (Wiley, 1995). Downward reductions suffer from the lack of the Human Interpretant, as “reality” is reduced to other physicalisms which suffer from an incomplete semiotic by negating various experiential dimensions including first-person perspectives, abstract meaning, intentionality, or behavioral autonomy that create human reality.

Wiley characterizes his Semiotic theory as manifesting during the emergence of language in each individual, where the inner triad arises out of speech, as following the leads of the Pragmatic theories of Mead and Peirce which Wiley sought to integrate. However, it must be noted that while speech concerns the most prevalent modality of language, language needn’t necessarily be vocalized as speech to be considered communication. Sign-language represents fully articulated communication, and particularly enlightening are people such as Hellen Keller and many others who have become fully articulated communicators and thinkers, despite both deafness and blindness. Thus, the inner-triad cannot be characterized simply as inner speech, but inner symbolic representation in some internalized form which mirrors the dominant modality of communication for each individual. Importantly, it is subjectively experienced, although its internalization is of a culturally shared form in coordination with all others.

While not explicit in Wiley’s theory, the integration of Cultural, Social, Interpersonal, and Psychological levels occurs via the Semiotic process, as information embodied through cultural transmission, social structural relations, interpersonal engagement, and subjective experiential thought mix in which the ever running “triad” between the I-You-Me integrate with the overall global Self-concepts.

It is the hypothesis of this study that the Semiotic I-You-Me conversation represents the conscious perception of the Identity Control Process (Burke & Stets, 2009) which integrates these six levels. The categorical perception from situational (Social), environmental stimuli produce meaning (Cultural), comparing it to like meanings from memory in relation to some standard (Social). A differential is computed (Neurological) yielding some a motivational, behavioral action response (Interpersonal) to subtly adjust the enactment of an identity (Psychological), which produces affective signals as stimuli (Biological / Physio-chemical) for each interactant to interpret

(Psychological / Interpersonal) in the next iteration of the Identity Control Process. Thus, an overall conception of reality must contain all these perspectives, both observationally and experientially, which the I-You-Me triologue is able to reflexively function in both capacities.

While the internal triologue is a conscious construction for planning, inferring and analyzing social conceptualizations, self perception occurs mostly at an innate, unconscious level (Laird, 2012), which lies at the heart of cognition. It is feeling which connects the unconscious processes of self-perception to the conscious level of emotion.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Emotional Hierarchy & Blending

“Emotion processes are innate, adaptive, complex integrations of action, autonomic preparation for action, and expressive signaling of the impending action sequence.” Laird (2007: 113)

Self-Perception Theory focuses on internal, subconscious emotion processes produced by biophysical feedback which subconsciously influence cognition and behavior. However, emotions are not simply subjective experiences, but arise from the structural aspects of social interaction and are interpreted according to cultural rules. Their common cultural interpretations are tied to defined social structural relations (expectations and sanctions for behavior), making them function like an Interpersonal Control System modulating and controlling behavior at the group level based upon the integration of external and internal perception.

This study posits that structural, social relational dimensions are characterized by evoked emotion categories which function like information in control systems. This rather abstract conception of emotions can best be observed by social control process relating to emotion: Pride, Shame & Conformity.

Evidence from cultural anthropology provides a deeper explanation of Power & Status interactions generating emotions and contributing to the concepts of blended and second order emotions. Evolutionary Anthropologist Daniel Fessler’s study of the Bengkulu culture, a small ethnic group on the island of Sumatra speaking Malay, explains a society which has an unusual social dynamic involving two opposing emotions whose analogue in most western cultures remain hidden or taboo. Bengkulu society values and orients around two prevalent emotions: a Shame-like (**malu**) and its opposite, a Pride-like (**bangga**), although neither are precisely the same concept as in English (Fessler, 1999). Bengkulu society’s outward focus on Shame-like and Pride-like emotions makes for a rare glimpse into the process underlying social structure, for these two emotions regulate Bengkulu

group behavior and provide a model for understanding the evolutionary origins of symbolic reference and the development of theory of mind.

Much of Bengkulu social life orients around entrenched group customs in which all participate to avoid *malu*. Such customs lead the Bengkulu to engage in normative prosocial behaviors such as participating in religious rituals, visiting the sick, avoiding ostentation, etc. Experiences of *malu* occur, after the breaking of normative customs, from observed or imagined appraisals of others for the failure of following Bengkulu norms for behavior. When someone from Bengkulu culture violates a social norm and feels the negative appraisal from another, it causes the norm breaker to experience the feeling of *malu*, whereas the fulfillment of a social norm causes one to experience *bangga*.

A second logic follows a set of rules reflecting rank dominance, where someone of superior social rank experiences feelings of *bangga* when rank is especially salient in interactions with a person of inferior rank, while the other experiences *malu*. Fessler provides an example of a young Bengkulu fisherman having to interact with one of his groups' esteemed leaders, towards whom he showed visible signs of deference in the lowering of his head and stammering during interaction. Upon interviewing the subject, it was explained that the young fisherman felt *malu* because of their difference in age and wealth, which could not be from breaking a norm but instead because of a disparity between their social rank.

Fessler derived two separate logics used by the Bengkulu to produce both *malu* and *bangga*, The emotion logic governing the breaking of social norms follows a six-step logic, while the status comparison follows a simpler three-step logic. The latter, simpler logic represents a more ancient emotion generated by the simple difference between social rank, while the complex logic produces second order emotions emerging from the “reaction to the subjective experiences of other individuals” (Fessler, 1999).

SHAME Paradigm Logical Conditions:

Inferiority a Salient feature of Interaction

- 1 - Ego assesses an Other as significantly **more** important than Ego
- 2 - Ego must interact with the Other in a situation which the discrepancy between Ego and Other is salient to Ego
- 3 - Ego experiences **malu**, an averse emotion

Failure a Salient feature of Interaction

- 1 - Ego violates Norm
- 2 - Ego is aware of this Failure
- 3 - an Other is also aware of Ego's failure
- 4 - Ego is aware of Other's knowledge
- 5 - Other displays hostility and revulsion towards Ego
or
Ego assumes Other experiences this
- 6 - Ego experiences **malu**, an averse emotion

PRIDE Paradigm Logical Conditions:

Superiority a Salient feature of Interaction

- 1 - Ego assesses an Other as significantly **less** important than Ego
- 2 - Ego must interact with the Other in a situation in which the discrepancy between Ego and the Other is salient for Ego
- 3 - Ego experiences **bangga**, a pleasurable emotion

Success a Salient feature of Interaction

- 1 - Ego successfully fulfills a Norm
- 2 - Ego is aware of her success
- 3 - an Other is also aware of Ego's success
- 4 - Ego is aware of the Other's knowledge
- 5 - Other displays towards Ego either
 - i) a positive appraisal and affection
 - ii) a positive appraisal and hostility
 or
Ego assumes that Other experiences (i) or (ii) towards Ego
- 6 - Ego experiences **bangga**, a pleasurable emotion

Fig. 16.1 - Bengkulu Shame-like & Pride-like Dual Logics - Source: Fessler (1999)

Fig. 16.1 outlines the two logics for both emotion types being generated in Ego. The simple three-step logic produces emotions from interactions between actors of greatly differing status. When their status is directly salient in the interaction, it causes an outwardly negative Shame-like emotion *malu* in the lower status individual and a positive Pride-like emotion *bangga* in the higher status individual. These can be considered first order emotions, directly reflecting a difference in status distribution. The more complex six-step logic involves the successful or unsuccessful fulfillment of a norm, recognizing the resulting emotion in Ego, Alter's reaction to & knowledge of the norm, then a second emotional reaction to Alter's knowledge of Ego's awareness of norm breaking.

The behavioral repertoires accompanying these two emotions are complete opposites, with head gesture, eye contact, body size, and social visibility displaying in opposing manners...*malu* avoids and shrinks while *bangga* shows and grows in size, both quite recognizable non-verbal cues across many cultures (Fessler, 1999: 13-15). The simpler three-step logic leads to displays which resemble Shame and Pride displays, which “serve principally to communicate assessments of relative superiority and inferiority” (Fessler, 1999: 17), representing more ancient forms of *malu* and *bangga*. The more complex six-step logics represent emotion displays which depend on knowing what the other is thinking, requiring greater cognitive load and **theory of mind**, which must be a more recent evolutionary adaptation (Fessler, 1999). Fessler argues the three-step logic emerging from the drive for dominance must have been favored by natural selection, as those high in dominance in rank-

ordered societies had more offspring. The six-step logic, on the other hand, represented a higher order logic allowing one to adjust their own behavior according to an awareness of another's impression of that behavior, which led to a social advantage. The two logics must then be related hierarchically and have emerged as separate evolutionary stages.

The emergence of the higher order logic can be explained by the simultaneous feeling of a self-directed and other-directed emotion to produce a blend of emotions arising out of two coupled dynamics in social interaction. The first dynamic relates to **Appeasement** or rank dominance, which is self focused and produces feelings of superiority or inferiority in Ego, as explained by the three-step logic. Another social dynamic exists in the proximity of individuals, which behavior can be characterized as affiliative or hostile, producing **Approach** or **Avoidance** social behaviors, which will later be shown not to be opposing ends of a single dynamic, but independent dynamics. Fessler's model hypothesizes all social interactions vary across Appeasement and Proximity, producing four distinct displays of other-evaluative, first order emotions. When another experiences being on the receiving end of these emotions, they become the source of second order emotions in Alter, following the six-step logic. These other-evaluative emotions are labeled Pity, Contempt, Admiration, and Envy (Fessler, 1999).

		<u>Evaluative Emotions Towards Alter</u>	
		Appeasement (Alter's rank versus Ego)	
		Inferior	Superior
Proximity (towards Alter)	Affection	PITY	ADMIRATION
	Hostility	CONTEMPT	ENVY
2nd Order Emotions in Alter		 V	 V
		SHAME	PRIDE
		SHAME	PRIDE

Fig. 16.2 - First & Second Order Evaluative Emotions - Source: Fessler (1999)

The emotions in **Fig. 16.2** of Pity, Contempt, Admiration and Envy are examples of evaluative emotions of Alter based on Alter's rank versus Ego (Rank Dominance) and well as proximal feelings

towards Alter (Affiliative). According to Fessler, such emotions are produced by a combination of Ego's attitude towards Alter, plus a structural comparison with Alter. These two evaluations towards Alter produce a blend of emotions, with the former representing an elementary attribution (**Affection** or **Hostility**), while the latter representing a comparison of Alter's rank versus Ego (**Inferior** -Alter lacks what is desirable, or **Superior** - Alter has what is desirable) (Fessler, 1999: 23). Thus generally, feelings of Pity towards another combine an appraisal of affection towards an inferior other, while Admiration arises from affection towards a superior other. Similarly, feelings of Contempt combine an appraisal of hostility towards an inferior other, while Envy combines an appraisal of hostility towards a superior. When these evaluative emotions are viewed from the point of view of Alter, according to the six-step logic's rule #5, they produce second order *Malu* or *Bangga* emotions in reaction to Ego's evaluative emotions towards Alter. Fessler offers this model as one which could describe the emergence of second order emotions such as Shame and Pride, as well as the development of social norms (Fessler, 1999).

The first order evaluative emotions seem to correspond to Subtle Emotions, which are blend of a triad of 2-category emotions (Thamm, 2004). These second order emotions might correspond to what Thamm (2004) termed **Emotion Syndromes**, which are powerful and, to a large extent, shape social interaction and social structure in general (Scheff, 1994) via the regulation of the Self through Self-Conscious emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2007), underlying moral judgment (cf Tangney *et al.*, 2007). The emotion dynamics of feelings towards alter (Warm/Cold) accompanied by a judgment of competence (sanctioning action), closely match the pattern of social perception described by the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008).

According to the SCM, a mixture of oppositely valenced affects yields a blend of both positive and negative feelings. Thus, the logic of Pity including the elementary affiliative warmth (+) (Joy) towards Alter plus a negative other-evaluative comparison towards Alter's behavior (-) (Sadness) yields a blend of both positive and negative feelings toward Alter. Similarly, Envy describes coldness (-) (Hostility) plus a positive evaluation for norm fulfillment (+) (Happy), resulting in the mixed emotion envy. Both match the ambivalent BIAS emotion types of the SCM (**Fig. 3.1**). When two similarly valenced other-evaluative emotions are combined, their combined matching valences result in increased intensity (arousal) in the direction of valence, producing emotion categories of Admiration (+)(+) and Contempt (-)(-).

Thus, when Ego observes Alter socially, Ego's feelings towards Alter are flavored by their status relationship (the Appeasement dimension) as well as their general proximal relationship, one of being typified by either Affection or Hostility. If viewed with affection and desire to be proximate towards Alter, then Alter's norm violation (a type of social inferiority compared to Ego) results in a show of Pity (1), which although containing a negative evaluation of Alter's norm failure, is sweetened by warmth. However, should Alter succeed in norm fulfillment where Ego doesn't (demonstrating the social superiority of Alter), it results in a show of Admiration from Ego (2). If Ego views Alter with hostility, it produces strongly negative feelings of Contempt (3) for norm violations, while norm fulfillment produces a less negatively valenced Envy (4). This dynamic highlights the production of both intensity and hedonic affect, which appear to be analogous to arousal and valence (Barrett & Russell, 1999) in blended emotions.

Fessler characterizes the more complex six-step logic rules as having evolved out of the recognition of another's emotional reaction to one's own behavior, ultimately a step up in a Theory of Mind (ToM), which ultimately displaced the three-step logic in importance (Fessler, 1999). The display of a first order emotion gives information about the internal state of the emoter. However, one's own reaction to that emotion when recognized as the that person's evaluation of oneself, produces a second order emotion in oneself, an emotional reaction to another's emotion. This yields important social knowledge of oneself through the eyes of Alter. These second order emotions of the Bengkulu, as in **Fig. 16.2**, manifest as Pride like and Shame like emotions. Being on the receiving end of first order emotions provide implicitly rewarding or punishing emotions, which motivate promotion or restriction of behavior. Second order emotions represent the impact of recognizing of Alter's view of Ego, providing another motivation to promote or restrict Ego's behavior, leading to a conformity towards social norms (Fessler, 1999).

The emergence of first and second order emotions could be generalized to accord with Power & Status Theory of Emotion (PSToE). The Proximity or Approach/Avoidance dimension directly relates to Power and Status, where Status-accord represents a type of liking or affection, while Power represents hostility and the use of coercion, both relating to a type of social **sanctioning** (Kemper, 1978). It is also possible to generalize the Appeasement dimension from one of pure rank dominance, to one of Social superiority or inferiority resulting from meeting or not meeting

expectations of social norms. However, comparisons of inferiority and superiority are distributional comparisons of meeting expectations. It becomes possible, then, to align the PStoE with Fessler's model for blending of other-evaluative first order emotions and their generation of second order self-evaluative emotions. They yields an important clue towards naming the composite Subtle emotion categories, as well as the Emotion Syndromes, providing the beginnings of decoding the emotion taxonomy suggested by Thamm (2004).

The other-evaluative emotions in **Fig. 16.2** translated to Thamm's E-S PStoE notation requires recognizing that they are produced from a blend of first order emotions to produce second order Subtle emotions. These arise from appraisals of very particular structural aspects of the Power and Status relationship between Ego and Alter. Fessler spells out the emotion rules for combining first order emotions that produce a blend feelings about of Appeasement and Proximity (1999: 23). Translated to the language of PStoE, each of these other-evaluative emotions result from a combination of a distributional comparison of expectations plus an elemental evaluation of other (Like/Hostility) (cf Fessler, 1999: 22-24). The figure below (**Fig. 16.3**) shows the decipherment of other-evaluative Subtle emotions Admiration, Contempt, Envy, and Pity:




Fig. 16.3 – First order Subtle Emotions in PStoE Notation –

Source: Fessler (1999), Thamm (2004, 2006)

However, Fessler's rules of these other-evaluative emotions translated to the PStoE nomenclature uncovers an inconsistency, which requires review. The evaluation of other, from Ego's point of view, are the distribution of Expectations crossed with an elemental evaluation (other's

For the Status Advantage/Disadvantage pairings in **Fig. 16.3**, the other evaluative emotions of Admiration and Contempt match the expected attributional E/S forms that agree with the BIAS positions in the Social Self Model. Thus, recall those whom are judged to be Admirable are those whom meet Expectations and receive rewards, with an attributional structure (vertical) of (+ +), while those judged with Contempt neither meet Expectations nor receive rewards, with a structure of (- -). The distribution (horizontal) emotions of Inferior (- +) and Superior (+ -) fit in the correct relationship, with Ego's display of Admiration coming from an inferior structural position, while the display of Contempt results from a superior structural position.

For the Power Advantage/Disadvantage pairings, the 2-category triad of emotion categories are made up of distributional comparison of expectations of Inferior (- +) and Superior (+ -).

However, the 2-category comparison emotions are exactly reversed from Fessler's account of the building block emotions that blend to produce Pity and Envy, compared with the BIAS emotion placement of Pity and Envy.

An explanation for this might be that the two Power and Status perspectives see Inferior and Superior structure differently. In a power-centric structural relation, inferior is someone who has less power, whereas in status-centric relationships, inferior is someone with less status. While Thamm's mapping of inferior was stated consistently as one not meeting expectations while the other met expectations, the dynamics of power may actually ignore this distributional relationship and weigh inferiority or superiority as an attributional relationship. Therefore, subtle emotions of Power dynamics may produce the other-evaluative emotions from a reversal of expectation logic, as not meeting expectations but still receiving rewards is the definition of the Power attributional structure, and would make one superior to someone who's not in power contexts. It may also be the case that emotion dynamics of expectation differentials change as one matures, with Envy and Pity changing

context, which is a hypothesis of this study to be reviewed later.

In most societies, Shame remains hidden, covered up both psychologically and through convention, making it difficult for empirical study and making the Bengkulu focus on shame quite unique. In societies where shame is unacknowledged, there are two variants. One variant, termed overt/undifferentiated shame, perceived by self vaguely and invisibly leading to **paralysis**, although it's accompanied by familiar shame-like body language (lowered gaze, physical hiding, blushing, speech disruption) (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1988). The other variant, termed bypassed shame, lacks the outward signs from body language, are covert and not displayed; instead speech and gesture are disrupted, halting and sped up in a **repetitive obsessive** quality (Lewis, 1971).

The overt, undifferentiated variant of Shame represents a negatively felt evaluation of self, **hidden** yet accompanied by a non-verbal display, which provides a clue as to its underlying adaptiveness. Embarrassment, which can be considered to be a prosocial emotion display as it signals to Alter one's desire for affiliation and acts as a sort of apology (Feinberg *et al.*, 2011), matches the nature of the overt behavior displays described by Lewis (1971). The displays could be seen an affiliative signal, a likely response to the ambivalent mix of emotions displayed by Alter, in this case **Pity** which besides the negative evaluation includes some affection (+) signaling affiliation.

The bypassed version of Shame also represents a negatively felt evaluation of self, **avoided** and without an accompanying display. Its self-conscious reaction from **Contempt** displayed by Alter, a doubly negative univalent blended emotion mixing moral superiority with condemnation, clearly lacks an affiliative dimension. Bypassed shame markers are covert and subtle, likely both a product of the disabling of social communication from the activation of the SNS in flight mode (Porges, 2007), as well as a protection from a univalent negative emotion which may signal aggression prompting the defensive fear response.

Interestingly, these two defenses AND the dimension of Sociability/Proximity along with a negative Model of Self match both the Polyvagal/ANS activation models in **Fig. 9.4**. Also matching are the avoidance aspects of the two variants of shame matching the attachment style avoidance of the left hand quadrants (negative model of Self). Additionally, the four primary first order blended emotions (Contempt, Envy, Pity and Admiration) match the BIAS dimensions of the SCM model of **Fig. 3.1**.

Similarly, Pride also has two variants, one which has overt excessive displays like hubris and produces negatively valanced feelings when expressed in front of others, as well as pride which displays like confidence and is positively valanced (Tracy & Robins, 2007). A similar analysis of Pride's two forms originate from reactions to the two first order emotion displays by Alter from Envy or Admiration from **Fig. 16.4**. The overt/hubristic Pride display would match a reaction to the first order ambivalent Envy emotion, which contains the negative affect of Anger and can seen to be a defensive reaction to the anger component. The valued, securely confident pride matches a response to univalent Admiration. Similarly, the mapping of these two variants to the ANS defense and Attachment styles would also match, with the overt Pride mapping to SNS activation of fight/narcissism defense, tinged with Anger and mobilization, while the secure Pride matches the Ventral Vagal Complex response, with its Secure feeling of attachment and doubly positive hedonic affect.

This provides evidence of the connection of both primary and blended emotion generation being tied to our physiological ANS response, psychological Attachment style defense, neurophysiological expression of behavior via peripheral/vocal system expression and hierarchical functioning of the Polyvagal system. Additionally, this would provide some confirmation the Psychological, Physiological, Behavioral and Social unity of the Social Self model.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Shame & Self-Conscious Emotions

“advanced levels of social cognition may have arisen as an emergent property of powerful executive functioning assisted by the representational properties of language (Barrett, Henzi & Dunbar, 2003). However, these higher levels operate on previous levels of organization, and should not be seen as independent of, or conflicting with one another. Evolution has constructed layers of increasing complexity, from non- representational (e.g., emotion contagion) to representational and meta- representational mechanisms (e.g., sympathy), which need to be taken into account for a full understanding of human empathy.” Decety & Lamm (2004: 9)

The production of second order emotions Pride and Shame emerge from the recognition that Alter's emotions refer back to Ego. They are examples of self-conscious emotions (Pride, Shame, Embarrassment, Guilt) evoked by the complex sense of self, which sets humans apart from all other animals. The complex sense of self is composed of self-awareness (the experiential I-self) and self-representation (the objective me-self), twin processes involved in self-evaluation (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Self-conscious emotions “motivate individuals to protect, defend, and enhance their self-representations, which in turn allows them to maintain their place in the social group and avoid social rejection” (Tracy & Robins, 2007). They are central towards guiding peoples’ thoughts, feelings and behavior (Tracy & Robins, 2007). While every emotion may be affected by the self process (Tracy & Robins, 2007), self-conscious emotions play a particularly significant role in human social interaction, especially in regulating individual adherence to conformity.

Deference-Emotion System theory explains how conformity is enforced in the absence of formal sanctions, via twin self-conscious emotions Pride and Shame, positing these emotions act as a “subtle and pervasive system of sanction of behavior,” serving as punishment and rewards for meeting expectations for social behavior (norms) (Scheff 1988:396). Both emerge from the continuous process of social self-monitoring, which pervades social thought and leads to self-evaluations of

either Pride or Shame (Scheff, 1988). Pride represents an informal reward, incurring deference from others which evokes feelings of Pride internally, while Shame represents a punishment, garnering a lack of deference from others while incurring an inner Shame (Scheff, 1988). Shame has been cited not only as a universal emotion, but as the cornerstone of human social interaction for its role in ordering society (Scheff, 1988).

The Deference-Emotion System posits that Pride and Shame operate not only internally, but interact “*between* and *within* interactants...to guarantee an alignment of thoughts, feelings and actions of individuals” (Scheff, 1980: 397). Shame especially, as well as combinations of Shame/Anger/Rage, spirals and grows with an unlimited ceiling, producing chain-reaction feelings of shame about feeling ashamed, producing shame upon shame, spreading like contagion (Scheff, 1988). Pride and Shame share a recursiveness in which shame accrues from displays of both Pride and Shame (Scheff, 1980). Shame can accumulate in a triple spiral in which each interactant can experience their own spiral of shame, while a third spiral can occur for their shared perception of each other’s shame.

This may be a major factor for Shame’s low-visibility and taboo in Western cultures (Scheff 1987; Fessler 2004), while in collectivist cultures, Shame is considered a far less negative emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Western cultures have feeling rules against showing negative self-emotions, especially Shame, which overrun personal feeling and leave little avenue for discharging such feelings, leading to alienation (Scheff, 1987). However, the subconscious movements and gestures of Shame displays may play a part in subtle signs of appeasement that can be differentiated from Embarrassment (Keltner, 1995).

Emotional Self-Alienation (ESA) names the general phenomena of being dis-attached from the feelings of emotion (Szanto, 2017). ESA is NOT reducible to feelings of being manipulated, coercion or self-deception, but rather simply not to appropriately or to deficiently-feel one’s own emotions. Emotional Self-Alienation causes one to “lose the appropriate affective responsiveness to her environment as well as to her own affective sensitivity” (Szanto, 2017: 16). This can occur across three different emotion category dysfunctions, the Experiential, the Normative, and the Self-Disclosing. Experiential ESA names the subjective experience of not having clear ability to focus and appropriately feeling what one feels. Normative ESA involves “not appropriately feeling what one ought to or supposedly could feel” from feeling rules which alter the experience, expression and

regulation of emotion. Self-Disclosing ESA involves “not appropriately feeling what oneself feels, but rather what ‘one’s Other’ or others feel.” All three dynamics, involving dysfunction of first person, second person, and third person perspectives, involve the taboo hiding of Shame.

However, Shame arose as an adaptive solution towards group conformity during human evolution, thus, the repression of Shame in modern individualist cultures represents a maladaptation with negative individual effects. Yet, Shame’s role in producing conformity and acting as sanction towards constraining behavior against the group fails for individuals whom are most able to repress our natural physiological tendencies. One would expect extreme individualists to repress Shame far more than individuals with a more communitarian focus.

Lewis (1971) proposed a model of Shame having two forms, overt/undifferentiated and bypassed, with each appearing to have opposite behavioral and implicit emotional responses (Scheff, 1988). Both forms are unacknowledged, strongly negative evaluations of Self characterized by hiding and feelings of inferiority. Moreover, these forms of Shame are **invisible** to not only the emoter, but to the analyst herself (Lewis, 1971).

Undifferentiated Shame’s overt style elicits feelings of pain from social humiliation or embarrassment, expressing itself in hiding behavior characterized by “speech disruption, lowered or averted gaze, blushing, barely audible speech”, as well as vocabulary used to denote feelings which hide shame, instead using alternate less emotionally impactful words (i.e. feeling foolish, insecure, stupid) (Scheff, 1988:401). The emoter feels the emotional pain of undifferentiated Shame, but doesn’t recognize its source, seemingly hiding it from themselves and others (Scheff, 1988). Additionally, undifferentiated Shame tends to bias consciousness towards an experiential subjective “I” orientation.

Bypassed Shame’s covert style “avoids the pain through hyperactive thought, behavior and speech,” “stepping outside of self, into the ‘me’ phase of the self, as if the pain were not happening” (Scheff, 1980:402). The covert style evades both the emoter and other’s conscious awareness of pain. The hyperactive nature of the bypassed form resembles OCD and has been characterized by other researchers as leading to obsessiveness. It is also accompanied by a narrowing of focus onto a single issue and social isolation from others (Scheff, 2007).

Both of these Shame types regularly lead to the emoter yielding to self-conformity following sanctioning imposed by a norm. However, while everyone experiences similar pain from Shame, those with high self-esteem are able to self-regulate, acknowledge and discharge it, while low self-esteem emoters have problems regulating it (Scheff, 1980). Left unacknowledged and unchecked, it's malignant form can cause recursive rumination which can spiral to pathological states of conformity (Scheff, 1980).

In either form, the role of Alter's condemning emotions, either expressed explicitly by alter's reactions or implicitly by an imagined audience's feelings, enforced by self, produce negativity in Ego directed explicitly outward towards others (Resentment) or implicitly inward towards Self (Guilt) (Scheff, 1988). Guilt, Shame and Embarrassment "are associated with social and moral transgressions, involve self-awareness, and motivate reparations for transgressions" and have been found to be distinct universal emotions (Keltner & Buswell, 1996: 155). Embarrassment is an autonomic response given when breaking minor social rules around social strangers (Keltner & Buswell, 1996: 155). However, Guilt in particular, is often conflated with Shame, as well as with the self-conscious emotion of Embarrassment, especially in western societies.

Guilt is an interactional emotion, caused by action taken by Ego, while Shame is a self attributional emotion, attributed to Ego. The Guilt complex is the result of using power in social interaction to gain unearned rewards and causing harm to others (Thamm, 2007). The negative feeling of Guilt motivates repair of a social bond brought about by (social) harm caused to others, driving prosocial behaviors of empathy, altruism and caregiving (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

Lewis (1971) outlined the Self - Other Relationship for both Guilt and Shame after her systematic analysis of hundreds of psychotherapy sessions. Her "discovery" of shame in sessions in which neither she nor the subject were aware led her to the insights of two types of hidden shame, undifferentiated and bypassed. Lewis' study was the first to systematically explore Shame and Guilt, and her framework for understanding these two central emotions of social interaction explains their opposing dynamics.

Self Other Shame Experience**Self (unable)**

1. Object of scorn, contempt, ridicule; reduced little
2. Paralyzed, helpless, passive
3. Assailed by noxious stimuli:
rage; tears; blushing; fluster; blank
4. Feels Childish
5. Focal in Awareness; being looked at; split
6. Functions poorly as an agent or perceiver; divided between imagining self and the other; boundaries are permeable; vicarious experience of self & other.

Other (able)

1. The source of scorn, contempt, ridicule
2. Laughing, ridiculing; powerful; active
3. Appears intact
4. Appears adult; going away; abandoning
5. Also focal in awareness; looking at
6. Appears intact

Self Other Guilt Experience**Self (able)**

1. The Source of guilt, as well as pity & concern; regret, remorse
2. Intact
3. Adult; responsible
4. Occupied with guilty acts or thoughts
5. Functioning silently

Other (unable)

1. Injured, needful, suffering, hurt
2. Injured
3. Dependent, by implication
4. Subject of thought as Related to guilt, otherwise, "other" need not be involved
5. Nothing comparable to vicarious experiences of shame,

Fig. 17.1 - Shame & Guilt Experiences - Source: Lewis (1971)

Fig. 17.1 shows the qualities of experience of Shame and Guilt from both Self and Other's perspectives. Shame signals a perceived threat to the social bond where the Self is **unable** while Other is **able** to regulate the emotion. It is an attribution emotion from both Self and Other's points of view, which leads to self blame and contempt from Other. From the Self's point of view, it includes feelings of scorn, ridicule, contempt; renders one paralyzed/helpless/passive; accompanied by noxious stimuli like rage, tears, blushing, fluster; focus of negative attention; and feelings of childishness and helplessness (Lewis, 1971). Other's point of view includes feelings of scorn, contempt and ridicule; behaviors of laughing, ridicule, power; associated with adult and abandoning, focusing on negative attention. These are the familiar characteristics listed in the figure above.

Guilt also signals a perceived threat to the social bond where the Self is **able** and Other is **unable** to regulate the emotion. It is a negative interactional emotion from both Self and Other's points of view,

which leads to unsatisfactory exchanges and a breakdown of interaction. Self is the source of guilt, although it stems from Self's action, rather than as an attribution of Self from Others emotional display, with Self feeling the adult role, responsible for the action, which remains a silent self-conscious feeling. It is a response to the action taken against an un-able Other, who feels injured, needful, suffering & hurt, dependent.

The popularity of the Tedx talk by psychologist Brené Brown on the power of vulnerability demonstrates that people recognize the desire to learn about and overcome Shame. Brown identified that people able to overcome shame do so by showing vulnerability and dealing with the uncertainty of being deeply seen, growing their sense of worthiness, letting go of blame, sticking their neck out to initiate connection and loving with their whole hearts (Brown, 2010).



Fig. 17.2 - Brené Brown Tedx Talk <https://youtu.be/iCvmsMzlF7o> - Source: Brown (2010)

Brown's (2010) research uncovered three traits that people successful in overcoming Shame had in common: Courage, Compassion, and Connection. These three traits seem to align with the Big "Three" Ethics of morality: Community, Autonomy, and Divinity. Recall, these ethics represent universal domains of social ordering used to frame and resolve moral issues (Rozin *et al.*, 1999). In

the interpersonal domain, Brown offers Courage, Compassion, and Connection as common traits of those whom have been successful overcoming negative self-conscious emotions resulting from moral judgments, sometimes self inflicted and other times from being the object of negative moral judgments by others.

The **CAD Hypothesis** offers an attempt to “systematize and taxonomize” a set of the Moral emotions emanating from social structure (Rozin *et al.*, 1999: 574). It posits that each of the Big “Three” Ethics have signature other-condemning moral emotions used to punish violations of morals, with **Contempt** linked to violations of Community, **Anger** linked to violations of Autonomy and **Disgust** linked to violations of Divinity. This study offers that being on the receiving end of these condemnations evokes second order self-conscious emotions. This study argues these self-conscious emotions will be forms of Shame (Lewis, 1971) and lead to social withdrawal, while Courage, Connection, and Compassion act as antidotes to overcome these forms of Shame, respectively. Each of Brown’s suggested motivational salves helps to discharge these negative self-conscious emotions. Each of these reparative emotions align with behavioral action potentials that could alter structural relations according to a logic that aligns with both the PSToE and Polyvagal Theory. The relationship between these emotion categories to autonomic functioning will help to solidify the mapping of the Big “Three” Ethics in the Social Self Model.

Take for example Contempt, a first order other evaluative emotion directed at others for violating community standards according to the CAD Hypothesis which could result in expulsion of alter from the group. Being on the receiving end of Contempt produces a second order emotion of Bypassed Shame, a second order subtle emotion not registered consciously, which masquerades in distraction, hyperactivity, ADHD...activity meant to deflect the painful feelings of exclusion. Its antidote requires refocusing on Connection with the group, which helps to turn bypassed Shame into conciliatory alternates like overt displays which socially signal acknowledgment of norm violation and sorry.

Anger is a self-enhancing emotion for overcoming an obstacle, linking forces which threaten one’s autonomy. It produces a self-conscious emotion of Guilt when anger is directed towards others, which is often confused with Shame, but instead of referring to Self, it refers to Self’s actions. However, being on the receiving end of Anger produces Fear, which can be soothed by Compassion from others in the form of VVC activation, promoting social trust, while at the same time the VVC’s

vagal brake counter's Anger activation, making Compassion a mediating emotion in the presence of Anger between parties. Showing oneself or others Compassion helps to recognize that our actions aren't perfect, nor can we take back our actions but learn from them, apologize to whom we feel guilt towards.

The third emotion, Disgust, is an other evaluative emotion that occurs when one negatively evaluates another socially. It is characterized as having an autonomic component of DVC activation of the PNS, which connected to the gut, produces the characteristic feeling that's been classified as socio-moral Disgust (Fessler, 2002), which evolved from the DVC's original response of revulsion from ingesting poisoned or decayed food (Haidt, 2003). The depression of PNS activity, according to Polyvagal Theory, requires enervation of the heart and SNS activations, typified by Courage, which coincidentally has an etymological root *-cour* meaning "heart" and in English originally meant "to tell the story of who you really are" (Brown, 2010). Showing vulnerability through courage helps to overcome negative self evaluations, by activating the heart by activating the SNS to power out of the immobilization of the PNS withdrawal. However, the notion of moral disgust is larger and more flexible than its typical user in moralizing, as it can also signal non-negative information rather than negative social evaluation (Clark & Fessler, 2014), which may be a cognitive assessment rather than connected to DVC activation, but still potentially requiring Courage in the semantic sense (e.g., caring for the diseased).

"In order to experience embarrassment, guilt, pride or shame, an individual must focus attention on his or her public and/or private self-representations; appraise the eliciting event (i.e., stimulus) as relevant to and congruent (for pride) or incongruent (for embarrassment, shame, and guilt) with identity goals; and attribute the cause of the event to some internal factor, blaming (or crediting) the self for the situation." Tracy & Robins (2007: 191)

Tracy & Robins (2007) offer an appraisal model which they posit generates self-conscious emotions through self-evaluation and self-attributions. Appraisals determine the relevance of a social event to one's social identity, and along with situational details, generate the appropriate self-conscious emotion. To be able to feel the self-conscious emotions, the quote above lays out the necessary components of attention on self-representations, appraising for congruency and attributing the cause

to an internal factor, as well as taking into account situational factors (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Their model explains the differentiation between Shame and Guilt coming down to the difference between negative feelings about the global stable self (Shame) versus Guilt's negative emotions originating from situational behavior. Attribution versus situations also accounts for the dual types of Pride.

Self-conscious emotions require self-regulation and in fact underlie the control of emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2007). This regulation may take a variety of forms to change the negative events as either congruent with self or caused by externalities, or other strategies. One strategy can take the form of changing attentional forces to externalities and away from Self, preventing self-conscious emotions (Avoidance). Another strategy is to downplay negative self-evaluations (Denial/Overcompensation). Another strategy is to reappraise self-identity when self-representation is challenged by negative self-evaluation. Yet another would be to reappraise the self, changing attributions of self and instead blaming on external situational attributes to be self-serving (Externalizing). Another can be reappraising Shame to be blamed on another cause other than self, resulting in Guilt, which has less negative impact on self-esteem (Tracy & Robins, 2007). All of these are strategies serve to protect self-identity, with most of them unconscious, yet they have a conformity behavioral effect.

The Deference-emotion system likely evolved as an additional dimension of dominance outside of Power, expanding behavioral expectations and sanctions by producing strongly valenced rewards and punishments in relation to Eminence (Prestige). Natural selection modified first order emotions of proto-Pride and proto-Shame from strictly Power-conflict competition into second order emotions that could motivate simple cooperation, not only because it promoted conformity, but also gave the ability to coordinate by predicting Alter's intentions through Theory of Mind (Fessler, 1999).

By modeling expectation of not only Ego's own emotion in relation to alter, but Alter's emotional reaction to ego, resulted in second order emotions. It enables comparative and theoretical modeling of social interaction, creating a system for inferring about the behavior and reactions of others to create more adaptive behavior. Second order emotions became in effect motivations towards meeting others' expectations, eventually generalizing towards a generalized other. This provided an adaptive advantage for those able to recognize information about their own Ego from social cues and emotion displays in Alter. Initially, these cues give attributional information about Alter, but the recognition of Alter's cues actually serving as context in reference to Ego give that second order level

of information about Ego, enlarging Ego's perspective.

However, implicit emotion regulation strategies also represent evolved innate psychological biases which evolved to protect the Ego from social harm. Their utility have decreased, however, in modern society, as unrecognized Shame remains a leading cause of negative behaviors like blame and perfectionism. It can also lead to long term emotional troughs in Self-Esteem resulting in negative social and physical health problems, "including depression, chronic anger, and the narcissistic, antisocial, and borderline personality disorders" (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Shame also can spiral and affect others (Scheff, 1980). Most of all, Shame limits our experiences, especially of positive emotions.

This analysis of the evolution of second order emotions and higher can be seen as a strong natural selective force for increased theory of mind and the driver of the social perceptual modeling used in the social engagement system, for "emotions combine with the ability to anticipate the future, and to hold a model of mind, in a manner which increases fitness by furthering the quest for high rank. Hence, we can view completely psychogenic second order emotions as the apex of a process of development that began with the simple rank-related emotions" (Fessler, 1999).

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Becoming Aware of Awareness

“Consciousness...is a construct of the Social Perceptual Machinery. Awareness is a perceptual reconstruction of attentional state; and the machinery that computes information about other people’s awareness is the same machinery that computes information about our own awareness.” Graziano & Kastner (2011: 98)

Consciousness and emotion are not separable (Damasio, 1999). Since emotional expression is rooted in vagal control of autonomic functioning (Porges, 2003), the vagus nerve & and the neural circuitry supporting its function (namely the Anterior Insula (AI) (Craig, 2008)) must play a part in consciousness. However, the philosophical, cognitive and neurological study of consciousness focuses mainly on cognitive brain function, with many traditional theories positing that consciousness itself is an emergent property of the functioning of the whole brain which somehow, through information processing and brain synchronization, enables an emergent consciousness. That still doesn't explain the “hard problem” of consciousness, that is, how it is that we “feel” conscious (Graziano & Kastner, 2011).

Neuroscientist Michael Graziano's Attention Schema theory (AST) posits that consciousness emerges from the neural machinery processing social perception. Like other types of perception (e.g., vision), social perception is processed and modeled in the brain, requiring the integration from a variety of sources of affective information read from other's body language & facial expression, gaze, intonation, vocabulary, arousal state. These are combined to form a model of Other. Attention Schema Theory proposes that the phenomenon of awareness itself is simply a perceptual model of attention. AST defines attention as the focus of a large number of resources on a small number of signals, anything that can be attended to, like raw information. Awareness contains exaggerated information in the form of a schema, a not entirely accurate model of information from attention. Schema models are useful to guide behavior, and as a model, it allows for information that can be pondered, thought about, visualized, located in the mind, etc. (Graziano & Kastner, 2011). Thus,

Attention Schema Theory posits the approximate model of paying attention of something, awareness, is simply a crude schematized attention.

The Social Perception used to model others' attentional state generates information about what the other is attending to, be it a sensory perception, a thing, an idea, etc, termed social attention (Graziano & Kastner, 2011). The ability of our minds to model this information must have been heavily favored by natural selection, since it provided information used to anticipate and predict another's future behavior, key information in social perception. However, when the awareness of attention is focused on self, the model applied to self would produce even greater adaptive value, since the self has access to so much additional information internally, i.e. body state, emotional state, sensation, etc, even in the absence of or before the advent of language. Attention Schema theory focuses not simply on modeling someone's (including our own) thoughts, beliefs, etc, but also on the modeling of attentional gaze and the motivation to know why and where social attention is directed. We seek to know what others are attending to and thinking about.

Attentional gaze is registered largely by detecting and tracking the eyes of others, which Baron-Cohen (1995) hypothesizes evolved via a neurocognitive module he calls the Eye Direction Detector (EDD). The EDD follows eye gaze, movement and attention of others, emerging by the fifth month in infants and eventually providing "split second eye direction detection" while averting one's own eyes when other's eyes rapidly focus on oneself (Baron-Cohen, 1995: 42). This provides information not only about another's attentional gaze, but also to their intention. While other animals share this type of eye detection of others, it is invariably used in defense/dominance staring, as eye contact between strangers in most species entails risk and results in avoidance and fear. However, only primates and humans have EDD functionality for both avoidance *and* affiliative behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Baron-Cohen begins his piece by describing subtle eye dynamics between a male and female over the course of 15 minutes of initial meeting, only to reveal it occurred between two primates during observation, sharing striking similarities of primate eye dynamics to human flirtation.

Baron-Cohen (1995) also posits another neurocognitive mechanism which pairs with EDD to determine if one is attending to the same thing as another, which he terms the Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM). The EDD produces a dyadic representation between Self and Other's attentional gaze, while the SAM takes this as input to produce a **triadic** representation between **Self, Other**

and an **object**, to determine if both are attending to the same object. When SAM identifies shared attention between Self and Other, it allows Self to be able to infer Other's "goal, desire or intention to refer," which contributes to Theory of Mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen, 1995: 52).

Both primate and human social environments are far more complex than any other species. Their environments favored social skills and social status that could be enhanced by mechanisms functioning both affiliatively and defensively. Thus, EDD and SAM could explain the mechanisms that provided important adaptive advantages in Social Cognition. Additionally, their combination provides the mechanism for joint-intentionality which separates humans from all other animals, primates included, especially since humans have the ability to share intentionality through language to a unrivaled degree. It is perhaps these EDD and SAM mechanisms that provide the representational mechanics of developing Social cognition, which in humans allow for the accumulation of social information to build solidarity, with joint attentional skills building over time leading to more complex behaviors, including the seeds of language acquisition and social cognition (Tomasello, 1999).

The ability to control attention and keep focus it on one thing, be it external stimuli or internal thoughts, has important ramifications for complex working memory tasks. The measure of Working Memory Capacity (WMC), which tests the number of things one can remember during a complex working memory task, is thought to represent a measure of both memory and processing that is indicative of the ability of executive controls to control attention (Barrett, Tugade & Engle, 2004). This component of executive controls has been found to explain individual differences in the ability of controlled processing over automated processing, the twins of Dual-process theories. Barrett and colleagues assemble evidence of the ability of the executive controls to suppress or inhibit automated processing and engage in controlled processing in attention-demanding circumstances depends on the ability to switch into deliberate controlled attention (Barrett, Tugade & Engle, 2004). When normal automatic sensory processing of important stimuli from our social environment "capture" attention implicitly, it launches the recall of "knowledge structures" which will control behavior, thoughts, and feelings (Barrett, Tugade & Engle, 2004: 3). In the face of complex, difficult environments with competing stimulus demands, executive controlled processing gives one conscious command over behavior, thoughts, and feelings, so that the most appropriate for the situation can be selected and the situation mediated.

As a neuroscientist, Graziano uses neuroimaging to find brain structures that are involved in the processing of social perception. He finds evidence for social perception from deficits in attention and self-modeling from damaged cortical areas, as well as brain imaging during self-perceptive and other-perceptive tasks. The brain areas identified by these tests include mostly right-hemispheric cortical systems like the Superior Temporal Succulus (STS) and Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ), which play a role in attentional processing, while the Medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) is involved in self-perception. While Graziano identifies no other brain areas, he speculates on the functions involved in creating awareness and comparing social models.

Challenges to Attention Schema theory require addressing several questions (Graziano & Kastner, 2011). The first involves answering how the simple processing of awareness by the social perception machinery is different than the actual FEELING of being aware. Attention Schema puts everything in terms of computing information, envisioning the mind like a computer. However, Polyvagal theory and Interoception explain the integration of mind, body, and embedding feeling (emotion) in the complex interplay of autonomic functioning controlled by the social engagement system (Porges, 2007) receiving feedback via interoceptive afferent pathways (Craig, 2015). Attachment Theory and Affect Regulation provide other evidence, as affective information gleaned from exteroception (from others) and interoception (from self/body) are processed by right-hemispheric cortical areas connected to the orbitofrontal system, which connects to the vagus nerve providing parasympathetic control over the SNS and DVC (Schore, 2008; Craig, 2015) and possessing "a vocabulary for nonverbal affective signals such as facial expressions, gestures, and vocal tone or prosody" (Schore, 2000). Schore provides even more in the following:

"Attachment patterns are now conceptualized as 'patterns of mental processing of information based on cognition and affect to create models of reality'. The 'anterior limbic prefrontal network,' which interconnects the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex with the temporal pole, cingulate, and amygdala, 'is involved in affective responses to events and in the mnemonic processing and storage of these responses', and 'constitutes a mental control system that is essential for adjusting thinking and behavior to ongoing reality.' " Schore (2000: 35)

Thus, the prime candidate for locating the social perceptual machinery described in Attention Schema Theory, as well as its evolution, resides in the orbito-prefrontal area connected to visceromotor areas, the executive controls of the social engagement system (Schore, 2009), instrumental in Polyvagal Theory, Attachment Theory, Affect Regulation, Interoception and the Theory of Constructed Emotion.

It is precisely this modeling of Self and Other, which we've seen at the level of the Polyvagal/ANS model (**Fig. 9.4**), and First & Second Order Emotion Generation (**Fig. 16.2**), along with the expectation and prediction system for mediating risk, homeostasis and readying for action, that inform the functioning of the Social Perceptual machinery of Attention Schema theory at physiological, psychological and social levels of study. They answer the challenges to Attention Schema theory. The machinery for social perception "feels" through the vagal and spino-thalamic afferent pathways, transmitting affect (feeling) body information to the brainstem and higher cortical areas, integrated and modeled in the anterior insula, the seat of subjective awareness (Craig, 2003). Awareness gains access to modality-spanning information via the VVC's connections to upper right-hemispheric peripheral sensorimotor connections pooled in the Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC). The question of Simulation theory and mirror neurons is less clear, although the proposed sites for modeling Self and Other modeling are proposals of Polyvagal theory (Porges, 2007) and provide compelling direction for further study.

Attention Schema theory is revelatory, for it posits that all living creatures have consciousness to some degree (Graziano & Kastner, 2011). And certainly most vertebrates have internalized models of others as well as have rich feeling states which inform those models. Thus, to fully use our consciousness, we can become aware to the fact that humans share this world with other living species with internal models and emotions. It's possible then to empathize not simply with other humans sharing our vast similarity, but with all living creatures. This process of waking up to the awareness of Awareness benefits not only oneself and those directly connected, but to those connected by third orders or more (Seppala, et al., 2013).

Attention Schema theory in the context of Polyvagal Theory and the P/S Theory of Emotion also gives some credence to Julian Jaynes' Bicameral Mind thesis, which posits that consciousness and rationality didn't fully emerge until very recently in human history, some 3000 years ago or so

(Jaynes, 1976). Since consciousness has to do with the modeling Self and Other, and becoming aware of subconscious mechanisms and processes, humans are still in the process of developing consciously throughout our lives. While Jaynes' identification of the corpus callosum being the causal agent of the breakdown of the bicameral mind might be decidedly wrong neurophysiologically, the heavily right-hemispheric orientation of the Social Engagement system and its development could very well have further evolved during the course of recorded human history through selection pressures presented by new cultural forms, as becoming aware of interoception through contemplative cultural patterns may have permitted deeper states of consciousness. Genetic evolutionary processes happen on a much shorter timescale than thought in the years since Darwin, as quickly as a generation or two (Wilson, 2015).

The conscious control of attention and direct control over awareness, overriding automatic controls, has grown in humans and enables directed conscious rationality. The ability to arrest automatic implicit processes and activate conscious control, particularly in the face of threat reactivity, stress and informational overload, enables human beings to cogitate intentionally and react based on knowledge and experience rather than reactively. Knowledge of this fact, and of the neurophysiological, psychological, social and cultural effects of conscious control, enables conscious formulation of cultural values and social behaviors or practices to gain more control, and thus, think and act intentionally. Awakening at the cultural level happens as the human population reaches a critical mass of people gaining better control over awareness, providing some support for a thesis such as Jaynes', albeit from a process-view instead of physiological view.

Attention Schema Theory's hypothesis that the Social perception machinery modeling of social others was eventually utilized to model Self, must be greatly enhanced by the shared nature of language. Social perception focused on others could be turned inward on Self, where joint attention could then also be refocused not simply on noticing differences in others, but in ourselves and our exchange that with others. Language could allow much more detailed differentiation of social relations and behavior, which could lead to expanded behavioral repertoires, because they could be more easily imitated, remembered and more importantly, valued. Behaviors of valued others could become valued themselves and mimicked, leading to higher level categorization of valued behaviors.

Information gleaned about oneself could lead to far more control over adaptive behavior by strategically behaving in a way to maximize one's standing within the group, leading to the creation of prestige for valued behavior, the development of prosociality and the civilizing process. Greater self-awareness through conscious self reflection of particularly salient past social situations helps to correct behaviors which elicit group disapproval, information gleaned from examining the reaction of others in relation to ourself. The negativity bias favored by evolution to orient aversion from social injury makes thinking about self in social situations and rumination of past social injury a common topic of the self dialogue. The development of social perceptual awareness, becoming aware of self performance, affective display states, and internal state grows apart from language and contributes to self-awareness. Coming to awareness of the autonomous self-dialogue, part of the success of cognitive behavioral therapies as well as mindfulness training, has the potential to interrupt automated controls and harness controlled attention towards intentional thinking.

How is it that we're able to often "run on autopilot", which involves thinking, believing and feeling without really truly being consciously in control and self-reflective of those processes? What underlying system of control exists that's able to process information sensorially, translate it to semantic knowledge and convert it into cognitive and behavioral action in vary degrees of conscious awareness?

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Semantic Differential & Affect

“...evaluation, potency, activity are not simply dimensions of words, but they are the hidden language, the affective Rosetta stone that allows the mind and the body to communicate.”
Clore & Pappas (2007)

Early attempts to empirically study the experience of consciousness began in the late 19th century in the field of psychophysics. Efforts to make an objective science out of subjective experience resulted in methods to determine the relations of physical properties of a stimulus with the psychological properties of sensation. Several decades of experimentation uncovered the thresholds of sensory perception and the adherence of perception to orderly laws such as Weber’s Law, Fechner’s Law and Steven’s Law, which related sensation not only across modalities but also across species (Kihlstrom, 2011). Psychophysicists discovered core qualities for each of the different modalities of perception (vision, audition, felt touch, etc.), which were thought to be the essential building blocks of the sensory space from which all sensation was constructed and whose neural structure could be localized. Vision science found qualities of color, saturation and hue to be elementary that provided physiological attunement to unique neural pathways processing vision, which were eventually localized in the rods and cones of the human eye.

The subjective experiential qualities of these modalities were termed qualia, essentially the “atoms” of the sensory space for each modality from which all experiences within that modality could be composed (Kihlstrom, 2011). Efforts to map the qualities of other modalities, for example taste, resulted in finding four qualia from which all tastes could be described: sweet, sour, salty and bitter. However, the diet of the researchers of the day limited their exposure to all tastes and the fifth dimension of taste, umami (savory), was not found until years later by Japanese researchers whose diet included savory tastes like soy. The European researcher’s lack of environmental experience with the full palette of tastes highlights the fact that introspection is dependent on experience, which can be limited by exposure to some stimuli, or put more simply, that in effect, the content of what’s

perceived can be limited by cultural experience (Kihlstrom, 2011).

Interestingly, the qualia discovered by the early psychophysicists were found to have unique qualities in language that were consistent across cultures (Kihlstrom, 2011). Linguistic terms for qualia are found to be expressed in language as monolexemic: single words that are used in language that expresses their quality alone. The linguistic terms for the products of combining qualia differ in that they also are the name of things or compound words. Take for instance the colors perceived as primary (blue, green, red and yellow). Their names in English describe nothing other than their basic color, which also includes several other primaries like black, pink, and brown. However, words for other colors are commonly the names of things having that color: orange, sky blue, olive, lilac, indigo, etc.

In a landmark study of color perception across the world, cultures differ which colors they discriminate (Kay & Berlin, 1968). Some cultures have been found to only have two basic terms for color, while others have been found having four, six or many other combinations. Interestingly, across all cultures studied, no matter how many colors they have terms for, their basic color terms follow in a particular order of perception: black, white, red, yellow, blue, green, pink, brown, and purple. In cultures across the world, the basic categories for perception in most languages are encoded in words for the quality of that experience and follow this formulae naturally. Language seems to reflect perception of these basic categories long before we understand them scientifically.

The empirical search for the atoms of sensory experience began with the structuralist movement in psychology in hopes of understanding the mind and finding neural correlates of subjective experience. The search for the qualia of emotions was led by the founder of the movement himself, William Wundt, who posited that all emotional experience could be composed of **three** essences: pleasantness versus unpleasantness, excitement versus calm, and strain versus relaxation. While Wundt's hypothesis was offered in the nineteenth century, it lay dormant through the Behaviorist movement, which dominated psychological study before the cognitive revolution. Quietly, emotion studies too began again in the 1960's and soon became a counter to the strictly cognitive scientific effort to understand the mind. An early set of findings from the study of language semantics provided a curious analogue to Wundt's early hypothesis on the qualia of emotion.

Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum (1962) discovered that affective content of semantic meaning can be measured by the Semantic Differential (SD), which measures connotation. The SD is a differential ratings scale using bi-polar adjectival pairs to get at the meanings of words, where adjectives describe things, people, institutions, concepts, events. By rating words across hundreds of adjective pairs, each running on a scale from -4 to +4, the SD found through factor analysis three cross-culturally universal dimensions of affective meaning inherent in language, each corresponding to an aspect (qualia) of affect (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1962). Together these affective dimensions create a universal 3-D affective space in which all semantic terms can be located, whose positional relation in that space represent their connotative meaning (Heise, 2006).

The SD's three dimensions are similar to Wundt's emotion qualia, which could be described by sorting the bi-polar adjectival pairs for each dimension, termed Evaluation (E), Potency (P) and Activity (A). Some examples of adjectival pairs used to describe these EPA dimensions include:

Evaluation (E)

positive: nice, sweet, heavenly, good, mild, happy, fine, clean

negative: awful, sour, horrid, bad, intense, sad, coarse, dirty

Potency (P)

positive: big, powerful, deep, strong, high, long, full, many

negative: small, powerless, shallow, weak, low, short, empty, few

Activity (A)

positive: fast, noisy, young, alive, known, burning, active, light

negative: slow, quiet, old, dead, unknown, freezing, inactive, dark

(Heise, 2006)

Within each EPA dimension, “terms are correlated...something judged sweet is likely to be judged clean also,” while terms across dimensions are uncorrelated. “Sensing that something is powerful provides no clue as to whether it is good or bad” (Heise, 2006).

Scales for measuring Evaluation, Potency, Activity




Fig. 19.1 - Semantic Differential Bi-Polar Rating Scales - Source: Schneider & Heise (1995: Fig. 1)

“Evaluation concerns goodness versus badness, Potency concerns powerlessness versus powerlessness, and Activity concerns liveliness versus quietness” (Heise, 2006). The dimensions of Evaluation, Potency and Activity (EPA) characterize the variety of contrasts and matters of degree humans are able to differentiate, represented symbolically through language. The EPA dimensions represent shared sentiment shaped through social interaction with others, arriving at culturally shared affective norms for concepts, with many sentiments learned during the process of language learning (Heise, 2006). While cultures may differ in their sentiment towards one concept or another, these dimensions are universal and are comparable in every culture. EPA dimensions can be thought of as the qualia of external feeling inherent in language.

A curious dilemma arises regarding the feeling typically expressed about one’s own feeling state, which Barrett (2006b) conjectured is described by the two universal dimensions of core affect, valence and arousal, analogous to the Evaluation and Activation dimensions of the EPA, measuring unpleasant versus pleasantness and activated versus calmness, respectively. But what of SD’s Potency dimension felt in self? While potency can be sensed internally, it isn’t frequently used to describe feeling states unless especially salient for the situation, e.g. try asking a powerlifter how they feel after lifting several hundred pounds or how a bed ridden patient feels, both contextualized by special circumstances of the situation, in which potency is salient.

The SD measures the feeling of external things of which potency is a salient dimension of perception, likely the result of the constant search to glean information about potent and potentially dangerous stimuli from the environment. Importantly, the SD dimensions of potency and activation are characteristics of the stimuli observed, while evaluation is appraised by the observer, not inherent in the stimulus (Kemper, 1978). While we experience the world cognitively through facts (via linguistically mediated thought), our social perception processes affective information implicitly gleaned through socially transmitted affect, physical attributions, and situational cues “to give us a feeling of confidence about those facts” through Core Affect (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009: 178). Evaluations of external stimuli must be inferred by the observer automatically by the Social Engagement system, resulting in automatic adjustments to one’s moment by moment processing of another’s affective cues (Schore, 2000).

At the heart of biases in social perception seems to be this dichotomy between the inferences made about one’s self and about other’s self. Core affect is available as a feeling state for self-awareness appraisals measuring level of activation and how good or bad that is interpreted, based on the situational context. Core affect provides a global measure towards understanding how one feels and how that may influence behavior, decision making, emotional reactivity, etc. In many cases, core-affect may not even reach awareness, yet have an effect on behavior causing much of the ambiguity or consternation in social behavior and the rumination afterward in order to seek understanding. In the case of self-awareness of core affect, it acts as a situational effect that contextualizes behavior, such as having a cruddy day can affect and be an excuse for one’s negative social disposition. However, the perception of other’s behavior does not include access to their valenced feelings, but must be inferred through observation of their behavior and the situation. Typically, the attributional bias towards others is to attribute behavior as due to internal dispositions, rather than to contextualize on the situation or on their own feeling state (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This seems to be the source of the Fundamental Attribution Error, which leads to attributing behavior of others to internal dispositions rather than on situational factors.

The social perception of others, measured through the SCM’s dimensions of warmth and competence have been found to be systematically related to EPA dimensions (Kervyn, *et al.*, 2013). SCM’s dimensions both have aspects of Evaluation since “it is better to be competent than incompetent, and

it is better to be warm than cold" (Kervyn, *et al.*, 2013). However, Evaluation was found more closely related to Warmth, whereas Potency is more related to Competence than negative Warmth. Abele & Wojciszke's (2007) research shows social perception is biased towards reading Warmth of others while biased towards Competence when judging self, precisely the bias that would come from having internal access to valence of self-feeling, but wary of evaluation of others. While the SCM to SD dimensional mapping isn't a perfect diagonal, their systematic relationship is established (Kervyn *et al.*, 2013).

Fiske's (2013) study also found that inferences of others creates biases matching the EPA relation to the SCM dimensions. A compensation effect centered on the EPA Potency dimension exists, meaning when two groups are compared, the group with more Competency in SCM terms, Potency in EPA terms, is judged to be more Warm (Kervyn *et al.*, 2013). Conversely, it found a negativity effect on the Warmth dimension, which means that a negative indication of non-Warmth weighs heavily (Kervyn *et al.*, 2013). These effects are important for detecting social deception, since more heavily weighing displays of non-warmth provide a more likely instance of persons engaged in deception since most warm people are rarely non-warm. Similarly, it's difficult to fake Competence, so positive displays of competence weigh more heavily than incompetence, which everyone from time to time displays.

However, the Activity dimension correlates with neither Warmth nor Competence, orthogonal to both on the SCM plane (Kervyn, *et al.*, 2013). In social perceptual terms, "activity items picked up on more physical features of the groups' stereotypes and not on the stereotypes of personality" (Kervyn, *et al.*, 2013). Activity is thought to relate to the Instrumental activity of technical work rather than social relational (Kemper, 1978). Since activity is orthogonal to both evaluation and potency, activation is orthogonal to the Social Self Model, meaning that Core Affect's evaluation and activation dimensions make up a plane orthogonal to the Social Self Model, running along the evaluation diagonal, while a similar Potency and Activation is orthogonal to the Social Self Model, running along the potency diagonal. In the case of Core Affect, it is missing the physical attribute of potency since it is an internal feeling state, while in the case of social relational evaluative plane, it is missing activity divorced from physical attributes.




Fig. 19.2 - The Social Self Model plus Semantic Differential EPA - Source: (Fiske et al., 2013)

The SCM's orientation towards EPA's Evaluation and Potency dimensions is not surprising given evidence from the BIAS emotions directed towards group types. They are signature emotions felt from appraisals of Warmth and Competence (Cuddy et al., 2008). The orientation of Evaluation and Potency match the psychological and physiological implications of our growing Universal Model of Theories map in **Fig. 19.2**. Positive Evaluation is found in the upper right quadrant, producing Admiration for groups and individuals sensed to be Competent and Warm. Strong Potency is found in the bottom right quadrant, producing Envy for groups and individuals sensed to be Competent and Cold. Negative evaluation (terms like bad, dirty, sad) lies in the bottom left quadrant, producing Contempt, while the upper left's negative potency yields an emotion like Pity. The BIAS emotions discovered in social cognition judgments match, both in kind and in orientation on the Social Self Model (See **Fig. 3.3**), those first order emotions can trigger in their emotional directed targets second order emotions of Pride and Shame (cf Fessler, 1999).

The emotion labels used to stereotype groups (and individuals) through social perception align to the universal dimensions of the Social Self Model, oriented systematically with the SCM dimensions of Potency and Evaluation, with the Activity dimension projecting orthogonally to the Social Self Model, correlated along the Potency axis in a third dimension (Morgan & Heise, 1988)(Kemper, 1990). This provides some evidence that the orientation of affective dimensions of semantic meaning of emotions align with the orientation of ANS emotion subsystems of the Social Self Model. The 2-dimensional autonomic functional surface shows an orientation of different ANS modes along diagonals which may provide a way to orient specific ANS co-activation with the affective dimensions of Potency and Evaluation.

EPA dimensions may represent a cognitive representation the internalized affective “settings” of external concepts related to all symbolic information used in social communication. Thus, in effect, the “information” exchanged in social communication is mapped in the body, with the 3-tiered Polyvagal system most prominent in affect communication and the ANS central in producing it. Similar to how the brain creates a mapping of the sensorimotor systems in the sensorimotor cortex, the body maps the world in the body, tagging all semantic concepts with affective dimensions, of which EPA are those which are found to be universally significant. And this affective information is what’s exchanged in social interaction, picked up by the social communication peripheral systems and processed in the OFC executive controls. In effect then, our body is our social mind.

The idea is that each emotional subsystem of the ANS contributes state information via the vagus nerve to the OFC for cognitive modeling and integration with higher level exteroceptive and interoceptive information where affective information is imprinted on cognitive content, stamped with each’s own specialty information for threat assessment (Schore, 2007). Each of the EPA dimensions map to one of these ANS tiers. Evaluation, corresponds to the lowest level, oldest part of the ANS mediated by the Dorsal Vagal Cortex and brain stem, contributing essentially a (gut) rating of good or bad. Potency is measured by the activation of the SNS, which determines arousal for fight or flight based on the “potency” of stimulus from the environment as compared to Self. Activation would be controlled by the VVC controlling the inhibition of the SNS via the vagal brake and thus level of arousal, especially with regards to threat or security, in order to meet the activity of a threat. Since the VVC and DVC are part of the parasympathetic nervous system, their contributions to EPA (Evaluation and Activation) model the two dimensions of Emotion, hedonic valence and intensity

respectively. Their neurophysiological differentiation during the evolution of the VVC saw the increased salience of the Activity dimension, where the ability to distinguish between affect increased in humans, while also having an effect on the potency dynamics of dominance vs. vulnerability.

The stream of data sent from the heart up the myelinated vagus nerve is parasympathetic information used by the executive controls (OFC) to model Self and Others, associating internal and external affective content modeled in our ANS and associated with all cognitive content. The three subsystem states would be imprinted on each and every chunk processed by the executive controls along these dimensions, with that affective information serving as reference for future prediction and planning of ANS activation. It is precisely this system which drives behavior, which for humans, gave us incredibly detailed control of our affective states once we were able to differentiate between states due of our ability to symbolically reference behavior with emotion displays through language.

In actuality, this Semantic Differential's three EPA dimensions and the ANS' three subsystems are a simplification, as these spaces are continuous and co-activating, not distinct segments. So the mapping of ANS subsystems in **Fig. 9.4** doesn't map to particular quadrants, but represents a complex co-activation space across the four quadrants which produce the EPA mapping (and subsequent pattern of 2 dimensions), which we perceive of as a set of fuzzy categories. There may be many dimensions of affect associated with concepts, but only three are statistically discernible though language, just as there are not three states of the ANS but a continuous set of states across a 2-D surface, likely including input from not simply the VVC, SNS and DVC, but other internal organs and systems. It's like an orchestra of affective information played by the body that's sent up for processing in the brain, with only the major sections are discernible by the "conscious" cognitive ear. Yet, the brain is able to take all input into consideration when anticipating the next orchestral movement.

CHAPTER TWENTY

Affect Control Theory

“affective meanings of social concepts provide an implicit cultural knowledge base from which social perceptions, emotions, and actions are generated without need for resource-intensive cognitive processing. By seeking to align their behaviors with the affective meaning of situations, individuals automatically reproduce cultural norms in social interaction.” Schröder et al. (2013: 3)

Affect Control Theory (ACT) combines a cybernetic control theory with symbolic microinteraction, positing that social interaction is influenced and adjusted semi-subconsciously by control processes monitoring feedback from impressions of social events, such that behavior is directed to align impressions of aspects of events towards fundamental sentiments. ACT is a well studied, sociological mathematized model (cf Heise, 2006) of social interaction that explains the psychological & behavioral functioning of Power and Status relations while being able to describe social identities, institutions and social structure as well as self-sentiment and emotions. ACT includes an empirically tested simulation software (INTERACT) able to predictively explain behavior, showing how feelings are generated from social actions, and also how effects arise from the simulation which mirror psychological processes (Heise, 2006). ACT has been described as “the most methodologically rigorous program,” the “best developed empirically applicable cybernetic model in the history of theoretical sociology,” and “a rigorous methodology for modeling emotion and interaction” (Heise, 2006).

The Control Theory aspect of ACT provides a model of an automated, implicit process instrumental in the maintenance of social behavior. ACT proposes an Affect Control Principle in which actors in a social situation seek to reinforce their identities by maintaining **Transient Impressions**, or how closely one’s situational identity matches one’s Self-evaluated fundamental identity, that are consistent with culturally defined fundamental sentiments (Robinson *et al.*, 2007). They do this by constantly monitoring the social environment, including their own action, for affective signals via

social communication and making micro adjustments to behavior to maintain an impression matching the shared meaning of a situational identity.

The concept of control system is embedded in the functioning of biological systems which are composed of hierarchically nested control systems (Powers, 1973). A control system operates analogously much like a thermostat, which monitors temperature, activating heat (or air-conditioning) once a threshold has been crossed, repeatedly checking temperature until the threshold is regained, finally turning off the heat (or air). Instead of a thermostat monitoring temperature, ACT's control system monitors and regulates the "gauges" of affect related to every aspect of a social situation and activates different behavioral routines to adjust behavior should changes in affect indicate straying from a threshold of behavioral expectation. These thresholds of expectation are defined by the identity, role and situation of the interaction. Instead of temperature being the metric of measurement, ACT uses self-sentiment, essentially the degree to which our identity, role and relationship with another person agrees with our internal model of Self.

The Symbolic Interaction (SI) aspect of ACT follows from the Sociological origins of the theory, where SI forms a main theoretical sub discipline in Sociology pertaining to microinteraction. It is the perspective that people's actions towards things are based on the meaning arising through the social interaction with others and adjusted through the process of interpretation (Blumer, 1969). SI implies that our behavior is not necessarily behavior due to psychological properties of the self, but the result of an actor's interpretation of the meaning of a situation, where gestures (words or behaviors) becomes symbols conveying meaning (Robinson *et al.*, 2007). Rather than social interaction being a medium through which people's actions pass, it is itself "a process which **forms** human conduct instead of merely being a means or a setting for the expression or release of human conduct" (Blumer, 1969:8).

ACT posits that Symbolic Interaction occurs not at the cognitive level, but the affective level, that meaning is conveyed affectively through symbolic communication. "Affect control theory makes the control of *affect* the key feature underlying social life" (Robinson *et al.*, 2007). ACT maintains that emotions serve not simply as signals, but are used in order to maintain situational self-identity, both in automated "routine role-taking" and in creative "non-routine" ways (Robinson *et al.*, 2007). Semantic labels describing symbolic identities (e.g., parent, actuary, car thief, senator) and role-

actions fitting those identities (e.g., instructs, plays, alienates, earns) have affective meanings which guide the control process in selecting behaviors which “feel” most closely aligned with behaviors matching the identity. Negative impressions occur when behavior differs from socially defined norms producing stressful negative emotions and a feeling of disconfirming identity, while impressions matching fundamental sentiment produce positive emotions, confirming identity and causing events to seem fulfilling.

ACT also expands upon the theories of face-to-face microinteraction described by Goffman's (1959, 1967) ethnomet hodological studies. Goffman's “expressive order” or **face**, presented within social interaction, is maintained in coordination with the group, where all actors conspire together to enact events which confirm their social identities relative to a situational frame. Non-verbal and verbal emotional cues inform actors of role-performance and allow for behavior to be adjusted to cover for errs, slips or gaffes, which regulate social interaction (Goffman, 1959). Cooperation is generally attempted to minimize disconfirming behavior for all actors in the event (Goffman, 1959). ACT broadens the concept of face to that of situational identity, which is inferred by actors and performed during interaction. ACT also brings from Goffman's studies the ideas of institutional influences on behavior, which can result in disconfirming impressions due to having to conform to institutional identities not matching self sentiment.

“Cultural entities are internalized in people's minds not only with cognitive meaning schemes, but also with affective associations that vary along three bipolar dimensions: goodness versus badness, weakness versus powerfulness, and quiescence versus activation; and the affectivity of cognitive concepts is the foundation of individual motivations in interpersonal and institutional activities.” Heise (2010: 24)

Individuals engaged in face-to-face microinteraction aren't simply unbounded in their behavior, but guided by socially learned meanings of person types, roles and behaviors characteristic of those types, social norms guiding that behavior, as well as situational aspects which either add or subtract certain features of interaction, all of which are interpreted by social actors during interaction. This meaning is acquired through sentiments learned via interaction with close others, strangers in public, the media, dictionaries, etc, all of which establishes a cultural medium of shared meaning (Heise, 2006). ACT essentially posits that this process is mediated by an automated control process guided

by symbolic meaning in order to confirm the sentiments we have about the identities of ourselves and others fitting the current situation. Or to put it more simply, we act out a situational identity which reinforces our sense of self and feel negative emotions when our role-enactment proves inauthentic for the situation.

To explain ACT more fully and concisely, MacKinnon (1994) offered a set of propositions defining ACT that explain the general framework.

Affect Control Theory Propositions

Symbols, Language and Affective Meaning

- 1- Social interaction is conducted in terms of the social cognitions of interactants.
- 2- Language is the primary symbolic system through which cognitions are represented, accessed, processed and communicated.
- 3- All social cognitions evoke affective associations.
- 4- Affective associations can be indexed to a large degree on universal dimensions of space.

Cognitive Constraints

- 5- Events are constructed in the framework of a definition of the situation that establishes the identities of participants.
- 6- Grammatical structures of various kinds constrain event construction.

Affective Response Control

- 7- The Affective Reaction Principle: People react affectively to every social event
- 8- The Affect Control Principle: People try to experience events that confirm fundamental sentiments.
- 9- The Reconstruction Principle: Inexorably large deflections instigate changes in the sentiments which are being used to appraise the meaning of events such that the new sentiments are confirmed optimally by recent events.

Event Assessment

- 10- Events are recognized within the framework of a defined situation.
- 11- Grammatical structures constrain event recognition.
- 12- The likelihood of event interpretations is inversely related to the affective disturbances they produce.
- 13- The perceived likelihood of events is inversely related to the affective disturbances they produce.

Event Production

- 14- A person develops actions by employing situational identities of self and other as actor and object.
- 15- Actions are produced within the constraints of relevant grammars.
- 16- The likelihood a person will engage in one feasible behavior rather than another is inversely related to the affective disturbances which the behaviors produce.
- 17- In the course of validating social identities, people engage in role appropriate acts.

Emotions

- 18- The Emotion Principle: An interactant's emotion following an event reflects the outcome of the event and also the identity that the person is maintaining. Specifically, the emotion is a function of the transient impression of the interactant that was created by the event; and the discrepancy between this transient impression and the fundamental sentiment associated with the interactant's situated identity.
- 19- People tend to maintain emotions that are characteristic of their salient identities.
- 20- Emotion displays facilitate intersubjective sharing of definitions of situations and of the operative social structures that are implied by definitions of the situation.

Cognitive Revisions

- 21- Social labelings render past events more credible by assigning interactants new identities that are confirmed by past events.
- 22- Dispositional inferences render past events more credible by assigning interactants modified identities that are maximally confirmed by the past events.
- 23- Dispositional inferences are more likely forms of re-identification than assignment of new identities through labeling processes.
- 24- Observers forego reassessments of an actor's character after disconfirming events if the person's emotion displays are appropriate to the person's conduct.

Fig. 20.1 - Affect Control Theory Propositions - Source: MacKinnon (1994)

To sum up **Fig. 20.1**, Social Cognition guides social interaction and produces affective associations (EPA dimensions) between social perception and behavior. Situations help establish social actor identities, which are constrained by language and culture. People react affectively and try to confirm self-sentiments about themselves in social interaction. Large differences in self-sentiment and

transient feelings can cause how people make meaning of events. Situations define the meaning of events, whose interpretation (or even perception) can be disturbed when affect is dramatically more negative than expected, something called deflection. Social actors define social actions according to the situation establishing identities of Self & Other and engaging in actions which confirm those role-identities. Protection against deflection guides behavior, as actions are chosen which minimize affective disturbances. People attempt to engage in role-performance to validate cognitively and affectively salient role-identities. Role-performance produces transient emotions, which can have discrepancies from self-sentiment, resulting in reinterpretation of role-identity or situation. People tend to maintain emotions which match their role-identity. Emotions act as signals confirming role-performance and similar definition of the situation. Social labels and inferences reinforce past events by reassigning modified or new identities confirmed by past events.

ACT models the interpretation of actions and the resultant emotions produced, which can even be strong enough to change our basic assessment of others, situations or behaviors. ACT is modeled by creating a Frame describing all the components of a single social action, with actor, objects of action (other actors), setting, modifiers and social action. These components come from a dictionary of words of a cultural group tested via the Semantic Differential having corresponding EPA values to used in the computations. A frame combines these components into a parseable sentence, which explains a social action. An event would be a collection of frames describing the social actions of actors which can cause effects to the EPA values of their identities, impressions and emotions over the course of many social actions during an event. During the process of impression formation, the affective meanings (EPA values) of actor, behavior, object and setting are combined and new meanings emerge (Heise, 2006). ACT computes these using empirically based impression formation equations, where in a series of interactions, computed post-action values are recycled and influence pre-action values for the next iteration. ACT's prediction come only from calculations done on EPA values for identities, behaviors and emotion words. "INTERACT's knowledge of human emotion is derived only from these affective inputs, the impression-change equations, and the theoretical model" (Smith-Lovin, 1990: 251).




Fig. 20.2 - Affect Control Theory Action Frame - Source: Heise (2006)

The combination of an actor, behavior, object and setting yields an action frame (**Fig. 20.2**), which can be seen as being plausible, common or implausible. Plausibility can be attributed to how much deflection is produced by an action, that is, how likely would it be for an identity to engage in that role behavior given the situation. Deflection is determined by sort of adding up all the components in a frame (their EPA values in affective space) and computing their mean distance (essentially how closely related affectively), which results in larger deflection the farther away concepts are.

Building a few examples, “A friend complimenting a friend at a coffee break” would have very little deflection, since the affective values for those action components are close together in EPA space, and to the “ear” sounds perfectly plausible and expected. “A friend fights a drunk at a museum” seems implausible since there seems a mismatch between interactants, the behavior and the setting, which are far apart in EPA affect space. A “fight” and a “drunk” (both BAD, POTENT and ACTIVE) would be far from “friend” and a “museum” setting (GOOD, PLACID, and QUIET) in affective space, which our social inferential system registers as implausible, and which ACT’s impression formation equations would register high deflection.

EPA profiles for scenario identities and behaviors

U.S.A.				Germany			
Concept	E	P	A	Concept	E	P	A
manager	0.6	1.3	0.1	Manager	-0.3	1.6	1.7
advisor	1.0	1.3	-0.7	Berater	1.3	0.8	-0.5
quiz	0.5	1.0	0.3	ausfragen	-1.4	0.2	0.2
inform	1.2	1.1	-0.1	informieren	1.5	0.5	-0.1
cross-examine	-0.4	1.8	1.1	ins Kreuzverhör nehmen	-2.5	1.4	1.8
cajole	-0.6	0.1	0.9	beschwätzen	-1.7	0.3	1.7
reprimand	-0.1	1.4	-0.3	tadeln	-1.8	0.5	0.5

Results of American and German Simulations

Manager's action	U.S.A.					Germany				
	D	Emotion	Re-identification	D	Emotion	Re-identification				
quiz	1.7	none to charmed	0.2 0.6 0.5	3.7	grollen resentful	-1.7 0.2 0.2				
cross-examine	6.3	angry	-0.7 1.4 1.1	9.7	unbefriedigt dissatisfied	-2.4 1.2 1.7				
reprimand	8.9	none to angry	-0.3 1.2 -0.1	10.7	ängstlich anxious	-1.9 0.5 0.5				

Fig. 20.3 - Affect Control Theory EPA Values over Several Actions -

Source: Schneider & Heise (1995: Table 1 & 2)

Fig. 20.3 shows an example of two sets of Action Frames simulated for identical US and German identities and a series of five role-behaviors (quiz, inform, cross-examine, cajole, reprimand) between the two identities for a particular scenario. The EPA values for each component are listed in the upper table and are plugged into the ACT impression formation equations to produce Deflection scores (D) and resulting emotions (with EPA values) for each action. Dictionaries of identities, role-behaviors, settings, and modifiers have been produced in 30 different cultures, with the EPA values for each representing the affective meaning of the terms for that culture. Cultures differ in the weight in which they value different aspects (concepts) in social life, reflected in differences between particular EPA values resulting in different sets of emotions and impressions (degree of deflection)

produced by similar contexts. In a this occupational comparison, an exchange between a Manager and Advisor creates different reactions when comparing US versus German workers. This example scenario, a German manager ends up having stronger, more negative feelings from having to quiz, cross-examine and ultimately reprimand an Advisor, as compared to an American counterpart, pointing out the differences in occupational culture (Schneider & Heise, 1995; see also Heise 2010). ACT's modeling of emotion generation across a large dictionary of role-identities provides a systematized and methodologically sound way to explore the differences between cultures & the inner working of social behavior.

Social actions can be thought of as situational, in that they include some ambiguity that is determined by how others perceive the action. The subtle differences between simply the words we use to discriminate between all the labels of social action shows how many ways things can be perceived. When there are differences between the understanding of an actor's social action and the sentiment for the actor, it can create a post-event impression that goes against sentiment for the actor. This can create negative emotions or even affect identity if the deflection is great enough. Acting against type or situation can produce big differences in EPA space, increasing deflection, corresponding to the production of a more strongly valenced emotions as a result of disconfirming interaction.

During each social action, the process of impression formation can have effects on components of the frame which register as transient feelings. Different effects which mimic psychological processes have been discovered through modeling (Heise, 2006), with "many 'predictions' correspond(ing) to important insights by other researchers" (Smith-Lovin, 1990: 250). Stability effects preserve the degree of EPA values for persons, settings and behaviors generally, where good actors remain good regardless of behavior and vice versa for bad actors. Behavior effects amplify EPA values and reinforce impressions, such as when good actors performing good actions make them seem more good, or powerful actors engage in powerful actions increase their power, or lively actors' lively activity to seem more lively (even contributing some to power). Being the object of an actor's action tends to diminish EPA values (Object Diminishment), making them less good, less potent, less active. Consistency effects cause changes to feelings when two components in the social action aren't consistent (mismatch). Congruency effects are more complex, but explain effects as different as Mercifulness, Sycophancy, Righteousness, Impertinence. Balance affects consistency when the

components of a frame are all of the same valence (positive or negative). And State of Being effects describe the identity action that serve as labels or shortcuts to moods, character traits, moral conditions, which typically have more of an effect on impression than the identity alone. (all Heise, 2006).

These effects demonstrate how and why structural components of social interaction produce certain types of emotions and behavior. Seeing the relations between actor and behavior from one's point of view, given the affect involved, show how biases work corresponding to certain mental processes which cause us to weigh one component or set of components more heavily during impression formation and in essence, during emotion production. Affect Control Theory's model of social interaction can be integrated with the theories and models covered by the IToCE to explain the both the management and production of emotion.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

ACT & Emotion

“Those who hold sentiments associated with a dominant ideology and culture experience the proper emotions without regard to feeling rules or norms. Feeling rules are a means of controlling those who do not maintain the ideologically appropriate meanings. In a sense, all of ACT’s predictions about emotions define norms since they are the responses generated by consensually held meanings.” Smith-Lovin (1990: 254)

Affect Control Theory’s offers a model of emotion that combines both positivist and constructionist theories of emotion, competing paradigms seemingly describing complementary aspects of emotion in either the production or management of emotions, respectively (MacKinnon, 1994: Ch 7). Affect Control Theory’s emotion model most closely aligns with Kemper’s Power and Status Theory of Emotion (Smith-Lovin, 1990), representing a combination of the two approaches, where emotions are both physiologically determined yet constructed according to congruence or difference in identity impressions and emotions correlated with the affective meaning of identity, action, and emotion labels. In somewhat of an analogy to Barrett’s Theory of Constructed Emotion, ACT constructs emotions from the error calculation between impression formation and foundational self-sentiment along with factoring in situational factors of the event. ACT marries the two approaches in its differentiation of affect influencing behavior and emotions produced from situated identities. ACT also accounts for the roles of both motivation and language in affect and emotion, thereby fusing and going beyond both approaches (MacKinnon, 1994: 149).

ACT’s core emotion model posits “emotions emerge from automatic and unconscious comparisons of the impression of self that have been created by recent events with the kind of person that one is supposed to be in that situation” (Lively & Heise, 2014: 52). ACT models emotions as the outcomes of impression formation in role behavior, representing transient feelings created by role performance in comparison with long-term fundamental sentiments. The EPA values of the transient impression and the deflection (D) are computed for each action frame, with very low deflections representing

confirmation of one's situated identity, thus the produced emotion resembles that identity's EPA values. However, large deflections represent disconfirming events for one's identity resulting in the emotion produced resembling the EPA values of the transient impression. "Emotions reveal how an individual is faring in an interaction, both absolutely and relative to the individual's (situated) role identity" (Lively & Heise, 2014).

Transient affective meanings change as interaction occurs, causing subtle changes in behavior (via the control process). Emotion dynamics modeled by ACT's equations produce empirically tested results which mirror human emotion generation. ACT posits these emotions are transmitted via subtle social communication cues which individuals can use to guide role performance, each generating emotions in self as feedback of the performance. The affect read from others include first order emotion displays transmitted via social communication, which ACT's impression formation equations model affecting Self's performance. ACT's impression equations compute effects of emotions from others on impression formation, thereby modeling the effect of emotions from emotions. However, ACT doesn't explicitly model second order self-conscious emotions felt by Self's own Self-evaluation from other's emotions, but rather simply from the effects affective meaning has on impression formation.

Each of the EPA dimensions contribute different dynamics to impression formation. Valenced Evaluations depend directly on the transient impression and can produce identity-protective effects. Negative self-evaluations resulting from large deflections can result in adjusting expectations to account for changes in valence. ACT's model accounts for identity changes should deflection prove too great. It can also result in dampening effects if identity already has high evaluation level, since positive emotions are less impactful than for an identity with a lower evaluation (Lively & Heise, 2014). If the fundamental affective meaning for self changes, it can affect identity to come closer to agreement with the emotion and impression being produced. Emotion dynamics exist for Potency, which causes positive emotions when powerful identities are confirmed by exercising power and can be additionally heightened when combined with positive Evaluation or Activity. Similarly, high Evaluation and low activity can spur more potent emotions to compensate. Additional emotion dynamics concerning Activity result from transient comparisons with fundamental activation, resulting in heightened activation when impression is active compared to the fundamental sentiment.

ACT's production of emotions from social actions make them trait-like, where they can influence the EPA values of identities, actions and events. Similarly, ACT also models social categories, with markers in the form of adjectives that can be combined with identities producing effects like decreasing evaluation for negative markers. These can be in the form of identity categories, like gender, race, culture. Different markers then can have differential effects on the same identity, leading to vastly different situational impressions depending on the EPA values of the markers, which when related to a group of markers can result in different cultures or subcultures. Similarly, intersectionality effects can be modeled to see the difference in emotion sets that occur from identity categories being added to traditional identities. Differences between social categories reflect that persons in these categories "occupy different worlds," highlighting that identity is culturally dependent (Lively & Heise, 2014).

ACT also models social norms, which emerge from shared sentiment in the form of agreement of EPA values of affective meaning for identities, roles, role-actions. "People have similar emotion reactions to events because they share affective meanings of the concepts that are deployed to comprehend events" (Lively & Heise, 2014: 58). This allows for the smooth interaction and consistency for expectations. However, when people from different subcultures interact or situations cause different definitions to be made, emotion norm violations ensue. This contributes greatly to the understanding of emotional conflict between rival ideologies, which not simply have different norms, but embody and situate the affective dimensions of language differently. In effect we may be using the same words but with vastly different affective meaning, which can be computed to explain differences in identity, behaviors and emotions.

The effect of the ideological aspect of emotion can cause people whom experience emotion different than commonly held expectations, termed emotional deviance, have two options. Either cover up feelings using emotion management techniques to agree and conform to social norms for emotion display, or feel disconfirmation of identities and behaviors which illicit moral condemnation from those holding ideologically conforming views. ACT's emotion model can inform Emotional Self-Alienation (ESA) (dynamics that are inherently embedded in the language we use to describe ourselves and our actions. In some sense, the model gives insight into the consensually held meanings we have, which are stored as affective dimensions of meaning relating to how we

internalize the world emotionally in relation to our own emotional selves.

Additionally, ACT models emotion management and emotion segue which provides the possibility of decoding how emotion is regulated from threat reactivity to calmness. Research from the study of emotion management reveals that men and women process emotion differently (Thoits, 1990), with women having a far greater emotional “vocabulary” and capacity for emotion, while men’s are more limited (Lively, 2009). Emotion segueing emerged from structural equation modeling to find correlations between emotion pathways (Lively & Heise, 2004). Emotion segues are shortest paths of connected emotions across the emotional 3-D space which allow one to traverse multiple adjacent emotions to arrive at a desired emotional outcome (management). Studies of shortest pathways for common emotion transitions reveal that women and men used different emotion pathways. Results show that women use more emotion steps and more positive emotions traversing their pathways, while men use more negative and fewer steps (Lively, 2009).

Emotion segue holds the potential towards finding specific therapeutic programs which could help people practice navigating out of negative reactive emotion states. Furthermore, the Social Self Model integration of the EPA dimensions would situate emotions within the two universal dimensions (according to EPA value), which could provide a key towards matching emotion to behavior to ANS reaction, potentially mapping emotion pathways to the functioning of the ANS and the Polyvagal system. Since ACT evolved out of the Symbolic Interactionist traditional within Sociological Social Psychology, its congruence with Kemper’s PSToE and Goffman’s emotion management and stigmatization, representing the integration of Constructivist, Positivist and Dramaturgical emotion theories, meaning this could serve to unify emotion theories covering not simply the Social, but also the Psychological, Physiological and Cultural realms as well.

ACT’s INTERACT software has already confirmed aspects of other theories from within Psychology. Findings by ACT reaffirm psychological evidence that people are guided along Social Cognition lines of behavior. The threat to social status, which Kemper (1978) posits is what’s behind emotion production, creates behavioral biases towards status conflict with others. Experimental evidence mentioned above confirms this behavior, as “people who are upset magnify differences in their friendliness toward esteemed and disesteemed partners” (Wiggins & Heise, 1988), similar to the SCM’s BIAS emotions, which “are the proximal cause of social behaviors” (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008:71).

Essentially, negative information about a Group (or person) considered to be Warm can have a disconfirming effect that changes opinion and decreases the sense of their warmth much more so than positive information would increase opinion (Fiske, 2007). Anyone can be warm, but warm people or groups are rarely if ever cold. Similarly, competent groups or people can come up with brilliant insights, but the incompetent rarely do, while dumb behavior can come from anyone at times. Fiske's study makes the leap that it is in fact EPA's Potency dimension that explains these two effects together. In terms of risk, it's wise to weigh negative information more heavily about those we trust to be safe or positive information from those we trust to be smart than the reverse, since disconfirming evidence of either can reveal a mistaken idea about someone else, which if we err increases risk. Both of these findings also reinforce the idea that information that would help us detect cheaters in social relations would be advantaged.




Fig. 21.1 - EPA Emotion Visualizations - Source: Lively & Heise (2014: Fig 4.2, 60)

ACT's INTERACT program for simulating social interaction provides a model that could also be used

to instruct and confirm these findings, especially if social structural rules were integrated into the modeling. The simulation is driven by the affective meaning of words, rated along EPA dimensions and used in equations that compute the closeness in EPA space and thus likelihood of social consistency, for if not, it causes deflection. Essentially, ACT models the shared system of meaning and shared intention via the cultural commonality of EPA ratings, using them to compute emotions resulting from interaction. Additionally, INTERACT can function with language datasets from other cultures to show how cultures comparatively value identities, behaviors and emotions. It provides a predictive cybernetic model for human interaction and a framework for testing the Power/Status Theory of Emotion. The IToCE posits the ACT model, in effect, represents the best implementation of simulating of human behavior, generating of emotion from structural components and computing the course of constructionist emotion management.

Knowledge of the Affect Control system provides an awareness of a largely subconscious or under-inspected process unavailable from any other source, like peering into the workings of the OFC executive controls at play in social interaction in its integration of affective social signaling from external sources with internal interoceptive affect. The regulation and management of expectation, motivation, behavior, and sentiment and production of impressions and emotion in social action can become something taught to grow emotional and social awareness. Not only does ACT provide a modeling capability for simulating human interaction, it also provides a theoretically robust model for therapeutic models (Heise, 2006).

The social action components modeled by ACT (impression formation, identity, emotion) provide a simple model of human social cognition. It is this modeling of social inference which makes Affect Control Theory a prototypical model of social interaction.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

ACT & Inference

“We may strongly suspect that there is a universe out there, beginning a millimeter outside of our nervous systems, but our perceptions are not that universe. They depend on it, but that dependence is determined in the brain, by the neural computers which create perceptual signals layer by layer through transformations of one set of currents into another. What might we learn about external reality by learning more about ourselves? What assumptions have we made about reality that are really no more than limitations of our brain?” Powers (1973: 37)

Affect Control Theory models social action by creating social action frames as inputs, with a social event containing many individual social actions. ACT’s INTERACT software processes successive iterations of social action frames to compose an event, computing impression formation for social actors and feeding forward results into the next iteration. The flow of social actions affect the next moment through the generation of emotion reactions to micro-interactional evaluations of indicating “how an individual is faring in an interaction, both absolutely and relative to the individual’s role identity” (Lively & Heise, 2014). These are similar to the appraisals of self which Tracy & Robins (2007) posit drives the generation of self-conscious emotions, central to self-regulation of emotion and affect control. However, ACT’s inferences model represent ways in which social actors extract information from social action. Social inferences are effortless reading between the lines to understand causation of events, guessing at missing or hidden identity; impression; or emotion in social action. Identity and impression added to emotion provide a trio of components of social action in which we triangulate meaning of the social encounters.

Lively & Heise (2014) outline rules of inference in social action which ACT models. The rules consist of a set of three inferences of each Self and Other, where knowing any two of Identity, Impression or Emotion allows for the inference of the missing action component. The process of social inference produces answers to hypotheses about why something happened (impression), who we really are

(identity) or what are we really feeling (emotion). When directed towards a model of Other, the inferences are about answering how Other interprets the situation (impression), who Other is trying to be (identity) or what Other is really feeling (emotion). ACT posits identity, impression and emotion are deterministic internally (Lively & Heise, 2014), meaning they're processed automatically and unconsciously through an implicit process by the executive controls. Their interpretation at the psychological level can vary since missing information (suppressed emotions or impressions), situational details or focalism (identity), or cultural constraints cause ambiguity (Lively & Heise, 2014). Such cultural constraints can also vary by cultural group or gender or by individual (inferring emotions) (Lively & Heise, 2014).




Fig. 22.1 — ACT Social Inference Models — Source: compiled from Lively & Heise (2014)

The inferences in **Fig. 22.1** represent three sets of meaning extracted from social action that may be filled in by implicit inferential process. These inferences are produced from sentiment unconsciously, rather than through conscious reasoning, although they can be attended to and corrected consciously after implicit inference through self-reflective thought. Knowing two of identity, impression and emotion allow inferring the missing component (??? at various nodes), representing information hidden from the perceiver. These inferences are used to decode the

meaning from behavior of other, or knowing one's own self.

Impression is created from an unconscious comparison of a transient identity (identity within the social action) with an identity standard. Its congruence or divergence produces a positively or negatively valenced emotion produced by the control process as sort of an error correction computation. That transient emotion's valence has some micro-effect on the identity (confirming or disconfirming), which the control process uses in adjusting behavior should the error correction (negative affect) require identity reinforcing behavior, both for the actor's sake while also for the performance for others in identity management processes. The ability to attend to multiple threads of the social performance of Self and Other within the moment of social actions requires attentional and cognitive resources (cognitive load).

ACT's mathematized simulation software computes the impression equations as if these inferences are consciously made, yet, the social inferential process involves implicit processes which guide micro-interaction based on the confluence of identities, behaviors, and emotions sharing similar affective meaning in EPA space. Since ambiguous behavior is more difficult to infer and creates greater divergence of impressions, social actors use social frames for coordinating interaction to go smoothly, often at a subconscious level, although it can also be used strategically (cf Goffman, 1967). These frames organize behavior by matching identities with role behaviors, and the situation is largely defined by the common frame actors share to make sense of interaction, which allows some automaticity. However, ambiguity cause gaps in knowledge, thus the six inferences in **Fig. 22.1** play a role in conscious effort to fill in missing information to make better sense of the action and gain insight into adaptive social interaction.

Explicit conscious contemplation can override and correct implicit inference. The correction model of social inference (Molden *et al.*, 2006) describes the social inferential process occurring over several stages, the first two implicit and quick while the third is slower and requires conscious effort. The first stage produces new social information based on the observation of someone's social action and the **categorization** of that behavior, part of an implicit unconscious process using one of the two implicit theory styles of inference. The next stage, also implicit, involves the **characterization** of that behavior as being either the product of a character trait or due to some situational aspect. It is only the last step, which **corrects** the characterization of the behavior as the result of conscious

consideration of alternative explanations. The corrections model posits the first two stages are effortless, unconscious and very quick (on the order of seconds), while the correction step require cognitive resources and motivation, which is subject to many types of reasoning biases (Molden *et al.*, 2006).

Social inference research reveals people tend to use one of two basic lay theories towards understanding social behavior, called implicit lay theories. So called **Entity theorists** tend to ascribe causation of social behavior to largely static character traits underlying a belief that people's attitudes are fundamentally unchanging. Entity theorists tend to be trait-focused, attending to personality or physical traits of individuals when inferring about social behavior. They seem to pursue a dispositional inferential goal of trying to answer "What type of person is this?" (Molden *et al.*, 2006). On the other hand, **Incremental theorists** ascribe causation of social behavior largely to situational constraints, where attitudes change due to situational influences. Incremental theorists tend to be process-focused on psychological processes of mental states, pursuing a situational inferential goal of trying to answer "What about the situation is causing this?" (Molden *et al.*, 2006).




Fig. 22.2 – Correction Model of Social Inference — Source: Molden *et al.* (2006: Fig. 1, 740)

Cognitive load has differential effects on the effortful conscious correction stage. These two lay

theory types have been found to maintain a continuous focus during the conscious reasoning stage of the correction inferential model, even when put under cognitive load (Molden *et al.*, 2006). There exist particular biases which preserve orientation, unless the opposing theory is made especially salient and mental resources are available to assess the other theory (Trait vs. Situational). The maintenance of this bias has been ascribed to the building up of practice & skill of either dispositional or situational inference styles, yet, most people possess the ability to evoke either inference type when instructed to (Molden *et al.*, 2006).

However, additional research shows that entity versus incremental lay theories have distinctly different effects on finding meaning in social action, affecting self-regulation, social-perception and social development (Molden & Dweck, 2006). Evidence from a variety of studies of entity versus incremental inference goals having differential effects on protecting Self-Regard (identity-protection), dealing with depression, attitude towards achievement, self-esteem repair strategies, behavioral dispositionalism, and influence & resistance to stereotype (Molden & Dweck, 2006). Although most individuals display a clear preference for either entity or incremental theory, and may even exhibit differential preference in different domains (intelligence versus personality) (Molden & Dweck, 2006: 194), the two theories show dramatically different responses across the social domain.

In a study of students use of these two lay theories, trait-focused entity theorists tend to compare themselves to other students who perform poorly (self-esteem); allow stereotype threats to be accentuated (stereotype threat); avoid difficult social situations and interaction partners (shyness); increased vulnerability to and dampening effect on coping (depression); intelligence as fixed, decreased setting of goals, effort as negative thing, helpless (view of intelligence); downward trajectory during college (self-esteem management); sees personality traits as fixed, over-attributing behavior to a person's traits (person perception bias); turn attention away from information that went against their stereotypes (applying stereotype) (Molden *et al.*, 2006).

		Entity Theorist – Trait-focused	Incremental Theorist – Situationally-focused
self-esteem stereotype threat shyness depression / dysphoria	Self-Regulation Self-Regulation Self-Regulation Self-Regulation	comparison to students who performed poorly effects of threat are accentuated engage in easier social situations and displayed avoidance behavior increased vulnerability to and dampening effect on coping	comparison to students who performed better effects of threat are alleviated challenge more difficult social situations to increase social skills decreased vulnerability to and energizing effect on coping
view of intelligence applying stereotype	Social Perception Social Perception	fixed - decreased setting goals, effort as negative thing, helpless turn attention away from information going against stereotypes	cultivable - increased setting goals, effort as positive & persistence turn attention towards counter-stereotypical information
performance in math performance of self-esteem person perception bias	Analytical Skill Social Development Social Development	equal - decreased performance downward trajectory during college traits fixed: over-attribute behavior to a person's traits	equal - steadily increased grades upward trajectory during college traits situational: over-attribute behavior to a specific situation

Fig. 22.3 – Entity Versus Incremental Lay Theories –

Source: compiled from Molden & Dweck (2006)

Situation-focused incremental theorists tend to study strategies used by students who performed better than them (self-esteem); allow stereotype threats to be alleviated (stereotype threat); challenge more difficult social situations to increase social skills (shyness); show a decreased vulnerability to and energizing effect on coping (depression); see intelligence as cultivatable, increased setting goals, effort as positive, increased effort and persistence (view of intelligence); upward trajectory during college (self-esteem management); sees personality traits as situational, over-attributing behavior to a person's situation (person perception bias); turn attention towards counter-stereotypical information (applying stereotype) (Molden *et al.*, 2006).

It has also been found that while dispositional inference remains consistent across cultures, situational inference is what varies (Norenzayan *et al.*, 2002). Social attributional lay theories have been studied to try and explain East Asian vs. Western societal differences in social perception. While Eastern societies tend to favor situationalism and Westerners dispositionalism (Norenzayan *et al.*, 2002), these orientations are also found mixed across persons within those same societies (Molden *et al.*, 2006). Moreover, a great many people from both societies are able to operate in either mode, although tending to favor one implicitly (Molden *et al.*, 2006). Also, those from East Asian societies tend to have stronger beliefs towards group agency and Westerners towards individual agency, both likely cultural level biases (Molden *et al.*, 2006). Dispositional inference tends to be used the same in both East and West when situational cues are absent or ambiguous, although they are qualitatively distinct in that Easterners see personality as malleable while Westerners see it as fixed (Norenzayan *et al.*, 2002).

Core Affect's differential effect of valence and arousal on social focus (Barrett, 1998) may contribute directly to a bias towards either dispositional or situational inferential styles. Arousal focus describes the influence of arousal on the conscious affective experience, which turns attention inward towards self-feeling. Sensitivity to internal/personal cues are misperceived as confirmation of an implicit attitude (Laird, 2012), decreasing the likelihood of corrective conscious inference and reliance on implicit dispositional stereotypes (Molden & Dweck, 2006). Inability to accurately predict feeling states from external stimuli (behavior and events) due to self-focus and stereotyped referential

models produce predictive error in the form of distressed arousal as stress and anxiety (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Empathic over-arousal induced by viewing another's negative emotion can lead to a stress response and personal distress, which prevents sympathetic intersubjectivity and increases self-focus (Decety & Lamm, 2006). Moreover, intersubjective interaction that could potentially elicit negative emotion and personal distress may be avoided, both consciously and subconsciously, especially if that distress comes from overt or bypassed shame (Scheff, 2001). Furthermore, over-arousal signifies sympathetic arousal, which influences both attitudinal negativity and behavioral avoidance according to the bivariate model of evaluative space and the autonomic covariant functional plan (Berntson *et al.*, 1994). Sympathetic activation inhibits the Ventral Vagal Complex (VVC) and the ability to self-regulate, limiting the social engagement system and feelings of trust (Porges, 2001).

Ultimately, these phenomena may all be tied to the neurological constraints of structural and functional differences in the Salience Network's rAI+ACC circuit's connectivity to the amygdala, the default mode network (DMN), and the orbitofrontal cortex & central executive controls (CEN) (Menon, 2015). The Salience Network (SN) is centered on the network model of insula function "implicated in disparate cognitive, affective, and regulatory functions, including interoceptive awareness, emotional responses, and empathic processes" (Menon & Uddin, 2010: 655). The SN's right Anterior Insula (rAI) connectivity analysis has shown a "significant causal outflow" of signals (Menon, 2015: 604) in activating the externally focused attentional CEN and deactivating the internally focused cognitive DMN, as well as switching between networks "across task paradigms and stimulus modalities" (Menon & Uddin, 2010: 661). Furthermore, the rAI shows "significant age-related differences in functional connectivity between the SN and other networks" (Menon, 2015: 604) and hyperconnectivity of the SN with the CEN and DMN is a predictor of autism in children in what's thought to produce "inappropriate assignment of saliency to external stimuli or internal mental events" (Menon, 2015: 605). The functional mapping of distinct large-scale network interactions between the SN routing to either the DMN or CEN may reveal the neural correlates of the opponent control system (Craig, 2008) producing the autonomic bivariate functional plane (Berntson *et al.*, 1994).

The switching from the SN to the DMN relies on a short connection from the rAI+ACC controller to the VMPFC and PCC (Menon, 2015). The SN->DMN switch is left hemispherically lateralized, associated with positive emotions; parasympathetic activity; affiliative actions; and energy

conservation (Craig, 2008). The main function of the DMN is to deal with internal, self-referential mental events and episodic memory retrieval. The DMN is “anti-correlated in functional imaging studies with the activation in the AIC associated with awareness and task-related attention” (Craig, 2008: 17). The switching from the SN to the CEN relies on the long-distance, rapid relay of signals from the rAI+ACC controller to the rDLPFC and rPPC executive controls via VEN spindle neurons (Menon, 2015). The main function of the CEN is to organize motoric behavioral response to deal with some salient external stimuli. The SN->CEN switch is right hemispherically lateralized, associated with negative emotions; sympathetic, threat-defensive action tendencies; and energy expenditure (Craig, 2008).

Differential connectivity strengths between networks might bias attention to either external stimuli or internal mental events, providing neurological constraints for differences across higher ontological levels. At the psychological level, this could be the source of focus towards external cues (valence focus) or internal cues (arousal focus). At the interpersonal level, this could be the source of other-focused or self-focused interaction. At the social level, this could lead to a bias towards a social relational focus on Status or on Power, with social perceptual biases towards situational or dispositional inferences. At the Cultural level, this could lead to a bias towards preferences for egalitarian (low Grid) or hierarchical (high Grid) social structural regulation. The alignment of phenomena from many different levels of analysis could provide a clearer picture of the effects of neural constraints ultimately having their roots in the connectivity and functional differences of Salience Network. The SN’s modulation of expensive, resource intensive effortful processing may ultimately be arbiter of subconscious, implicit forms of inferential intuition and conscious, explicit forms of inferential rationality.

Both dispositional and situational inference can be corrected through reflection, which is thinking about one’s thoughts (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Reasoning is reflective inference, which offers high cognitive information processing involving memory and logic to deduce new information consciously, rather than rely on automatic, intuitive inference (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Social inference as moral judgment, when inference is used to evaluate behavior as right or wrong according to some virtue, has long been thought to be part of a moral rational reasoning process (Haidt, 2001). The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) provides a theory that challenges rationalist models that typify moral judgment as the product of rational reasoning. Instead, the SIM posits

moral inference is a multi-step process which first involves implicit, unconscious affective processes in which judgments “appear in the mind” while moral reasoning arises *post-hoc* as a type of psychological support of the implicit judgment (Haidt, 2001). The implicit steps of SIM result in “the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good–bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008: 188). The later conscious steps of reasoned judgment and private reflection take far greater time, energy and intention, analogous to the effortful corrective inferential processes of

Fig. 22.2.




Fig. 22.4 – Social Intuitionist Model – Source: Haidt (2001: Fig. 2, 815)

The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) in **Fig. 22.4** shows the flow of moral judgment and reasoning. The SIM framework includes intrapersonal influences on implicit processes (the dotted lines from Reasoning back to Intuition and Judgment). Implicit intuition is also susceptible interpersonal influences from other people’s judgement and reasoning, which can be received through discussion or imagined as in the generalized other (i.e. social or cultural influences). Influence and persuasion

from other's judgments and reasoning likely occurs via affective information received through social communication and modeled in the social engagement system, likely arriving via an implicit process much more quickly than slower cognitive effortful reasoning. Haidt (2001) notes that affective priming studies, which measure the effect dissonant affective word pairs (good + bad) can have on judgment, demonstrate a dual-process model where "feeling" experienced first influences the slower "thinking" second, characterizing the basic dynamic of intuition vs. reasoning.

The SIM also captures the social nature of moral judgment, in that the reasoning generated in support of implicit intuition and judgment are used for strategic social purposes (eg. Managing one's reputation) (Haidt, 2001). Moral reasoning employed to support the intuitive inferential material serves the purposes of argumentative defense and correction of one's implicit beliefs (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Moral reasoning is the ability to represent inferential representations as premises and draw conclusions from them consciously (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Thus, reasoning represents a meta-representational structure on par with verbal and theory of mind representations (models) that allow for intuitive inferences to be made from them. Essentially, the brain has the general ability to perform inferences against meta-representational structures which can provide alternatives to implicitly generated arguments. The production of the arguments create a confirmation bias which reinforces one's own claims based on implicitly generated inferential material.

Haidt (2001) offers four reasons to doubt the causal role of reason in moral judgment. The first includes the rapid automatic evaluation of affective evaluation, relating to the Semantic differential's Evaluation dimension, essentially the implicit gut feeling of good-bad (Haidt 2001). The second involves motivated reason from sources which bias reason, that of social influence from others and protective defenses of one's cultural commitments like beliefs & attitudes (Haidt 2001), which also likely include identities from the CGR evidence (Kahan, 2011). The third exposes moral reasoning to be post-hoc (after the event), which creates causal explanations for behavior out of a "pool of culturally supplied explanations for behavior" (Haidt, 2001). Haidt also mentions Kohlberg's account of Moral Development serves as rationalized explanations from respondents of implicit moral judgments, a kind of ethnography of moral communities (cultures). The fourth reason demonstrates that social action covaries with moral emotions. Rather than reasoning driving emotions, action itself stemming from a largely automated source of behavior, drives the production of emotion, agreeing with the PSToE.

This can be seen as an explanation of cultural cognition of risk's ability to seemingly override individual conscious reasoning when cultural-self identity is threatened. Each of Haidt's four reasons provide biases towards the rapid selection of inferential content providing the most safety when under threat. When cultural-identity is at risk, inferences which provide emotional defense against the negation of identity are likely automatically salient. Seeking protection within the group through conformity additionally biases reasoning to select the inference which most closely matches sentiment from valued social influences. Those naturally would provide a better reason for selection than an inference going against sentiment of social influences and provide less moral judgment of self from valued others. This snap reasoning also would align the moral emotions with social actions long engrained by socialization and repetition, thus aligning response to be biased towards cultural cognitive biases. Evidence that people categorize others nearly instantly and the emerging view of social cognition posits that behavior, judgments, attitudes and impressions are made automatically (Haidt, 2001). Thus, the default selection aligns with culturally learned safest "best guesses", which may be further corrected by conscious reflection of previously learned experience.

Affect Control Theory's model of social behavior seems quite applicable towards studying these phenomena since it models the implicit inference processes which comprise a great deal of automated "reasoning." ACT's model could be modified to incorporate the dynamics of autonomic covariation in an effort to expand and more clearly define evaluative and motivational processes and locate autonomic correlates of emotion categories. ACT's clear integration of the dynamics of interpersonal engagement with the semantic meaning of identity, actions, and emotion make it ideal for instructional and potentially perspective enhancing teaching tool towards growing awareness of the implicit social perception which takes place via an automated control system. Gaining conscious awareness of this subconscious system could provide not only a new perspective on one's own and other's behavior, but also possibly provide an important technique for developing new therapies and improving a social relations.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

An Integral Perspective

“It is a narrow mind which cannot look at a subject from various points of view.” George Eliot, Middlemarch

This study is named an Integral Theory because it attempts to construct a full, integral picture of the “elephant” by combining knowledge from different epistemological perspectives in hopes of finding some common way of systematically relating those different knowledge perspectives into a new unified model. However, rather than beginning with the Integral framework developed by Ken Wilber (cf 2000a), this study begins with analytic frameworks of theories from different levels, with the hope of constructing a parsimonious framework combining all levels that could negate the effects that only upward or downward reductions (Wiley, 1995) would introduce.

While Integral Theory offers many theoretical propositions which this study hopes to elucidate, many of its “advanced” features are beyond the scope of this study. The Integral framework takes as its universal perspectives the Internal-External and Individual-Collective dialects, which when set orthogonally, produces a map containing the Internal Subjective perspective of individuals, the External Objective perspective of individuals, the Internal Intersubjective perspective of collectives, and the Interobjective perspective of collectives. In Integral Theory lingo, these four quadrants represent the I, It, We, and Its perspectives.




Fig. 23.1 — Integral Theory Quadrant Map — *Source:* DailyEvolver.com

Furthermore, each of the Integral Quadrants can be methodologically studied from within that perspective (experientially) or from outside of that perspective (observationally), yielding eight methodological or paradigmatic Zones. Integral Methodological Pluralism posits these zones represent fundamental, irreducible knowledge perspectives which can produce truths about reality for which no other perspective (zone) is privy. Very generally, the scientific enterprises focused on the Psychological, Physiological/Behavioral, Cultural and Social levels map to these four quadrants, and the various schools of thought and methodological practices sorting into those levels either involve internal study of that quadrant perspective or a distanced observational study of the perspective.

Thus, the subjective knowledge from thoughts, emotions, or sensations experienced by individuals through diverse domains such as Buddhism, Meditation, or Phenomenology is gained internally from the inside, while Psychology, Psychotherapy, and Structuralism are knowledge pursuits which

examine that Subjective perspective externally, from an observational position. Similarly, the objective external reality of the individual is the domain of the physical sciences including the biological, behavioral, and other empiricist sciences, which glean knowledge from the outside, while its interior is examined by Cognitive science, Autopoiesis Theory (Maturana & Varela, 1987) and Enactivism (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1987). The Intersubjective knowledge of collectives include Worldviews, Values, Norms, Language, etc, studied from the inside via Hermeneutics and Exegesis, while from the outside by Anthropology, Intersectionality, and Critical Theory. The Interobjective collective quadrant includes all the systems, technologies, and institutions which emerge from collective behavior constructing the Social System and Environment, studied by domains such as Sociology, Systems Theory, and Environmentalism, while the Interobjective studied from the inside is the province of Social Autopoiesis, which elucidates how collective processes, such as the Law, can be conceived as a self-reproducing system of meanings constructed from the system of communications within communities (Teubner, 1989).

Integral Theory's quadrant perspectives have a relation to person perspectives, emanating from the different speaker perspectives (Habermas, 1979), which create realms of knowledge corresponding to a first-person Subjective realm, second-person Intersubjective realm of Normativity, and a third-person Objective realm. Validity claims made from these perspectives differ, in that first-person Subjective claims can only be judged for their Truthfulness, second-person Intersubjective claims for their Rightness, or third-person Objective claims for their Truth (Habermas, 1979).




Fig. 23.2 - Integral Theory Person Perspectives — *Source: IntegralAcademy.eu*

Integral Theory is also an evolutionary theory which introduces the AQAL Map, which is an acronym meaning All Quadrants, All Levels, All Lines. It means that each quadrant contains stages (Levels) of development over which individuals and collectives vary and grow in competencies and complexity of organization (Lines), with each level representing a different logical type. Each quadrant contains different ontological manifestations that grow and evolve, which in IT's Individual Objective quadrant 2 represents the physical structures the biological world is constructed, running from quarks, atoms, molecules, cells, organs, nervous systems, organisms, species, ecosystems, etc. For Quadrant 3, its cultural hierarchies imagined having evolved over earth's history, while in Quadrant 4, its social systems and technological epochs. However, in Quadrant 1 of Individual subjective experience, IT posits a detailed series levels of Consciousness extending into the mystical and nondual take Integral Theory away from mainstream academics into the meta-physical.

However, Integral Theory's Developmental Levels also have a standard model based upon the stage theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, among many others (cf Wilber, 2000b), in which individuals develop and grow competency, care and concern over Preconventional, Conventional, and Postconventional stages of development. A standard model of developmental levels that span those stages include a hierachic set beginning from the impulsive, to egocentric, to group-centric, to universal, to integral. Although not specifically identified as such in Integral Theory, these represent

competencies of Self over the ontological symbolic levels (**Fig. 15.4**) outlined by Wiley (1991) that underlie the universal inner semiotic of thought.

The nomenclature used by Integral Theory to define levels have a few variants, this standard set can be paired with the Ontological levels in **Fig. 15.4**, which although different logical levels, aren't characterized as developmentally different but represent different ways the Self-process comes to know the world from different ontological perspectives. At the Physiological - IT's impulsive first level is defined by perception and action that is ruled by the emotions. At the Psychological - IT's Egocentric second level, behavior is motivated solely by one's desires. At the Interpersonal - IT's Group-centric third level, behavior is defined by the group (roles). At the Social - IT's Institutional fourth level characterized as world-centric, behavior is self-directed in pursuit of achievement and social identity (norms). At the Cultural - IT's Interindividual fifth level characterized as integral, the postconventional is achieved through seeing outside of one's culture to systematic similarities between culture.




Fig. 23.3 - Integral Theory Quadrant Levels – *Source: IntegralLife.com*

At each of these levels, IT characterizes growth of care as including and extending from self-focused, to group-focused, to society-focused, to world-focused. This may be seen as expanding the boundary around which one's concern is focused as people expand their sense of Self to include collective identities (Wilber, 2000c). Integral Theory also specifies Developmental Lines relating to multiples "intelligences" (Gardner, 1982; 1993) that evolve during maturation and socialization well into adulthood, which too are beyond the scope of the interpersonal focus of the Social Self Model of this study. Finally, there is the theory of Spiral Dynamics (Beck & Cowan, 2006)(Wilber, 2000a), which describes the developmental levels of culture, which will be covered later.

The product of developmental lines Quadrant 2 produce a line of nested holons (Wilber, 2000a), which come from Holonic Theory (Koestler, 1970), which attempts to overcome the problem of defining Parts and Wholes in the Physical sciences, particularly in Biology and Organismic Sociality, and strongly related to Control Theory (Powers, 1973). In relation to biological and social sciences, Holons are self-regulating open systems displaying both autonomy of a whole and dependency as a part. Integral theory uses holonic theory to show the evolution of the physical universe from elementary particles from the sub atomic to the biological, as well in its characterization of growing social holons, which are collectives of individual holons with a group identity or sense of "we"-ness, and systems of holons at different levels of hierarchy are defined as Hierarchy.

This study traces through Scientific theories studying perspectives of human language, interaction, thought & emotion to understand from an outside perspective, how knowledge from these ontological levels can be modeled into a coherent structure to find the underlying commonality between the Biological and Social Sciences. It is an effort at Consilience, defined by Whewell as "the 'jumping together' of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation" (E.O.Wilson, 1998: 18). Holonic theory has applicability to this study and to Consilience, as the Parts and Wholes problem has relevance at every level of study covered above.

Within each discipline and each theory analytic, the division of autonomy between components at that level of study have dependencies to lower levels of organization that ripple down the hierarchy. This is evident in the Social Structure having dependency on mass behavior of organisms, which have dependency on the psychological systems evolved toward adaptive behaviors, which are dependent

upon the neurophysiological systems controlling intero-, extero-, and neuroception to modulate the autonomic nervous system, etc and so on down the holarchic chain to the DNA molecules and the proteins they code for. At each level of the holarchy, selection can occur that reorganizes the holons below into a new pattern, which optimizes fitness. This can happen at the level of DNA, as well at higher levels of the holarchy.

The unifying dimensions labeled Group-Grid, Community-Autonomy, Collective-Horizontal, Status-Power, etc., when intersected produce the quadrant pattern typologies of human collectives that differ in their beliefs, behaviors, values, motivations, etc., and importantly how they solve group level problems. However, when problems exist that affect all groups, these problems exist at the intersection of these dimensions (E.O. Wilson, 1998), where parts and wholes ill defined. Problems affecting the holarchy at a level above the individual or group or whatever social holon, require problem solving at a higher ordered level that can integrate best practices across all holons and importantly, get buy-in so that each group is represented in the solution. At a time when problems facing human groups are Global in scope requiring great cooperation, this has never been more important to highlight.

Seen from the lens of Conflict Theory, five different different strategies for resolving conflict negotiate Cooperativeness and Assertiveness (**Fig. 23.4** below), which in the case of globally scoped problems, cannot rely on Avoidance, Competition, Accommodation, or Collaboration alone as resolution strategies, but must include Compromise. While a compromising position is a loaded term oriented towards competition, its location in the center between social holons allows Compromise to integrate the perspectives outside of the center. Solutions to human problems, especially at the group level, require integrative decision making and rationality, both dependent on emotion and both differentially influenced by the Worldviews, Social relational models, social dynamics of Power & Status, and the emotional dynamics of expectations and sanctions. Thus, integral solutions to such problems must take a whole account emotions and of the holonic parts of the whole.





Fig. 23.4 - The 5 Options of Conflict Resolution (Isomorphism) — *Source: kilmanndiagnostics.com*

The consilience across knowledge disciplines can be seen by taking an Integral perspective of everything presented so far by sorting the theories covered by this study into the quadrants of Integral Theory. The Social Self Model (**Fig. 19.2**) provides a snapshot of our multi perspective dataset. It can be translated to the Integral Theory AQAL model by sorting the various knowledge perspectives into the Integral AQAL framework orientation. Sorted into an AQAL model to examine evidence from Integral theory's perspectives and levels will allow for a systematized global view of the connection between levels and parts and wholes, which will help to validate this theory.

The theories covered by this study, the IToCE, can be roughly sorted into Integral Theory's quadrants, although many of them combine multiple perspectives, as disciplinary boundaries within the sciences are disappearing (E.O. Wilson, 1998). However, the intention of **Fig. 23.5** below is to show that across the interconnected theories at different levels and perspectives, taken as a whole they begin to show a consilience in the similarity in the patterning of their analytics found in the Social Self Model (**Fig. 19.2**), which points to an hidden symmetry underlying their models and underlying these ontological levels.

**Fig. 23.5** - IToCE Theories map

Accompanied by their analytic models, these theories could help to construct an overall analytic which could provide an empirical framework for confirming the validity of Integral Theory itself, who's detractors point to its lack of testability and falsifiability in their dismissal of it in mainstream academics. However, its clear that to "prove" Integral Theory, an integration of interdisciplinary work must occur, and an analytic model is required.

The new model presented by this study (**Fig. 19.2**) can be better comprehended by devolving the Social Self Model into levels. While the ordering and placement of theories and analytics are neither exact nor well measured, they allow a new way of seeing the evidence presented so far, in which the parts can be seen as a new whole.




Fig. 23.6 - IToCE Social Self Levels Model

The two dimensions of Power & Status not only define the basic units of microinteraction, but can also be projected upward as common dimensions at higher macro levels of analysis (Kemper & Collins, 1990). Micro-, meso- and macro-level analysis of these two dimensions also apply cross-culturally among whole societies, as well as among subcultures among classes, organizations and professional groups. They're able to link both "upward" macro-levels in society and culture and "downward" physiological and neurophysiological levels. Our social cognition interprets them as Warmth & Competence, Plural Rationality Theory, and Cultural Cognition characterize their cultural level forms as Grid & Group, Morals and Ethics explain their social order forms as Community & Autonomy, while psychology sees them in the form of behavioral orientations towards Agency & Communion.

We can also recognize these dimensions in analysis of behavioral and physiological models: in the generation of second order emotions, the functioning of the ANS, the defense strategies in

attachment styles, BIAS and semantic differential. The basic dimensions of relation of self & other are the essential perspectives of human micro-interactional pattern producing second order patterns at various levels of analysis. While Kemper and Collins, who first compiled these similarities across many fields of study state showing that Power & Status emerged at nearly every level of study of human interaction, they state that the most important route proceeds from the outside in, that the social drives the physiological. However, Porges' polyvagal theory differs from this, claiming that "*the range of social behavior is limited by physiological state*" (Porges, 2001), it starts from the inside and works outward, where exercising the neural regulation via the vagal brake to sooth defensive strategies and reengage the social.

Scheff (1997) proposes a theoretical model of social behavior spanning from micro behavioral interaction to the macro structure of social groups. Scheff begins with the observation that single case and comparative methodologies for studying human behavior, measuring parts and wholes, respectively, require methodological integration. Their institutional separation via the boundaries of Empiricist and Constructionist paradigms, prevents the integration of Biological and Social Science disciplines. This separation between top down and bottom up reductions results in a dichotomy of theories which often produce diametrically opposed theoretical models for particular phenomena of study. Verweij's (2007) theory of Constrained Relativism provides a pragmatic example of a theoretical bridge between such a gulf by imposing as boundaries neurophysiological restraints on theory construction, which leads to a middle ground between competing schools of thought spanning the Materialism - Idealism divide (e.g., Rational Choice Theory vs. Social-Constructionism). However, Scheff's effort represents a broader, more generalized paradigm with specific focus on social integration anchored by emotion and the social bond.

Scheff's specific theory posits the social bond as the optimal level at which Social Integration operates, centering study at the level of social interaction between a dyad with a special focus on the language as indicator of the state of the bond. Scheff's analysis begins with the detailed study of a verbatim segment of interaction over some set of time, an interaction event composed of a series of social actions, which provides a dataset of a particular exchange of social actions between two actors "instantiating" a relationship. The analysis combines linguistic analysis (semantic) with ethnographic coding of affect (tone, gesture, communicative pattern). Relationship dynamics are fleshed out through the microanalysis of interaction to reveal the health of the relationship from the

actual words and non-verbal affective cues inherent in each actors' actions. Inferences can then be made to reveal the both the relational meaning and social structural elements which influence the relationship, ie, emotion cues indicating embarrassment put dialogue into context revealing a patient-therapist hierarchy and a dysfunction of engulfment (Scheff, 1997). The micro-macro combined analysis yields the strength of the social bond, a measure of social integration between the two running from social solidarity to alienation.

Scheff's methodology produces a theoretic tripartite model of Social Integration (**Fig. 23.7** below), which posits social integration as being too little, too much, or balanced between the micro and macro. Scheff finds a similar pattern across the spectrum of Social Science theoretic and empirical models. Optimal health of Social Integration results in what social theorists have conceptualized as interdependence (Elias), solidarity (Durkheim), secure-bond (Bowen), I-thou (Buber), while empirical indicators provide data points such as emotions : Pride (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991), Secure attachment (Ainsworth & Bowlby), I-WE relationship(Elias). Too little integration leads to conceptualizations such as Independence (Elias), anomie (Durkheim), isolation (Bowen), I-it (Buber), with empirical indicators such as Bypassed Shame, Avoidant Attachment, I-we. Too much integration leads to conceptualizations such as Dependence (Elias), , engulfment (Bowen), it-thou (Buber), accompanied by empirical indicators like Overt Shame, Anxious-ambivalent attachment, i-WE (Elias).

Social Integration

Too Little		Too Much	
Anomie	solidarity	Altruistic	E. Durkheim
Alienation	communism	?	K. Marx
Stigmatization	Reintegration Shaming	?	Braithwaite
Independence	Interdependence	Dependence	N. Elias
United States	?	Japan	T. Doi
Isolation	Secure bond	Engulfment – confusion	M. Bowen
blame – compute	Leveling	placate - distract	V. Satir
I – it	I – Thou	It – thou ?	M. Buber
Alienation	?	Self-estranged	M. Seeman
I – we	I – WE	i – WE	N. Elias
Bypassed Shame	Pride	Overt Shame	Scheff-Ratzinger
Avoidant	Secure	Anxious-Ambivalent	M. Ainsworth

Fig. 23.7 – Social Integration – Source: Scheff (1997: Fig. 4, 100)

Scheff's Social Integration theory provides several relevant features which this study can set as a general template for further analysis of the MMM & MFT model. It includes a part/whole analysis using the combined methodology of top down and bottom up analysis, using both empiricist and constructionist frameworks, from a verbatim sample of social interaction in situ capturing multiple modalities beyond simply the semantic. That includes the detailed textual analysis of the meaning of the text semantically, as well as the meaning of affective non-verbal communication exchanged in its microanalysis. This provides a temporal linkage between simply textual analysis and affective social signals which put the text into context, combining both the digital and analogue components of social communication together (Watzlawick et al., 2011). The empirical data generated may be then analyzed according to social theories of Social Integration across different Levels, in hopes of confirming agreement across the micro and macro.

Scheff's theory places the interpersonal as the optimal perspective from which humans reach social integration via the social bond. A secure bond is one in which both of a dyad experience a balance between their own self and the shared intersubjective self. A focus predominantly upon self leads to social action which isolates an individual from the experiential exchange of social affect and shared identity of a group. A focus predominantly upon the group leads to an estrangement and distraction from one's self, risking engulfment in the group identity.

For the purposes of this study, the actual empirical paradigm of Scheff's study is less important than his overall argument for structuring methodology to incorporate both Empiricist and Constructionist methodologies. An analysis incorporating methodologies from both a top down and bottom up approach, as well as linking empirical data temporally, reveals levels of agreement for both upward and downward reductions. Analysis can oscillate across both to produce a fuller confirmation of a theoretical social model.

Scheff's analysis combines both qualitative narrative analysis to establish temporality and context combined with quantitative analysis. However, they are done from an observational perspective, one of detached observer, as is the data analyzed via transcript and video, which leaves out the engaged intersubjective involvement in the interaction. A pragmatic approach going up and down levels of analysis using induction and deduction would approximate Peirce's adductive process.

A Pragmatic Alternative to the Key Issues in Social Science Research Methodology

	Qualitative Approach	Quantitative Approach	Pragmatic Approach
Connection of theory and data			
Relationship to research process	Induction	Deduction	Abduction
Inference from data	Subjectivity Context	Objectivity Generality	Intersubjectivity Transferability

Fig. 23.8 – Pragmatic Paradigm in SSR Methodology – Source: Morgan (2007: Table 1, 71)

Thus, an integral framework for analyzing social behavior and the evolution of culture must incorporate the essential perspectives of Subjectivity, Objectivity and Intersubjectivity. Inductive approaches must be balanced with Deductive approaches, in a cycle of hypothesis setting and revising to hone in on the patterns that connect up and down every ontological level and across the differences created by covariance across two universal dimensions. An Integral Theory of Cultural Evolution requires a full accounting from every perspective of the phenomena that connects up and down and across all quadrants. It requires an integral theory of Emotion.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

The Color of Emotion

“A complete account of emotion, however, should make reference to all levels of analysis, ranging from the feelings and behaviors associated with emotion to how they are computed at the neural level of brain structures and systems.” Ochsner & Barrett (2001: 2)

An Integral view of emotion theories yields a middle path reconciling both objectivist and constructionist positions, a new way of conceptualizing the problem (Plutchik, 2001). The emotion theories of Plutchik, Ekman, Kemper, Thamm, Porges, and Barrett can be integrated into a single theory where psychological, neurophysiological, social, and cultural theoretical perspectives coincide and evidence reconciled. Such a higher order understanding of emotion can be envisioned by constructing a theory of emotion based analogously on the theory of color vision. While emotions have long been compared to color in their resemblance to primary colors that can be blended, no such group of primary emotions can be agreed upon, nor can their neural correlates be found (Barrett, 2006). However, the now well understood neurophysiology and psychology of color explained by an opponent color theory model deeply informed by a theory of categorization serves as an appropriate analogue for establishing a unified theory of emotion.

Lakoff (1987) explains how the discovery of categorization of color perception provides a deep insight into the workings of cognition and affect. Lakoff’s cognitive linguistic theory posits that language functions through categorization and that metaphor of embodied action underlies our semantic explanation of feelings. This is especially true of emotions, which can be described by metaphoric language tying certain emotions to experiences typifying their expression, e.g. pressure, heat and explosiveness for Anger. Lakoff’s theory arises out of the application of Rosch’s (1978) Category theory to language and semantic meaning.

Overturning the long held view that all category members must share a common attribute, Rosch found vision perception and the naming of color categories shared both universal and distinctly

cultural aspects, which helped to reformulate the theory of color vision. The Kay-Berlin (1969) cross-cultural study of basic emotion terms provided evidence that cultures may vary in the color categories they consider basic, although the way in which different sets of primary colors are distinguished follow a systematic hierarchical order. While English has terms for and recognizes eleven basic colors (black, white, red, blue, green, yellow, brown, pink, orange, turquoise and grey), other languages have varying numbers of basic color terms (Davies & Corbett, 1994). Cultures having fewer basic terms recognize these basic color categories in a particular order, consistent across all cultures studied. Cultures having only two basic color terms use dark-cool and light-warm, with the other basic hues being sorted into the former (blue, green, brown) or the latter (white, red, yellow, pink, orange). Cultures with only three basic colors will have dark-cool, light-warm and red as distinct color terms. Cultures with four or five add green and yellow in various order. Cultures having six terms add blue. Cultures having seven terms add brown to the previous six, and so on through cultures having terms for all eleven. Russian is the lone exception, having a twelfth term distinguishing an additional primary light blue from blue. Thus, cultures discriminate the boundaries around primary colors, varying in their recognition of which shades have meaning and varying sorting of non-primaries into different primaries.

Interestingly, focal colors serving as ideal instances of these shades are consistently selected as the best example of each color across all cultures, whether they explicitly recognize the shade with a label or not. When given a choice of a group of chips of different shades of red, people choose focal red as exemplar no matter what culture they're from. Similarly, this holds true for hues of blue, yellow and green; focal colors are chosen as the most representative of those colors. This surprising result indicates a neurophysiological commonality underlying vision perception, despite a distinctly cultural aspect to color.

The neurophysiological universals of color vision emerge from the neurophysiological processing of color by ganglion cells connected to the rods and cones of the retina. A set of six distinct cells served to break up the visual input into three sets of color opponent pairs which distinguish Blue-Yellow, Red-Green and Light-Dark. Four types of cells (+B-Y, -B+Y, +R-G, -R+G) fire at a base rate with no stimulus, but at different rates when encountering wavelength signals. These different rates indicate varying amounts of blue, yellow, red and green. The other two cell types measure lightness and darkness (+L-D, -L+D).

Blue-Yellow cells (+B-Y, -B+Y) together determine the response to blue or yellow stimuli via the union of their cell firing rates. The +B-Y cell fires at a high rate when encountering Blue, while the -B+Y fires at below rate. The situation is reversed when encountering Yellow. For red or green stimuli, the union of Red-Green cell (+R-G, -R+G) signals result in the +R-G firing high when encountering Red, while the -R+G fires low, and vice versa when encountering Green.

Kay & McDaniel (1978) helped to integrate the purely neurophysiological with psychological by showing that fuzzy sets of primary colors could be combined to produce the additional primary color categories of brown, pink, orange, turquoise and grey. Blended primary colors are experienced from different firing rates of these four types of color processing cells in combination with two processing Light and Dark. For example Pink occurs through the combination of +R-G firing high and -R+G firing low (Red), the blue-yellow cells firing at a neutral base-rate, while the lightness cell (+L-D) firing high while the darkness cell (-L+D) firing low. Similarly, Brown is constructed from Yellow and Darkness, Orange from Red and Yellow, Purple from Blue and Red, Turquoise from Blue and Green, and Grey from Light and Dark. This set of cells firing in different categorical modes produce experience of and the limit of the categorical basic colors, although they allow for all the graduations of non-primary colors produced across the visual cellular functional plane. Cultural language delineates, names, and shapes the categorical modes influenced by their environment, although neurophysiologically constrained. Thus, the neurophysiological explanation unites the pancultural aspect of human color perception, explaining the perception of the basic colors directly relatable to the structural/functional architecture of the six types of color cells. The psychological component reflects cultural variance which may place non-primary colors in a small n-tuple set of primary color categories.

Visual information represents one modality coming in from a specialized system for translating light into internal signals which are then routed and rerouted internally through dedicated neural areas to compute spatial, spectral, and depth visual information, pattern matched with information held in associative memory, and eventually perceived internally in the everyday images seen through the eyes. Only these **visual** images are re-presentations of representations that exist internally. They eyes aren't seeing, the brain is.

A similar neurological dynamic must exist for emotions, which are simply another type of perception to the brain. Likewise, affective information representing information about others and about social concepts, including our self-concept or that of the relationship, is streaming in through multiple modalities, including vision, and affective cues are translated into internal signals which are also routed and rerouted internally through dedicated neural areas to compute various aspects of non-verbal communication, pattern matched with information held in associative memory, and eventually perceived internally in the everyday emotions felt through the body. Only these **emotional** images are re-presentations of representations that exist internally.

This divergence into opponent-color theory, fuzzy categorization, and differential hemispheric processing provides not simply an analogy but the outline of a universal theory of emotion which can serve to unite theories from across academic disciplines. Emotion, too, must have both neurophysiological and psychological components reflecting cultural variance, which may be demonstrated by a system similar to the opponent-color theory's combining of neurophysiological evidence with psychological categorization.

However, the search for emotion “cells” or emotion neurological circuits has yielded little evidence, as the neural components of primary "colors" of emotion are not found in particular locations of the brain (Barrett, 2006a: Table 1). In vast agreement with Lakoff’s cognitive linguistic theory of semantic meaning resulting from embodied action, Barrett’s conception of the integration of sensory, motor and semantic meaning into the categorization of emotion comes close to explaining emotion as constructed without a “neural fingerprint.” Barrett’s (2006b, 2017) CAM and CTE combine categorization theories with emotion construction, but from a hard constructionist position, denying a neurological analogue to emotion generation. However, the fingerprint Barrett and other neuro-imagists are searching for and not finding, cannot be found in snapshots of brain activity. The functioning of brain states occurs subconsciously, invisible to people’s naive realist observations required to allow psychological categorization.

The Autonomic Nervous System (ANS), too, like the color visual system, functions as an opponent control system (Craig, 2015)(Schore, 1998), functions in a complex heterogenous fashion producing many discreet states (Berntson et al., 1991) from the functioning of hierarchically organized separate subsystems (Porges, 2001), while also producing psychologically categorizable signatures (Kemper,

1987)(Porges, 2001). Polyvagal Theory's three emotion subsystems produce a psychologically recognizable set of behavioral responses at a universally basic level. The ANS ability to produce a multitude of discreet states supports the conception of blended states, which can vary in their cultural categorization dependent on contingent cultural feeling rules or environmental niches.

The relationship of the three Polyvagal subsystems producing four modes was visualized in **Fig. 9.4**, the Polyvagal /ANS Threat Response Matrix, which shows the DVC, VVC and SNS fight or flight modes patterning over the two universal dimensions of the Social Self Model. Each of the four quadrants represent a stereotypical response connecting modes of the ANS with motor behavior, neurochemical signature, psychological motivation, evolutionary defense strategy and prototypical emotion category. Like the color cells of the visual cortex, the ANS produces functional divisions in paired Blue-Yellow (Parasympathetic) and Red-Green (Sympathetic) "cells" which are able to co-activate to produce an infinite variety of states (Berntson *et al.*, 1991). These autonomic "cells" represent prototypical autonomic response patterns in different modes of operation: Depression (DVC activated, parasympathetic withdrawal, neutral sympathetic), Satisfaction (VVC / parasympathetic activation, neutral sympathetic), Fear (neutral parasympathetic, sympathetic withdrawal), Anger (neutral parasympathetic, sympathetic activation). The differential functioning of the three emotion subsystems (Porges, 2011) produce recognizable physiological patterns as a result of social behavioral substructures that Kemper (1978, 1987) asserts emerge as universal dimensions of social interaction, namely Power and Status, and which Self-Perception Theory explains are feedback from behavior (Laird, 2011).

These four autonomic emotion categories are included in the vast majority of theories of primary emotion, each having prototypes with stereotypical facial, intonation, autonomic, and other sensory cues, originating from the symbolic functioning of the Autonomic Nervous System and associated with a wide variety of situations and behaviors. While a wide range of affective sensory cues accompany instances of these emotion categories, prototypical cues for each category are universally recognized and identify stereotypical instances (Ekman, 2003; Barrett, 2007). These are categorized into four fuzzy sets, using Kemper's (1987) terms, recognizable as Satisfaction, Depression, Fear, and Anger, and analogous to color cells continua of .

Thamm's extension of the Power & Status Theory of Emotion adds crucially important

expectations and **sanctions** as the primary social-structural universal dimensions which generate emotions, providing social signals detailing the social relationship and how interaction is going (Thamm, 2004). While not emotions themselves, they are rather “two critical dimensions of any interaction that constrain and circumscribe the **valence** and **amplitude** of emotions” (Thamm, 2004: 192), or the two component dimensions of what Barrett (2012) refers to as Core affect (Russell, 1980). Expectations and Sanctions are social relational dimensions that must be incorporated into any emotion theory, representing a key to uniting Social and Psychological models of emotion. They represent two additional dimensions of emotion experience, each analogous to color vision’s Light-Dark brightness dimension, which combine with the primary “emotion cells” to create blended emotion categories.

Plutchik’s circumplex model (**Fig. 6.1**) contains four primary emotions matching the autonomic modes (which he termed Joy, Sadness, Fear, Anger), as well as four other “primaries” corresponding to Thamm’s E/S dimensions. Surprise and Anticipation represent a prediction continua essential in emotion appraisal (Lazarus, 1992), matching Thamm’s Expectation dimension. Disgust and Trust describe social motivations underlying Thamm’s Sanction dimensions of punishments and rewards. Conveniently, we can use the paired emotions on opposite ends of the Emotion Circumplex to produce a hypothetical model of Color Cells of Emotion: Depression-Satisfaction, Fear-Anger, Surprise-Anticipation, and Disgust-Trust. Similar to the opponent-control theory of color, an opponent control theory of emotion would produce the copious diversity of emotion gradation through varied settings of these four “color cells” of emotion.

This study posits the Modes of Autonomic Control (**Fig. 24.2**) could serve as this model as affective prototype categories associated with situated conceptualizations (Barrett, 2017) to allow for “dialogic cognitive representations” (Tomasello *et al.*, 2005). Instead of traditional emotion research investigating purely neurological “circuits” as the source of primary emotions, these hypothetical emotion cells can be found in the fuzzy sets representing different modes of autonomic nervous system functioning. Berntson *et al.* (1991) propose a Model of Autonomic Control in which the Sympathetic and Parasympathetic function in tandem, rather than being opposite ends of one spectrum. In their model, Sympathetic and Parasympathetic responses can each separably be increasing, decreasing, or steadily unchanged.

Modes of Autonomic Control

Sympathetic response	Parasympathetic response		
	Increase	No change	Decrease
Increase	Coactivation	Uncoupled sympathetic activation	Reciprocal sympathetic activation
No change	Uncoupled parasympathetic activation	Baseline	Uncoupled parasympathetic withdrawal
Decrease	Reciprocal parasympathetic activation	Uncoupled sympathetic withdrawal	Coinhibition

Fig. 24.1 - Modes of Autonomic Control - Source: Berntson *et al.* (1991: Table 1, 463)

These three generalized states for both Sympathetic and Parasympathetic, when intersected, produces a pattern of 9 distinct modes of the ANS as in **Fig 24.1**. When both the SNS and PNS are increasing in activation, the ANS is said to be in a Coactivation mode. Oppositely, when both are decreasing, they're said to be Coinhibiting. Reciprocal modes are those in which the SNS is increasing while the PNS decreasing, or vice versa, while the uncoupled modes are those in which one is held to no change while the other is either increasing or decreasing in activation, producing an uncoupled mode for each of the SNS and PNS. A ninth mode is Baseline in which the SNS and PNS are balanced, although this is an idealized mode since allostatic control processes represent constant predictive regulation not a return to homeostatic zero (Sterling, 2012).

The generalized modes of Autonomic response via these modal patterns can be thought of as functioning analogously to the cells of color vision. The modes of autonomic control can produce a schematized model of hypothetical emotion cells for categorical prototype functional states corresponding to Plutchik's primary emotion pairs involved in the social regulation process (Plutchik, 2001). Such a schema could locate the four primary emotion categories arising from threat events (Anger, Fear) and loss/gain (Depression, Satisfaction) (Plutchik, 2001) to the uncoupled autonomic modes, which Polyvagal theory (Porges, 2001; 2007) explains in the coordination and inhibition of autonomic functioning by the three emotion subsystems.

The Sympathetic nervous system is typified as the mobilization system by Polyvagal Theory, fueled by the adrenal system, which produces fight or flight responses functioning in a spectrum across this

response range before Parasympathetic processes bring the ANS back to equilibrium. Sympathetic modulation of Epinephrine (E) "adrenaline" produces an avoidance (flight) response to avoid threat and escape to safety (Plutchik, 2001), typified by the recognizable state of Fear. The modulation of Norepinephrine (NE) "noradrenaline" produces an approach (fight) response to overcome an obstacle (Plutchik, 2001), typified by the recognizable state of Anger. Fear and Anger emotion categories fit those situations in which the parasympathetic response remains neutral (No Change), where uncoupled autonomic arousal arises from purely sympathetic effects.

The activation of the Ventral Vagal Complex equalling uncoupled Parasympathetic activation produces a recognizable state of Satisfaction, independent of SNS activation. The activation of the Dorsal Vagal Complex (DVC) is analogous to the withdrawal or decrease in activation of the Parasympathetic, triggered in the case of unmitigated threats in which an SNS response is overridden (Porges, 2003), which produces immobilization and a recognizable state of Depression. Both of these Parasympathetic modes, Satisfaction and Depression, are found to remain unaffected by arousal changes (Laird, 2012: 89), further strengthening the match to uncoupled Parasympathetic activation and withdrawal, respectively, independent of Sympathetic activation. Similarly, Anger and Fear provide a match to uncoupled Sympathetic activation and withdrawal, respectively. These "primary" emotion pairs are like the Red-Green and Blue-Yellow set of color vision cells.

Modes of Autonomic Control

		SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE		
		Decrease	No Change	Increase
PARASYMPATHETIC RESPONSE	Decrease	DVC Activation – SNS Withdrawal SURPRISE Parasympathetic & Sympathetic CoInhibition	DVC Activation DEPRESSION Uncoupled Parasympathetic Withdrawal	DVC Activation – SNS Activation DISGUST Reciprocal Sympathetic Activation
	No Change	SNS Withdrawal FEAR Uncoupled Sympathetic Withdrawal	BASELINE	SNS Activation ANGER Uncoupled Sympathetic Activation
	Increase	VVC Activation – SNS Withdrawal TRUST Reciprocal Parasympathetic Activation	VVC Activation SATISFACTION Uncoupled Parasympathetic Activation	VVC & SNS Activation ANTICIPATION Sympathetic & Parasympathetic CoActivation

Fig. 24.2 - Modes of Autonomic Control -

Sources: Berntson et al. (1991: 461-462), Plutchik (2001), Porges (2001, 2007)

The other two pairs of Plutchik's primaries would map to the Reciprocal modes and Coupled nonreciprocal modes (corners), as seen in **Fig. 24.2**. Consider first the identification of reciprocal modes as those which manifest in behavioral contexts (p. 454). These describe opposition between the parasympathetic and sympathetic, such as when the vagal brake is applied (PNS activation) while the SNS withdraws, which Polyvagal theory describes as producing a state which allows for the activation of the Social engagement system and secure attachment (Porges, 2003), providing mutual support and acceptance (Plutchik, 2001), thus feelings of Trust. Conversely, the sudden decrease of vagal activity typified by the engagement of the DVC with simultaneous SNS activation produces an aversive motivation of avoidance, often with repercussions of the digestive system controlled by DVC withdrawal (Porges, 2003), ejecting the unpalatable (Plutchik, 2001), producing a physiological state similar to Disgust.

Coupled nonreciprocal modes occur when the PNS and SNS either CoActivate or CoInhibit, e.g. are

both activated or both in withdrawal, which manifest in behavioral contexts (Berntson *et al.*, 1991: 454). CoActivation of both the Vagal and SNS has been shown in the presence of aversive conditioned stimuli, as well as attentional stimuli (Berntson *et al.*, 1991), representing examination of the environment and extracting knowledge (Plutchick, 2001), aligning in the context of Anticipation. CoInhibition, where both the PNS and SNS are in withdrawal, arises from central reflex mechanisms, which represent automatic non-volitional behavior (Berntson *et al.*, 1991) produced by unexpected events, as in cases of Surprise, requiring a freezing of the action for time to stop and orient attentional/energy resources (Plutchick, 2001).

These “primary” emotion pairs are like the Light-Dark color vision cells. The reciprocal modes provide fits for Trust and Disgust primary categories having vastly different behavior contexts (outcomes), providing a continua for Sanctions. The coupled nonreciprocal modes provide fits for Anticipation and Surprise primary categories along a continua for Expectations.

The mapping of Plutchik’s emotion “cells” to these modal autonomic correlates receive further confirmation from Cacioppo & Berntson’s (1994) study of Attitudes and Evaluative Space. They propose a similar bivariate Evaluative Space Model (ESM) where Positive and Negative evaluations may co-vary, producing a 2-D bivariate plane identical to **Fig. 9.2** in which Attitudes are produced by the “net difference between positive and negative valent processes aroused by a stimuli” (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994: 401). Traditional attitude research has been restricted to purely bipolar notions of attitude variation by methodologies and measures sensitive only to reciprocal notions of evaluation (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994: 405). However, other research focusing on nonreciprocal modes of evaluative activation have demonstrated that reciprocal modes alone “may not be sufficient to simply and comprehensively capture the patterns of evaluative activation underlying attitudes” (Edwards & Ostrom, 1971 cited by Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994: 405). Other neglected research such as Miller’s (1959) theory of conflict support that positive and negative substrates underlying behavior can be non-reciprocally activated and separable (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994: 407-411).

Thus, the resulting schema of a bivariate Evaluative Space contains a similar set of modes, where Negative and Positive evaluations co-vary, producing reciprocal, nonreciprocal, uncoupled SNS, and uncoupled PNS modes (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994: Table 1, 415). While not specifically identifying the autonomic space described in Berntson *et al.* (1991), clearly the modes of autonomic activation

underlies this model, with processes of evaluation sharing the same co-variational dynamics and schema structure. Moreover, the ESM contends that as higher order neurodevelopment continues into adulthood, including structures involved in emotion appraisal, the separability between Positivity and Negativity increase, allowing adults to simultaneously experience Happiness and Sadness, for example, while in children this ambivalent affect is limited (Larsen *et al.*, 2007). This agrees with development of executive controls and greater granularity of autonomic control (emotion regulation) dependent on maturation. The combined models including the ESM with colors of emotion are shown in **Fig. 24.3** below.

Modes of Evaluative Activation & Attitudinal Props

		SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE		
		low	← NEGATIVITY →	high
PARASYMPATHETIC RESPONSE	Decrease	Decrease	No Change	Increase
	Decrease	DVC Activation – SNS Withdrawal SURPRISE	DVC Activation DEPRESSION	DVC Activation – SNS Activation DISGUST
		Co-Inhibition	Uncoupled Positive Reduction	Reciprocal Negative Activation
		Low Dynamic Range Low Reactive Liability Low Directional Stability	Intermediate Dynamic Range Intermediate Reactive Liability High Directional Stability	High Dynamic Range High Reactive Liability High Directional Stability
	No Change	SNS Withdrawal FEAR	BASELINE	
		Uncoupled Negative Reduction Intermediate Dynamic Range Intermediate Reactive Liability High Directional Stability		
		VVC Activation – SNS Withdrawal TRUST	VVC Activation SATISFACTION	VVC & SNS Activation ANTICIPATION
	Increase	Reciprocal Positive Activation High Dynamic Range High Reactive Liability High Directional Stability	Uncoupled Positive Activation Intermediate Dynamic Range Intermediate Reactive Liability High Directional Stability	Co-Activation Low Dynamic Range Low Reactive Liability Low Directional Stability

Fig. 24.3 - Modes of Evaluative Activation & Attitudinal Properties -

Source: Cacioppo & Berntson (1994: 417)

The dynamics of the diagonal cells are particularly useful. The upper left cell (Surprise) of **Fig. 24.3** with respect to evaluation reflects the activation of low Positivity and low Negativity by a stimulus, a neutral evaluation. Although neutral, however, the diagonal midpoint in attitude formation reflects

maximal conflict between evaluative processes, as the stimulus evokes neither positive nor negative affects, creating ambiguity in an evaluation which may oscillate between positivity and negativity (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Its opposite cell, in the bottom right (Anticipation), represents high activation of both Positivity and Negativity from a particularly salient stimulus, for which attention will be directed and whose outcome is anticipated in a ready mode where both the SNS and PNS are activated and ready to swing in any direction.

Modes also have properties which explain the dynamic of attitude change given the evaluative dimension that is either increasing or decreasing. Directional stability measures the likelihood of the overall valence continuing in that evaluative direction (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Dynamic Range and Reactive Lability measure the constraint on attitude change, which are maximum under Reciprocal modes (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994), meaning that high positivity and low negativity, such as the Trust mode, presents the widest range for attitude change as there is greatest difference between positivity and negativity, which is negatively true for the Disgust mode. Attitudes are much more able to be affected by negativity or positivity changes in neutral or ambivalent cases (Co-activation modes), while Uncoupled modes are intermediated (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994).

However, this mapping of primary emotions to modes of Autonomic functioning seemingly flies in the face of and is contradicted by Barrett's constructionist account of Emotion, in which distinct primary emotions are not natural kinds and have no autonomic, neurological, physiological, etc signatures that all categorical members share (Barrett, 2007). Additionally, there are many hypothetical variants of a primary like Anger which vary considerably such as quietly seething, hotly exploding from injustice, coldly simmering in resentment, icily wryly smiling with revenge in mind, all different types of autonomic and physiological states of Core Affect (Russell, 1987)(Barrett, 2003), even if anecdotally. Likewise, Fear, Depression, and Satisfaction have many autonomic variances and no distinct signature, as well as no distinct involuntary facial signatures that occur with all instances, in opposition to Ekman's universal facial signatures (Barrett, 2007). Instead, according to constructionist accounts, emotions have conceptual cores (Wilson-Mendenhall *et al.*, 2010) organized around language, which is culturally defined although constrained neurophysiologically.

This study's offering of a set of primitive emotion categories corresponding to modes of the autonomic nervous system must be reconciled with Barrett's constructionist theory. However, the

autonomic modes “are intended as taxonomic descriptors of empirical patterns of ANS response, and may not map isomorphically onto functionally distinct underlying mechanisms” (Berntson et al., 1991: 460). While Autonomic modes are idealized states on a 2-D functional map of autonomic space, qualifying the exact state of the Sympathetic and Parasympathetic nervous systems is notoriously inexact (Berntson *et al.*, 1997). Both are connected to all the internal viscera and subject to opponent control mechanism via both vagal afferents and sympathetic afferents, as well as neuroendocrinial mechanisms for change via the HPA-axis (Craig, 2006). Moreover, internal monitoring of autonomic activity is exceedingly difficult (Berntson *et al.*, 1997), and external monitoring of physiological markers (e.g., heart rate, heart rate variability, blood pressure, finger temperature) often produce contradictory and ambiguous results under laboratory test conditions (Kreibig, 2010). Most studies of ANS function and emotion fail methodologically to be able to test both emotion coherence and specificity (Levenson, 2014). Experimental design must include empirical monitoring across levels (subjective, behavioral, physiological), temporal response across time, and coherence/specificity at the time of emotional experience (Levenson, 2014).

Additionally, would it be possible to feel the same primitive emotion from an event starting from two vastly different “geographic regions” on the ANS functional plane, such as already being in an aroused state of SNS activation (slightly raised heart rate and increased blood pressure) and slight PNS withdrawal (lower vagal tone) as compared to the opposite of SNS withdrawal (low heart rate and low blood pressure) and PNS activation (higher vagal tone). An actor in these oppositely paired states experiencing an unexpected stimulus in two trials that cause them to experience simultaneous uncoupled reciprocal PNS activation, meaning both different ANS starting points experience the same directional ANS modal change (vector). Would these not both produce a similar conceptualization of Trust, despite having different autonomic signatures since starting from different levels of SNS & PNS states? Would this be true of two actors from vastly different cultures?

The TCE claims the situated conceptualization comes from the retrieval from memory some previous experience that matches the error calculation producing a directional Autonomic modal change. However, conceptualization is oriented around similar actions, not similar autonomic states, and it is the direction of change that provides autonomic motivational and evaluative states that serve as selectors or enablers of particular classes of action. Perhaps it is through language that ultimately these two theories can be reconciled, as the EPA dimensions underlying semantic connotation of

cultural identities, roles, actions and modifiers represent a direction in vectorized EPA space (Heise, 2007). Perhaps the error calculation posited by the TCE produces some core affective value (valence and arousal level) towards which the ANS is adjusted, which then activates conceptualizations sharing that affective signature, for which the best fit given the current situation is selected. This produces a target state which requires micro-adjustment of both the SNS and PNS in some modal direction, no matter the current starting point. The feeling of this ANS modal vector then represents some common affective core around which the social action becomes associated and its overall adaptiveness for the current situation is assessed afterward, leading to a strengthening of the association if it provided an adaptive response. The larger the error calculation, the more strongly the change in autonomic directions and the more memorable the event, strengthening associative learning.

An agreement between this Color Theory of Emotion and the TCE's conception of emotion categorization can be found through the mapping of semantic emotion terms, which are culturally shared categorizations in EPA space related to concepts. This would require reconciling the motivational evaluative plane of the Social Self Model with the evaluative arousal plane of Core Affect. It is through language categorization the affective and conceptual worlds meet, and a third dimension of arousal to the E-P space is required to see a fuller picture, in 3-D.

The 2-D planes showing bivariate autonomic (Berntson *et al.*, 1990) and evaluative (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994) functional surfaces, are both highly abstract models of complex autonomic states in flux. The orientation of the two functional surfaces in those papers are not oriented the same, but the simple addition of the Emotion Modes from **Fig. 24.2** and **Fig. 24.3** applied to the original graphs show their relation:

Autonomic Space & Overlying Functional Surface




Fig. 24.4 - Autonomic 2-D Functional Surface w/ Modes -

Source: Berntson *et al.* (1991: Table 1, 463)




Fig. 24.5 - Bivariate Evaluative Plane w/ Modes -

Source: Cacioppo & Berntson (1994: Figure 1, 402)

However, both of these 2-D models roll the 3rd dimension of activation into the model, making these models of Core Affect which is orthogonal to the plane of the Social Self Model (Kervyn, *et al.*, 2013). However, the avoidance and approach are the basic, orthogonal universal dimensions of the Social Self Model, so both **Fig. 24.4** and **Fig. 24.5** are rolling up three dimensions into a 2-D functional surface. To understand emotion categorization requires three dimensions, for which the Semantic Differential's Evaluation, Potency, and Activity dimensions are universal orthogonal dimensions of affect. It also requires seeing the EPA dimensions in functional terms related to the neurophysiological emotion control system involving the Salience Network's core rAIC+ACC circuit as the seat of emotion awareness with the executive controls via high speed spindle neurons (Craig, 2006).

It is literally young children first learning language who identify, indirectly, the key to understanding how the three dimensions come to be, in the subject matter of their early language focus:

“Among the very first things very young children talk about are desires, perceptions and emotions... (about) what they and others want, see, and feel, rather than what they know or think about.” Gopnik et al. (1999: 42-43)

Desires, perceptions and emotions represent distinct mental states which as the focus of early language must mean they are operationally functional in children. They are produced by what Barrett (2011) terms psychological primitives: Core Affect, Conceptual System, and Controlled attention. These psychological primitives are functional, information processing systems which are recruited to produce affective mental states and the experience of emotion states. Even before linguistic fluency, children have developed not simply interest in other's and their own mental states, but these very mental state capabilities that are present from birth and developed through intersubjective engagement with caregivers wiring up right hemispheric dominant capabilities (Schore, 2006). By the second year as language is emerging and brain growth becomes left hemispheric dominant (Schore, 2006), emotions, desires and perceptions must already be functionally wired, yet untrained by the different patterns of social relational mods. These three mental states can be thought of as fundamental, functional subsystems of the brain, which for each vary according to two orthogonal dimensions to produce a 2-D functional surface in EPA affective space.

The key to conceptualizing this rather abstract conjecture is found, as Kemper (1978) so presciently notes, in the fact that potency and activation are aspects of a stimulus that is perceived through raw perception, a process involving conceptual categorization and cognitive representation (Barsalou, 2017), while evaluation is also a categorization of a higher logical type in that it is about a stimuli (Edelman, 1987).

“The three Semantic Differential factors are not homogeneous with respect to their underlying form. Specifically, potency and activity are properties of the stimulus that is being evaluated. On the other hand, evaluation is a property of the evaluator...thus, although there is some parallelism between activity (technical), potency (power), and evaluation (status), the parallelism breaks down at an important point. The technical, power, and status factors refer exclusively to the stimulus, whereas in the SD tradition, the activity and potency factors refer to the stimulus, and the evaluations factor refers to the evaluator or rater.” Kemper (1978: 366)


Attempts to correlate Power & Status with the EPA dimensions has been met with problems because the Activity is not social relational and is excluded as technical from the Power & Status model (Kemper, 1978). The Activity EPA dimension is uncorrelated with Evaluation (E) and Potency (P), as well as uncorrelated with the Warmth and Competence dimensions of the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008)(Fiske *et al.*, 2007) and not belonging in the same 2-dimensional space due to its relation to physical attributes rather than social stereotypes (Kervyn *et al.*, 2013). Activity are shown to yield fine gradations across a number of pure emotion terms, while combinations of high Evaluation and low Potency had no correlation with any emotion terms (Morgan & Heise, 1988).

The SCM’s warmth and competence were found to correlate with status and power, although with the caveat previously noted above, that they seem to have different meanings of Status, in that SCM’s warmth matches PStoE’s status (liking), but that the SCM refers to competence as status, while coldness (warmth’s opposite) is akin to power. Contradictions between the two analytics can be resolved by considering semantic EPA space and the fundamental dimensions of Affect, Motivation, and Perception combining both self and other perspectives.

A three dimensional space has, by definition, three fundamentally orthogonal dimensions, in EPA's case Evaluation, Potency, and Activation, which in a generic coordinate system could correspond to the y-zxis, x-axis, and z-axis, although they could be in any configuration. A 3-D space is composed of a triad of orthogonal 2-D sub-planes, with each sub plane having two orthogonal affective dimensions. Thus, combinations of two EPA dimensions represent fundamental 2-D sub-planes, and all semantic concepts can be located in EPA space by the Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1962).

Potency and Activation represent properties of the stimuli (Kemper, 1978) gathered through perception via different exteroceptive sensory (visual, auditory, olfaction, kinesthetic, taste) modalities directly as cognitive representations, rather than as some amodal perceptual intermediary that must then must be translated to representational form (Barsalou, 2017). Evaluation and Activation represent the affective internal state representing hedonic valence and arousal, the two core components of Core Affect (Russell, 2003), made possible through proprioceptive sensory (interoceptive...ie the body's readiness state) modalities. Evaluation and Potency represent the interactional, conceptual space representing the motivational plane, recognized in the Sociological tradition by status and power, the two core components of the Social Self Model found throughout analytics across the Social Sciences (Kemper & Collins, 1990).

Hypothetically, these EPA 2-D sub-planes measure covariance of two EPA dimensions corresponding to a functional plane of a psychological primitive (Barrett, 2011). These functional affective planes represent feeling space (Core Affect), interaction space (Power-Status), and perception space (Stimulus Categorizing), each contributing to control from different fundamental perspectives from which we come to know the world: the subjective, the interactive, the objective. The three orthogonal EPA sub-planes produce an octant model, as visualized below:

**Fig. 24.6** - Semantic EPA Octants locating Sensation, Motivation, Perception -

Source: graph image Wolfram Mathworld (2020)

The 3-D hypercube on the right in **Fig. 24.6**, has eight Octants formed by the intersection of the three quadrant sub planes. The three EPA dimensions are arbitrarily mapped to the coordinate lines of $x =$ Potency, $y =$ Evaluation, and $z =$ Activity. The **Core Affect** circumplex of **Fig. 12.1** as a quadrant model mapping sensation has valence (y-axis) & activation (z-axis) dimensions. The **Social Self** quadrant model representing motivational concepts maps evaluation (y-axis) & potency (x-axis) dimensions. The **Categorical Representation** quadrant model representing direct perception maps direct physical attributes of potency (x-axis) & activation (z-axis) dimensions. Each of the fundamental Octants (cubes) formed by the orthogonal relation of these planes, map to the Color Cells of Emotion corresponding to the Modes of Autonomic Control.

Access to different affective dimensions for each of three functional systems would imply differential performance for information processing tasks, such as inferences made against affective, motivational or perceptual conceptual spaces. Perhaps the origin of dispositional versus situational differences in social cognition lie in the reliance on one of these functional subsystems over another, as inferences made against perceptual conceptual space are more trait focused being tied to physical attributes of the stimulus, whereas inferences made against the motivational conceptual space include the intersubjective situation, without access to the physical activity affective dimension.

These functional planes correspond to psychological primitives having a 2-D functional space varying

over two affective dimensions representing fundamental perspectives of affect in the social dyad. Core Affect's valence and activation are subjective dimensions experienced as a feeling state, where activation of the ANS, influenced by current events, is evaluated as valence by the self, that can serve as a somatic marker of the event (Damasio, 2010), giving it a category of *firstness*. Evaluation can also be in relation to someone else in the social dyad, putting the self's core affect in relation to the dyadic situation, a social concept of concepts which provide a context and motivational direction for action, giving it a category of *secondness*. The objective dimension of direct perception of stimuli is a process of categorization represented in activation and potency affective dimensions, cognitive symbols giving it a category of *thirdness*. These are the symbolic dimensions that Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer, 1969) posits humans seek to understand their own and others' behavior symbolically through conceptual, affective EPA space.

Symbolic Interactionism combined with Control Theory (Powers, 1973), provides the theoretical basis for Affect Control Theory (Heise, 1976), which offers a well tested analytic theory with a mathematized set of equations operating on the affective EPA dimensions of semantic concepts describing the Social frame (Goffman, 1974) or situated conceptualization (Barsalou, 2015), both nested hierarchical structures of social representations of the present or imagined situation. All concepts of the social frame such as the identities, actions, and modifiers (nouns, verbs, adjectives) are located in EPA space (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1962), as are the emotion labels for structural emotions (Lively & Heise, 2014). The equations are able to compute the predicted effect of the social action on the actor, which provides differences in EPA 3-D space, which locate other semantic concepts matching the interpretations of meanings derived from the social action.

Affect Control Theory closely aligns with theories covered by this study across the ontological levels of Knowledge, in that symbolic language is used coordinate meaning culturally, which creates and defines social structures, which valued behaviors enact and expand upon, which are biased by our psychological modules engaged in information processing, which are constrained by the neurophysiological systems evolved to support the social and the self. How we affectively embody the world affects how we model the world symbolically, how we evaluate behavior, how we act towards others, and how we feel about ourselves. ACT provide an analytic model able to test the blending of emotions and their location in EPA space predicted by a Color Theory of Emotion in **Fig. 24.6**, which for simple blending of primaries would yield the following:

E/S Autonomic Modal Emotion Taxonomy


order	classic type	aspect	intensity	plutchik_label	valence	arousal	plutchik_primary	mod_exp_primary	autonomic_mode	mod_exp	activity
0 th	baseline		neutral	Rest							
1 st	primary		mild	Pensiveness	-	*			↓ DVC		
1 st	primary		base	Sadness	-	**	X		↓ DVC		
1 st	primary		intense	Grief	-	***			↓ DVC		
1 st	primary		mild	Serenity	+	*			↑ VVC		
1 st	primary		base	Joy	+	**	X		↑ VVC		
1 st	primary		intense	Ecstasy	+	***			↑ VVC		
1 st	primary		mild	Apprehension	-	*			↓ SNS		
1 st	primary		base	Fear	-	**	X		↓ SNS		
1 st	primary		intense	Terror	-	***			↓ SNS		
1 st	primary		mild	Annoyance	-	*			↑ SNS		
1 st	primary		base	Anger	-	**	X		↑ SNS		
1 st	primary		intense	Rage	-	***			↑ SNS		
1 st	expectation	attention	mild	Interest	+	*			↑ VVC + ↑ SNS		
1 st	expectation	attention	base	Anticipation	+	**			↑ VVC + ↑ SNS		
1 st	expectation	attention	intense	Vigilance	+	***	X		↑ VVC + ↑ SNS		
1 st	expectation	inattention	mild	Distraction	-	*			↓ DVC + ↓ SNS		
1 st	expectation	inattention	base	Surprise	-	**	X		↓ DVC + ↓ SNS		
1 st	expectation	inattention	intense	Amazement	-	***			↓ DVC + ↓ SNS		
1 st	sanction	reward	mild	Acceptance	+	*			↑ VVC + ↓ SNS		
1 st	sanction	reward	base	Trust	+	**			↑ VVC + ↓ SNS		
1 st	sanction	reward	intense	Admiration	+	***	X		↑ VVC + ↓ SNS		
1 st	sanction	punish	mild	Boredom	-	*			↓ DVC + ↑ SNS		
1 st	sanction	punish	base	Disgust	-	**			↓ DVC + ↑ SNS		
1 st	sanction	punish	intense	Loathing	-	***			↓ DVC + ↑ SNS		
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Optimism	++	**	Joy	Anticipation	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Love	++	**	Joy	Trust	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Submission	-	**	Fear	Trust	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Awe	-	**	Fear	Surprise	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Disapproval	-	**	Sadness	Surprise	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Remorse	-	**	Sadness	Disgust	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Contempt	-	**	Anger	Disgust	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	blend	base	Aggression	-	**	Anger	Anticipation	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Amusement	+	**	Joy	Surprise	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Gluttony	+	**	Joy	Disgust	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Disobedience	-	**	Fear	Disgust	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Trepidation	-	**	Fear	Anticipation	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Unhappiness	-	**	Sadness	Anticipation	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Loneliness	-	**	Sadness	Trust	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Jealousy	-	**	Anger	Trust	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	base	Frustration	-	**	Anger	Surprise	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Zeal	+	***	Ecstasy	Vigilance	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Devotion	+	***	Ecstasy	Admiration	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Subservience	-	***	Terror	Admiration	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Petrification	-	***	Terror	Amazement	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Horror	-	***	Grief	Amazement	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Shame	-	***	Grief	Loathing	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Hatred	-	***	Rage	Loathing	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	blend	intense	Domination	-	***	Rage	Vigilance	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Euphoria	+	***	Ecstasy	Amazement	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Hubris	+	***	Ecstasy	Loathing	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Control	-	***	Terror	Loathing	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Dread	-	***	Terror	Vigilance	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Suffering	-	***	Grief	Vigilance	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Sympathy	-	***	Grief	Admiration	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Envy	-	***	Rage	Admiration	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	intense	Exasperation	-	***	Rage	Amazement	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Bemusement	+	*	Serenity	Interest	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Acknowledgement	+	*	Serenity	Acceptance	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Acquiescence	-	*	Apprehension	Acceptance	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Wariness	-	*	Apprehension	Distraction	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Dismay	-	*	Pensiveness	Distraction	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Listlessness	-	*	Pensiveness	Boredom	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Impatience	-	*	Annoyance	Boredom	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	blend	mild	Disfavor	-	*	Annoyance	Interest	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Buoyancy	+	*	Serenity	Distraction	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Sloth	+	*	Serenity	Boredom	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Delinquency	-	*	Apprehension	Boredom	↓ DVC + ↑ SNS	AVOID	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Unease	-	*	Apprehension	Interest	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Pessimism	-	*	Pensiveness	Interest	↑ VVC + ↑ SNS	EXPECTED	passive
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Insecure	-	*	Pensiveness	Acceptance	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Curiosity	-	*	Annoyance	Acceptance	↑ VVC + ↓ SNS	APPROACH	active
1 st	subtle	pseudo	mild	Irritation	-	*	Annoyance	Distraction	↓ DVC + ↓ SNS	UNEXPECTED	passive

Fig. 24.7 - Primary E/S Emotion Blending

While Plutchik's blending of primary emotions are limited to adjacent primaries, **Fig. 24.7** expands blending to both adjacent and reciprocal emotions, corresponding to the uncoupled ANS Mode emotion cells varying over the full reciprocal and coupled nonreciprocal ANS mode emotion cells. This is analogous to Color vision's Blue-Yellow (+B-Y, -B+Y) and Red-Green (+R-G, -R+G) cells varying over Light-Dark (+L-D, -L+D). In Color Cells of Emotion terms, Anger-Fear and Satisfaction-Depression (Joy & Sadness in **Fig. 24.7**) (both Uncoupled) can vary over both Anticipation-Surprise (coupled nonreciprocal) and Trust-Disgust (reciprocal) modes. Analogous to the color cell firing patterns of base-rate firing of each cell while one Color rate is activated to produce the experience of that color, emotion emerges when the emotion "cells" firing at base rates simply refers to an uncoupled autonomic modal state crossed with a directional change that is reciprocal or coupled nonreciprocal. The emotions, both primary and blended, have autonomic modals signatures in each of the eight combinations of SNS and PNS increase, decrease, or unchanged.

Activation levels in color vision are represented by the intensity of cell firing, while for Emotion "cells" the analogue is in the energy expenditure to adjust the autonomic SNS and PNS computed by size of error computation, the degree of change, having no "functionally distinct underlying mechanisms" (Berntson et al., 1991: 460). These are captured in **Fig. 24.7** in mild and intense variants for each of the primary emotion "cells." The secondary blends are simultaneous "firing" of an uncoupled emotion cell (a change to either SNS or PNS) blended with a reciprocal or coupled nonreciprocal emotion cell while the other remains at "base rate" or no change. The basis for this conjecture of blending related to the crossing uncoupled with the "corner" modes resides in Thamm's E-S paradigm's Expectations (prediction) and Sanctions (motivation) correspondence with Anticipation-Surprise and Trust-Disgust.

The production of the various shades of blended emotion labels (categories) could be further discriminated through placement in EPA octant space across each of the combinations to provide constraints and dynamics of measuring relation between emotion concepts semantically (cf Scherer 2005: 720)(cf Morgan & Heise, 1998). Once such visualization of a taxonomy of emotion blends could be the following:

**Fig. 24.8 - Primary E/S Emotion Taxonomy**

Kemper's (1978) proposed typology of general emotion categories includes a distinction between Structural, Anticipatory and Consequent categories. All three categories are related to comparisons of Power and Status levels as being adequate, excessive or insufficient, providing a range over which emotions can vary in intensity as feedback and expected patterns of ANS regulation. Thamm characterizes the three categories as the before-change, transition, and after-change stages of social change dynamics, with Structural representing the before-change, Anticipatory the transition stage, and Consequent the after-change. These vary temporally and invite comparisons to the internal triadic I-you-me structure and the Semiotic synthesized by Wiley, which might explain the moment to moment interrelation of Prediction, Autonomic activation, Conceptual meaning, and emotion regulation.

The mapping of the autonomic modes to the Social Self Model is guided by the ANS Threat Response Matrix (**Fig. 9.3**) as well as by the BIAS emotions which provoke uncoupled autonomic mode responses corresponding to emotion categories in reaction to the BIAS emotion in each quadrant. However, the real test is to situate the Co-Activation, Co-Inhibition and Reciprocal ANS modes, which is attempted below.




Fig. 24.9 - Modes of Autonomic Control Social Self Mapping

The Co-Inhibition (Surprise) and Co-Activation (Anticipation) modes align run along the horizontal axis in **Fig. 24.9**, representing the spectrum across which both the Sympathetic and Parasympathetic run from inhibition to activation to handle environmental challenges (*cf* Porges, 2001: 136). The horizontal axis represents the dimension of the Approach drive, running from low to high. This orientation agrees with supporting evidence from the horizontal alignment of increased autonomy via self-regulation, as anticipatory social competence is gained during social development.

Conversely, Surprise involves freezing to assess unexpected stimuli, leading to either Fear or Immobilization responses until the stimuli is assessed and prepared for, requiring activation in the direction of Anticipation.

The Reciprocal modes align with the vertical axis, representing the more defensive oriented Avoidance dimension, which runs from low to high, producing feelings ranging from Trust (low Avoidance) to Distrust (high Avoidance). These two modes agree in orientation with the Universal Dimensions across analytics related to group dynamics of Inclusion/Exclusion. VVC activation leads to affiliative behavior producing feelings of Trust in the Social Warmth/high Community direction. In the opposite direction, Social Coldness/low Community typify Sympathetic activation combined with PNS withdrawal. Moral disgust has been shown to have an Autonomic signature SNS reciprocal activation, differing from physiological disgust, which differentiates the Disgust in the Social Self Model's evaluative plane as sociomoral (Ottaviani *et al.*, 2013), thought to have been repurposed by social judgment (Rozin *et al.*, 1999).

The judgment of social behavior in social action through social cognition originates from the “perspective-dependent differences in accessibility and applicability of competence and moral categories” (Wojciszke, 1994: 222). The first is judgment in moral terms, which tends to be observational and dispositional in nature, where social actor's intended goal is evaluated as a disposition/trait of the actor's character. The other is judgment in competence terms, which tends to be self-directed and situational in nature, in which causes of action are attributed to situational influences up on the social actor's “efficiency of goal attainment.”

These two categories are orthogonal and can vary in relation to each other (Wojciszke, 1994), such that it creates four patterns of High Competence/Morality, Low Competence/Morality, Hi Comp/Low Morality, Low Comp/High Morality. These are directly mappable to the Social Self Model, in which Morality runs along the vertical Social axis from high morality at the top to low at the bottom. Competence runs along the horizontal axis, with high competence on the right, while low competence on the left. The universal dimensions of the Social Self Model help orient social judgment of behavior in relation to each of the analytics from theories ranging from the Cultural, Social, Interpersonal, Psychological, & Physiological levels.

However, affect and cognition and perception (feeling and thinking and awareness) are not separate ontologically, but part of the same information processing in the brain (Duncan & Barrett, 2007). The “affective” dimensions of the EPA, when taken in pairs, represent different perspectives on information processing from our human perspective, which are functionally recognized as different things although those differences are not ontological realities, but rather subject to the Psychologist’s Fallacy, about which “*Dewey (1894) wrote, ‘is to confuse the standpoint of the observer and explainer with that of the fact observed’* (p. 555; see also James, 1890/1950, p. 196)” (Duncan & Barrett, 2007: 1185).

Emotion, Motivation, and Perception/Cognition and are different domains of functional information processing, each using different aspects of affect in order to make sense of the internal, external, and shared sense of the world. This study posits this affective connotative space emerges from the opponent control functioning of the three emotion subsystems of the autonomic nervous system, mapping a functional space, connecting the system of inner feeling to all living things shared symbolically. The symbolic system that emerges from the cultural coordination of internal affect to external concepts via these three functional systems produce the subjective, intersubjective, and objective perspectives. Although the human ANS has evolved in such a way as to support the detached symbolic reference to this affective system allowing us to communicate very discretely about our subjective realities, other species share this autonomic space and it is used by automated control processes to adjust behavior motivationally. However, humans can become consciously aware of this system.

With a testable Color Theory of Emotion, it would be possible to map a complete emotion taxonomy using Thamm’s E-S paradigm to situate emotions in microinteraction correlated with autonomic functioning and semantic meaning.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Social Structure & Emotion

“Power-status attributions, distributions, and interactions are components of universal social structures, and when appraised predict universal complex emotions syndromes.”
Thamm (2004: 207)

By viewing all the evidence presented so far from an integral perspective, it is now possible to unify Sociological, Psychological and Neurophysiological theories of emotion, connecting the Power/Status Theory of Emotion (Kemper, 1987)(Thamm, 2004, 2007), Plutchik's Evolutionary Emotion Theory (2001), the OCC model (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988), ANS activation (Kemper, 1987)(Berntson *et al.*, 1991), Affect Regulation (Schore, 2000), Emotional Segue (Lively & Heise, 2014), Polyvagal Theory (Porges, 2010), and Constructed Emotion Theory (Barrett, 2017). A unified theory of emotion reveals a beautiful symmetry that's able not only to account for a taxonomy of emotion categories, but also to reveal the underlying structural patterns of behavior which construct social structure.

Thamm's Power/Status Theory of Emotion provides the systematic framework for integrating appraisal, discreet and social interactional emotion theories, offering a notational system for mapping out all the interactional relationships between Power & Status, each of which would produce distinct emotion categories. Recall that **Fig. 8.5** shows the structural emotional components of a Power Advantaged comparison, one of the 16 combinations of Power & Status dyadic comparison. Thamm's notation system can be further systematized by seeing the relationship between Self & Other incorporated into his E-S paradigm. The four matrix positions in the notation represent a row of Expectations (top) & Sanctions (bottom) and columns of Self (left) and Other. These actually can be seen as related to the Social Self Model, where Expectations = high Group, Sanctions = low Group, Self = low Autonomy and Other = high Autonomy. Thus, not only can the interiors of each PSToE notation be oriented to the model, but the 16 Power & Status combinations can be oriented into the Social Self Model.

The set of subtle emotions for a Power Advantage relation outlined by Thamm were shown in the bottom right panel of **Fig. 8.5**. Three relational comparisons comprise the Balance Theory mode match the comparative emotional components of the E-S diagram: Distribution comparisons (horizontal between Ego and Alter), Interaction comparisons (diagonally between Ego and Alter), and Attribution comparisons (vertical), which can be remembered D-I-A and form appraisals of the social actions. These are labeled as sides of the triadic forms from balance theory, which model three social relations which can each provide an emotional appraisal if attended to (Distribution: $P(+/-) > O$, Interaction: $O(+/-) > X$, Attribution: $P(+/-) > X$). Additionally, there are four perspectives of DIA interactions each with a balance graphs, representing each of the four subtle (3-component) emotions, whose decoding Thamm (2007) stated was beyond the scope of his paper. The four triads per PSToE diagram show subtle emotions composed of three 2-component emotions, each a side of the balance graph. Additionally, two pairs of subtle emotions inform about the model of Ego, while the other two inform about the model of Alter, although both are from the point of view of Ego. The point of view of Alter are the mirror opposite diagram model connected either vertically (left) or horizontally (right).

The full decoding of the 24 different subtle emotion categories requires estimating the composite of each's three 2-component pairs, which Thamm posited is a job for semantic analysis (Thamm, 2007). The subtle emotions represent self-conscious and other-conscious first order social emotions which trigger second-order emotions. The detailed description of the rules of the Bengkulu rules for emotions about others compiled by Fessler (1990, p.23) provides a logic to decode the first four subtle emotions of Contempt, Pity, Envy and Admiration from **Fig. 16.2**. These emotion displays produce second-order self-conscious emotions in others, which helps to decode which PSToE diagrams have hidden emotions like Shame and Pride, the emotional basis of social structure (Scheff, 1988). Thus, a detailed review of emotion terms generated by D-I-A triplet relations could theoretically show how emotions like Humiliation, Embarrassment, Hubris, Remorse are generated from social interaction. Affect Control Theory's INTERACT software should be able to model and verify. However, the Subtle taxonomy can be decoded through logical evaluation of emotion blending and emotional label definitions and relationships, as in **Fig. 25.1** below. It is left up to the community of readers to guess at the full decoding of the Subtle emotions and thus the Self-Conscious emotions.




Fig. 25.1 - Conflict Interactional Subtle Emotions - Source: Thamm (2004, 2007)

A few notes are in order to explain the labeling of the different subtle emotion categories in **Fig. 25.1.**, because there appears to be an inconsistency between Thamm's nomenclature and Fessler's depiction of first order Other-Evaluative emotions (third column) which give rise to second order Self-Conscious emotions of Pride and Shame. The third column of Subtle Emotions in **Fig. 25.2** below shows the familiar BIAS emotions of Admiration, Contempt, Pity, and Envy, with corresponding comparison emotional components (the triad of emotions below each Subtle form) that explain the overall Subtle emotion category. For the Status Advantage/Disadvantage pairings, the other evaluative emotions of Admiration and Contempt match the expected attributional E/S forms that agree with the BIAS positions in the Social Self Model. Thus, recall those whom are judged to be Admirable are those whom meet Expectations and receive rewards, with an attributional structure (vertical) of (+ +), while those judged with Contempt neither meet Expectations nor receive rewards, with a structure of (- -). However, for the Power Advantage/Disadvantage pairings, the 2-category triad of emotions don't seem to make up the correct constituent emotions that make up Pity and Envy. Precisely, the distributional comparison of expectations that lead to feelings of Inferior and Superior seem to be reversed for these two cases, conflicting with Fessler's (1999) account of the emotion building blocks that blend to product Pity and Envy.

As mentioned earlier, an explanation for this might be that the two Power and Status contexts trigger different conceptions for inferiority and superiority. Power dynamics focus on differentials of power, where power conflicts occur with complementary Power forms (powerful - powerless), while symmetrical power dynamics are Consensus forms. The context of power may actually make the attributional relationship comparing levels of Power salient, altering the inferiority or superiority.

The expectation differential in conflicts are assured by the complementary power forms, where a difference in distribution is guaranteed. In the context of Power, a guaranteed outcome where Power acquires rewards without meeting expectations is structural rather than being a result of interaction or consequent (Kemper, 1978). Therefore, the other-evaluative Subtle form for Power conflicts involve an emotion dynamic which produces pseudo forms of Pride and Envy from the Other's Expectation structure and the Contribution interaction in which Alter's emotion reaction is lacking, explained below. This would bring the Other-evaluative first order emotions into agreement with both second order Self-conscious emotions (Fessler, 1999) and the BIAS emotions of the SCM (Cuddy et al., 2008).




Fig. 25.2— Self-Conscious Subtle Emotion Categories — Sources: Thamm (1992, 2004, 2007)

Fessler's (1999) characterization of the logic of Envy is produced in Ego when Alter is superior to Ego, Alter has something Ego desires, and Ego has hostility towards Alter. Similarly the logic of Pity is produced when Alter is inferior to Ego, Ego has something Alter does not, and Ego has affection for Alter. In Fig. 16.3 earlier, when mapped to Thamm's E/S paradigm, the logics for these two

emotions are reversed. This study suggests a second form of Pity and Envy exist comprised by different emotion structures in Power contexts, where superiority is defined as using power to get rewards, while meeting expectations and not getting rewards is an inferior position. Instead in **Fig 25.2**, second order Hubris and Overt/Undifferentiated Shame are generated by different emotion structures, which can be explained when seeing the emotions through Alter's eyes.

In the Envy case, the elemental judgment of Other in terms of affection or hostility is instead defined by their meeting or not meeting expectations and the Interactional contribution of Ego is compared. Thus, when Alter does not meet expectations but gets rewards (Power-superior), the contribution emotion is generosity, which expects a gratitude in return from Alter. However, without that gratitude, it makes Ego's contribution thankless and creates a type of hostility that creates Envy. From Alter's point of view and superior power differential, receiving rewards is a sign of "respect" or Admiration, yet the underlying emotion in Alter's negative Self-attribution of manipulative accompanied by Ego's negative assessment, sours the Admiration making any show of Pride a false one, instead approaching Hubris.

In the case of Pity, when Alter meets expectations (Ego impressed with Alter) but doesn't get rewards (Powerless-inferior), then Ego's contribution emotion is Regret, which expects Anger in return from Alter. From Ego's point of view, the emotion structure of powerless elicits Compassion. However, the inferior, low Power position of Alter is Submissive, which would not register as Anger. From Alter's point of view, not receiving rewards is expected with Ego's positive Impression and Compassion warm emotions, approximating Ego's blended emotion like Pity.

These points are very speculative, but the contextual reversal of inferiority and superiority in Power relations must alter the structural emotion dynamics, and for the other-evaluative emotions to agree with Fessler's second order logic and the SCM's placement of BIAS emotions requires using different comparison structures, in these cases interactional. There may be in fact, two forms of Envy and Pity, one in the context of Power dynamics that focuses on interactional dimensions, and one in terms of expectations when the use of Power is alter, and meeting expectations changes the definition of Inferior and Superior, which causes the definition of Pity and Envy to reverse. It may also be the case Thamm's notation must be altered to agree with Fessler's & Cuddy *et al*'s accounts.

Importantly, Fessler's (1999) account of the rules in Bengkulu culture regulating Shame-like and Pride-like emotions reveal the evolutionary logic which lead to the emergence of second order emotions of emotions. They inform the observer about Other's view of the observer, which provided symbolic reference, the first steps toward self-awareness. Shame and Pride are particularly important second order emotions, for they are universal second order emotions which guide social behavior via the internalization of social norms, causing prosocial behavior either through adherence to social norms (conformity) or high valence prosocial emotions from making others feel good, integral in Social Structure (Scheff, 1994).

Shame and Pride's construction using the nomenclature of the PStoE involve the 3-category Subtle emotions. Other-evaluative emotions (Contempt, Pity, Envy and Admiration) are the third column of subtle emotions, as in **Fig. 25.3**. These are outward displays representing moral judgments of others, arising implicitly from particular structures of Power and Status relation. Each of these other-evaluative emotions are found in the Conflict Interactions between Power and Status. They can also appear as subtle emotion combination in the Mixed forms which Thamm ignores because of their unlikely interactions. The detailed structure of these other-focused subtle emotions are worth taking a deeper look.

Rules for constructing the second order emotions are as follows:

- Univalent (Bypassed) Pride: arises from being the object of Admiration
- Univalent (Bypassed) Shame: arises from being the object of Contempt
- Ambivalent (Overt) Pride: arises from being the object of Envy
- Ambivalent (Overt) Shame: arises from being the object of Pity

The difficulty in their decoding is a cultural norm or feeling rule, which other cultures do not necessarily have, evidenced by Fessler's study of the Bengkulu culture and their social awareness of Shame-like and Pride-like emotions. Culture differ in their awareness and valuation of emotions, resulting in different valued identities and behaviors, which in part explains the misunderstanding that can occur when trying to understand foreign practices that are different than what in our own culture is conventional. The cultural diversity results from the history of people over a long time fitting into a niche that's influenced by the innate psychological responses evoked by environmental cues, by interactions with other cultures, by the sheer happenstance of historical chance, by the

ingenuity of people making unique contributions to the culture. No culture can claim superiority nor can they be deemed inferior, for all are unique across an unfathomable large number of factors.

What they do share in common is in the pancultural universals which the IToCE is trying to piece together to show the underlying system of systems influencing cultural change.

The relationship between the 16 different 4-category Power & Status combinations (of which 8 are simply mirror images of the other 8) creates an interesting pattern which, when mapped together, helps to visualize the systematic dynamics of social interaction guided by Status and Power, producing structural emotion categories. The PStoE diagrams sort systematically into the neatly ordered and symmetrical pattern in **Fig. 25.3** below. It should be noted that the four quadrants in **Fig. 25.3** are **not directly mapped to cultural level worldviews**, as worldviews do not participate in Power and Status interaction, individuals do. Those individuals use various combinations of Power and Status throughout interaction with many different people and in many different settings. While it may be claimed that people tend to habitually exhibit particular tendencies is fair, but interactions with other individuals sharing or having different worldviews can include many of thees interactional patterns of power and status use.




Fig. 25.3 – PStoE Structural Emotion Categories – Sources: Thamm (2004, 2007)

The patterns of Power and Status dyadic structures in **Fig. 25.3** represent the sixteen different configurations, half of which are mirror images. This symmetrical alignment shows the conflict structures in the center, which are consistent in their interactional diagonals, which is true also of the corner structures, showing both Self and Other mirroring each other. The other structures in **Fig. 25.3** represent inconsistent relations, as the interactional diagonals are mismatched, which reflects low probabilities of interaction (Thamm, 2004). Therefore, Power conflicts reflect tendency for

interaction, while Status conflicts reflect no interaction between high status and low status.

The incompatibility of inconsistent interactions in which one interactant is labeled as being a power combination versus one in a status alignment, which this study labels as ambivalent interactions. Thamm left these diagrams undocumented and stated in most cases they rarely led to interaction because of inconsistency in agreement about norms, represented by the diagonal interactional relations within each square. Their different sets of emotion structures do not match the expected categories. This may reflect incompatibility between Power and Status frames, analogous to Relational Model Theory's incompatibility between Mods, although each Mod expresses all of these Structural relations, although perhaps favors some structures over others.

However, evidence from the structure of communication gives some evidence of the dynamics involved in Power-Status structures in **Fig. 25.3**. The diagonals represent consistent, stable power status conflict structures, while the corners represent consistent stable cooperative consensus structures. The edges represent inconsistent, social structures which lead to misunderstanding.

The study of the pragmatics of communication has found two types of interactional patterns, termed complementary and symmetrical interactional styles, which are types of “behavioral gestalts” between the dyad that produce stable forms (Watzlawick *et al.*, 1967: 67-71). The complementary interactional style produces a balance between assertive and submissive behaviors which complement each other based on the *maximization* of difference of behavior. The complementary style has two positions which interlock either as a “one-up” or “one-down” position, not good or bad, but in relationship which evoke behaviors which complement one another (as in parent-child dyad). The symmetrical interactional form produces a competitive boasting behavioral pattern arising from symmetrical interaction based on the *minimization* of difference of behavior. Both communication modes have both stable forms, as well as a “potentially pathological forms (escalation in symmetry and rigidity in complementary)” (Watzlawick *et al.*, 1967: 69).

These two styles in communication have behavioral analogues which manifest in **Fig. 25.3**. About the inconsistent interactional emotion substructures, which are found in comparisons between high and low Status, Thamm states that “actors tend to avoid interaction with incongruent others” and that “some status differences in the structure of social action tend to produce emotions that are

distancing and alienating" (2006: 205). Here Thamm is referring to the diagonal relationships within a single notation, which for Power relationships, interactions are congruent (signs match) while for Status relationships, signs are mismatched. However, the larger pattern of the mismatches connecting mirror image relationships between adjacent quadrants, there is another order of mismatch in that the interactional diagonals are neither both congruent or incongruent but completely mismatched. They can be said to be differences in complementary or symmetrical relational forms (Habermas, 1990).

The key to understanding the miscommunication occurring between people interacting with mixed Power and Status comparisons (the four outer patterns connecting adjacent quadrants) rests in the expectation and sanction pairings that are mismatched in these pairings. This produces expectations for predictable emotion patterns that are not met because one side is expecting a Power dyadic form which can be said to usually be complementary, while the other expects a symmetrical Status form. Their mix produces emotion categories from emotion substructures that don't fit the logic for the other form, resulting in emotional self-alienation (ESA) (Szanto, 2017) from evoked feelings which aren't appropriately matched to their expected form.

The distributional, attributional and interactional structures that make up the Subtle ambivalent forms create mismatches in the expectations and sanctions. The incompatibility between the two produce structural emotion categories which don't make sense for the relational logic whether complementary or symmetrical. The familiar patterns we see between individuals and groups of compatible and stable Power and Status diagrams produce stable sets of interactional patterns and stable structural emotions. Similarly, the unpaired corner diagrams have stable structure leading to stable interactional patterns and stable structural emotions.

The relationship between the diagonal opposite relational styles show a consistent structure & common interactional patterns of complementary Power or Status interactions. Consistent pairings reflect the agreement on norms for behavior, yielding consistent interactions, while inconsistency reveals discord of norms. This inconsistency occurs because of a mismatch in pairing one actor in a Power attributional state paired with the other in a Status attributional state. While these interaction tendency groupings resemble the quadrants of Social Self Model, they can occur within any or across quadrants, as they simply reflect interaction between two people having certain levels of power and

status, although the dynamics scale to groups. However, the accumulation of microinteraction of similar behavior across a great many individuals creates social structure, and these interaction tendencies create social structure. Thus, the consistent interactions create social structural patterns which at the cultural level influence what norms are valued and internalized while the behaviors are copied and externalized.

“Oppressive anxiety may include activities ranging from Self shaming, belittling, demoting, demeaning, depreciating, or rejecting Other, to an outright use of humiliation. All of these tactics are designed to confirm Self’s emerging victorious superiority in the relation.

Although there may be a degrading sympathy for Other, it is secondary to Self’s motive to gain honor, prestige or esteem, and to dominate the status relationship.” Thamm (2004: 217)

The PSToE also models the emotion effects in a process dimension of Power and Status. Emotions which occurs in the process of change from one losing power or status or gaining power and status, must differ from the structural emotions from having those traits. Structural traits of Power and Status are normally static and unchanging. Thamm theorizes that social processes goes “from an old stability, to instability, and then to a new stability; from certainty, to uncertainty, to certainty again” (Thamm, 2004: 207). This produces anticipatory anxiety that varies from positive hopes to negative fears. During the transitional stage, when the outcome is unclear, the prospect of losing power or status drives anxiety in all interactants. This changes the makeup of emotion blends of interactional relations, which carry an anxiety transition from one distribution to another.

The comparison emotion relations as well as subtle emotions built from 2-component comparison emotions change yielding different sets of emotions after a reversal. A single PSToE diagram alone shows a structural comparison, but a transition diagram shows a combined before change and after change notation with associated anxiety. Power anxieties can be characterized as Offensive or Defensive in the case of power struggles, while Status anxieties would be Oppressive or Depressive. Associated with changes to power attributions are feelings of injustice, which represent judgments of fairness. Appraisals of deserving or undeserving also accompany these changes. “Change of power and status relations result in both actors changing their appraisals of who is undeserving of the punishments and deserving of rewards.” (Thamm, 2004: 210).




Fig. 25.4 - PStoE Reversing Status Relations - Source: Thamm (2004, 2007)

Fig. 25.4 shows a Status Reversal notation, from a disadvantaged to advantaged Status position. The structural comparison and subtle emotions essentially flip to their opposite pairs in the before-and after-change structures. The important part of reversals and social change is that anxieties emerge during transition which result in instability and gradual shifting of devious action by the actor trying to acquire Power (in the case of power), or in the case of Status, the change in deference to status results in demeaning and deferring, with the demeaning substructure of emotion during these changes resulting in displays of disrespect and dishonor. These status substructures involve the losing or gaining of respect for the other, which produces either oppressive or depressive anxiety. These processes result in the changing of the meaning of injustice for whomever emerges with the advantage (Thamm, 2004).

The expectation and motivation scales in the center of **Fig. 25.4** represent different levels of

Expectation of outcome and Motivation level after the change. These scales have been added by the IToCE emotion theory to augment Thamm's conception of two dimensions of expectancy and sanction. The degree to which the levels of either change increases the intensity of anxiety during the transition and especially the emotions produced by the outcomes. Failure to anticipate the changes of a negative outcome increases the negative intensity of the resultant emotions, corresponding to autonomic co-inhibition, while anticipation of the outcome results in autonomic co-activation accompanied more positive feelings. Similarly, the intensity of emotions can produce different levels of motivation to sanction with punishment or reward, increasing or decreasing the degree of avoidance or approach to the other. These two measures, Expectation and Sanction, correspond to Core Affect's activation and valence, affecting the nuance of corresponding 2-category and 3-category emotions.

The Power & Status comparison diagrams (16 total) are each composed of at least 15 possible emotions, representing various combinations: eight Primary, eight Distributional, eight Attributional, eight Interactional, 32 Subtle and 16 emotion syndromes. These represent emotion categories that could be felt through appraisal during interaction, although most go unappraised unless salient to the situation. Thamm's model posits these emotions categories are available for appraisal by the conscious expansion and attention to the many different relational perspectives in social interaction. Thamm's model could be extended to understand the emotion dynamics at the macro level of groups, perhaps discovering other sets of relations between groups that do not appear in individuals.

Affect Control Theory may very well be able to confirm the PStoE emotion model. ACT provides a mathematical model for simulating emotion generation and could model the PStoE Expectation and Sanction (E-S) paradigm and transitional emotion dynamics. ACT simulates the expectations and sanctions people make when enacting role relationships, modeling how people behave as individuals shaped by language, experience and impressions (Wiggins & Heise, 1988). "As individuals seek experiences confirming their sentiments, they construct behavioral expectations for role identities, label or attribute character traits to people in order to comprehend deviance, and experience emotions that reflect successes and failures of the confirmation process." (Lively & Heise, 2014: 1110). The meeting of expectations of social actors produces positive emotions, while expectations not met produces negative emotion and sanctioning behavior. Sanctions also produce similar

emotion categories as the Thamm's theory of Emotion posits.

If the state of the ANS emotion subsystems are recognizable and encoded into the affective meaning of language symbolically representing concepts in affective space, it should be possible to understand how emotions are expressed in the body. Affect Control Theory's mathematized model to produce a predictive theory of action, identity and emotion (Heise, 2001) provides the tools to test this. It should be theoretically possible to build Thamm's proposed "Periodic Table of Emotion" from the combination of these two models.

Wiggins and Heise make the point that "extending role explanations to individual conduct, and to support its claim as a general theory of action...(requires) show(ing) that ACT does model how people behave as individuals" (1988: 154). This makes sense, since criticism of Symbolic Interactionism and ACT is that role-identities are simply patterns of behavior, not causative of behavior (Wiggins & Heise, 1988). However, empirical testing of actual subjects' answers to properly formed studies of Expectation and Sanctioning and the subsequent production of emotions match closely the ACT simulated model of social behavior (Wiggins & Heise, 1988: 163), so integrating the PStoE into ACT could solve social emotion decoding and provide a solid base for understanding human emotion and adding to a new synthesis.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

Moral Judgment & Emotion

*“When a **goal** varies as a function of situation and differs consistently among individuals, it is called a **motive**, but when the same goal is consistent and the widely shared it is called a **value**. When a shared goal is observed from the point of view of its functions for the collectivity, it is called a **norm**, and when individuals insist that they and others must pursue it, it is called a **moral standard**. When people justify the legitimacy of a social system with reference to such a purpose, it is called an **ideology**.” Fiske (1992: 698)*

Jonathan Haidt’s *Righteous Mind* introduced Moral Foundations Theory to the general public and reinvigorated psychological study of moral judgment. Its subtitle sought to answer “why good people are divided by politics and religion,” which according to MFT, was due to a handful of moral intuitions honed by evolution through the process of human cultural evolution. These intuitions act as the building blocks from which cultural systems coalesce around the rules of the game that regulate group living, who is in the group and who is out.

However, does simply knowing that there are intuitional moral foundations explain “why good people are dividing by politics and religion,” or explain simply that they are divided? What would ultimately answer the why, how and what causes these foundations to emerge and not others? And why are moral foundations *not* “equipotential” or “equally likely” (Joseph *et al.*, 2009) to be held by those having different ideological positions? How are emotions involved and perhaps essential to the psychological foundations which underly morality?

Fiske’s (1992) quote above provides a roadmap towards putting the puzzle together, while the following quote expands on that proposition to identify the full accounting of phenomena across all ontological levels as ultimately necessary to explain morality:

“Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities,

institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life possible.” Haidt & Kesebir (2010: 800)

Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) attempts to provide the foundational building blocks, spurred by the research of his academic mentor Fiske’s Relational Models Theory (see **Fig. 4-1**), as well as Fiske’s mentor Shweder’s Big “Three” Ethics (see **Fig. 1-3**), both originating from cross-cultural research attempting to find universals of social relations and moral judgment, respectively. Each emerged from research of cultural systems valuing aspects of morality that differed from modern, Western theoretical models tending to focus more on individuals and rights, whereas much of the world focuses on duty and purity (Haidt, 2012). All of these theories are examples of theories of constrained relativism (Verweij, 2007), an umbrella term for theories constrained and grounded in the realities of social-neurological evidence. Such theories can be thought of as TYPE theories, where the vast array of difference across human systems and behavior emerge from a combinatorial system involving a small set of basic units (Verweij, 2007).

Moral Foundations Theory exemplifies a constrained relativistic theory, where such types aren’t seen as mutually exclusive, but rather functioning together to different degrees producing variation among cultures and subcultures, which weight the six foundations to vary degrees, creating signature clusters. The foundations are characterized as moral “tastebuds” over which cultural “tastes” differ (Haidt, 2012). Yet, while MFT provides an empirical framework for measuring these clusters, why the clusters have these particular tastebud “signatures” is not explained by the theory. Bruce (2013) sought to unify MFT and the Big “Three” Ethics with Plural Rationality Theory’s cultural biases, to create an empirical framework for testing “how and why people behave the way they do” according to their political worldview and cultural biases (p. 44).

Despite its popularization and influence within Moral Psychology, other theories take issue with MFT, both theoretically and empirically. Some from within moral psychology characterize MFT’s list of foundations as lacking. Graham *et al.* (2013) explain MFT is not meant to be exhaustive of all the possible foundations and is open to revision, other theories offer more systematic approaches towards enumerating the core moral foundations. One such theory critiques MFT’s characterization of the Loyalty-Authority-Purity binding foundations as un-moral, citing their correlation with

ideological movements which have engaged in highly immoral behavior (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Another theory, Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC), bases its “foundations” on well studied evolved cooperative strategies like kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, competitive altruism, and property rights (Curry *et al.*, 2019). A third offers both a critique of, as well as a complement to, Moral Foundations Theory, one which posits moral conduct can be systematically seen to emerge from two behavioral systems regulating approach and avoidance with underlying “foundational” moral motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013).

Taking this last competing theory first, the Model of Moral Motives (MMM) (Janoff-Bulman *et al.*, 2008; 2013; 2015) maps the moral domain to the two fundamental dimensions of motivation and regulation of behavior, Approach and Avoidance. However, rather than being two opposite ends of one continuum, Approach and Avoidance have been shown to be controlled through dual processes of an Affect System providing appetitive and aversive information processing (Cacioppo *et al.*, 1999). They produce a behavioral activation system (BAS) sensitive to reward and a behavioral inhibition system (BIS) sensitive to punishment, each having distinct neural substrates (Janoff-Bulman *et al.*, 2008). They represent two self-regulatory strategies reflecting different ways of guiding behavior towards some goal or away from an anti-goal, mechanisms that can become habitualized and lead to different outcomes (Heimpel *et al.*, 2006). Revised reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) provides more detail on the activation and inhibition of avoidance and approach behaviors which MMM generalizes, adding Fight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS) as a third motivational system that handles avoidance behaviors, with BIS providing inhibitory control over both approach (BAS) and avoidance (FFFS); more on this later.

The Model of Moral Motives applies these two self-regulatory strategies to the moral domain, positing that morality is governed by both a proscriptive moral logic of protecting against harm through inhibiting behavior, as well as a prescriptive logic of providing nurturance through activating prosocial behaviors, each of which enhance group living. Moral proscriptions focus on prohibitions (“should not’s”), while moral prescriptions focus on positive obligations (“shoulds”) (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). These two types of moral motives reflect separate types of self-regulatory strategies producing different moralities (Janoff-Bulman *et al.*, 2009).

Proscriptive regulation requires monitoring immoral thoughts and urges and avoiding harmful

actions towards others to avoid what the group deems “should not” be done, while prescriptive regulation requires monitoring for moral opportunities to do good deeds, care for others, and (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2011). These differences in social monitoring would produce very different emotion dynamics, with prescriptive emotions focusing upon positive emotions like Trust, while proscriptive monitoring focus upon immoral acts produces Shame (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2011), the emotion taboo in Western cultures (Scheff, 1983), the source of repression and rigid conformity (Scheff, 1988), and recursively compounded when unaddressed between people (Scheff, 1990). The phenomena of proscriptive moral overregulation paradoxically producing “a greater inclination to morally transgress and a greater inclination to feel shame as a result of violating an internalized prohibition” (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2011), seems to be the direct result of these unintended consequences of Shame.

Model of Moral Motives

			PERSPECTIVE FOCUS		
			SELF FOCUS INDIVIDUAL	OTHER FOCUS INTERPERSONAL	GROUP FOCUS COLLECTIVE
MORAL REGULATION	P R O S C R I P T I V E	P R O T E C T I N G	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity
	P R E S C R I P T I V E	P R O V I D I N G	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility

Fig. 26.1 – The Model of Moral Motives – Source:

Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: Fig 1, 3)

The MMM posits that proscriptive and prescriptive moral regulation strategies apply across three psychological perspectives from which stem group-enhancing behavior, focused on the self, on a particular other, or on the collective, which creates six generalized moral motives as in **Fig. 26.1**.

Self-focused motives either proscribe Moderation and Self-Restraint to self-protect, or prescribe Industriousness and Self-Reliance in order to self-provide. The interpersonal, Other-focused moral regulation benefits group living since other-focused motives either proscribe and restrain self-interest to protect others or prescribe and enable altruistic helping others. The Group-focused motives concern the welfare of the group. The Group protective proscriptions are rules of right and wrong enforced to ensure internal group order and solidarity, as well as to protect against outgroup influence and perceived aggression. The Group protective prescriptions provide for group welfare through a shared sense of responsibility and equality-oriented justice.

The Model of Moral Motives locates the foundations of MFT within its Six-Cell model (**Fig. 26.2** below). MFT's group binding foundations of Authority and Loyalty focus on binding together the group in Communal Solidarity, which MMM labels Social Order. MFT's individualizing foundations of Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity are characterized as the province of the Interpersonal realm, where those foundations are other-focused and fit with a "virtually complete correspondence between the two (Interpersonal) perspectives in terms of content" (Janoff-Bulman *et al.*, 2013: 5). The MMM slightly differs in its characterization of Purity, which it applies generally to all proscriptive regulation which attempts to prevent the corruption of self, others, and the collective from degradation, with Self-Restraint from personal contamination through moderation the archetype for purity.

Model of Moral Motives w/ Moral Foundations

			PERSPECTIVE FOCUS		
			SELF FOCUS INDIVIDUAL	OTHER FOCUS INTERPERSONAL	GROUP FOCUS COLLECTIVE
MORAL REGULATION	P R O S C R I P T I V E	P R O T E C T I N G	SELF-RESTRAINT Self-Protecting <small>Moderation</small>	CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Other-Protecting <small>Not Harming</small>	SOCIAL ORDER Group-Protecting <small>Communal Solidarity</small>
	P R E S C R I P T I V E	P R O V I D I N G	SELF-RELIANCE Self-Providing <small>Industriousness</small>	ENABLE ALTRUISM Other-Providing <small>Helping / Fairness</small>	SOCIAL JUSTICE Group-Providing <small>Communal Responsibility</small>
	A V O I D A N C E	A P P R O A C H	<small>MFT: PURITY Sanctity</small>	<small>MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm</small>	<small>MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority</small>
			<small>MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty</small>	<small>MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness</small>	<small>MFT: BINDING Care, Fairness (Equality)</small>

Fig. 26.2 – The Model of Moral Motives with Moral Foundations Theory – Sources:

Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: Fig 1, 3), Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009: 113)

Additionally, the MMM offers as a critique to MFT that it fails to measure an additional Group binding that motivates equity within groups, which it labels Social Justice. This “liberal” group binding represents a prescriptive regulation of the group via in-kind reciprocity and equal treatment/say/opportunity (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). While MFT characterizes Liberals as having a narrow focus on individualizing moral foundations of Care and Fairness, Conservatives are characterized as having a “conservative advantage” of a full moral palate, valuing both the Individualizing moral foundations, as well as Group level bindings of Authority, Loyalty, and Purity (Haidt, 2013). The MMM posits Liberals, too, focus on a similar collective level binding, providing instead a prescriptive foundation envisioned as Social Justice depending on “foundations” of Welfare and Equality (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). These concerns of welfare and equality applied at the collective level, must be distinguished and are different than the Individualizing Care and Fairness individualizing foundations (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). Moreover, the Social Justice group binding is found to be negatively correlated with the Social Order group binding (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016).

“when we move to the group level, the more antagonistic nature of moral regulation appears to require that we choose one or the other type of group-based morality. And thus conservatives, more sensitive to prescriptive regulation, opt for a restrictive morality that seeks to protect group members, whereas liberals, more sensitive to prescriptive regulation, opt for an enabling morality that seeks to provide for group members.” Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: 13)

This difference in group regulation is thought to represent a more measurable difference between Liberal and Conservative views of social-regulation than simply group binding versus individualistic moral foundations (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). The MMM distinguishes this difference due to the motivations of Conservatives towards proscriptive motivations protecting the group against harm by enforcing conformity, while motivations of Liberals tend towards prescriptive motivations for providing for the good of all (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). However, at the intra- and interpersonal perspectives, research has shown Liberals and Conservatives differ little in Self-focused or Other-focused moralities (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). Importantly, the intra- and interpersonal moral motives have a high correlation with each other, highlighting that moral people of any political persuasion tend to refrain from harming others while also helping others, as well as engaging in self moderation and self reliance (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016).

Interestingly, further research shows that Libertarians tend to have, comparatively, very low regard for both of the Group bindings, as well as low regard for the Harm and Care foundations (Janoff-Bulman *et al.*, 2013). The MMM includes the Self focused prescriptive motivation of Self-Reliance, producing an Industriousness striving for independence and freedom from the group, which matches MFT’s additional sixth moral foundation of Liberty (Haidt, 2013). Adding both a Self-Reliance moral foundation, as well as a collective Social Justice foundation, would provide a more robust theoretical picture and potentially greater empirical discernment of the Individual, Interpersonal, and Collective moral focus of all political clusters.

Reorienting the combined MMM & MFT model in **Fig. 26.2** above to isomorphically transform rows to columns produces the following model seen in **Fig. 26.3** below.

Model of Moral Motives w/ Moral Foundations

		MORAL REGULATION	
		Proscriptive	Prescriptive
		Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	GROUP COLLECTIVE	<p>Group-Protecting</p> <p>SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity</p> <p>MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority</p>	<p>Group-Providing</p> <p>SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility</p> <p>MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality</p>
	OTHER INTERPERSONAL	<p>Other-Protecting</p> <p>CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming</p> <p>MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm</p>	<p>Other-Providing</p> <p>ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness</p> <p>MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness</p>
	SELF INDIVIDUAL	<p>Self-Protecting</p> <p>SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation</p> <p>MFT: PURITY Sanctity</p>	<p>Self-Providing</p> <p>SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness</p> <p>MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty</p>

Fig. 26.3 — The Model of Moral Motives with Moral Foundations Theory (vertical) — Sources:
Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: Fig 1, 3); Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009: 113)

The difference of motivational factors across the different political ideological groups in US politics can be better visualized using the combined MMM and MFT model in **Fig. 26.3**. Recalling from the

first chapter of this study, the cluster analysis by Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009) found in fact four distinct moral “palates” in American political culture having different valuations of the Moral foundations (**Fig. 1.3** above). The standard presentation of Moral Foundations Theory typically features the standard Conservative and Liberal clusters, while the Libertarian cluster was augmented by adding a sixth foundation, Liberty, to the standard five foundations (Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity). Their cluster research produced a fourth cluster, which they termed “Religious Liberalism,” often going unmentioned in both the standard MFT and the MMM accounts. Including that fourth cluster in a side by side comparison using the combined Model of Moral Motives produces a more visually detailed spectrum of US political motivation below.

Matching the Moral Foundation valuation data in **Fig. 1.3** to the corresponding positions of moral foundations within the MMM framework across each of the four clusters yields **Fig. 26.4** below. Using a heatmap coloring scheme showing different valuation levels of foundations in the key at the bottom highlights the difference in variation between the US political “palates.” Missing are data for the untested foundation of Liberty, added as a foundation after the analysis done by Haidt, Graham & Joseph’s (2009) cluster analysis. Also missing would be MMM’s Social Justice motive, a group level binding motive which MFT lacks. An analytic combining both the MMM and MFT models could produce a more finely detailed distinction between these four US political types, as well as showing coherence between both MMM’s motivations and MFT’s moral foundations.




Fig. 26.4 – Model of Moral Motives Cluster Heat Maps –

Source: Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009: 113)

Fig. 26.4 also includes the third Cluster from **Fig. 1.3** which has been relatively ignored in the

standard account of a Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012) largely focused on Liberals and Conservatives, while also later included Libertarians. However, this “missing” third Cluster from the standard MFT account represents a distinct political cluster, which in their analysis also includes the largest sample size of nearly twice the size as their Conservative Cluster (Haidt, Graham, Joseph, 2009: 113). The missing third cluster provides a similar “taste” for each moral foundation, in that like the Conservative cluster and unlike the Liberals, it places a higher valuation upon traditional binding foundations, but unlike the Conservative cluster, also highly values Care and Fairness. The differences between these four clusters would be more clearly disambiguated by including both an additional Liberty foundation, as well as a prescriptive group binding of welfare & equality for the Social Justice motivation predicted by the MMM.

The “missing” third cluster characterized as the “Religious Left,” bears a striking resemblance to the Liberal Religious Left largely excluded from the US political sphere and particularly focused upon Social Justice concerns. The social movements led by the Religious Left have been grassroots efforts to challenge the power exerted by the Establishment seeking to preserve the Social Order. The black religious clergy who led the US Civil Rights Movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s provides an exemplar of this cluster, which confronted the racial bigotry, institutional racism, and white supremacy of the Social Order’s repressive Jim Crow laws. However, the civil rights movement found little support from traditional white religious congregations at a time, as well as little general US public support , except from the far left white liberal religious congregations. Similarly, the “Religious Left” led Social Justice movements in South Africa against the Apartheid system; in Central and South America against the militarized State sponsored violence against the Indigenous, lower class & trade unions; and in India against colonial British Imperial occupation. Each Social Justice movement was typified by hostile opposition from the Establishment and minimal public support from the public at large except from the “Religious Left.” Adding moral foundations of group bindings for Welfare and Equality could expand MFT’s analytic to show a more finely detailed distinction between clusters, while their exclusion leaves Moral Foundations Theory lacking in its analysis of the foundations of political difference.

Additionally, Social Justice movements eschew violent confrontation through self-restraint against violence the Social Order uses to preserve and perpetuate its power through coercion, repression, and murder—all moral violations of containing self-interest and causing harm. Social Justice movements

maintain and build moral fortitude through the communal solidarity of positive goals such as Freedom, Equality, Inclusion, Tolerance, and Liberation. Millions of participants in those movements are buoyed by these moral foundations through a communal effort for Social Justice, while the reaction for preserving the Social Order often results in morally corrupting its adherents to support causing Harm, not Caring, and violating rules of Fairness, as well as Liberty. Social Justice movements are maligned by the Social Order as threatening chaos and violence, but staying true to the course of communal non-violent solidarity goes against the stereotype set by the Establishment, avoiding dispositional stereotypes and highlighting situational salience (Cuddy *et al.*, 2008: 130). Such moral dynamics can be made far more clear by expanding the Moral Foundations to include this wider, moral palate.

A competitor theory to MFT, Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC), expands that palate through a systematic use of non-zero-sum game theory cooperative strategies to uncover a wider set of foundational types of cooperation (Curry *et al.*, 2019b). The MAC posits that morality emerges from cooperation, which game theory provides via solutions honed by natural selection serving as potential domains which lead to moral intuitions. The MAC identifies seven moral values which emerge from “well-established types of cooperation: (1) the allocation of resources to kin (Hamilton, 1963); (2) coordination to mutual advantage (Lewis, 1969); (3) social exchange (Trivers, 1971); and conflict resolution through contests featuring displays of (4) hawk-ish and (5) dove-ish traits (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973); (6) division (Skyrms, 1996); and (7) possession (Gintis, 2007)” (Curry *et al.*, 2019a: 106-107). MAC presents evidence these domains of morality provide a greater empirical discrimination as foundational units than MFT using similar methodological Questionnaire inventories and mathematical analysis methods (Curry *et al.*, 2019b: 106-107). MAC names these seven moral domains as (1) Kinship, (2) Mutualism, (3) Reciprocity, (4) Heroism, (5) Deference, (6) Division, and (7) Possession, which are supported by evidence from surveys measuring moral valence of these behaviors from 60 cultures around the world (Curry *et al.*, 2019b).

Three of MAC’s moral domains map to corresponding MFT foundations, perhaps not by definition, but in kind. MAC’s **Mutualism** matches MFT’s Loyalty (Curry, 2016), in that coordination of groups larger than kin groups require collaborative behavior regulated by coalitional dynamics, Ingroup loyalty & Intergroup rivalry (Ballet *et al.*, 2014) and theory-of-mind (Tomasello, 2009). MAC’s **Deference** matches MFT’s Authority (Curry, 2016), in that obedience and submission to

authority are expected (Scheff, 1999; Thamm, 2004). MAC's **Possession** has some relation with MFT's Liberty, in that it characterizes territory ownership in the sense of property rights and theft prohibition (Curry, 2016), each chief concerns of Libertarians. This differs from the freedom aspect of Libertarianism offered by MFT (Haidt, 2012), although possession of territory, in a sense, provides a freedom of independence and expansion of self through ownership, with theft felt as a violation of self.

The other MAC moral domains are claimed to not map to MFT's other foundations. MAC's **Reciprocity** is stated to be different than MFT's Fairness, which MAC considers as exchange (Curry, 2016). MAC focuses upon reciprocity as a cooperative strategy, which includes conditional cooperation such as tit-for-tat. It manifests in moral concepts such as trust, favors, revenge, gratitude and amends (Curry *et al.*, 2019b). Fairness, on the other hand, is characterized as more closely compared to although different than MAC's **Division**, in that allocation of shared resources can be decided through bargaining, negotiation and compromise as cooperative struggles in doling out the "pieces" fairly and rationally, while MFT's fairness instead conflates Exchange and Fairness (Curry, 2016). MAC's **Heroism** is characterized as the exercise of Dominance in such things as Bravery, Skill, as well as other-benefitting obligations such as Noblese Oblige. However, mostly it typifies heroism as hawkishness, in contrast to its Deference moral domain, which it associates with dovishness (Curry *et al.*, 2019b). MAC's **Kinship** is claimed to not match MFT's Care, as MAC focuses on the genetic relatedness directed altruism fostering cooperation centered on allocating resources to and duty towards family. MAC characterizes Care as too general a concept that "does not distinguish between forms of prosocial behavior with different ultimate and proximate roots" (Curry *et al.*, 2019b: 50).

Similarly, the MAC specifically omits MFT's Purity as too general because "avoiding pathogens" is not itself a cooperative problem while its corresponding emotion Disgust "is moralized only when employed to solve a cooperative problem" (Curry *et al.*, 2019b: 64). Certainly, aspects of purity are found in Kinship seen from the root of kin ("kind"), as in member of a natural kind unspoiled by non-"kind" (Fiske, 1991); Mutualism seen from the Ingroup versus Outgroup distinction and coalitional goals allowing no dissent; Heroism seen from self-sacrifice, fortitude, aesthetic of practice/skill. MFT too uses Purity in a sense larger than simply the disgust dimension stemming from ingestion of poisons or contaminants, the latter of which has been shown as a purity dimension

of Liberal ideologies, while not Conservative (Kahan *et al.*, 2009), whom Haidt characterizes as lacking the purity tastebud. Purity's omission (or rather, its emotion manifestation Disgust) from morality studies may be reflective of a common research bias regarding Disgust and morality (Clark & Fessler, 2014), similar to Shame's absence from emotion studies until the 1970's, and then only lightly studied at that until the 2000's (Scheff, 1988).

MAC similarly typifies Care as too general, having aspects associated with multiple moral domains, such as in the context of duty or obligation to others for Kinship vis a vis cooperative breeding via alloparenting (Hrdy, 2019); Reciprocity in the care necessary to develop and nurture intimate relationships requiring mutual sharing and turn-taking; or even Heroism in care group members as in the generosity of Noblesse Oblige; or even Possession as in care to maintain property, both private, shared property or the commons (Ostrom, 1990). Additionally, proto- forms of care represent an important ethic in non-human cooperative domains (Dunbar, 1998)(de Waal, 1996). And as can be said regarding morality research of Disgust/Purity, Care too has suffered from early morality studies due to different forms of research bias (Gilligan, 1982).

However, ignoring the debates between MFT's and MAC's theoretical or empirical differences, and instead seeking congruence between the two models, MAC can add an important theoretic that will enhance a growing Moral Model (**Fig. 26.2**). While MAC posits that its moral taxonomy only emerges from game theoretic cooperative strategies, its inclusion seems possible using the context of identifying Person Focus distinctions and Moral Regulation strategies, prescriptive (should not's) and prescriptive (shoulds) rules for morality. Additionally, some of its taxonomic lineage emerges from well studied cooperative strategies shaped through natural selection via Kin-selection, Reciprocal Altruism, Linear Dominance Hierarchy (Wade, 1978), as well as potentially through Property, as its modern cultural institutions representing money, contracts, bargaining, and markets, may represent cooperative strategy shaped through evolutionary forces, namely multi-level selection and Spontaneous Order (Hayek, 1988).

Model of Moral Motives & MFT w/ MAC

		MORAL REGULATION	
		Proscriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	GROUP FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Heroism	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity
	OTHER FOCUS	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness
	SELF FOCUS	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: PURITY Sanctity MAC: N/A	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession

Fig. 26.5 - The Model of Moral Motives & MFT w/ MCA – Sources:

Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: Fig 1, 3); Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009: 113); Curry (2016)

To understand MACs fit into the MMM, it must be recognized that while cooperation is assumed to

be a unitary group level activity, it occurs across three different levels of organization. The ontology of cooperation includes (1) Social Behavior of the Individual, (2) Interrelationship between the dyad, and (3) Social Structure of the Group. They are hierarchically related in that they represent different logical levels of organization, or hierachic reorderings of levels (Wade, 1978)(cf Bateson, 1987). Cooperation also requires neurophysiological and psychological mechanisms, which too would be found at levels “below” social behavior, although each of the levels are interrelated through control systems and are simply reorderings of previous levels, so levels carry no evaluative connotation that some levels are “better” than others (Powers, 1973).

Human behavior and cooperation at these levels are shaped by symbolic thought. The semiotic structure of thought (**Fig. 15.4**), when thinking at any one of these levels, affects both how humans experience, interpret and perceive reality. Any effort to understand morality must take these levels into account, which requires not simply recognizing the difference in levels, but more importantly recognizing that individuals seek to coordinate symbolic goals, values, motivations, and norms shaping morals, and this coordination is conducted through the exchange of words, behavior, thought and emotion.

While the MMM describes different motivations driving approach and avoidance behaviors, when the goals that produce such motivations are consistent and widely shared across the group, they are called values (Fiske, 1990). Values are beliefs representing desirable “trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group” Schwartz (2007: 712). They serve as socially desirable standards which people use to organize goals and communicate with other in order to gain cooperation towards goal attainment (Schwartz, 2012).

Schwartz Value Theory (SVT) provides a cross-cultural, empirical model of a basic set of ten “motivationally distinct types of value” running along two bipolar dimensions, which are mapped around a circumplex graph having four major groupings. SVT posits that values represent conceptual beliefs motivating action towards goals that are “requirements of human existence... meet(ing) the needs of individuals as organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups” (Schwartz, 2012: 4).

SVT places these universal motivational value locations around a circle, with values proximally close

sharing a positive correlation. The ten basic values are an arbitrary set of value categorizations dividing the motivational continuum, of which their placement on a continuous circle implies (Schwartz, 2012). The SVT Circumplex can be conceived of a motivational continuum in which the combination of every adjacent value reveals an underlying “motivational emphases” (Schwartz, 2007), while values diametrically distant tend to restrict or oppose values on the opposite side of the circumplex (Schwartz, 2007). Individuals prioritize values, holding many of the values in different situations and contexts. Opposing values tend to compete in single actions and individuals normally choose one that is most psychologically consistent with their view of the situation (Schwartz, 2012).




Fig. 26.6 - Schwartz Value Theory Circumplex & Reorientation -

Source: Schwartz (2012: Fig. 1, 9)

The SVT Circumplex on the left in **Fig. 26.6** has one diagonal axis measuring conservation versus openness to change (i.e., tradition, conformity, & security versus self-direction & stimulation), while the other diagonal axis measures self-enhancement versus self-transcendence (i.e., achievement and power vs. universalism and benevolence) (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). The SVT Circumplex can also be transformed by flipping it 180 degrees along the SW-NE axis without losing the structural relationships between values, preserving the relationship between values as seen in the right image in **Fig. 26.6**. The transformed model more roughly aligns with the orientation of the MMM in that the upper half of the right image, Conservation and Self-Transcendence, are group level focused

while Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement are personal focused.

This similarity in orientation between the transformed SVT Circumplex and the MMM is more evident in a quadrant diagram of the SVT, **Fig. 26.7** below. It too has been also modified from the original in Schwartz (2012: Fig. 2, 13), with Personal and Social focus flipped from the original image to align the Social focus “northward” and personal “southward,” showing a similarity with the MMM’s top Group-focus and bottom Self-focus, while the left and right Value columns correspond to protection based and provision based motivations. The quadrant model below matches and more clearly shows the alignment of values in the transformed circumplex in **Fig. 26.6** (Right image).




Fig. 26.7 - Schwartz Value Theory Quadrants -
Source: modified from Schwartz (2012: Fig. 2, 13)

In this quadrant model, the colors of Schwartz’s quadrant model in **Fig. 26.7** are original to

Schwartz (2012) and do not have any correlation with quadrant colors of the Social Self Model. The horizontal x-axis shows Self-Protection/Prevention against loss versus Self-Expansion/Promotion of gain. The left and right halves of **Fig. 26.7** are similar to the prohibition and provisioning aspects of motivational regulation in the MMM. The vertical y-axis show Social and Personal Focuses flipped vertically from the original in Schwartz (2012) to align with the Group and Individual focus vertical alignment of the MMM's Group and Individualizing orientations in **Fig. 26.3**. While the SVC labels of Group and Personal seem to match the Group-focus and Self-focus of the MMM, they are not equivalent.

The Schwartz Value Survey and Questionnaire measure the priority people give values, and thus, the underlying motivations, which differ between people. Values are also commonly grouped into wider, superordinate value orientations, as can be seen in the four quadrants as Self-Enhancement, Conservation, Openness to Change, and Self-Transcendence. The structure of superordinate categories, as well as the ten basic values and their relations, “are discriminated nearly universally” and common to all societies studied (Schwartz, 2012: 12-13). And while individuals differ in the priority assigned to values, there is common agreement across societies in a hierarchical ranking of values from least important to most (Schwartz, 2012: 14).

However, salient to the MMM, a different way of grouping the SVT Values would be according to their focus upon Self, Other, and/or Group. Most of the ten basic values are clearly focused on one of these person focuses, while a few are focused on both Group and Self, as these focus levels are not completely differentiated in the Survey or Questionnaire, which complicates a one-to-one mapping with the MMM. The chart below shows each of the ten basic values, with a corresponding defining goal, associated key concepts related to the value, and a hypothetical person focus.

Schwartz Theory of Basic Values

Value	Defining Goal	Focus	Concepts
Self-Direction	Independent Thought & Action	Self	creativity, freedom, choice, curiosity, independence
Stimulation	Excitement, Novelty & Challenge	Self	varied life, exciting life, daring
Hedonism	Pleasure or Sensuous Gratification	Self	pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgence
Achievement	Personal Success according to Social Standards	Self / Other	ambition, success, capability, influence, intelligence, self-respect, recognition
Power	Social Status & Prestige Control or Dominance	Self / Other	authority, wealth, social power, preservation
Security	Safety, Harmony, & Stability	Group / Self	social order, family security, national security, clean, reciprocity
Conformity	Restraint of Actions & Impulses from Harm or violating Social Norms	Group / Self	obedience, self-discipline, politeness, loyalty, responsibility, honoring elders
Tradition	Respect, Commitment & Acceptance of Cultural Ideas & Practices	Group	respect for culture, humility, devotion, moderation, spiritual practice
Benevolence	Preserving & Enhancing Welfare	Group	helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible, friendship, belonging, meaning
Universalism	Appreciation, Tolerance & Welfare	All	social justice, peace, unity, wisdom, ecological conservation, harmony

Fig. 26.8 - Schwartz Theory of Basic Values - Source: Schwartz (2012: 5-7)

The first three values listed in **Fig. 26.8** of self-direction, stimulation and hedonism are personal focus values related to self-expansion and growth, part of the openness to change orientation, and by definition, self-focused. The next two values, achievement and power, are also personal focus values for self-enhancement in the pursuit of personal success and to protect status (Schwartz, 2012). While part of the self-enhancement orientation and seemingly self-focused, achievement and power both have an other-focus in the relation or comparison of self to others, whether according to some identity standard or practically in the preservation of status and control over others.

The Conservation values of security, conformity and tradition have group level focuses in the sense of motivations which benefit groups via protecting from threat, by requiring order. Security values typically concern the harmony and stability of groups from the dyadic size of the married couple, to families, to in-groups, up to the size of nation states. Conformity preserves social norm following through proscriptive actions to limit harming groups, interaction between people, or selves. Tradition concerns perpetuating time-honored practices of one's culture, often with the proscription of inhibiting the practice of outgroup cultural practices. Each of SVT's Conservation values can be seen as focused towards maintaining Group stability, conformity, and authority through sacrifices of individual freedom from cultural identities, actions and traditions, thus acting at both Group and Self levels. The Self-Transcendence values of benevolence and universalism, however, occupy definite group level focus, with benevolence focused towards the in-group, although this can also be

considered an other-focus towards individual others whom are co-members of the in-group, while universalism is inclusive of all groups and beyond (Schwartz, 2012).

Beyond self-, other- and group-focus distinctions, SVT also posits that adjacent values share an underlying motivational focus, which aren't quite the same as Plutchik's blended emotions, but rather a motivational space which combines aspects of both values. Therefore, the pairing of adjacent values related to a motivational space produces twelve motivations which the SVT characterizes as a continuum around the circle. While Schwartz (2005) admits the values and the motivational continuum are divided arbitrarily, these values and motivates are recognized culturally. For each motivation, this study offers a "thematized" single word offering a short-hand action concept used for labeling and coordination with other theories, which turn out to appear "foundation"-like.

SVT Motivational Continuum

Value Locations		Motivation	Theme
Power	Achievement	social superiority and esteem	Ambition
Achievement	Hedonism	self-centered satisfaction	Egocentrism
Hedonism	Stimulation	desire for affectively pleasant arousal	Gratification
Stimulation	Self-Direction	intrinsic interest in novelty and mastery	Autonomy
Self-Direction	Universalism	reliance on one's own judgment and comfort with diversity of existence	Tolerance
Universalism	Benevolence	enhancement of others and transcendence of selfish interests	Elevation
Benevolence	Tradition	devotion to one's in-group	Loyalty
Benevolence	Conformity	normative behavior favoring close relationships	Reciprocity
Conformity	Tradition	subordination of the self in favor of socially imposed expectations	Obedience
Tradition	Security	preserving existing social arrangements that give certainty to life	Conservation
Conformity	Security	protection of order and harmony in relations	Purity
Security	Power	avoiding or overcoming threats by controlling relationships and resources	Dominance

Fig. 26.9 - Schwartz Value Theory Motivational Continuum - Source: Schwartz (2012: 9-10)

Each of the motivations in **Fig. 26.9** can be seen to be part of the motivational continuum guiding human relations. However, the question of how these motivations in the SVT motivational

continuum relate to the fundamental motivational domains of the MMM requires coordination with a couple of other theories that help to disambiguate the basic political dichotomy of Conservative and Liberal in terms related to Schwartz Value Theory (SVT).

Two theories offered by political psychologists use Schwartz Value Theory to focus on the social and moral dynamics of groups. Both theories critique Moral Foundation Theory's characterization of Conservatism and Liberalism, with each claiming their models better differentiate differences between Conservatism and Liberalism than MFT. They do this by focusing not upon foundational morality, but instead oriented around two ideological dimensions: Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), concerning the solidarity of in-group against out-group threats, and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), concerning individual drives for achievement and power (Kugler et al, 2014). Research of RWA and SDO spanning decades characterize the moral content of these two ideologies as something which political psychologists feel cannot be justified as “moral (as opposed to ‘Amoral’ or ‘Immoral’)” in any philosophically ethical sense (Jost, 2006).

Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) is defined as “intra-group or defensive ethnocentrism, emphasizing ethnic devotion, collective security, and cohesion” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 5). Authoritarianism refers not to those whom assert authoritarian control, but rather, to the psychological personality of Authoritarian followers whom show high levels of deference to traditional authority, aggression in the name of authority, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 2006: 9). A strong correlation exists between the tendency to see the world as threatening and authoritarianism (Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). Empirical evidence shows that Right wing Authoritarianism (RWA) is “robustly correlated with authoritarianism, prejudice and discrimination against disadvantaged groups” (Jost, 2006: 4-5).

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Pratto *et al.*, 1994), describes a personality orientation towards exerting dominance, particularly in pursuing self-enhancing power exerted against outgroups (Sinn & Hayes, 2012). SDO is defined as “inter-group ethnocentrism stressing superiority, exploitation, and group-based dominance” (Sinn & Hayes, 2012: 5). SDO Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) “predicts sexism, racism, classism, homophobia and wide range of prejudicial outcomes” (Jost, 2006: 4-5).

Both RWA and SDO have been found to be correlated with Conservatism, as well as to “Conservatism’s intuition of ingroup, loyalty, obedience to authority, and enforcements of purity” (Jost, 2006). Moral Foundation Theory (MFT) research too finds the correlation between RWA, SDO and Conservatism (Graham & Haidt, 2009), showing Conservatives score highest in both measures, while Secular Liberals measure lowest (Haidt et al, 2009). Haidt and colleagues find correspondence of MFT foundations with Schwartz Value Theory, due partly to design of their questionnaire inventory using SVT questionnaire (Haidt et al, 2009). The Moral Foundations Questionnaire used to measure the foundations was partially constructed from subsections of the Schwartz Value tests for Fairness and Harm, as well as the RWA tests for Authority (Graham & Haidt, 2009). Iyer *et al.* (2012) also found Libertarians far more strongly endorsed Self-Direction than any other SVT value, as well as more strongly than either Liberals or Conservatives, while being moderately both on Benevolence (Iyer *et al.*, 2012: 9). Libertarians were similar to Liberals on the other values, except Universalism where they were substantially lower (Iyer *et al.*, 2012: 8-9). Libertarians were substantially lower than Conservatives in conformity, security, and tradition, while moderately higher on hedonism and stimulation (Iyer *et al.*, 2012: 8-9).

Evolutionary-Coalitional Theory (ECT) offers additional support through an evolutionary group coalitional theory of political ideology focusing upon intra- and inter-group competition which produce several different group level motivational dimensions driving political ideology (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Within- and between-group dynamics represent different adaptations to ancestral environments in which “us versus them” cohesive morality emerged under selective pressures of coalitional competition between groups over resources (Sinn & Hayes, 2016:3). ECT posits ingroup and between group dynamics form a better discernment of differences in political ideology through RWA and SDO personality dimensions and that MFT is simply “rediscovering well-known ideological constructs of SDO and RWA,” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 15).

Evolutionary-Coalitional Theory (ECT) offers that Conservatism, beyond simply a “binding” collective motivation, is better described as an alliance of two motivational dimensions corresponding to an authoritarian motive concentrated on the “defensive solidarity in response to outgroup threat” central to RWA and a dominance motive concentrated on the “hierarchical exploitation of outgroup” central to SDO (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 2). ECT also posits Liberalism expands beyond MFT’s individualizing focus to one of a universalizing motive acting at the collective

level as an “anticoalition/hierarchy response to within-group exploitation threat” from authoritarian and dominance motives (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 2). This has support from evolutionary theories of the origin of collectivized intervention against morally deviant behavior in the form of egalitarian bands suppressing dominant bullying (Boehm, 2000) and establishing reverse dominance hierarchies to prevent any of its members from dominating others (Boehm, 1993).

MFT lacks this Universalizing group binding, failing to recognize the “universalism exhibited by the left” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 17). ECT reconceptualizes MFT’s individualizing Harm and Fairness as a Universalizing motive, while the binding Authority, Ingroup, and Purity reflect an Authoritarian motive (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 15). These biding foundations of Authority, Ingroup, and Purity are critiqued as amoral, as they have driven the deleterious effects of reactionary movements and cannot be considered to be on the same moral plane as Care and Fairness (Kugler et al, 2014).

ECT offers that Conservatism is better modeled by authoritarian and dominating motives, while Liberalism by a universalizing motive, which “shows a strong negative correlation with both RWA and SDO and predicts liberalism” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 6). ECT posits SVT’s superordinate value orientations equate with Authoritarian and Dominating motives, as “Conservation values correlate with RWA, self- enhancement values with SDO, and power and security values correlate with both” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016: 5). The relations become more clear with SVT’s Quadrant model (**Fig. 26.7** above), where RWA and SDO correlate with the left Social quadrant and left Personal focus quadrant, respectively.

While disagreement between ECT and MFT’s models of morality, they provide enough agreement to integrate Schwartz Theory of Basic Values (**Fig. 26.6** above) with the growing Model of Moral Motives. This can be done by mapping not the SVT values themselves, but instead using the motivational continuum “themes” from **Fig. 26.9** as shorthand terms that could correlate with MMM’s moral motivations. These motivational continuum “themes” seem logical terms for each motivation description by Schwartz, and their meanings generally correspond with the logic of the corresponding moral motivational cell, as in **Fig. 26.10** below:

Model of Moral Motives & MFT MAC w/ SVT Values

		MORAL REGULATION	
		Proscriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	GROUP FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Heroism SVT: Loyalty, Obedience, Purity Conservatism, *Reciprocity	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity SVT: Reciprocity, Elevation, Tolerance, *Loyalty
		Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship SVT: *Dominance, *Ambition, Purity	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness SVT: Elevation, Tolerance
		Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: PURITY Sanctity MAC: : N/A SVT: *Egocentrism, *Gratification, Purity	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession SVT: Autonomy, Tolerance
	SELF FOCUS		

Fig. 26.10 - The Model of Moral Motives & MFT MAC w/ SVT - Sources:
 Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: Fig. 1, 3); Iyer *et al.* (2012); Schwartz (2012: Fig. 1, 9)

The left and right halves in **Fig. 26.10** correspond to SVT's Quadrant model's (**Fig. 26.7**) self-

protection and self-expansion motivations, respectively, allowing for coherence between the MMM and SVT. The motivations to protect against threat manifest as proscriptions against certain motivations. For the self-focus perspective, proscriptions against Gratification, especially in traditional morals around sexuality, as well as Egocentrism, as in the form of negative self-centeredness such as Selfishness or Vanity, morally protect the self from impurities. Similarly for the other-focus perspective, proscriptions against using Dominance or Ambition motivations against others are judged morally good. For the group-focus perspective, the motivations of Loyalty and Obedience aren't necessarily "should nots," yet trigger moral emotions which spur moral judgments towards others. They require prescriptive motivations at the individual level corresponding to not using Dominance or Ambition, nor pursuing Self-Gratification or egocentric pursuits which threaten the group by promoting harmful individual pursuits. Tension between values on opposite sides of the circumplex are visible in these group binding motivations being composed of the proscriptions against motivations on the opposite side of the circumplex (opposite values in the SVT circle) (Schwartz, 2012).

Similarly, the right half of SVT's Quadrant model (**Fig. 26.7**) corresponds to prescriptive motivations towards expansion and growth. For the other-focus perspective, Elevation is the term offered by Algoe & Haidt (2009) for the emotion felt when observing the enhancement of or self-less acts towards others, matching altruism or helping, squarely in the Other-focused prescriptive cell. Similarly for the self-focus perspective, the general theme of Autonomy in the sense of self-mastery and openness to intrinsic interests that lead to expansion of self's experiences and capabilities fits with the self-focused moral motivational cell. The group-focus perspective includes a motivation of Reciprocity driving social exchange, as well as a sense of fairness in that exchange, with violations of such fairness leading to moral judgments against, although in some ways different than violations of prohibition logic. A similar tension between motivations on opposite sides of the circumplex are also apparent for openness to experience being at odds with conservation motivational themes at the prescriptive group-level, matching MFT's Liberty in tension with group binding intuitions (Haidt, 2011). Other tensions are found between values in adjacent axes, such as between Universalism versus Security and Power (Sinn & Hayes, 2016).

While motivational theme placement in the MMM into a corresponding group-, other- or self-focus cell remains straight forward for most, two in particular fit multiple motivation cells. The logic of

keeping self or relationships morally sound rely on self-focused and other-focused proscriptive motivations, respectively, which both have a sense of purity, as in keeping the self from impure Gratification or Self-Interest or in keeping an intimate relationship free from Dominance or Ambition. The regulation of group level Loyalty and Obedience in protection from outgroup influence or ingroup dissension produces motivation of ingroup hostility towards outgroups and enforcement of ingroup conformity, both having connotations of maintaining group purity. Thus, purity is a glue and general theme of proscriptive motivations at self-, other-, and group-focusses.

The same can be envisioned of tolerance in the sense of universalizing over for all social actors and prescriptive motivations. The logic of self-enhancement in self-directed exploration of autonomy begs for a sense of toleration of deviance from group norms for sameness and conformity. Similarly, enhancement of others through caring or helping ideally would ideally apply to all others (universalizing), which requires a tolerance for differences between one's self and others. At the group-focus level, reciprocity of the groups towards individuals is ideally fairly distributed to provide for the welfare and fairness across society, which in the context of universalizing, would apply to both ingroup and outgroup individuals requiring a tolerance for all. However, this universal tolerance towards others clearly lies at odds with in-group Loyalty, identifying a motivational tension found in the dynamics of Social Justice versus Social Order. Thus, tolerance is also a glue and general theme of prescriptive motivations at self-, other-, and group-focusses.

This combined MMM model (**Fig. 26.10**) represents the confluences of individual regulation at self-, other-, and group-focusses, as intuitions, values, motivations are experiential individual level attributes. Individuals vary in their regulatory strengths and motivations depending on context and situation, which leads to variable valuations for each of the moral motivations and values. The similarity of response to regular patterns of social context and situations across individuals produces normative behaviors and social institutions. Observing directly, experiencing intersubjectively, or imagining subjectively in relation to these regularities across the collective results in social information processing involving differential neurological resources and producing differences in social cognition (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). Thus, for each of these cells, there is in a sense both an experiential and observational reality to moral regulation.

The observation of other's behavior or speech related to each of these dimensions produces implicit

moral intuitions (Haidt, 2011), which would be expected to produce implicit emotion reactions from violations of particular “cell” contexts influenced by cultural feeling rules. Moral judgments evoked by a social action in the context of any one of the MMM’s cells, whether a “should not” that was violated or a “should” that was not acted upon, whether at the group, other or self focus, would produce an emotional reaction if salient to that person, as in valued by that person in that context. The question would be, does the violation of a group-focused moral foundation like loyalty to the ingroup or obedience to authority produce an emotion that would be similar to the emotion produced by from the violation of social welfare or fairness? Would the emotional reaction to observation or simulation of violations at an other- or self-focus produce similar emotion reactions to group level violations?

The CAD Hypothesis (Rozen *et al.*, 1999) posits the “Big Three” ethics of Community, Autonomy and Divinity (Shweder *et al.*, 1997) guide moral intuitions, for which judgments of moral violations produce characteristic emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust, respectively. This study started with the Unified model offered by Bruce (2013) of which Community and Autonomy aligned with the Group and Grid dimensions in what became the Social Self Model, while Divinity was speculated to relate to the “glue” of PRT’s cultural worldview biases. The violation of moral norms produce moral intuitions that come in the form of other-condemning emotions. Thus, a simple pairing of other-evaluative emotions to violations at each perspective for both proscriptive and prescriptive regulatory models could be made with the CAD emotions to guide the way.

Group-focused moral violations invoke the Community ethic, where communal solidarity or responsibility require individuals to sacrifice individual concerns towards group benefit. However, prohibitions require individuals to maintain self-control by avoiding self interest, other exploitation, or actions against group conformity. Prescriptions, on the other hand, motivate individuals towards expanding self-interests and capabilities; enhancing and being tolerant towards other’s autonomy; and universalizing reciprocity so that the social group provides for the welfare and fairness for all. Violations of these result, according to the CAD hypothesis, produce other-condemning contempt, as contempt is thought to illicit corrective behaviors in others via self-conscious emotions sensitive to contempt and threat of group expulsion (Rozen *et al.*, 1999). Contempt shown in proscriptive violations target individuals, since “should nots” are clearly defined rules which individuals must follow. However, contempt shown in prescriptive violations target collectives such as societies or

institutions rather than individuals, as individuals are not expected to provide the welfare or fairness to all members of the group, nor provide help to all people or be entirely self-autonomous. Moreover, it would appear judgments of either proscription or prescription violations would be differentially valued depending on one's cultural bias or worldview, as individuals vary in their valuation of motivational "cell" logic (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016).

Other-focused moral violations can be thought of at both the smallest collective level, the social dyad, as well as the highest individual level in the focus upon the other beyond the self. However, these would invoke the Autonomy ethic, as other-focus would be with respect to other's autonomy.

Self-focused moral violations invoke the Autonomy ethic, where individual actions against experiencing harm elicits anger that's thought to protect against and counter moral injury. However, it would seem violations of proscription would produce different emotion reactions from observers than would violations of prescriptions. Taking the latter first, violations of prescriptive self-reliance and autonomy would produce other-directed emotions of pity, if one had positive regard for that person Fessler (1999), while disgust would be seem to be more likely if one had negative regard for them. Similarly, for proscriptive self-focus violations, anger would seem

For all of these moral motivations in the value continuum, their situated contexts of proscriptions against or prescriptions for provide a logic to social judgment of others which makes violations against or exemplifications of, respectively, evocative of strong emotional reactions of either punishing violators or praising upholders. The SVT motivational continuum put into proscriptive and prescriptive regulation strategies at self-, other-, and group-focuses seems to provide the context that leads to evaluation of social action to be judged morally, rather than simply evaluatively. The dynamics of moral judgment may be made far more clear by uniting Schwartz Value Theory with the Model of Moral Motivations, especially in concert with the concept of foundational intuitions shaped by game-theoretic solutions to problems of life shaped over the long evolutionary history of human group living.

When values are used to organize action towards group goals, certain behaviors are expected by the collective group working cooperatively. Such expectations are group norms, which when enforced by the group over everyone, are considered Moral Standards (Fiske 1992: 698). The norms of the most general type of group, the culture, organize around a logic which is all encompassing, larger than a worldview. These organize social action towards solving some recurrent and important goal affecting the whole of culture. Such logic has been found around the organization of Social Relational Models, which this study covered earlier in Relational Model Theory (RMT) (see **Fig. 4.1**).

RMT's four broad classes—Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP)—provide “representations, grammars, or script-like social schemata” for coordinating social life, while “not fully specifying behavior,” instead provide “a set of rules which strongly **constrain the possibilities** and which **organize responses to violations of the rules**” (Fiske, 1991: 21). Interpretations of behavior trigger evaluative judgments of good or bad, which differ depending on its congruency with the Mod logic used based on social relational context. Behavior which is interpreted as matching model logic is judged right and good, while behavior interpreted as incongruent with model expectations and threatening cultural logic triggers negative moral judgments, which motivates the group to punish violators. “Moral motives, judgments, sanctions, redress, emotions, and actions are embedded in social- relational models for living in groups,” and thus, produce fundamentally different moralities (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Each of RMT's have a unifying moral motive providing the Mod specific logic underlying moral judgment and guiding the logic of social norms: Unity (CS), Hierarchy (AR), Equality (EM), and Proportionality (MP) (Rai & Fiske, 2011), which added to RMT's Manifestations & Features (Fig. 4.1) yields **Fig. 26.8** below.

Four Social Relational Models Manifestations & Features

	Communal Sharing (CS)	Authority Ranking (AR)	Equality Matching (EM)	Market Pricing (MP)
Decision Making	Group Consensus	Chief Decides & Delegates	Voting	Market Mechanism
Group Organization	all pitch in without assignments	orders down a chain of command	everyone do an equal share	compensation depending on proportion
Social Influence	Conformity	Obedience	Compliance	Cost & Benefit Incentives
Social Identity	Membership in a Natural Kind	Social Rank	Co-Equal Peer	Occupation or Economic Role
Natural Selection Mechanism	Kin Selection	Dominance / Submission Adaptiveness	"Tit-for-Tat" In-Kind Reciprocity	Specialization & Commodity Exchange
Relational Structure	Equivalence Relation	Linear Ordering	Ordered Abelian Group	Archimedean Ordered Field
Measurement Scale Type	Categorical or Nominal	Ordinal	Interval	Ratio
Significance of Time	Relationships idealized as Eternal Perpetuation of Tradition	Sequential Ordering by Rank Temporal Priority to Superiors	Oscillation of Reciprocation Synchrony of Action	Calculus of Rates of Interest/Return/Pay Efficient use of Time
Relationship Marking Mode	Enactive, Kinesthetic, Sensorimotor Rituals	Spatiotemporal Ordering	Concrete Operations	Abstract Symbolic Representation
Constitutive Media	Consubstantial Assimilation Birth, Nursing, Food Sharing, Ritual Synchronization, Movement, Shared Pain	Social Physics Above, In Front, Earlier, Larger, More Numerous, Greater Force	Concrete Operations Turn taking, In-kind Reciprocity, 1:1 Correspondence, Balance, Alignment	Arbitrary Signs Money, Propositional Language, Writing, Numbers & Math, Digital Accounts
Motivation	Intimacy	Power	Equity	Achievement
Moral Motive	Unity	Hierarchy	Equality	Proportionality
Moral Ideology	Group Legitimization	Heteronomy	Balanced Reciprocity	Rational Legal Legitimation
Moral Judgment	everyone's suffering as one's own	obey command of elders or God	treat each person equally	everyone in proportion to deserving

Fig. 26.11 - RMT Manifestations & Features adding Motivations -

Sources: Fiske (1992: 694-696; 2004b)(Rai & Fiske, 2011)

Rai & Fiske (2011) posit a social-relational morality in which “moral motives, judgments, sanctions, redress, emotions, and actions are embedded in social- relational models for living in groups” (Rai & Fiske, 2011: 59). Maintenance of social-relations occur through the evaluations of “one’s own and others’ judgments and behaviors (including speech, emotions, attitudes, and intentions) with reference to prescriptive models for social relationships” (Rai & Fiske, 2011: 59). Moral transgressions and obligations are judged based upon internalized social-relational model logics which are triggered by situational cues “automatically” and for which disagreements about moral content can be due to using different Model logic. Social-relational context triggers categorization of a particular mod which provides the “motivational force” behind social behaviors for regulating social relationships through general moral motivation which “form the core of our moral psychology” (Rai & Fiske, 2011: 59). The motivation is built into the categorization and logic, as well as human “proclivity to related to people in these modes” for which they are “‘prepared’ and attuned to find and participate...create...and insist on” (Fiske, 1991: 195).

Affect Control Theory (ACT) posits this cultural knowledge base is “generated without need for resource-intensive cognitive processing” built into the “affective meanings of social concepts” which guide the alignment of behaviors with the affective meaning of situations...reproduce cultural norms in social interaction” (Schröder *et al.*, 2013: 3). The core control process works on the affective “data” of the system embedded in the affective meanings inherent in concepts, largely cultural in

nature since most of what we know about the world is culturally transmitted rather than experienced. This cultural knowledge reflects the alignment of embodied cultural affectations in the understanding of semantic connotative meanings, for which language is the conduit for aligning cultural sentiments. However, the data of the system is constrained by the logic of the Mods, which become salient due to situational features. The enactment of social norms, then, are not merely rule following but flow out of the meanings of social concepts in which context is delineated by model logic. The mods are like a superset of nested conceptualized concepts whose core logics are set early in development, much like the categorizations for vowel sounds, where prototypes are established through early infant-caregiver social engagement and then repeatedly reapplied by associating new experiences to the Mod which best fits according to situational context.

The degree of adherence to normative rules varies depending on the dynamics of the relations of the Mods to each other, not necessarily in the logic within the Mod itself, for which any culture combines these building blocks in various combinations and in various contexts. The Tightness-Looseness construct (Gelfand et al., 2006) measuring the strength of social norms and how vigilantly they are sanctioned, emerges with the Market Pricing social relational model, the abstract symbolic domain that is distinctly human (Fiske, 1992). Social norms provide a social mechanism that encourages costly altruistic primary behaviors (expectations for forgoing self-interested actions) through lower cost secondary behaviors (sanctioning) which benefits group regulation (Sober & Wilson, 1998). Cultures vary in their degree of tightness or looseness, with both productive and unproductive models of each. Extreme tightness inhibits creativity and openness while enforcing potential inequality. Extreme looseness results in self-interest of others harming the collective or individuals through decreased social solidarity and increases social ambiguity. A healthy balance of tightness and looseness can benefit the harmony within the group while giving it competitive advantages with other groups.

Integrating RMT with the Model of Moral Motive & MFT is aided by RMT's moral motives of Unity (CS), Hierarchy (AR), Equality (EM), Proportionality (MP) (Rai & Fiske, 2011). While all of RMT's MOD logics are used interchangeably in constructing social relations at dyadic and group levels, it

could be argued those model logics are also operational at the Self-focus level, as subjective states as well as subjective though are subject to social relational logic, since much of what we experience internally is motivationally related to the social world. However, RMT's moral motive may each be thematic for individual "cells" of the MMM. Additionally, RMT's four MODs map to social action fluxes, which are signature dyadic interaction patterns of which there are only six, with ASOCIAL and NULL as the additional non-social fluxes (Favre & Sornette, 2015), providing six social relational models for six moral motive cells. While the non-social fluxes don't have necessarily have moral content per se, in some sense they assist the mapping of RMT to the MMM, with a speculative hypothesis explained below.

Model of Moral Motives & MFT MAC SVT w/ RMT

		MORAL REGULATION	
		Proscriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	GROUP FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Heroism SVT: Loyalty, Obedience, Purity Conservatism, *Reciprocity RMT: HIERARCHY (AR)	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity SVT: Reciprocity, Elevation, Tolerance, *Loyalty RMT: EQUALITY (EM)
	OTHER FOCUS	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship SVT: *Dominance, *Ambition, Purity RMT: UNITY (CS)	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness SVT: Elevation, Tolerance RMT: PROPORTIONALITY (MP)
	SELF FOCUS	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: PURITY Sanctity MAC: : N/A SVT: *Egocentrism, *Gratification, Purity RMT: NULL	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession SVT: Autonomy, Tolerance RMT: ASOCIAL

Fig. 26.12 — Model of Moral Motives & MFT MAC SVT w/ RMT — Sources:

Janoff-Bulman & Carnes (2013: Fig 1, 3); Rai & Fiske (2011); Haidt *et al.* (2009: 109); Curry (2016)

Each of RMT's moral motives of Unity (CS), Hierarchy (AR), Equality (EM), Proportionality (MP) (Rai & Fiske, 2011), as well as the two non-social action fluxes (Favre & Sornette, 2015), fit the logic for one of the motivational cells of the MMM. Clear matches are in Social Order's preference for Hierarchy and Social Justice's theme of Equality, while the non-social Self-Focus dimensions match Self-Reliance with Asocial interaction type whereas Self-Restraint provides a good fit for a disinterested NULL interaction type. The Other-focus, interpersonal cells of the MMM also fit the remaining two RMT Moral Motives. Enabling Altruism matches Proportionality in the sense of Assortive Interactions, where people find cooperative others to engage in altruistic mutual aid. Containing Self-Interest, however, doesn't seem to fit the CS motive of UNITY, which RMT clearly posits is the basis of all groups and would seem a group level focus. However, all Groups are composed of interpersonal dyads, the fundamental base of social interaction, for which there is a tacit agreement to not harm each other to enable social interaction. Self-restraint from Harm is perhaps the only truly universal Moral that all cultures recognize, giving it the sense of a unifying moral from which to build all Groups.

The dynamic, then, of goals, motivations, and values acting in concert in evaluation of self and others' behaviors provide the system for systematizing norms:

*"In that they communicate something about the actor's character, **social norms** are a language. Complying with a social norm sends a message. Normative conformity is like conformity to the rules of grammar: it is done (albeit unknowingly) for purposes of communication. In fact, social norms are an intricate system of communication, one that conveys a single yet important message: the actor's potential as a cooperative partner."*

Druzin (2013: 261)

Habermas' Communicative Action theory of speech claims that universal validity claims correspond to speaker perspectives with expressive intentions corresponding to subjective first person perspectives that can be judged for Truthfulness, interactive interpersonal expressive corresponding to normative second person perspectives judged for rightness or appropriateness, while cognitive propositional content can be judged for Truth claims (Habermas, 1979). These roughly match the

platonic triadic realms of Beauty, Justice, and Truth (cf Wilber, 2000a). These realms correspond to the 1st person-perspective representing a subjective, expressive mode, the 2nd person-perspective representing a normative, interactive mode and the 3rd person representing an objective, cognitive mode. However, as is clear from **Fig. 26.12**, moral motivations exist at subjective, normative, and objective perspectives, for both deontic rules against (should nots) and obligatory prescriptions for (shoulds).

Therefore, current integral analysis of American Politics by integral theorists limiting morality to simply the objective domain end up with a model of ideology that stereotypes ideologies into false dichotomies and false polarizations. While their intention is to find the commonality of values which are shared, it artificially creates a model which emphasizes division and separateness. For instance, McIntosh (2016, 2017) offers a model of four US political worldviews aligning from political left to political right as Progressive Postmodernists, Liberal Modernists, Fiscally Conservative Modernists, and Socially Conservative Traditionalists. These worldviews are then stereotyped to be centered on moral values of Caring, Fairness, Liberty, and Heritage respectively (McIntosh, 2017), clearly in reference the Moral Foundations Theory's typification of moral focus for its four ideological clusters, Religious Liberals, Secular Liberals, Libertarians, and Social Conservatives respectively. This, however, does not match the evidence provided by the composite model of moral motivations offered by this study, which takes into account the role of affect regulation, social relational models, and cooperative evolutionary strategies. The integral account of ideology McIntosh (2016, 2017) essentially bakes in polarization and division due to the simplification of political ideology to individual "exemplar" moral foundations.

"a relational model is attached to a relationship between two actors (that can be persons or groups), whereas a cultural bias emerges from a larger pattern of social relationships. By larger pattern, we mean a set of nodes (actors) and links (social ties), as in graph or network theory." Favre & Sornette (2016: 14)

This study has shown the coherence of different theories of morality by integrating them with the Model of Moral Motivations, taking morality as a regulatory activity occurring at self-, other- and group-focuses. Mapping MFT's moral foundations to these MMM cells allows for a rough measure of the valuation for different focuses over prescriptive or proscriptive regulation at a cultural level, as

measured by the clusters found of foundation valuations according to political ideology. Now, aided by mapping of RMT's social relational models and MAC's game theoretic evolutionary solutions, the heatmaps of **Fig. 26.4** begin to offer more than showing that there *are* differences in values, but in the pattern of difference across the constellation weighting of social relational logic and of cooperative strategies. Expanding MFT to include the sixth foundation of liberty, as well as a social justice group "binding" foundation, could lead to a better understanding of "how and why people behave as they do" (Bruce, 2013: 44).

This study makes the prediction that a fully measured cluster analysis of these two additional "foundations" would lead not only to a better understanding of the differences between US political Conservative, Secular Liberal, Libertarian and Religious Liberal clusters, but more generally, a universal model of cultural moral ideology that could help to disambiguate much of the political mis-categorization and mudslinging in the labeling of ideological "others." For, these MMM heatmaps, combining the MMM with MFT, MAC, SVT. & RMT can connect the micro to the macro, revealing a model for which Bruce (2013) was seeking in a coherent universal integration of Moral Foundations Theory with Plural Rationalist Theory (Grid-Group) and the Big Three ethics, as shown by the figure below:

PRT Configuration of Model of Moral Motives & MFT Valuation HeatMaps

CLUSTER 4 : Conservatives

MORAL REGULATION		
	Prescriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Hesitanc RMT: HIERARCHY (AR) L = 3.85 A = 4.25	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity RMT: EQUALITY (EM) W = 0.00 E = 0.00
	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship RMT: UNITY (CS) Hn = 2.80 Hp = 2.80	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness RMT: PROPORTIONALITY (MP) C = 0.00 F = 2.70
	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: SANCTITY Purity, Moderation MAC: NA RMT: NULL P = 2.65 M = 0.00	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession RMT: ASOCIAL I = 0.00 D = 0.00

CLUSTER 3 : Religious Liberals

MORAL REGULATION		
	Prescriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Hesitanc RMT: HIERARCHY (AR) L = 2.85 A = 2.70	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity RMT: EQUALITY (EM) W = 0.00 E = 0.00
	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship RMT: UNITY (CS) Hn = 3.95 Hp = 3.85	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness RMT: PROPORTIONALITY (MP) C = 0.00 F = 3.70
	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: SANCTITY Purity, Moderation MAC: NA RMT: NULL P = 2.70 M = 0.00	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession RMT: ASOCIAL I = 0.00 D = 0.00

CLUSTER 1 : Secular Liberal

MORAL REGULATION		
	Prescriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Hesitanc RMT: HIERARCHY (AR) L = 1.70 A = 1.95	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity RMT: EQUALITY (EM) W = 0.00 E = 0.00
	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship RMT: UNITY (CS) Hn = 0.10 Hp = 0.10	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness RMT: PROPORTIONALITY (MP) C = 0.00 F = 4.15
	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: SANCTITY Purity, Moderation MAC: NA RMT: NULL P = 1.30 M = 0.00	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession RMT: ASOCIAL I = 0.00 D = 0.00

CLUSTER 2 : Libertarians

MORAL REGULATION		
	Prescriptive Protect / Inhibition (Avoidance)	Prescriptive Provide / Activation (Approach)
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS	Group-Protecting SOCIAL ORDER Communal Solidarity MFT: BINDING Loyalty, Authority MAC: Mutualism, Deference, Hesitanc RMT: HIERARCHY (AR) L = 1.70 A = 1.95	Group-Providing SOCIAL JUSTICE Communal Responsibility MFT: BINDING Welfare, Equality MAC: Reciprocity RMT: EQUALITY (EM) W = 0.00 E = 0.00
	Other-Protecting CONTAIN SELF-INTEREST Not Harming MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Harm MAC: Kinship RMT: UNITY (CS) Hn = 3.00 Hp = 3.00	Other-Providing ENABLE ALTRUISM Helping / Fairness MFT: INDIVIDUALIZING Care, Fairness MAC: Fairness RMT: PROPORTIONALITY (MP) C = 0.00 F = 4.20
	Self-Protecting SELF-RESTRAINT Moderation MFT: SANCTITY Purity, Moderation MAC: NA RMT: NULL P = 1.10 M = 0.00	Self-Providing SELF-RELIANCE Industriousness MFT: INDEPENDENCE Liberty MAC: Possession RMT: ASOCIAL I = 0.00 D = 0.00

Fig. 26.13 — PRT Configuration of Model of Moral Motives Cluster Heatmaps —
Sources: Haidt, Graham & Joseph (2009: 109); Bruce (2013)

Plural Rationality Theory posits that people use cultural biases in contextualized ways to make sense of social structure for how society should best be structured. Bruce (2013) posited that Moral Foundations Theory and the Big “Three” Ethics could be mapped to PRT’s cultural bias typology to provide empirical support for understanding what motivates people to behave in the ways they do.

Fig. 26.13 is an elaboration of Bruce’s unified model locating Community-Autonomy along the Group-Grid orientation in which the Cluster Heat maps correspond to PRT’s Hierarchy, Egalitarian, Fatalist, and Individualist worldview biases (rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise). Thus, high to low Community would run vertically downward while low to high Autonomy would run horizontally rightward. This would also allow Tightness-Looseness to be added, which describes the degree to which cultural norms are defined and sanctioned, aligned along the horizontal from left (High Grid) to right (Low Grid), respectively.

This cultural tightness-looseness dynamic corresponds with the Vertical-Horizontal dimension of the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), with the Collectivism - Individualism dimension running from high Community to low Community. Thus, PRT, HVIC and the MMM Clusters combined would map Conservatism with Vertical Collectivism - Hierarchist, Secular Liberalism with Vertical Individualism - Fatalist, Libertarian with Horizontal Individualism - Individualist, and Religious Liberals with Horizontal Collectivism - Egalitarianism quadrants. This would place high Grid/Tightness on the left (Conservatives and Secular Liberals) and low Grid/Looseness on the right (Libertarians and Religious Liberals).

However, Bruce (2013), who offered the Universal model that began this study, points out that the mapping of PRT’s Fatalist with Secular Liberalism is tenuous, requiring “further work is necessary to clarify the relationship between them” since PRT “describes fatalists as subject to all the negative phenomena Secular Liberals worry about...rather than the lived experiences of Secular Liberals themselves” (Bruce, 2013: 44). Furthermore, the correspondence of Schwartz Value Theory’s Self-Enhancement values quadrant shares concerns with Security and Power with Conservatism doesn’t seem to fit the Secular Liberals valuation cluster, albeit, with two of the six motivation cells not yet measured. It may be those additional moral motivation/foundations would lead to finding a fifth cluster through factor analysis, one which would share a fatalist worldview and similarities to moral

foundation valuations, but differentiated by the unmeasured focus on the self-reliance dimension. Furthermore, a significant portion of the American electorate is non-political (Gorman), both abstaining from voting and party identification, of which PRT's fatalist worldview predicts, identifying a hidden population that may also be absent traditional testing methods, a product of distrust or non-involvement with institutions.

It is a hypothesis of this study the Fatalist worldview would include two variants, one more oriented **towards** Self-Enhancement via power correlating with the other variant oppositely oriented **against** Self-Enhancement via power, perhaps associated with social withdrawal or exclusion. In agreement with Bruce, further study is needed which may be aided by correlating with cultural emotion dynamics.

Typical Integral models of US political worldviews incorrectly cast Progressive Postmodernists as the smallest, politically left most grouping within the American polity, whereas its analogue to the MMM and PRT, named by MFT as the Religious Liberal, is mainly ignored by MFT studies. This worldview cluster shows the greatest balance of "moral tastebuds" according to five moral foundations in the Cluster Analysis, as well as the largest sample size (Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009). From a purely intuitive view, the Social Justice moral motivation would figure to be most valued by this "hidden" cluster, one which directly challenges the Social Order supported by the Establishment.

Further study of moral foundations of cultural worldviews, particularly US ideological worldviews, must reconcile with the composite moral model (**Fig. 26.14**) offered by this study, which may be enlightened by the study of Power and Status and of affect regulation. While the arguments of whether binding dimensions are truly moral may be debatable, philosophical arguments that morality is "irreducibly a second person phenomenon" (Darwall, 2009) agrees with the moral theories included in the combined Model of Moral Motivations, something that wisdom traditions have taught for ages and for which is even discernible in primate studies.

"Do unto others as you would have them do to you' brings together empathy (attention to others' feelings) and reciprocity (if others follow the same rule, you will be treated well). Human morality could not exist without empathy and reciprocity – tendencies found in our fellow primates." De Waal (2013)

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

Development & Emotion

“In 1975, E.O. Wilson predicted that ethics would soon become part of the “new synthesis” of sociobiology, in which distal mechanisms (such as evolution), proximal mechanisms (such as neural processes), and the socially constructed web of meanings and institutions (as studied by the humanities and social sciences) would all be integrated into a full explanation of human morality. The key to this integration, Wilson argued, was to begin with the moral intuitions given to us by our evolved emotions.” Haidt & Kesebir (2010: 800)

Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) (**Fig. 22.4**) posits moral judgment and reasoning arise from a multi-step process where moral judgments arise from quick implicit social intuitions, arriving automatically in the mind like perception, while slower, more costly self-reflective steps require effort and energy. These judgments then provide the material from which post-hoc reasoning automatically forms, providing argumentative propositions which can be used to justify and persuade others of the validity of such judgments. Slower reasoned judgment comes through deliberative effort, requiring time and mental energy, which may be honed through self-reflection. The SIM posits that moral reasoning emerges as common intuition, while the deliberate effort of self-reflective reasoning remains relatively rare. Private reflection and reasoned judgment of SIM can overcome the implicit intuitions and judgments that are automatically produced by our subconscious cultural biases towards social structural perceptions.

This implicit moral reasoning emerges in graded stages during childhood through adolescence in a predictable and monotonic sequence (Kohlberg, 1971). Many theorists have created models showing the emergence of psychological development, from Piaget’s initial cognitive developmental theory, Loevinger’s ego development, to Kohlberg’s moral development (Wilber, 2000b). These models trace the emergence of fundamental cognitive categories like time, quantity, justice, causality, etc. and how these concepts change over the course of childhood. They are measured by requiring children to explain through descriptive reasoning why and how they think. The Social Intuitionist

Model (Haidt, 2001) offers a model of reasoning which includes implicit processes instead of Kohlberg's entirely deliberative rationalist account, "questioning the causal role of reflective, conscious reasoning" (Haidt, 2001: 5). However, what causes the differences between differing moral foundations that result in differing implicit moral judgments?

Since Moral Foundations are correlational, they cannot be located in developmental theories without further theoretical and empirical work (Kovaleva *et al.*, 2012). MFT's exploration for a deeper set of moral foundations than those of the iconic Developmental Theory in Moral Psychology, Kohlberg's (1971) Six Stage Model of Moral Development, which found that Care and Fairness to be the two Moral universals. Kohlberg's model theory builds upon Piaget's childhood cognitive developmental theory, proposing six sequential, progressive stages of moral development representing different levels of moral reasoning reflected in the child's expanded use of taking enlarged social perspectives of Ego and Others. The model posits three successive levels of two stages each—Preconventional, Conventional and Postconventional—which trace the evolution of moral thinking from an externally mediated cultural standard to one internalized by the child, to one ending with a universal standard.

Kohlberg tested this model by investigating the moral reasoning used by children during different periods in childhood, requiring them to explain their thought for different moral dilemmas. By observing the reasoning children used at various times in their life, Kohlberg could determine the level of and stage at which their cognitive development had progressed. Evidence showed a distinct patterning of successive stages along roughly stable ages over which these emerge.

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

<u>Levels</u>	<u>Stage</u>	<u>Stages of Motivation</u>	<u>Cognitive Prerequisite</u>	<u>Social Perspective</u>	<u>Focus</u>
Preconventional (3-7 years-old)	1	Obedience & Punishment	Egoistic	Blind Egoism	Individual
	2	Self-Interest	Individualistic	Instrumental Egoism	Individual
Conventional (8-13 years-old)	3	Interpersonal Accord & Conformity	Group Cohesion	Social Relational	Group
	4	Authority & Social Order Obedience	Group Coordination	Social Sanctions	Group
Transition	4.5		Can See Other Perspectives	Communities	
Postconventional (adulthood)	5	Social Contract	Multiple Perspectives at Once	Contractual Perspective	Universal
	6	Universal Ethical Principles	Integral Perspective	Mutual Respect	Universal

Fig. 27.1 — Stages of Moral Development — Source: Kohlberg (1971)

Other developmental models (e.g., Piaget) detail an initial sensorimotor stage during infancy, not specified in Kohlberg's stage model, when the infant undergoes attachment to caregiver(s), allowing the post-natal development of the social engagement system (Schore, 2001). Expectations emerge during early development as part of the attachment process- "children derive a set of expectations about their own relationship capacities and about other people's resources to their social overtures and interactions, these expectations being created on the basis of their early parent-child attachments" (Rutter, 1987 in Schore, 2000: 32). However, Kohlberg's model captures the process of moral reasoning expressed through language, clearly not testable until the emergence of language. Much research has shown that infants are undergoing rapid cognitive development through the first few years of pre-verbal life (Trevarthen, 1979). This sensorimotor stage occurs before the initial stage 1 in **Fig. 27.1.**

According to Kohlberg's model, beginning around age three through age seven in what's termed the (1) Preconventional Level, young children begin the process of externalizing behavior towards placating individual need, first learning to avoid punishment, the first stage. Morals are seen to be a fixed set of invariant rules by an external authority (i.e., parents, teachers) affecting only the self (egocentric first-person perspective). Gradually, the child sees these rules as varying depending on whom is in authority, recognizing various viewpoints are relative and an individual is free to pursue one's own self-interests (instrumental egoistic first-person perspective). At this point the child's view of punishment and rewards are tied to risk of getting caught rather than an ultimate standard that must be followed (second stage).

During adolescence (8-13 years old), the child achieves the (2) Conventional Level where social relational rules for good relationships are internalized and integrated with the needs of the individual. The child's viewpoint expands to see expectations of groups (family, community) require the child to value good behavior over bad (i.e., kindness, generosity & love vs. selfishness, greed & spite). At this point their moral thinking reflects second-person perspective taking representing the concern for others within one's close relationships (third stage). As the child's perspective gradually becomes generalized by taking the perspective of society as a whole, the child comes to see the need for obeying rules and regulations to maintain good behavior generally, to uphold the social order (fourth stage).

By adulthood, the individual may achieve the (3) Postconventional Level in a transition to an even wider perspective and reflective of moral reasoning based on individual equality and reciprocity. Moral reasoning at this stage is able to discern differences in moral standards between groups within society and to abstract moral standards which ought to be met, by viewing Ego's actions from a third-person perspectives (fifth stage). These become abstract standards to live up to and to uphold in society (fourth person perspective). A sixth stage represents adopting these universal principles to achieve justice, respecting the lives and dignity of all with universal human rights. At this stage, a universal justice requires one to oppose rules and regulations which may cause hurt to others, including engaging in civil disobedience to challenge unjust laws favoring one group over another. This stage is virtually unobserved in test settings and debates on whether it amounts to an actual psychological or philosophical stage remain.

Haidt's (2001) critique of Kohlberg's model asserts that test subjects produce *post hoc* reasoning reinforcing innate judgments that appear as intuitions. The verbal explanations given during data collection for Kohlberg's theory represent imprecise cognitive mechanisms trying to explain unconscious implicitly generated intuitions. Moral reasoning is highly influenced by worldview, in that it too is shaped unconsciously by culture serving largely as a form of argument reinforcing one's implicit judgment, i.e. motivated reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Conscious reflective moral reasoning occurs with cognitive effort, requiring time and mental resources to correct initial implicit judgment to achieve an objective reflective perspective. Moreover, that form of reflective reasoning continues to work with implicit intuitions. Consciously thinking about social interaction with other persons generates new intuitions. It is the development of additional perspectives which aid in creating new intuitions that can then be consciously reflected upon. Thus, Kohlberg's model seems to represent the development of SIM's sixth stage of reflective moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001), where each stage of Kohlberg's study reflect cognitive mechanisms of semantic understanding of morality, "involving conscious, language based thinking" (Haidt 2001:4) built atop an implicit moral judgmental process.

Kohlberg's model has also been critiqued for its singular focus on the moral dimension of Justice, which Gilligan (1982) showed as being biased towards the male perspective, especially true since only boys were tested initially. Even when girls were eventually tested, they were often rated at the third

stage, despite the ability to engage in complex reasoning as boys, while using a moral reasoning focusing on the ethics of care, compassion, relationship and responsibility rather than rules and rights (Gilligan, 1982). Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's theory, and of the lack of recognizing Care as a moral dimension, exposed how women must transition to a moral world dominated by male-centric morals after adolescence, which requires them to live according to two standards, an externally applied standard with rules contradicting their internally oriented standard coming from a place of care (Gilligan, 1982). This double standard forces a life geared towards individualism, hierarchy, work, and identity rather than interdependence, network, relationship, and intimacy (Gilligan, 1982). Moreover, the double standard has deprived women the ability of choice and forced them to "defer to the judgment of men, although often intimating a sensibility of their own which is at variance with that judgment" (Gilligan, 1982: 69). Women must struggle through conflicting standards of human development that hold "the role of separation as it defines and empowers the self," versus "the ongoing process of attachment that creates and sustains the human community," where "silencing the narrative of women in adult development distorts the conception of its stages and sequence" (Gilligan, 1982: 156).

"The elusive mystery of women's development lies in its recognition of the continuing importance of attachment in the human life cycle. Women's place in man's life cycle is to protect this recognition while the developmental litany intones the celebration of separation, autonomy, individuation, and natural rights." Gilligan (1982: 23)

Gilligan, who collaborated with Kohlberg, created a theoretical model of moral development centered on a Care-based ethic, which too has Preconventional, Conventional, and Postconventional levels of development, during which the focus of care grows from **egocentric** perspective, to one of **group care**, to a **universal care**. These are theorized as the same general stages males traverse as they lose egocentricity, only that male socialized ethics focus more on justice and rights rather than care (Gilligan, 1982). The male ethic too can follow the same path of expanding from egocentric, to group-centric, to world-centric ethical focus. Wilber (2000b) characterizes another level above universal or world-centric termed integrated, one that integrates both ethics beyond world-centric to universal ethical focus.

These two ethics of Care and Rights are generalizable to the Group-focus and Self-focus nodes of the

y-axis of Moral Motivations. The agentic expansion of moral motivation from “should nots” to “shoulds” corresponds to the preconventional - conventional - postconventional x-axis of moral regulation. These two orthogonal dynamics are seen in the moral motivations model, which cannot be understood from a single methodological approach, but must combine both top down and bottom up approaches.

While these developmental models delineate the path of conscious moral reasoning, the evidence presented by this study point to unconscious, implicit processes lying at the heart of judgment, social perception and emotion. The neurophysiological development of the unconscious mind, identified as right hemispheric dominant, occurs early during the first 14 months of life guided by the training of the social engagement system during infant-caregiver attachment (Schore, 2006). This period into the second year of life, during which the VVC fully myelinates before the onset of language, is identified by developmental psychologists as the crucial period in which a child develops the foundations of emotional co-regulated affective interchanges (Greenspan & Shanker, 2004: 67). The development of social signaling allows the toddler to “separate perception from action,” meaning automated innate reactions to things in the world (i.e., food, the caretaker, any stimulus) are tempered by the desire to communicate with others in long affective sequences. This creates an image of the stimulus less tied to action or some innate response, instead “acquiring meaning and becoming a symbol” which Greenspan & Shanker (2004: 38) theorize, provides the basis for symbolic reference in which the symbolic is abstracted and separated from an indexical or iconic physical reference (Deacon, 1997). Additionally, they posit that social signaling, emotion and affect are essential to understanding cognitive development, for they provide the basis for symbol formation, allowing for language, problem solving, and higher-level self-reflective thinking (Greenspan & Shanker, 2004: 39).

Greenspan & Shanker (2004) offer a theory identifying key emotional and social milestones from infancy through adulthood in which affect and emotion are at the heart of the symbolic world and of cognitive development. Sensations from stimuli are double-encoded as both something felt, as well as something shared through signaling with others. This double-encoding includes not simply the feeling of what things are like, but their symbolic significance shared with others through a nurturing connection. Patterns of emotional signaling become recognized for their social significance allowing the child to make sense of the world and develop a sense of self. These experiences detach from

action and become symbolic, which can then be recognized and labeled. Emotional transformations occur which guide intellectual development and reflective thinking, with emotion “orchestrating cognitive, language, motor, sensory, and social experience” (2004: 51). It is the growing sense of self that integrates different emotional aspects of self, (ie., “good” self with “angry” self) that provides a capacity for reflection, gray area thinking, and an internal standard which replaces concrete operations (*ibid*). This account provides a continuity of social regulation from non-human primates through its human origins and the emergence of the symbolic and offers comparisons of their development as compared to human children, noting where along their stage model humans excel and primates fail to advance.

According to developmental theories, the reconstruction of development is conceptualized in stages, with many stage theories. This study, in previous versions, attempted to augment Habermas’s developmental reconstruction of the transition from Preconventional to Conventional (cf Habermas, 1990: 116-170) by offering that emotion must be considered in any cognitive account of the reconceptualizing of Complementary and Symmetrical speech and action integration. While a reconstruction of that time in childhood development may help to determine how conscious, language driven reasoning forms, moral or otherwise (Kohlberg, 1971), it cannot account for the underlying question of how the moral motivations and intuitional system develops, which govern automatic moral judgment and group living. Affective processes clearly are involved, but these are established in the primordial beginnings of life, during the training of the Self-Engagement system guided by social and emotional engagement with caregivers.

The basic emotional building blocks posited as requisite for the construction of mental representations for understanding and enacting shared intentionality in pursuit of collective social action must develop far earlier than childhood and adolescence, as conscious use of language requires a firm bedrock of unconscious processes (Schore, 2006). The desire to share emotional experiences with others develops from birth through the first 14 months and is at the heart of human social interaction and cultural transmission (Tomasello *et al.*, 2005). This motivation provides the difference in human sociality, allowing for the construction of shared representations of social scenes providing the symbolic means of cultural transmission (Tomasello *et al.*, 2005). Emotional engagement and shared intentionality provide a motivational drive to engage in the construction of “dialogic cognitive representations” which allow the sharing of goals and the same means of action

towards goal achievement (Tomasello *et al.*, 2005: 1).

Moreover, from birth the infant experiences the world starting from an intersubjective perspective in close dyadic engagement with caregivers (Reddy, 2008). First-person proprioceptive perspective awareness emerges gradually, as the child experiences and becomes aware of the caregiver's attention towards themself, and connects the emotion exchange from the caregiver with the feeling of emotion in the self (Reddy, 2008). The objective perspective emerges later, as the child experiences the attention of the caregiver towards another object, and connects the third-person perspective to the affective display of the caregiver (Reddy, 2008). This will lead to the infant to attempt to engage the caregiver in directing their attention to an object the infant has noticed through Declarative Pointing (DP) (Brink, 2004), taking in the caregiver's reaction to adjust their own internal reaction, in a distanced instance of co-regulation (Reddy, 2008). These actions are wiring up different functional systems of the social engagement system, and presumably, functional systems of the brain. The attention of attention leads to the ability to infer from attention the intention of others, which develops pre-verbally, thus is not dependent on semantic meta-representation but pragmatic and experiential (Reddy, 2008).

The wiring of the social engagement system integrates the categories of experience, culminating in the ability to engage in joint attention around the 9th month (Reddy, 2008). The schematic of the eventual joint attention, using the familiar triadic form of the Self; another person/Alter; and a stimulus in the form of an object event; would look like the Balance Theory diagrams. Each of the side of the triad represents a category of experience relating self to another to an event or object, as in the figure below:




Fig. 27.2 – Social Inference Triadic

The subjective, intersubjective, and objective correspond to Peirce's general categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, respectively, as in **Fig. 27.2**. The intersubjective second-person perspective represents the fundamental experiential state from birth, the social dimension. The infant is able to glean information from its environment through the shared dyadic experience to associate the caregivers attention to itself through play. The various states of emotion exchange and coordinated facial displays grow the subjective experience of the child. The back and forth of co-regulation and play lead to ability to both follow and lead in eliciting joint affective states. From about this time the child can already sense the intention of the caregiver (Reddy, 2008). Later, the building of experience with objects becomes the focus, leading to joint experimentation and play with objects, with distal regulation through distanced looking and pointing with the caregiver, developing the objective perspective.

Craig (2006; 2008; 2017) offers a proposed structural model of awareness, located in the "posterior-to-anterior progression of re-representations in the human insula...culminate(ing) in the most recently evolved regions of the anterior insula, situated at its junction with the frontal operculum and orbitofrontal cortex" (Craig, 2088). This neurophysiological structure provides a "foundation for the sequential integration of the homeostatic condition of the body" that "successively includes homeostatic, environmental, hedonic, motivational, social and cognitive activity to produce a 'global emotional moment', which represents the sentient self at one moment of time" (Craig, 2009: 20). This structure is essential for the Salience Network and control of the Social Engagement system, as the right Anterior Insula becomes deeply wired with the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) in the coordination of affect and motor control, as well as wired to executive functional areas of the prefrontal lobe via high-speed Spindle cell VENs (Craig: 2017).

Schore (2006) contends co-regulation of emotion engagement during the early attachment between caregiver and infant during the first year wires up during infancy, related to automatic socioaffective reactions expressed early in ontogeny (Trevarthen, 1979). By the time children begin their very first attempts at language, they are already focused upon key social coordinates corresponding to neurophysiological constraints of the SN. The early language focus upon emotions (core affect), desires (motivational concepts), and perceptions (attention) presupposes an early ontological development and integration of the AIC (viscerosensory - affect), ACC (sensorymotor - motivation), and PFC (executive control - attention), in which growth and development are right hemispheric dominant during the first year (Schore, 2006). By the second year as language is emerging and brain growth becomes left hemispheric dominant (Schore, 2006), emotions, desires and perceptions must already be functionally wired, yet untrained by the different patterns of social relational mods.

Through simple infant-caregiver relational patterns, basic first order competencies are grown that are later utilized by innate cognitive modules (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Early developmental studies of infants show the seeds of social relational patterns are planted far earlier in development than previously thought, not simply in early childhood in the second year, but in the first half of the first year through the engagement of affect and attention (Reddy *et al.*, 1998). The early intersubjectivity of infant-caregiver occur in the action and response that operationalize primordial Social relational patterns.

This study posits the operationalization of patterns of social exchange between infant-caregiver embed primordial social relational patterns, as well as coordinate the early modes of autonomic control, which integrate the capabilities of emotion regulation, social perception/cognition, and social motivation, the primary 2-D dimensions of affect in which to represent concepts symbolically. While other stage theories show development during later stages as language develops, it is this critical period before and at the onset of language that the system for metarepresentation and symbolic reference must develop to be ready for those first words.

Recall the degree of social and emotion engagement, as well as person perspective, results in different “styles” social cognition from the differential recruitment of neural brain systems in social information processing (Schilbach *et al.*, 2013). These differ whether one is engaged emotionally or not and whether interactive with another or distanced as an observer, yielding different temporal neurological patterns of social information processing, resulting in different social cognitions (cf **Fig. 3.2**). Differences in social and emotional engagement, whether from an observational standpoint or an engaged standpoint, different brain networks involved in different types of processing are activated differentially, producing different ways of perceiving, feeling and knowing.

Different combinations of person perspective in the evaluation of the social frame containing internal, external, and historical information would then recruit different patterns of brain system switching, each representing some fundamental neural circuit involved in information processing yielding an inferential product, in the form of a feeling, intuition, or propositional statement. Different combinations of perspectives from the social frame would then correspond different categorizations of the situated conceptualization (Barsalou. 2015), yielding all the different types symbolic meaning extracted from a social encounter, describing the categories of the semiotic.

These would represent different combinations of brain system functioning in some information processing capacity, producing different categories of social information related to the situated conceptualization (Barsalou, 2015). These different categories of social information must relate to all the various combinations of firstness, secondness, and thirdness can be combined, which according to Peirce, occur in a very precise structure of categorization. Recall Peirce’s categories of semiosis (**Fig. 15.2**), the systematic combinations of firstness, secondness, and thirdness corresponding to

different ways the semiotic extracts meaning over a continua ranging from feeling to propositional semantics. That systematic pattern of relations between the semiotic triad of sign vehicle, object and interpretant when focused upon a self-, other-, or object-focus in some social situation represents different combinations of subjectivity spanning the semiotic levels of self (cf. **Fig. 15.6**) (Wiley, 1995).

This rather abstract description of the relation of theories to each other, is more easily grasped by expanding Peirce's categories of semiosis, as in the figure below:

Distribution of Categories in Semiosis Perspective Focus & Brain System Recruitment				
ROI	Classes of Sign Triad Type	Phenomena	Perspective	Brain Systems
1	1 1 1	rhemetic iconic qualisign a general vague of hurt	subjective self-focus	AIC
2	2 1 1	rhemetic iconic sinsign a model	intersubjective self-focus	AIC-ACC
3	2 2 1	rhemetic indexical sinsign an involuntary shout	intersubjective other-focus	AIC-ACC, dIPRC
4	2 2 2	dicent indexical sinsign a weathervane (pointing in direction of the wind)	intersubjective group-focus	AIC-ACC, vmPRC
5	3 1 1	rhemetic iconic legisign onomatopoeia: "cock-a-doodle-doo"	extra-subjective self-focus	leftH, AIC-ACC
6	3 2 1	rhemetic indexical legisign an indexical word: "that"	extra-subjective intersubjective other-focus	leftH, AIC-ACC, dIPRC
7	3 2 2	dicent indexical legisign a red light in context	extra-subjective intersubjective group-focus	leftH, AIC-ACC, dIPRC, vmPRC
8	3 3 1	rhemetic symbolic legisign a common noun: "apple"	extra-subjective extra-subjective self-focus	leftH, AIC-ACC, vmPRC
9	3 3 2	dicent symbolic legisign a proposition: "it's cold in here"	extra-subjective extra-subjective other-focus	leftH, AIC-ACC, dIPRC, vmPRC
10	3 3 3	argument symbolic legisign abduction: "It's cold in here" Interpreted as a request to close the window. induction: "Where there is smoke there is fire" deduction: the red light of the traffic code in the abstract.	extra-subjective extra-subjective group-focus extra-subjective extra-subjective group-focus extra-subjective extra-subjective group-focus	leftH, AIC-ACC, dIPRC, vmPRC leftH, AIC-ACC, dIPRC, vmPRC leftH, AIC-ACC, dIPRC, vmPRC

Fig. 27.3 - Categories in Semiosis, Perspective Focus & Brain System Recruitment -

Source: Everaert-Desmedt (2011)

The categories in semiosis provides the organizing pattern to integrate ontological perspectives (subjective, intersubjective, objective), brain system functional and temporal patterning, and the relational model logic. Each category is a combination of the parts of the semiotic. The sign vehicle (Representamen), the Object, and an Interpretant, produce meaning, or in the terms of the situated conceptualization, a concept. This study proposes this categorization is the functional product of the "essential mechanism of development" described by Schore (2009: 112) in the right-brain to right-brain emotional engagement with the caregiver that wires the non-conscious, implicit affective regulatory system (Schore, 2009). The exercise and wiring up of these functional brain systems control the autonomic system through the operation of the limbic system controls of the Salience Network's component systems with the Central Executive Network and eventually the Default Mode Network. All these representational categories would be located in 3-D affective space through the integration of affect, motivation and perception information processing. This then provides the functional system that allows for "primary" emotion categorization representation, which become

"culture bound" prototype categorizations like the vowel sound prototypes that solidify during the first year of infancy (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1997).

The emotion prototypes could be tracked through key milestones in dyadic social engagement:

0-2 months, infants display early preferences for human faces, human milk, and close kin (caregivers) over other, while also displaying neonatal interpersonal awareness in their early "focus on and imitate, with voluntary and exploratory effort, a wide range of expressions, including facial, vocal and gestural movements" producing conforming actions (Reddy *et al.*, 1998: 248-249). The effortful imitation of iconic facial, vocal, and gestural movements highlight intentional "aspects of bodies" and actions "shared in common,"... "producing a categorical bond" in a "process of consubstantial assimilation" (Fiske & Fiske, 2007: 18).

The autonomic mode feeling states corresponding to Depression and Satisfaction modes exist in the early training of the Parasympathetic Nervous System during nursing requiring the synchronization of PNS withdrawal (DVC activation) and during ritual synchronization of PNS activation (VVC activation) (Porges, 1997). This forms the CS pattern of iconic, ritualized exchanges with caregivers in close bodily contact, requiring the immobilization of the infant for prosocial behaviors during nursing and pair bonding via DVC activation in the infant via Oxytocin, which activates the VVC in the caregiver (Porges, 2007).

2-4 months, sees a recognizable "biosocial behavioral shift" (Keller *et al.*, 2004), as infants engage in "mutual, conversation-like exchanges" in which they use active pre-speech movements and engage in reciprocal protoconversations which "the dynamic co-operation results from adult and infant taking complementary emotional positions from moment to moment," (Reddy *et al.*, 1998: 250). Gaze avoidance, in which the infant withdraws eye-contact begins during this time, which can come in positive, neutral or aversive flavors (Reddy *et al.*, 1998). The positive gaze avoidance occurs after a bout of mutual engagement with a familiar other accompanied by a smile, while a similar positive avoidance when the infant views itself in a mirror resembles coyness (Reddy *et al.*, 1998). Distressed gaze avoidance can occur from "intensive or insensitive demands for interaction" (Reddy *et al.*, 1998). Avoidance behaviors are in response to highly parasympathetic overtures from others, resembling early fight or flight activations of the immobile infant.

The autonomic mode feeling states corresponding to Fear and Anger modes result from uncoupled SNS withdrawal and activation. Absent emotions, these states during engagement resemble proto-forms of complimentary social patterns in which eye contact is broken and gaze withdrawn, related to the patterns of proto-conversational deference in ceding one's turn after an utterance, or in response to stress from interaction. This resembles the AR pattern of complementary reciprocity and social exchanges, requiring alternations of taking control/lead of interaction and ceding control, establishing temporal ordering in call and response in a differentiation of primordial communicative roles.

8 months, infants offer food & objects in exchange in cooperative games of give-and-take in early forms of sharing (Reddy *et al.*, 1998: 254), mirroring EM in the reciprocal equal matching. Reciprocal SNS and PNS activation occur in the matching of emotion states with the caregiver, representing antipodes of non-matching (non-agreement in exchange and no building of shared match) and matching (agreement in exchange and shared match), which in the context of food sharing could represent the failed exchange of something offered by the child of what they like, and the offer back of something they dislike, which triggers their disgust, while a match of something back they like triggers satisfaction.

The autonomic mode feeling states corresponding to Satisfaction and Depression modes result from uncoupled PNS activation and withdrawal, of which symmetrical matching forms the EM pattern of symmetrical reciprocity requiring concrete operations involving alternating exchanges.

9 months and on, infants are sensitive to others' reactions to external objects, particularly during uncertainty in which they reference the emotions of others (Reddy *et al.*, 1998). In addition, they begin to display sensitivity to the feelings and communicative attentions of their partners (Reddy *et al.*, 1998: 255).

The autonomic mode feeling states corresponding to Anticipation and Surprise modes result from coupled SNS and PNS activation and inhibition, to be ready against surprise, or to freeze and assess through observation what the other is attending to. These mirror MP in the exercise of balancing coupled systems for social attentional system wiring Anticipation.

These affective state pairs or feeling states, are then used during socialization as magnets around which clusters of social actions in the forms of mental dialogues/rehearsal scripts can be triggered by and for producing social meaning. The emotion pairs tuned early in development are then repurposed as the sort culturally organized homeostatic controls to help solve “problems of life” later in development (Plutchik, 1980). This emotion control system is then recruited for coordinating social action according to Power and Status categories during socialization, in the learning of the Social Relational Mods which is language dependent. These presuppose that learning is metacognitive and the Relational Mods provide meta-representational categories for organizing.

Relational Model Theory (RMT) posits four basic models used to construct, coordinate and make sense of social situations and behavior are learned through socialization teaching not only “where, when, and with whom to implement each model,” but also how (Haslam & Fiske, 1997: 388). RMT posits these models are learned during phased stages in socialization (Fiske, 1991: 1992). Communal Sharing (CS) relational pattern emerges from the caregiver-infant bond through the natural sensorimotor rhythms of holding, nursing, feeding, and sharing of bodily movements, during the process of consubstantial assimilation (Fiske, 1991; 1992). The next ontogenetic model Authority Ranking (AR) is thought to emerge from the social physics in ranked societies where power and status initially relate directly to physical attributions of above, in front, larger, numerous (Fiske, 1991: 1992). The next model Equality Matching (EM) model emerges from the concrete patterns of interaction involving turn taking and reciprocation, and other social patterns in which similarity and social balance are salient (Fiske, 1991: 1992). Later in adolescence the Market Pricing (MP) model manifests through the purely symbolic representations learned through language which manifest socially through the distribution of social goods such as money, maths, (Fiske, 1991: 1992). However, RMT makes only general claims of when these models are learned during socialization, with estimates of CS from birth, AR by age 3 and EM soon after before age 4, while MP takes until the break from concrete social relations to the abstract, around age 9 (Fiske, 1991).

RMT’s mods help to organize “the basic kinds of relationships people perceive and construct that determine the morally required response in a given situation” (Rai & Fiske, 2011: 58). Moral disagreements coming from differential application of relational models results in legitimate moral perspectives which cannot be reconciled logically (Rai & Fiske, 2011). These, each Relational Mod should correspond to a Moral Motivation, a signature judgment triggered by a positive or negative

signal, having its origin in the functioning of the ANS. Moreover, these emotion pairs will be signals from evolutionary

Such an integration of Emotion, Morality, and the Social can be seen in **Fig. 27.4** below, with the addition of Emotion theories covered throughout this study, which have been added as the more darkly shaded rows.

Four Social Relational Models Manifestations & Features

	Communal Sharing (CS)	Authority Ranking (AR)	Equality Matching (EM)	Market Pricing (MP)
Decision Making	Group Consensus	Chief Decides & Delegates	Voting	Market Mechanism
Group Organization	all pitch in without assignments	orders down a chain of command	everyone do an equal share	compensation depending on proportion
Social Influence	Conformity	Obedience	Compliance	Cost & Benefit Incentives
Social Identity	Membership in a Natural Kind	Social Rank	Co-Equal Peer	Occupation or Economic Role
Natural Selection Mechanism	Kin Selection	Dominance / Submission Adaptiveness	"Tit-for-Tat" In-Kind Reciprocity	Specialization & Commodity Exchange
Relational Structure	Equivalence Relation	Linear Ordering	Ordered Abelian Group	Archimedean Ordered Field
Measurement Scale Type	Categorical or Nominal	Ordinal	Interval	Ratio
Significance of Time	Relationships idealized as Eternal Perpetuation of Tradition	Sequential Ordering by Rank Temporal Priority to Superiors	Oscillation of Reciprocation Synchrony of Action	Calculus of Rates of Interest/Return/Pay Efficient use of Time
Relationship Marking Mode	Enactive, Kinesthetic, Sensorimotor Rituals	Spatiotemporal Ordering	Concrete Operations	Abstract Symbolic Representation
Constitutive Media	Consubstantial Assimilation Birthing, Nursing, Food Sharing, Ritual Synchronization, Movement, Shared Pain	Social Physics Above, In Front, Earlier, Larger, More Numerous, Greater Force	Concrete Operations Turn taking, In-kind Reciprocation, 1:1 Correspondence, Balance, Alignment	Arbitrary Signs Money, Propositional Language, Writing, Numbers & Math, Digital Accounts
Motivation	Intimacy	Power	Equity	Achievement
Moral Motive	Unity	Hierarchy	Equality	Proportionality
Moral Ideology	Group Legitimization	Heteronomy	Balanced Reciprocity	Rational Legal Legitimation
Moral Judgment	everyone's suffering as one's own	obey command of elders or God	treat each person equally	everyone in proportion to deserving
Age of Externalization	Infancy	3 years old	4 years old	9 years old
* Autonomic Mode of Control	Uncoupled PNS Withdrawal / Activation	Uncoupled SNS Withdrawal / Activation	Reciprocal SNS / PNS Activation	SNS / PNS Coinhibition & CoActivation
* Autonomic Mode Primaries	Depression – Satisfaction	Fear – Anger	Disgust – Trust	Surprise – Anticipation
* E/S Emotion Structures	Elemental	Attributional (Complementary)	Distributional (Symmetrical)	Interactional
* Expectation Emotion Pairs	Approving – Disapproving Impressed – Disillusioned	Honor – Disgrace Manipulative – Powerlessness	Pride – Shame Inferiority – Superiority	Generosity – Regret Helplessness – Ineffectiveness
* Sanction Emotion Pairs	Happy – Sad Affection – Hostility	Impressed – Disillusioned Disgust – Compassion	Joy – Sorry Excluded – Selfishness	Gratitude – Anger Hopelessness – Ungratefulness
* Kemper's Relational Channels	Own Power	Other's Power	Own Status	Other's Status
* Kemper's Hidden Variables	Controlling Aggression	Autonomy	Competency & Achievement	Giving & Loving
* Plutchik Problems of Life	Temporality	Hierarchy	Identity	Territoriality
* Plutchik Emotion Pairs	Sadness – Joy	Fear – Anger	Disgust – Acceptance	Surprise – Anticipation
* Semiotic Structure	Indexical / Metonymic	Iconic / Metaphoric	Procedural	Symbolic

Fig. 27.4 - RMT Manifestations & Features adding Emotion Theories -

Source: Fiske (1992: 694-696; 2004b)

The categories of semiosis include iconic, indexical, and symbolic reference, which correspond to different relations between the object to the infant's self. In the earliest stage of development, it is expressed through sharing of the basic rituals of nursing, holding, and other close engagements with another, producing an icon of the relation. The indexical refers to the movements and relations in social physics which the infant expresses through complementary exchange/play with the caregiver. When the complementary changes to symmetrical exchange in the child offering things to the

caregiver, this is expressed through concrete-operations of proto reciprocity. The symbolic emerges with the first words and the first legisigns, usually concrete nouns which represent the most salient people in the infant's life, mamma or dadda, or which terms fit the cultural vowel prototypes.

These categories provide a way to connect the porto-categories of relational Mods, for Fiske (1991) outlines these semiotic structures in each Mod. The simultaneous affective exchanges and typical exercise of the different modes of Autonomic Control (Berntson *et al.*, 1992) occurring at the same time as the brain structure modes in **Fig. 27.3**, could confirm the synthesis of Plutchik's primaries in relation to the Problems of Life (Plutchik, 1980). These would then be directly related to the and Relational Channels and hidden variables of Power and Status (Kemper, 1978). It is possible to match Plutchik's problems of life with RMT's proposed natural selection mechanisms that drove neurological and autonomic changes, providing a point of correlation of the two theories. Tenhouten (1995) noted the alignment of Plutchik's existential problems - Identity, Hierarchy, Territoriality, Temporality - with RMT's Equality Matching, Authority Ranking, Market Pricing, and Communal Sharing. The bipolar emotion pairs represent prototypical adaptive reactions which guide adaptive behavior to overcome a common problem/situation around a social relational pattern (Tenhouten 1995: 443). Recall Plutchik's model of emotion proposed that certain existential problems of life were so common to in our evolutionary past that particular adaptations that provided success became instinctual. The adaptations were conceived of as evaluative mechanisms using feeling for selecting an adaptive response of Approach in the case of a positive feeling or of Avoidance in the case of negative feeling. When evaluated psychologically, they are felt as bipolar "primary" emotions guiding motivation and adaptive behavior.

Thus, the problem of Temporality, essentially distress from loss of loved one/group member, involves emotions of Sadness and Joy for facilitating sympathy and nurturing, analogous to Depression and Satisfaction modes of the uncoupled Parasympathetic functioning of the ANS. This problem of life seems most ancient, which is in agreement with Fiske's (1991: 197) assertion of the CS relational structure homologous across many other species, aligning with a natural selection mechanism of Kin Selection, and ontologically first.

Similarly, the problem of Hierarchy found in the dominance/submission in the struggle for resources is managed by Sympathetic fight and flight, analogous to the Anger and Fear modes of uncoupled

Sympathetic functioning of the ANS. This problem of life is also shared with many species, particularly well studied in the AR linear ordered dominance hierarchies exhibited by many social animals, particularly mammals.

Likewise, the problem of Identity, essentially defined by acceptance in or rejection from the group, is regulated by Trust and Disgust (Pride and Shame), opposite modes of reciprocal PNS and SNS activation, respectively. Fiske (1991) offers three are no other species exhibiting EM features, as its supposed natural selection mechanism balanced reciprocal altruism (Axelrod, 1984)(Trivers, 1971) has been sparingly found in great ape species (De Waal, 1982)(Mitani, 2009).

Lastly, the problem of Territoriality, involving the managing the boundary of one's territory and orientation against intrusion, requires Anticipation and Surprise respectively, the Co-activation and Co-inhibition modes of PNS/SNS functioning. While a common problem to many types of species, its relation to MP is in the rational calculation and estimation of costs and benefits found in Specialization & Commodity Exchange, two human enterprises having evolutionary impact without analogue in the non-human world (Fiske, 1991). It remains to be seen if human CS, AR, EM or even MP are phylogenetically homologous in other species, or whether their appearance is an example of convergent evolution (Fiske, 1991: 198-199).

With the basic prototype emotion categories set, the process of language acquisition builds a symbolic system relating concepts to basic dimensions of affect during the second year of life, as the brain development shows left-hemispheric lateralization (Schore, 2009). The fully symbolic system then is able to grow according to patterns of social development where orderings of social actors related to the hierachic scales of **nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio** in the following:

Nominal = society regulated by who's in the group (categorically alike, aka, kin) versus who's not

Ordinal = society regulated by social physics (biggest, strongest, most authoritative)

Interval = society regulated by balances of social exchanges (accounts of owing or giving assortive individuals)

Ratio = society regulated by balances for social exchange based on abstract medium (money, trade among strangers)

The nominal scale type of CS emerges from the elementary group needs of expecting all in the group to conform by controlling aggression via parasympathetic regulation by limiting one's own power, where the pattern of Dorsal Vagal (DVC) and Ventral Vagal (VVC) co-regulation prototyped during infant care and nursing provides the archetype. The sharing of constitutive substance such as milk, blood or genes serve as cultural cues, "materializing group cohesion" during nursing that is later thematized in family and kin dynamics of food sharing (Fiske & Fiske, 2007). Thus, elemental emotion categories regulating meeting group expectations (Satisfaction-Depression) and receiving rewards (Affection-Hostility) by controlling Parasympathetic withdrawal/activation first modeled in nursing become the archetypes for group regulation for all kindred members of the group.

The ordinal scale type of AR emerges from comparison structural relations guided by complementary differentials between ranked individuals, which emerge from group ordering according to dominance hierarchy measured through comparison with other's power and status (attributional) and with other's expectations and sanctions (distributional). Social physics of in front/behind, above/below, stronger/weaker, forceful/weaker, etc become highly salient. Focusing on power and status attributions, as learning to navigate the power of others includes learning complementary roles and earning autonomy through negotiation of the hierarchy, requiring knowing when to show deference to superiors and when to use manipulative strategy to move up in the hierarchy. This requires regulation of Sympathetic withdrawal/arousal by controlling one's fight or flight reflex when confronted with another's dominant role such as a parent or older sibling and differential outcomes. Relevant expectation & sanction comparisons in conflicts generate complementary emotion categories such as attributional Manipulation/Submission & Disgust/Compassion action tendencies while differential distributional outcomes require regulating complementary Superiority/Inferiority & Selfishness/Jealousy.

The interval scale type of ER emerges from reordering the hierarchy within groups through symmetrical social practices such that social regulation between peer balances through negotiated in kind reciprocity and turn taking. As groups expand beyond kin groups by adding non-related sub-groups, the hierarchy becomes blurred. Management of groups and building of shared identities relies on negotiating acceptance through equal exchange and participation, requiring the synchronization of SNS & PNS reciprocal modes to produce states of affiliative trust or coalitional disgust. This is coordinated through balancing symmetrical distributions for expectations or

punishments/rewards. Matching meeting/missing expectations produce emotion categories such as Proud/Shame while matching rewards/punishments results in Joy/Sorry categories.

The ratio scale type of MP emerges from the negotiation of interactional social dimensions, where cost benefit analysis and strategy crucial in group living require enforcing norms. Since meeting norms requires reigning in individual desires for the good of the group, as well as enforcing norms sometimes with a cost to oneself, a regulatory system which uses proportionality of action/response provides a mechanism which maximizes cooperation, in the trade off between norm enforcement looseness to allow for creativity with tightness for reigning in harmful norm violations. Thus, a graded interactional repertoire required for balancing action and sanction according to norms requires managing SNS & PNS co-activation or co-inhibition states to be able to anticipate costs/benefits and assess surprising outcomes.

The later stages of Moral reasoning measured by Kohlberg (**Fig. 27.1**) and reconstructed by Habermas (1990) are reliant on the foundational Relational Mods already wired in simple forms for the basic controls of the Social Engagement System (SES) and autonomic controls, that will later be attuned to the practices and particulars of the culture within which it occurs, providing the variation. While the initial development of the young child's emotion system occurs before symbolic language, semantics, and conscious learning, the emotion and social structural constraints of the SES are baked and must be re-categorized by higher logical types formed by the adoption of cultural patterns for learned behaviors coordinated via structural emotions. Such a reconstruction must include emotion beyond simply cognitive developmental milestones, and it is the structure of emotion categories related to Status and Power comparisons which provide the hierarchical model which can be tested empirically. These comparison structures, made salient through feelings of emotions, assist in gaining new perspectives of social engagement, learned implicitly and explicitly through cultural conventions and normative behaviors.

Those sharing a language and a culture align the connotative meaning of concepts to similar positions in EPA space, where concepts are situationally defined and valued culturally. Much of our affective sentiments are shaped by cultural norms, accounting for much of the conservation of sentiment change, as they most strongly influence Evaluations, although there is some individual variation, with slightly more for Potency and Activity (Heise, 2006). Within individuals, EPA ratings

are resistant to change, with Evaluations and Potency estimates remaining very stable over decades, while estimates of Activity change as we grow older (Heise, 2006). Culturally, the rate of change is even slower, as cultural concepts shift in affective space on the order of one tenth of one percent per year, as “the overall culture is nearly static!” (Heise, 2006: 16).

Thus, the slow pace of cultural change is due to the overly complex symbolic relation of affective meaning between all concepts each and every one of us embody and coordinate through language. Every bit of social information taken in contains these affective dimensions, which when processed by the Social Engagement System, introduce tiny perturbations and contributions to body states, for the preparation of the body and mind for predicting the needs of the next instant. The differential success of various forms of concepts shared among people produce cultural level forces upon which natural selection can and does act. This system is the basis of the cultural symbotype (Wilson *et al.*, 2014).

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

Sustainability & Emotional Resilience

“The continuation of the very existence of humanity may truly depend on us coming to consciously recognize and oppose the obedience to social norms enforcing conformity towards annihilation through genocide and ecocide.” ~the author

I'll repeat, the continuation of the very existence of humanity may truly depend on us coming to consciously recognize and oppose the obedience to social norms enforcing conformity towards annihilation through genocide and ecocide.

While this may seem an alarmist or polemical claim, or perhaps a contrarian provocation, the logical possibility exists that the catastrophes of warring against outgroups and unsustainable consumption and degradation of the environment, both largely supported by the Social Order and obedience to social norms, could together bring about the destruction of human civilization in any recognizably modern form. War and resource degradation represents Strife perpetuated not simply because of ideology or human nature, but through the following of inefficient and unpopular social norms, which reinforce the status quo (Bicchieri & Fukui, 1999). This dynamic originates in social misjudgment by individuals, not in errors or mistakes, who despite feeling personal condemnation against certain norms, inaccurately judge the majority as supporting the unpopular norm (Bicchieri & Fukui, 1999). The phenomenon of Pluralistic Ignorance describes “the discrepancy between public actions and private sentiments, typically produced by the widespread adherence to a social norm” that originates from people's mistaken social cognition of other's actual sentiments (Prentice & Miller, 1996: 161).

The source of this misjudgment is related to several social psychological dynamics. Sometimes, an individual's own commitment to some cultural belief, such as to a shared political belief, improves that individual's group identity and standing (Kahan *et al.*, 2011). This can lead to the false enforcement of unpopular norms (Centola *et al.*, 2005)(Willer *et al.*, 2009), When those beliefs

occur around a particularly threatening issue, showing support for the group may involve overriding one's own private beliefs to reinforce safety within the group, which can be both conscious or subconscious. This can be particularly dangerous when those group beliefs are illusionary or based on outright falsehoods designed to promote a particular political agenda, especially when culturally protective cognition overrides individual rationality (Kahan *et al.*, 2011).

Other times, when observation of other's behavioral inaction lends support of a particular belief, such as the shocking Kitty Genovese murder when the presence of many bystanders nobody showed alarm and failed to take any action, the inaction is seen incorrectly as confirmation of the majority's belief of non-alarm (Bicchieri & Fukui, 1999), and event which spurred numerous studies in social psychology. However, even in widespread public action in condemnation against a particular norm or issue, the majority can be manipulated into believing that support represents only a tiny minority through techniques used by the Social Order to preserve the status quo. For example, even in the face of unprecedented public peaceful demonstrations in the run-up to the military US invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the global public participated in the largest anti-war demonstrations in history **before** an actual war, the coverage by the global corporate media virtually ignored widespread public support against the war and promoted the opposite through stonewalling public debate on its airwaves by the total exclusion anti-war voices.

Pluralistic Ignorance appears across many social phenomena in which the public holds particularly different sentiments than those publicly expressed. Bicchieri & Fukui cite the study of private sentiment in the US during the Civil Rights Movement, where less than 20 percent of those polled expressed personal support for segregation, but themselves overestimated public support for it at near fifty percent (O'Gorman, 1975) by (Bicchieri & Fukui, 1999, p. 101)). A similar divergence of personal sentiment showing the dynamic of pluralistic ignorance has been found in the denial of personal and societal contributions to climate change (Geiger & Swim, 2016) or in public support for war and hyper-nationalism (Scheff, 1997).

Often, a change in a country's socioeconomic context affects the gridness and groupness of that society (Chai, Liu & Kim, 2009: 202), which in the context of increased threat corresponds to increased cultural tightness in social rules and norm enforcement (Gelfand *et al.*, 2006). Existential threats to society of economic crisis, social ingroup-outgroup tensions, or challenges to national

sovereignty are the types of threat which trigger culturally protective cognition and increases polarization between cultural ideologies (Kahan et al., 2006), while increasing pressures for conformity (Scheff, 1997). Focus upon threat causes individuals to express more conservative views, even in those whom identify as Liberal (Jost et al., 2003), as well as triggers obedience to authority and aggression towards outgroups in individuals with psychological tendencies towards Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), respectively (Jost et al., 2003).

However, while the causes of the World Wars are commonly attributed to warring ideologies and outgroup scapegoatism, the origins of the Wars of the twentieth century have more to do with the pursuit of national self-interests, especially in securing exclusive access to the control of production of third world natural resources and labor, particularly by European and other world powers (Marshall, 1995). The organizational structures to prevent conflict between nations, such as the political treaties supporting the “Symphony of Europe,” became disturbed by an early twentieth century Germany that had grown economically, politically, and socially powerful to a degree that challenged the balance of power with England and France (Nye & Welch, 2009). The International order was lacking global governance mechanisms or legal frameworks to manage trade and conflict, a lack which still exists today despite international bodies like the United Nations or WTO that lack true global authority (Nye & Welch, 2009).

The patterns of past are again repeating in the twenty-first century. The simultaneous challenge to US industrial, extractive energy, and military industries simultaneously by Climate Change and the specter of political, economic, and potential military conflict with China and Russia have created a very dangerous historic moment. China and Russia control vast amounts of environmental resources important for modern goods and industries upon which western economies depend on, yet their economies lay outside the well-ordered western capitalist markets and global legal frameworks, despite efforts to integrate both over the past 40 years. Moreover, China and Russia’s pursuit of their national interests and cooperation and trade with US allies challenge US hegemonic power, which requires foreign dependency on US military and economic policies.

Nations pursuing self-interests in lieu of coordinated global cooperation cannot provide a solution to problems global in scope, or so called common-pool resource problems (Ostrom, 1990). Additionally, modern geopolitics now include powerful non-state actors such as multinational

corporations, proxy armies, investors, and NGOs negotiating cooperation versus self-interest in an anarchic international system (Nye & Welch, 2009). Only cooperation from the full set of global actors will lead to favorable outcomes in lieu of global governance authorities (Druzin, 2016). Without a global governing body to manage disputes and access to scarce resources, the exploitation of resources through national or corporate self-interest results in a tragedy of the commons (Ostrom, 1990).

The **most** important global common-pool resources are the arable Soil, stable Atmosphere, fresh Water, and clean Energy resources. The viability of future generations, not only of humanity but also of the vast biodiversity across the globe upon all rely, is threatened by Climate Change and relies on the wise stewardship of these resources. The implementation of effective global programs to address this most serious challenge of Climate Change, depends on voluntary compliance from all parties (Leal-Arcas & Morelli, 2018), meaning each country voluntarily agrees to determine their level of participation and agrees to meet that commitment. Bad faith action from any individual member, such as the example of the US withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, seriously threatens the solution to the tragedy of the commons (Druzin, 2016). However, the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was designed to be resilient to bad faith actions by actors, even prominent signatories such as the US, through important aspects of International Law (Leal-Arcas & Morelli, 2018).

Compliance Theory in International Law accounts for different types of compliance that result from different types of motivations ranging from “treaty-induced” compliance which is coerced by the treaty to coincidental non-intentional compliance (Leal-Arcas & Morelli, 2018). Non-compliance may come from valid “good faith” attempts, which are not punished, but rather, while intentional non-compliance through deliberate acts or withdrawal are problematic for the treaty as a whole unless certain resilient features are present. However, even intentional non-compliance through unilateral withdrawal does not relieve nations from the commitments to multilateral global agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement. Mandatory multilateralism in International Law would require that all nations “remain subject to norms that prohibit them from adopting measures or positions that undermine the efforts of other states to develop an equitable multilateral framework...and) subject to the obligation to continue to pursue good faith efforts to reach a mutually acceptable outcome” (Criddle & Fox-Decent, 2019: 53).

China's pursuit of their national interest and security in a unilateral rejection of international law over maritime rights in the South China Sea is also subject to mandatory multilateralism (Cridle & Fox-Decent, 2019). Mandatory multilateralism requires compliance to the "procedural requirements of investigation, consultation, and good faith negotiation or third-party dispute resolution" as well as "refrain from taking steps that would irreversibly alter the status quo" or "avoid actions that could undermine international peace and security in the region" (Cridle & Fox-Decent, 2019: 48-49). Unfortunately, the United States' unilateral precedent of pursing security and national interest through its 2003 invasion of Iraq under the false pretenses of weapons of mass destruction (Center for Public Integrity, 2014). The standards of International Law the United States was so instrumental in helping to erect after the end of WWII still apply to all nations, even if lieu of their intentional non-compliance.

Solutions to problems at the global scale, including treaties such as the Paris Agreement, directly relate to the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and game theory, in which cooperative altruism between actors represents the best strategy for the group, while individual success is maximized by defection (McElreath & Boyd, 2007). The dilemma comes from determining whether to maximize one's individual fitness or cooperate with the group. The cost of cooperation, defined philosophically, is in the missed opportunity for gaining resources that are limited when other actors will defect and pursue theirs, thereby threatening future access to the resource for all those not defecting. Druzin (2016) points to the source of the problem being the inability for global participants to effectively signal their cooperativeness, leading to a race to the bottom, as all actors assume the others will cheat and all pursue self-interest in consuming the common-pool resource in a "tragedy of the commons" (Ostrom, 1990).

Ostrom (1990) offers a solution to the Tragedy of the Commons, one based in decades of research of the management of common-pool resources (CPRs) across the globe ranging from the management of forests, fisheries, coastline, etc. Examining wise and bad strategies across a number of case studies, Ostrom selected a set of best practices practiced by successful CPR Management self-governance titled the Core Principles for Management of common-pool resources (CPR), for which Ostrom received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. Ostrom offers a theory of constructing institutions for governing CPRs meant to get cooperative buy-in from all actors involved, not simply in adopting the principles, but actively participating in their upkeep, decision making and practice

that provides transparency and fairness to all (Ostrom, 1990). Further case studies since Ostrom (1990) provides “empirical evidence of the efficacy of the core design principles” (Wilson, 2015: 11).

Eight Core Design Principles of Common-Pool Resource Management

1. Strong Group Identity and Understanding of Purpose

The identity of the group, the boundaries of the shared resource, and the need to manage the resource must be clearly delineated.

2. Proportional Equivalence between benefits and costs

Members of the group must negotiate a system that rewards members for their contributions. High status must be earned. Unfair inequality poisons the collective effort.

3. Collective-choice Arrangements

People hate being told what to do but will work hard for group goals to which they have agreed. Decision-making should be by consensus or another process that group members think is fair.

4. Monitoring

A commons is inherently vulnerable to free-riding and active exploitation. Unless these undermining strategies can be detected at relatively low cost by norm-abiding members of the group, the tragedy of the commons will occur.

5. Graduated Sanctions

Transgressions need not require heavy handed punishment, at least initially. Often gossip or a gentle reminder is sufficient, but more severe forms of punishment must also be waiting in the wings when necessary.

6. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

It must be possible to resolve conflict quickly and in ways that group members perceive as fair.

7. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize

Groups must have the authority to conduct their own affairs. Externally imposed rules are unlikely to be adapted to local circumstance and violate rule #3.

8. Polycentric Governance

Every sphere of activity has an optimal scale. Large scale governance requires finding the optimal scale for each sphere of activity and appropriately coordinating the activities.

Fig. 28.1 - Core Principles for Management of common-pool resources (CPR) - *Source: Ostrom (1990)*

Successful management of common-pool resources **Fig. 28.1** represents not merely a list of best practices, but a shorthand for a complete theory of analyzing institutions of governance in managed CPRs, which includes an analytic framework for gathering empirical data and analyzing institutions and actors' behaviors, sharing much in common with Affect Control Theory's social action scripts and Goffman's Frame Theory (cf Ostrom, 2010). Understanding behavior of organizations in complex economic and political environments requires integrating situational information as well as attitudes

of those involved, as well as influence of outcomes on future behavior (learning). These are included in the economic analytic tools beyond the scope of this study, but requiring further study and integration with analysis of meaning and emotion.

The similarity of the Core Design Principles with successful strategies of multilevel selection, an often neglected and still controversial aspect of evolutionary theory, is noted by evolutionary theorists (Wilson, 2015). Multi-level selection is not widely accepted largely due to stasis within the relevant academic fields that are resistant to flavors of evolution different from the modern synthesis of genetic inheritance system through gene mutation. Yet, genetic evolution represents only one inheritance system, as other inheritance systems have been found to undergo natural selection via epigenetic, behavioral and symbolic variation (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005), so theoretically and practically, evolution can occur at multiple levels and across different mediums not strictly limited to DNA. Darwin's theory of natural selection posited that descent with modification describes the general paradigm in which any system that displays Variation, Selection and Replication can undergo evolutionary transformation.

Yet, human evolution through cultural evolution has remained centered on theories of cooperation tied to genetic evolution alone. Attempts to explain the evolution of social behavior has yielded several different evolutionary accounts of the mechanisms of social adaptation, all centered around explanation for how cooperation emerges in group living. Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) (cf Curry *et al.*, 2019b) provides a ready list of evolutionary theories of social adaptation in its search for the foundations of cooperation. MAC focuses on theories representing different game theoretic strategies for acting cooperatively: Kin Selection (Hamilton, 1963); Coordination to mutual advantage (Lewis, 1969); Reciprocal Altruism (Trivers, 1971); as well as Rank dominance (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) and Possession (Gintis, 2007). What each of these theories have in common is a focus upon an individualistic explanation of cooperation with the individual as the unit of selection, entirely focused on the genetic inheritance system and genealogical relatedness (Sober & Wilson, 1998). Selfish Gene Theory represents yet another evolutionary theory of human behavior that goes even further, positing the individual is simply a collection of genes selfishly trying to replicate (Sober & Wilson, 1998), although according to its author it could just as easily been posed as an "altruistic" gene theory when he states: "Emphasize 'selfish' and you will think the book is about selfishness, whereas, if anything, it devotes more attention to altruism." (Dawkins, 2006: viii).

In opposition to the individualist focus, Multilevel Selection Theory is an evolutionarily based theory that defines cooperation in terms of fitness differences within and between groups, where groups represent the unit of selection. Group selection was first envisioned by Darwin (1871), although largely in passing, as he was trying to first establish a general theory of evolution decades before the inheritance mechanism, Mendelian genetics, was discovered. However, early mischaracterizations of evolutionary theory applied to humans via Social Darwinism and Eugenics fueled harmful, racist policies within traditionally liberal American and British Society, as well as the racist genocides by reactionary Nazi Germany. Those miserable state policies largely tarnished any attempts of studying human evolution within the academy for several generations. However, the proliferation of cognitive sciences combined with the progress of evolutionary theory, has lead to new synthesis that reestablishes Group and multi-level selection in firm territory (Wilson, 2015).

Multi-level selection doesn't require genealogical relatedness but rather relies on Assortive Interactions (Sober & Wilson, 1998), where members within a population engage altruistically with one another as a continuous behavioral/motivational trait (altruistic disposition), rather than one defined by a genetic mutation that must survive and be passed down through reproduction. When altruists find each other and associate with altruistic tendencies, even with moderate levels of altruism that may induce some negative selection for those individuals, the adaptive fitness of the group can improve beyond that of other groups, leading to that group's expansion and success and spreading of altruism across all groups. Studies claiming to show culture cannot produce cooperative behavior have been shown to be mistaken using the mathematical tools used in population genetics (Boyd & Richerson, 2010). Using the same mathematical tools as kin selection, it can be shown that evolutionary dynamics of within-group and between-group selection can occur and lead to altruism's growth overall even when it comes at a "cost" to the individual, an assumption that is often over-exaggerated, as behaving altruistically can often be beneficial to the individual (Wilson, 2015). The key is that altruistic individuals have cognitive and affective ability to detect good cooperators and associate with them to improve the fitness of the group, and those adaptive behaviors adopted by the group can act as a constraint on selection (Sober & Wilson, 1998).

"Human social interactions among unrelated individuals are anything but random, and our ability to learn and to change our behavior according to what we learn provide a powerful

mechanism for the evolution of altruism and other group-advantageous behaviors... Sanctions for normative behavior in the form of rewards and punishment can be seen as secondary behaviors which require group-selection to evolve with respect to group fitness.”
Sober & Wilson (1998: 142, 149)

Consider the motivation for such policies in relation to the Model of Moral Motivations (**Fig. 26.9**). Cooperative solutions found through natural selection solving game-theoretic dilemmas were proposed by Curry (2016) to be essential in finding the foundations of morality defined as cooperation (MAC). The combined MMM model (**Fig. 26.9**) proposed mapping of the moral motivation of Social Order with MAC’s cooperative strategies of Mutualism and Deference/Heroism (Dove-ish/Hawkish Conflict). These correspond to Moral Foundation Theory’s Binding foundations of Authority and Loyalty, as well as Relational Model Theory’s (RMT) Hierarchy model. Similarly, MAC’s Possession corresponds to MFT’s Liberty and MFT’s Asocial model. However, these required individuals respecting moral standards, which evolved from and are constrained by neurophysiological systems producing emotion states which in evolved to hold us accountable, as it is painful for most people to go against moral standards of some kind. However, actors at group levels scaling from small groups up to large collectives such as Nations, multinational corporations, etc do not have neurophysiological constraints nor are directly accountable to the negative feelings of bad emotions from moral violations, because these entities are not persons.

Group level moral motivations of Social Order and Social Justice are rivals in the political arena and rival group strategies for the evolution of cooperation. The Social Order group moralistic strategy to “cooperate, punish noncooperators, and punish those who do not punish noncooperators can be evolutionarily stable” (Boyd & Richerson, 1992), which represents the use of authority to enforce cooperation through strong enforcement of social norms, a high grid/high cultural tightness (Gelfand *et al.*, 2006). The Social Justice group moralistic strategy also exists, one in which the collective asserts its vast power to prevent one or more dominant actors from bullying, belligerence, or intentional non-compliance that hurts the viability of the group (Boehm, 2016). Egalitarianism is the organizing pattern, which for the vast evolutionary history of humans living in hunter-gatherer groups appears to have been the dominant political mode, and was infrequent in the historical annals until its reappearance in the age of Enlightenment (Boehm, 2016).

The reappearance of egalitarianism on the world stage occurred during the Enlightenment with an intellectual and philosophical movement to collectively confront an antiquated Social Order by arguing for individual freedom of liberty, religious toleration, etc. This culminated in the democratic revolutions in the United States, France, and elsewhere to topple monarchies and establish someone more egalitarian political institutions, albeit flawed due to the limited scope of whom was afforded liberty since slavery and other remnants of the Social Order continued. However, as Wiley (1995) notes, the founders of the American revolution in the US were limited in their conceptions of human nature, science, religion, and the natural world. In the time since, the advancement of scientific knowledge and of morality by the widening scope of egalitarian law and social norms, has steadily progressed despite the many violent responses in preserving the Social Order. And yet, social order is necessary for many in society, as the traditional structure of rules and social supports to mitigate risk among the population has been shifted to place the burden upon the public itself to manage individually (Martin, 2007).

The global pandemic has been disastrous to public health among the aged and poorest health, to the economic health of small businesses, to the mental and physical toll on health workers, and to the families suffering through economic hardship through sickness, job loss, breakdown of traditional familial patterns. The global pandemic has exposed the cracks in the pillars of western society, policy, media, and governance. However, it has shown a light on the effect upon emissions from transportation, showing how directly city air is polluted by individualized, consumer oriented transportation and consumption. So reliant on leisure and the imperative to consume are western markets that political leaders are willing to risk health and safety in order to perpetuate the capitalist market system at the expense of public safety. The public's own resistance to adequately "mask up" or to strictly enforce adequate safety exposes how deeply selfish, atomistic, and individualistic western social mores have become, requiring higher levels of tightness. Similarly, the social mores of Internet cancel culture and comment anonymity requires enhanced tightness as well. On the opposite side, over-punitive solutions to solve public health crises, economic crises, housing crises, mental health crises can be shown to be inadequate and require higher levels of societal looseness.

What then are we to do? What can we as individuals, families, friends, citizens, churches, schools, communities, cities, states, nations, and humanity do to change the direction we are seemingly

headed?

We must balance our individual moral regulation, recognizing the moral imbalance in society can be affected by our own rebalancing focused on the dimensions of constraining our self-interest to refrain from harm through dominance or ambition in our relationships, to grow our self-restraint in moderation of egocentrism and instant gratification, to growing our self-reliance by following our interests and gaining new capabilities, to enabling our altruistic empathy towards helping others while, most importantly, being tolerant of wherever they are at in their own moral regulation. Rather than other-condemning or self-condemning, we must reorient to other-uplifting and self-affirming. These two perspectives of self-focused and other-focused moral regulation involve living less in our minds and more authentically engaged with others.

These can be found by connect with each other in our local communities, in everyday activities oriented towards each other rather than atomistic individualized pursuits. Global problems will require solutions at every level. The re-localization of community, food production, civic engagement, work life, home life, transportation, and social exchange can begin to rebuild the trust in society, through re-engaging with each other intersubjectively in direct dyadic interaction. Whatever culturally constrained objectivity or subjectively experienced simulation influences our social cognition to what we think of others, it is in dyadic engagement that we can attune to each other in the direct exchange in communication with each other, which tacitly includes an agreement to cooperate. Especially if we are different from each other, direct engagement offers to bridge the gulf the social cognitive biases from which we think we know others are like to the experience of what another is like.

However, a core set of social motive “underlying all psychological motivations” for human sociality are Belonging, Understanding, Controlling, Enhancing Self, and Trusting Others (North & Fiske, 2013). Belonging represents the desire to have close relationships with others, which produces motivations to conform to group norms, yet has the drawback when insecure of eliciting out-group exclusion to maximize one’s own position in the group or identity (North & Fiske, 2013). Understanding represents the desire to believe what others believe, which is a heard mentality that has the drawback of outgroup exclusion and ingroup homogeneity (North & Fiske, 2013). Controlling represents the desire to have autonomy over one’s social outcomes to avoid exclusion,

while its drawback is often social dominance over outgroup members or in collectives, traditionalism which excludes against outgroups (North & Fiske, 2013). Self-Enhancement is the need to feel good bout oneself, as in the maintenance of self-esteem “as a sociometer an indicator of their group standing” (North & Fiske, 2013: 36). The drawbacks of self-enhancement are again outgroup exclusion, while social setbacks can lead to loss of self-esteem creating negative emotions which can spiral in self-devaluation (North & Fiske, 2013). Finally, Trusting Others is the desire to develop faith in the group and see the good in others, which is a positive social trait that leads to higher levels of empathy for others (North & Fiske, 2013). The drawbacks occur in betrayal and “shattered assumptions,” which induce trauma and threaten the social bond and lead to rejection sensitivity (North & Fiske, 2013).

The moral motivation of tolerance towards others is an antidote for the outgroup exclusion that hurts others socially, while usually indicating insecurity on one’s own standing in the group and using exclusion of others to bolster one’s feeling of group membership (North & Fiske, 2013). Having tolerance in engagement with others and ourselves allow for the liberty of autonomy to build our capabilities and enable the capabilities of others.

However, the social categorization and identity making that drives group membership, however, is a social construction and illusionary. That inner drive is a subset of the universal qualities which everyone shares of the mind’s discursive inner dialogue, desire to analyze the social world and compete socially. These are vestiges of the long history of human evolution, and while present in all consciousness, it simply operates as a control process that can become the object of awareness to see it as such. The social identities towards which everyone strives is but the constant hum and whirring of the semiotic, in the sense making during the Default Mode Network. While predicting and planning can be adaptive, much of what we think is automatic, hypothetical, or imaginative and takes us out of the present moment. It is that moment, the now, that is always available, and so valuable and rich when shared with another sentient being or in just being. And control of that process, of gaining conscious awareness of the moment leads to clear reflection, deeper engagement with others, stringer creativity, and positive feelings.

The solutions we seek for the worlds problems and our own are at heart social in nature. All solutions will require input from more than one cultural goal, social relational Mod, moral

motivation, ideology, or cultural worldview. They must integrate all four mods, and all six motivational sextants, and all eight integral perspectives. All share the same building blocks of the basic typology of four emerging from the variation across the Individual and the Collective crossed with the Internal and the External, rooted in the autonomic nervous system. All groups share this same human architecture and no one group or nation can solve these problems alone, for everyone is dependent on the deeply woven interdependent web of systems now global in scope. It will require an integration of the cooperative strategies honed over humanity's long evolutionary history, and new variation through new cooperative and coordinated strategies that exist in young minds just waiting to connect.

"The Allegory of the Cave...describe(s) a group of people who have lived chained to the wall of a cave all of their lives, facing a blank wall. The people watch shadows projected on the wall from objects passing in front of a fire behind them, and give names to these shadows. The shadows are the prisoners' reality. Socrates explains how the philosopher is like a prisoner who is freed from the cave and comes to understand that the shadows on the wall are not reality at all, for he can perceive the true form of reality rather than the manufactured reality that is the shadows seen by the prisoners. The inmates of this place do not even desire to leave their prison, for they know no better life. The prisoners manage to break their bonds one day, and discover that their reality was not what they thought it was. They discovered the sun..." Wikipedia (2018)

Appendix A - Emotion Taxonomy

Elemental Emotions

Primary Categories

<i>affect</i>			
Self Status Attribution	+	=	Approving of Self
			Self met Expectations
Self Power Attribution	-	=	Disapproving of Self
			Self failed to meet Expectations
Self Status Attribution	+	=	Happy
			Self is Rewarded
Self Status Attribution	-	=	Sad
			Self is Punished
Other Status Attribution	+	=	Impressed by Other
			Other met Expectations
Other Power Attribution	-	=	Disillusioned with Other
			Other failed to meet Expectations
Other Status Attribution	+	=	Affection towards Other
			Other is Rewarded
Other Status Attribution	-	=	Hostility towards Other
			Other is Punished


Comparative Emotions

Attribution Categories

Self Status Identity	+	+	=	deserving	Honored	=	Approving of Self Happy
			Self High Status Identity				
Self Statusless Identity	-	-	=	deserving	Disgraced	=	Disapproving of Self Sad
			Self Low Status Identity				
Self Power Identity	-	+	=	undeserving	Manipulative	=	Disapproving of Self Happy
			Self High Power Identity				
Self Powerless Identity	+	-	=	undeserving	Powerless	=	Approving of Self Sad
			Self Low Power Identity				
Other Status Identity	+	+	=	deserving	Impressed with Other	=	Impressed w/ Other Affection toward Other
			Other High Status Identity				
Other Statusless Identity	-	-	=	deserving	Disillusioned with Other	=	Disillusioned w/ Other Hostility toward Other
			Other Low Status Identity				
Other Power Identity	-	+	=	undeserving	Disgust for Other	=	Disillusioned w/ Other Affection toward Other
			Other High Power Identity				
Other Powerless Identity	+	-	=	undeserving	Compassion for Other	=	Impressed w/ Other Hostility toward Other
			Other Low Power Identity				

Comparative Emotions

Distribution Categories



Comparative Emotions

Interaction Categories

Effective Contribution	+	=	consistent	Generous	=	Approving of Self Affection toward Other
	+					
Effective Contribution	-	=	consistent	Regretful	=	Disapproving of Self Hostility to Other
	-					
Ineffective Contribution	+	=	inconsistent	Helpless	=	Approving of Self Hostility to Other
	-					
Ineffective Contribution	-	=	inconsistent	Ineffective	=	Disapproving of Self Affection toward Other
	+					
Effective Retribution	+	=	consistent	Grateful	=	Happy Impressed w/ Other
	+					
Effective Retribution	-	=	consistent	Anger	=	Sad Disillusioned w/ Other
	-					
Ineffective Retribution	-	=	inconsistent	Hopeless	=	Sad Impressed w/ Other
	+					
Ineffective Retribution	+	=	inconsistent	Ungrateful	=	Happy Disillusioned w/ Other
	-					

Subtle Emotion Taxonomy

Conflict Interactions


S = Distributions

			imbalance		balanced		imbalance		balanced	
			+ -	- +	+ -	- +	+ -	- +	+ -	- +
Status Advantage			=							
Self-Righteous Syndrome		Self-Righteous								
Thamm (2004:206)										
					HUBRIS				CONTEMPT	SCHADENFREUDE
Status Disadvantage			=							
Intimidated Syndrome		Intimidated								
Thamm (2004:206)										
					EMBARRASSMENT	HUMILIATION		ADMIRATION		JEALOUSY
Power Advantage			=							
Guilt Syndrome		Guilt								
Thamm (2004:205)										
					GUILT			PITY		APPRECIATION
Power Disadvantage			=							
Resentment Syndrome		Resentment								
Thamm (2004:205)										
					INDIGNATION	FLATTERY		ENVY		DISGUST


Subtle Emotion Taxonomy

Consensus Interactions


S = Distributional + Interactional + Attribution



SATISFACTION GRATIFICATION ELEVATION GRATITUDE



DISSATISFACTION DISHONOR




S: Contentment

O: Contentment

S: Resignation

O: Resignation



S:

O:

S:





O:

SYMPATHY

Subtle Emotion Taxonomy

Ambivalent Power Interactions

S = Distributional + Interactional + Attribution



Subtle Emotion Taxonomy

Ambivalent Status Interactions

S = Distribution:

	SATISFACTION		SYMPATHY		APPRECIATION	
Univalent Status Adv	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline + & + \\ \hline + & - \\ \hline \end{array}$	$=$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline balanced & \\ \hline + & + \\ \hline + & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline balanced & \\ \hline + & - \\ \hline + & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$
	Univalent Pride		S = proud + grateful + honored		S = selfish + helpless + honored	S = proud + helpless + compassion
Ambivalent Status Adv	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline + & - \\ \hline + & + \\ \hline \end{array}$	$=$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline imbalanced & \\ \hline + & - \\ \hline + & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline balanced & \\ \hline + & + \\ \hline + & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$
	Ambivalent Pride		S = superior + ungrateful + honored		S = joy + generous + honored	S = superior + generous + disgusted
Ambivalent Status Disadv	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline - & + \\ \hline - & - \\ \hline \end{array}$	$=$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline balanced & \\ \hline - & + \\ \hline - & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline imbalanced & \\ \hline - & - \\ \hline - & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$
	Ambivalent Shame		S = inferior + hopeless + disgraced		S = sorry + regretful + disgraced	S = inferior + regretful + compassion
Univalent Status Disadv	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline - & - \\ \hline - & + \\ \hline \end{array}$	$=$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline imbalanced & \\ \hline - & - \\ \hline - & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$	$\begin{array}{ c c } \hline imbalanced & \\ \hline - & + \\ \hline - & \\ \hline \end{array}$	$+$
	Univalent Shame		S = ashamed + anger + disgraced		S = excluded + ineffective + disgraced	S = ashamed + ineffective + disgusted
EMBARRASSMENT		DISHONOR	ENVY			
			DISSATISFACTION	HUMILIATION	DISGUST	

Glossary

Abduction - the process in theory construction of iteratively producing a hypothesis and revising it based on surprising results of empirical evidence.

Activity - an EPA dimension of affect measuring intensity, concerning liveliness vs. quietness. See *Semantic Differential*.

Affect - the conscious, subjective experience of an emotion; an evaluative (positive or negative) orientation toward an object.

Affect Regulation - the set of control processes by which we influence, consciously and voluntarily, our emotions and how we experience and behaviorally express them (Schore, 2009: 116). See *Affect Control Theory*.

Affective Meaning - three abstract (EPA) dimensions— Evaluation (good versus bad), Potency (powerful versus weak), and Activity (lively versus quiet)—that add to the traditional denotive (dictionary) meaning associated with all semantic constructs.

Affective Quality - the ability to cause a change in core affect (Russell, 2003).

Afferent Pathways -the ascending nerves of the autonomic nervous system carrying signals mainly from the heart-brain via the vagus nerve and spinal cord to subcortical areas (medulla, hypothalamus, thalamus, amygdala) and then onto cortical areas (cerebral cortex) (McCraty, 2015).

Agency - active, willful, goal-seeking behavior

Agonic Group - a group dominated by a central powerful animal or small group of animals engaged in power oriented relations (Kemper & Collins, 1990). See *Power*.

Alter - the objective other in an interpersonal dyad.

Altercasting - creating and maintaining an identity for Alter in order to maintain one's own identity (Burke & Stets, 2009).

Altruism - prosocial behaviors that benefit the recipient at a cost to the donor (Decety & Svetlova, 2011). Behaviors that decrease relative fitness within groups but increase the fitness of groups (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 99).

Allostasis - the process of how the brain balances metabolic costs and benefits to ensure resources for physiological systems have enough to grow, survive and reproduce (Barrett, 2017: 3).

Alloparenting - cooperative breeding strategy where kinfolk, usually post-menopausal grandparents, aunts, sisters, share parenting responsibilities for young children to free the mother from constant care towards one child (Hrdy, 2009).

Ambivalent Emotion - a blended emotion having mixed positive and negative feeling. It can be the source of emotional dissociation.

AQAL - An term in Integral Theory for “All Quadrants, All Levels,” referring to IT’s 4 quadrant integral map representing the Internal-Psychological, External-Bio-behavioral, Internal-Cultural and External-Social, each of which contain evolutionary developmental levels. See *Integral Theory*.

Arousal - the intensity of experience.

Attachment - an innate biological system promoting proximity seeking between an infant and a specific attachment figure in order to increase the likelihood of survival to a reproductive age (Decety & Svetlova, 2011). The interactive regulation of biological synchronicity between organisms (Shore, 2000).

Attention - the brain’s ability to focus a large number of resource on a small number of signals.

Attributed Affect - core affect attributed to an object.

Attribution - the process in which people appraise behavior and events to determine cause.

Attribution Categories - *just* (deserving) and *unjust* (undeserving) attribution identities make up the structural definitions of these categories. Just structures are defined when the expectation sign is consistent with the sanctioning sign, and unjust structures are defined when the two signs are inconsistent. This distinction parallels Turner's (2002) conceptualization of justice and injustice in relations (Thamm, 1999).

Autocueing - voluntary retrieval from memory.

Autonomy - the degree to which agency is self-determined.

Awareness - the conscious focusing on an aspect of Attention, able to be grown through mindful practices.

Blended Emotion - a mixture of multiple emotions from several perspective sources. It can be either *Ambivalent* or *Univalent*.

Categorical Perception - the automatic differentiation and sorting of perceptual information into distinct categories according to a found similarity, across modalities.

Categorization - the process whereby an individual may treat non-identical objects or events as equivalent (Denton, 2005: 102).

Cognitive Dissonance - (Festinger,)(Laird, 2011).

Concept - a dynamical distributed system in the brain that represents a category in the environment or experience and that controls interactions with the category's instances (Barsalou,

2016). Different perceptual categorizations combined to construct a ‘universal’ through the abstraction of common features (Denton, 2005: 102).

Confirmation Bias -

Congruency Effects - in Affect Control Theory,

Consistency Effects - in Affect Control Theory,

Constrained Relativism - complexities at one level can be explained by physical properties bounding at a lower level (Verweij, 2007).

Control System - (Powers, 1973).

***Core Affect** - the constant stream of transient alterations in an organism’s neurophysiological state that represent its immediate relation to the flow of changing events. In a sense, a neurophysiological barometer of the individual’s relation to an environment at a given point in time, present at birth and homologous in all mammalian species (Barrett, 2006b: 30-31). Composed of two orthogonal dimensions, *Arousal* and *Valence*. Object free, although through attribution can be directed towards an object (Russell, 2003).

Culture - information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission (Boyd and Richerson, 2001).

Deduction - the process of deriving statements (called propositions) from a set of assumptions (called axioms). See *Induction*.

Deflection - in affect control theory, the amount of disagreement between an identity and a role performance. Higher deflection results in negative impression formation. Highest deflection results in negation of identity.

Degeneracy - the capacity for dissimilar neural representations to give rise to instances of the same category (e.g. anger) in different contexts (i.e. many- to-one mappings of structure to function) (Barrett, 2017: 3).

Depersonalization - the process of seeing the self in terms of the social category embodied in the prototype or standard (Burke & Stets, 2018).

Distributional Category - includes the distribution of performances and the distribution of sanctions, between Self and Other. *Equal* distribution structures are defined when the two expectation signs are consistent, and *unequal* distribution structures are defined when the signs are inconsistent (Thamm, 1999)

Divinity - one of the Big “Three” ethics, attributed as being a causal agent of suffering to acts of God/divine (Shweder *et al.*, 1997).

Dominance (in emotion) - the degree of control exerted by the stimulus.

Dorsal Vagal Complex (DVC) - the oldest emotion subsystem of the Autonomic nervous system, connecting by the dorsal (bottom) vagal nerve to the gut.

Dyad - a group of two people, the smallest possible social group, linked via a social relationship.

Dyadic Communication - face-to-face verbal communication between two people involving their mutual ideas, thought, behavior, ideals, liking, disliking, and the queries and answers concerning life and living in nature (Wikipedia).

Efferent Pathways - the descending nerves in the autonomic nervous system carrying signals from the brain to the heart and other organs.

Effortful Control - a superordinate construct that includes temperamentally based regulatory skills, such as attentional and inhibitory control and planning (Alessandri *et al.*, 2014: 3).

Egalitarianist - one of the four person types from cultural theory, characterized by low Grid (egalitarian) & high Group (communion) dimensions.

Ego - the subjective subject in a generic dyad.

Ego Depletion - the state of diminished willpower or low energy associated with having exerted self-regulation.

Ego Resiliency - how well and flexibly individuals adapt to and/or deal with stressful interactions.

Embodied Simulation - the internal modeling of the body in the world for effective metabolic regulation (Barrett, 2017). See *Allostasis*.

Emotion Management - deliberate attempts by an individual to change one or more components of their subjective experience in order to bring that feeling into line with normative requirements (Thoits, 1994:192). See *Coping*.

Emotions - from the purview of ACT, the labels that are applied to the way we feel after social interaction.

Empathetic Concern - (sympathy) an other-oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need (Decety & Svetlova, 2011).

Empathy - an affective response stemming from the understanding of another's emotional state or condition similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel in the given situation (Decety & Svetlova, 2011). The formation of an association between the Other's display and Ego's memory of the subjective experience of the corresponding emotion (Fessler, 1998).

Empathizing - the drive to recognize another person's mental states (emotions and thoughts) and

respond with the appropriate emotional response (Baron-Cohen *et al.*, 2003).

Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness - a statistical composite of the adaptation-relevant properties of the ancestral environments encountered by members of ancestral populations, weighted by their frequency and fitness-consequences. These properties are selected out of all possible environmental properties as those that actually interacted with the existing design of the organism during the period of evolution. (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990: 386-387).

EPA Dimensions - three universal dimensions of affect associated with all semantic meaning. Found in all languages studies, thus pancultural. EPA an acrobat standing for the three dimensions: Evaluation (E), Potency (P), Activation (A). See *Semantic Differential*.

Epidemiological Culture -

Epigenetics -

Evaluation - an EPA dimension of affect measuring valence, concerning goodness vs. badness. See *Semantic Differential*.

Evoked Culture - behavior evoked by the environment, not through cultural processes. See *Innate Psychology*.

Exteroception - the perception of stimuli originating outside or at a distance from the body.

Fatalist - one of the four person types from cultural theory, characterized by high Grid (hierarchy) & low Group (communion) dimensions.

Fundamental Attribution Error - a cognitive bias in which people tend to under-emphasize situational explanations for observed behavior, while over-emphasizing dispositional explanations for their own behavior. Also known as Correspondence Bias or Attribution Effect.

Heart-Brain - the intrinsic cardiac nervous system, an intricate network of complex ganglia, neurotransmitters, proteins and support cells, that enables the heart to act independently of the cranial brain to learn, remember, make decisions and even feel and sense (McCraty, 2015).

Heart Coherence - an optimal physiological state associated with increased cognitive function, self-regulatory capacity, emotional stability and resilience (McCraty, 2015).

Heart Rate Variability (HRV) - the normally occurring beat-to-beat changes of heart-rate accelerations and decelerations reflecting nonlinear interactions among a number of different physiological systems. A measure of the functional status of physiological control systems (McCraty, 2015).

Hedonic - relating to emotion, pertaining to pleasantness or unpleasantness of sensation. See *Evaluation*.

Hedonic Group - a group only occasionally led by a dominant animal, with lower rates of

aggressions and high rates of mutual grooming and hugging (Kemper & Collins, 1990). See *Status*.

Hierarchist - one of the four person types from cultural theory, characterized by high Grid (hierarchy) & high Group (communion) dimensions.

HPA Axis - the Hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis defines the neuroendocrine regulation system that controls stress reactions.

Identity - a self-categorization in terms of a social category referring to a class, group, or role as represented in the prototype or identity standard (Burke & Stets, 1998).

Ideology - the legitimacy of a social system with reference to moral standards (Fiske, 1992).

Impression Formation - the integration of separate pieces of information about a person's traits into a coherent view of that person.

Induction - the process by which general lessons are drawn from a finite set of experience or observation. See *Deduction*.

Inference - a process that, given some input information (premise), reliably yields as output further information (conclusion) that is likely to be true if the input information is, used in perception and motor control (Sperber & Mercier, 2014).

Innate - organized in advance of experience (Graham et al., 2009).

Instrumental Action - action that is directed at a problem (or opportunity) that requires a behavioral solution (Russell, 2003: 150).

Interactional Emotion Categories - Emotion categories generated by this dimension include *contributions* of Self-to-Other and *retributions* from Other-to-Self. *Effective* interaction structures are defined when the two signs are consistent, and *ineffective* interaction structures are defined when the two signs are inconsistent (Thamm, 1999).

Intersubjectivity - the subjective engagement of the self in social relation to others, ie what it feels like to be socially attuned with people around us.

Integral Theory - a philosophical theory integrating all human knowledge pursuits into a single coherent framework along two universal dimensions of Internal-External & Individual-Collective (cf Wilber, 2001).

Interoception - arising from the process of allostasis, the perception, representation and utilization of internal sensations such as pain, temperature (cool, heat, cold), pinch, pin prick, itch, sensual touch, muscle ache, burn, toothache, cardiac pain, the urge to urinate or defecate, and vasomotor flush (Barrett, 2017; Craig, 2015).

Interpersonal Orientation - the tendency to either accommodate another's wishes or to assert

one's will (Selman, 1980).

Microinteraction - dyadic social interaction between two persons, characterized by social communication via affective dimensions like gesture, posture, intonation, etc.

Mimesis - a supramodal system of motor control which can be retrieved from memory for the intentional imitation, rehearsal and modification of action that allows for the refinement of action by purposive repetition, thought to be a necessary preadaptation for human language (Donald, 1993).

Moral Standard - a norm which individuals insist they and others must pursue (Fiske, 1992).

Motive - a goal varying as a function of situation and differing consistently among individuals (Fiske, 1992).

Norm - a shared goal observed from the point of view of its functions for the collectivity (Fiske, 1992).

Pancultural - a phenomenon which appears consistently across all studied human cultures.

Perception - the discrimination of an object or event through one or more sensory modalities — separating them from the background inflow. Something is picked out (Denton, 2005: 102).

Person Perception - the process of assigning someone (or his or her behavior) to a meaningful category so that a perceiver "sees" an instance of that category and can infer something about the person's internal state or enduring disposition or both (Barrett, 2006b: 28).

Post Hoc Reasoning - after the fact reasoning positing an event following a previous event attributes the first as the cause of the second.

Power - the active ability of one social actor to compel or coerce another towards something they don't want to do, against their will (Kemper & Collins, 1990).

Process of Semiosis - the dynamic interpretive activity by which semiotic relationships emerge from other semiotic relationships and ultimately derive their grounding on the physical phenomena they thereby bring into association (Deacon, 2012: 10). A triadic relationship between a sign or representamen (a first), an object (a second) and an interpretant (a third) which can cause an endless cycle of representamen triggering an interpretant, which then becomes another representamen, leading to an endless cycle. This represents the human symbolic thought processes (Everaert-Desmedt, 2011).

Proprioception - the perception arising from the kinaesthetic sense of self-movement and body position.

Reasoning - reflective inference.

Reflection - thinking about one's own thoughts.

Resilience - the capacity to prepare for, recover from and adapt in the face of stress, adversity, trauma or challenge (McCraty, 2015).

Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) - intra-group or defensive ethnocentrism, emphasizing ethnic devotion, collective security, and cohesion (Sinn & Hayes, 2016).

Schema - a mental preconception about the habitual course of an event.

Second Order Emotions - an emotion caused by observing the emotion of another causing self-reflection.

Self Categorization - a cognitive association of the self with one social category in contrast to other categories (Burke & Stets, 1998).

Self Concept - the set of all of a person's identities (Burke & Stets, 1998).

Self Regulation - the process of altering one's responses, including thoughts, feelings, impulses, actions, and task performance.

Self Verification - the process of behaving to maintain one's situationally manifest identity close to the meanings and expectations given in the prototype or standard (Burke & Stets, 1998).

Situated Conceptualization - in embodied cognition, the process of interpretation of the concepts involved in an environmental setting, with agents, objects as well as the action they perform, sensations they feel and mentalizing they experience, all of which contribute to the construction of emotional feeling. See *Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion*.

Social Dyad - the smallest unit of microinteraction, between two individuals.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) - intergroup ethnocentrism stressing superiority, exploitation, and group-based dominance (Sinn & Hayes, 2016).

Social Engagement System (SES) - the neurophysiological system connecting the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) with the sensorimotor peripheral system involved in Social Communication, connected by the vagus nerve.

Social Structure - the pattern of repetitive microinteractions between individuals, that at the macro level, are identifiable identities and institutions.

Status - the passive ability to have others voluntarily comply to one's will, accompanied by "deference, acceptance and liking. It involves the voluntary provision of rewards, benefits, and gratifications without threat or coercion" (Kemper & Collins, 1990).

Symbolic Interactionism (SI) - the perspective that people's actions towards things are based on the meaning arising through the social interaction with others and adjusted through the process

of interpretation (Blumer, 1969).

Symbolic Reference - (Deacon, 1997).

Systematizing - the drive to analyze or construct systems, involving the use of systematic (Baron-Cohen *et al.*, 2003).

Temporal Process - a series of operations or events leading to achievement of a specific result.

Univalent Emotion - a blended emotion having either strongly positive or negative feeling.

Valence - the positive or negative quality of an emotion, a dimensional property of experience (Barrett, 2006b) and one component of Core Affect.

Value - a goal consistently and widely shared (Fiske, 1992), trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group (Schwartz, 2007).

Emotion Glossary

These emotions are taken from several different sources (Plutchik, 1980), (Lazurus, 1980), (Thamm, 1996), (Stets, 2007) and integrated w/ definitions by (Eckman, 2016),

Anger (Primary)

primary emotion category characterized by uncoupled activation of Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS) with norepinephrine (NE) signature with positive valence and high arousal.

Anger

subtle emotion composed of being denied rewards while me

Acceptance

Admiration

Aggressiveness

Alarm

Amazement

Anguish

intense agitated sadness.

Annoyance

very mild anger.

Anticipation

Anxiety

inability to cope with an anticipated or actual threat.

Argumentativeness

an inclination to prolong disagreements.

Aversion

a desire to avoid something disgusting.

Bitterness

disappointment that no one wanted to settle a problem.

Boredom

Compassion

Contempt

the last emotion to appear in child development, it is a feeling of moral superiority to the target.
Often mixed with enjoyment.

Curiosity

Cynicism

Delight

Despair

resigned anguish.

Desperation

a response to the inability to reduce danger.

Discouragement

a feeling that there is no way to cope.

Disappointment

a feeling that expectations are not being met.

Disgust (Primary)

Dislike

the mildest form of disgust.

Distraction

agitated sadness.

Distraught

very mild anger.

Dread

anticipation of severe danger.

Dominance

Ecstasy

rapturous delight. A state of very great happiness, nearly overwhelming.

Embarrassment

self-conscious distress or awkwardness. Often activated by praise from another, or by a faux pas. It has no vocal signal, but may cause a blush that is visible only in light-skinned people.

Empathy

The ability to imagine one's self in another place and understand their feelings.

Enjoyment

Positive feeling state. Ekman's term for primary high valence, low arousal state, see *Satisfaction*.

Envy

although often misused as a synonym for jealousy, envy involves resenting and wanting what another person possesses. When a person feels envy, anger, contempt or sadness may also be felt.

Excitement

energy that, unlike other enjoyable emotions, is rarely felt slightly, but ranges from mid to high in intensity. May merge with any of the emotions, generating an active form of that emotion.

Fear (Primary)

primary emotion category characterized by uncoupled withdrawal of Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS) with epinephrine (E) signature with very negative valence and high arousal.

Fiero

enjoyment felt when you have met a challenge that stretched your capabilities.

Frustration

a response to failure to overcome an obstacle despite repeated attempts.

Fury

intense anger.

Grief

anguished sadness over a loss of a loved one.

Guilt

regret about a past action, which motivates the wish to confess the wrongful action, hoping for forgiveness.

Hate

enduring anger focused on a particular person or group of persons. Over time hatred may generate the personality trait of hostility.

Helplessness

realization of the inability to prevent or cope with loss.

Hope

Hopelessness

a feeling that nothing good is to come.

Interest

Jealousy

an emotional storyline involving three people: the desired person, the person afraid of losing the commitment of the desired person, and the rival. During jealousy, anger, fear, disgust, sadness or surprise may be felt by any of the three people.

Joy

enjoyment felt when you act to relieve another person's suffering.

Loathing

intense disgust focused on a person.

Love

a strong attachment to another person, typically parent toward child and child toward parent, but also between those romantically committed. Within loving relationships, anger, fear, sadness, disgust and enjoyment can all be experienced.

Misery

anguished sadness, usually prolonged.

Morbidness

Naches

feelings of pride for the accomplishments, or sometimes just the existence, of your actual offspring or mentored offspring.

Nervousness

uncertainty as to whether there is a danger.

Optimism

Outrage

Panic

a consequence of desperation.

Pensiveness

Pessimism

Pleasure

enjoyment derived through one of the five physical senses.

Pity

sorrow and compassion caused by the suffering and misfortunes of others

Pride

a desire for others to know the pleasure you feel in the accomplishments of you or someone you either nurtured directly or identified with.

Rage

Rejoicing

a warm, uplifting feeling that people experience when they see acts of human goodness, kindness, and compassion. Also called Elevation.

Relief

when something expected to be unpleasant, especially the threat of harm, is avoided or comes to an end.

Remorse

Repugnance

repulsion to something literally or figuratively toxic.

Reproach

Resignation

acceptance that nothing can be done.

Revulsion

very intense disgust.

Sadness (Primary)

primary emotion category characterized by vagal withdrawal of the Parasympathetic Nervous System (PNS) Dorsal Vagal Complex (DVC) with negative valence and low arousal.

Satisfaction (Primary)

primary emotion category characterized by vagal activation of the Parasympathetic Nervous System (PNS) Ventral Vagal Complex (DVC) with positive valence and low arousal.

Schadenfreude

enjoyment of the misfortunes of another person, usually a rival.

Sentimentality

Serenity

Shame

an expectation that others would be disgusted if they knew what the person was thinking of or had done. It motivates a strong wish to prevent others from learning what the person has done or thought.

Sorrow

sadness over a loss.

Surprise

the briefest emotion, surprise is triggered by the sudden occurrence of an unexpected event. It is often a way station that leads, after more appraisal, to any of the other emotions.

Sympathy

The ability to feel another's feelings.

Terror

maximum fear.

Trepidation

anticipation of the possibility of danger.

Trust

Unbelief

Vengefulness

a desire for retaliation.

Vigilance

Wonder

an experience of something that is very surprising, beautiful, amazing or hard to believe.

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